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This	   thesis	   offers	   a	   critical	   feminist	   reading	   of	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan,	   from	  
invasion,	   through	   the	   practice	   of	   counterinsurgency,	   to	   the	   training	   of	   the	  
Afghan	  National	  Army	  as	   a	   central	   part	   of	  NATO’s	   exit	   strategy.	  Empirically	   it	  
focuses	   on	   the	   discourses,	   policies	   and	   practices	   of	   the	   US	   and	   Norwegian	  
militaries	   in	   Afghanistan.	   It	   draws	   on	   a	   range	   of	   material	   including	   military	  
doctrine	   and	   policy,	   parliamentary	   discussions,	   public	   policy	   documents,	  
interviews,	  political	  statements	  and	  soldiers’	  memoirs.	  	  
Deploying	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  performative	  gender	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  
embodiment,	  it	  shows	  how	  particular	  gendered	  bodies	  are	  called	  into	  being	  and	  
how	  the	  distinct	  practices	  of	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  produce	  and	  rely	  on	  a	  series	  of	  
multiple,	   fluid	   and,	   at	   times,	   contradictory	   performances	   of	   masculinity	   and	  
femininity.	   It	   demonstrates	   how	   gendered	   performances	   should	   not	   be	  
considered	  superfluous,	  but	  rather	   integral	  to	  the	  practices	  of	  war.	   It	   illustrates	  
this,	   first,	   by	   examining	   the	   production	   of	   the	   (in)	   visible	   ‘body	   in	   the	   burqa’	  
alongside	  the	   ‘protective	  masculinity’	  of	  Western	  politicians	   in	   the	   legitimation	  
of	  the	  invasion;	  second,	  through	  the	  ‘soldier-­‐scholars’,	  ‘warriors’	  and	  the	  Female	  
Engagement	  Teams	  (FETs)	  in	  practices	  of	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency,	  
examining	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   counterinsurgency	   is	   a	   gendered	   and	   embodied	  
practice;	  and	  third,	  through	  the	  remaking	  of	  the	  fledgling	  Afghan	  National	  Army	  
(ANA)	  recruits	  in	  the	  NATO	  exit	  strategy.	  	  
The	  thesis	  furthers	  feminist	  studies	  on	  gender	  and	  war	  in	  International	  Relations	  
by	   emphasising	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   gendered	   bodies	   and	   performances	   by	  
problematizing	  singular	  notions	  of	  masculinity	  and	  femininity.	  It	  contributes	  to	  
existing	   literature	   that	   reads	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   neocolonial	   and	  
biopolitical	   practice,	   enhancing	   these	   readings	   by	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	  
gendering	   of	   bodies	   and	   their	   performances,	   thereby	   expanding	   critical	  
investigations	  into	  late	  modern	  ways	  of	  war	  and	  counterinsurgency.	  	  
 4	  
Performing	  Gender	  in	  the	  ‘Theatre	  of	  War’:	  Embodying	  the	  Invasion,	  
Counterinsurgency	  and	  Exit	  Strategy	  in	  Afghanistan	   1	  
Acknowledgements	   6	  
Abbreviations,	  Acronyms	  and	  Glossary:	   8	  
	  
Chapter	  1	  -­‐	  Introduction	   11	  
1.0	  Situating	  the	  Project	  and	  the	  Empirical	  Focus	   12	  
1.1	  US	  and	  Norway	  in	  Afghanistan	   15	  
2.0	  Methodological	  and	  Epistemological	  Reflections	   22	  
2.1	  Discourse,	  Productions	  and	  Performances	   22	  
2.2	  Memoirs,	  Experience	  and	  Embodiment	   28	  
3.0	  The	  Argument	  and	  Structure	  of	  the	  Thesis	   31	  
	  
Chapter	  2	  	  -­‐	  Performing	  Gender	  in	  the	  ‘Theatre	  of	  War’	   38	  
1.0	  Sex,	  Gender,	  Bodies	  and	  Performativity	   39	  
1.1	  Intersections,	  Assemblages	  and	  Racialized	  bodies	   43	  
2.0	  Military	  Masculinities	  and	  War	  Writing	  (on)	  Bodies	   46	  
2.1	  The	  Military	  Writing	  (on)	  Bodies	   47	  
2.2	  Military	  Masculinities	  	  -­‐	  Multiplicity,	  Fluidity	  and	  Change	   51	  
2.3	  Writing	  Women’s	  Martial	  Bodies	   58	  
3.0	  Gender,	  Biopolitics	  and	  Counterinsurgency	   60	  
Conclusion	  
	   63	  
Chapter	  3	  -­‐The	  Gendered	  Invasion	  of	  Afghanistan:	  The	  (In)Visible	  ‘Body	  in	  the	  
Burqa’	  and	  Performances	  of	  ‘Protective	  Masculinity’	   65	  
1.0	  ‘A	  Fight	  for	  the	  Rights	  and	  Dignity	  of	  Women’	   67	  
1.1	  Reinventing	  President	  Bush	   68	  
1.2	  Maternalism	  and	  Imperialism	   70	  
2.0	  The	  (In)Visible	  ‘Body	  in	  the	  Burqa’	   75	  
2.1	  Unveiling	  the	  Afghan	  Woman	   75	  
2.2	  Beauty	  without	  Borders	   79	  
3.0	  Performances	  of	  Masculinities	  in	  Foreign	  Policy	   81	  
3.1	  Performing	  ‘Protective	  Masculinity’	   82	  
3.2	  Playing	  with	  ‘the	  Big	  Boys’	   87	  
Conclusion	   90	  
	  
Chapter	  4	  -­‐The	  Practice	  of	  ‘Population-­‐Centric’	  Counterinsurgency:	  Reimagining	  
the	  ‘Battlefield	  of	  War’	  and	  the	  Multiplicity	  of	  Military	  Masculinities	   92	  
1.0	  Reimagining	  and	  Governing	  the	  ‘Battlefield	  of	  War’	   94	  
1.1	  The	  Dawn	  of	  the’	  Soldier-­‐Scholars’	   99	  
1.2	  Culture	  and	  Counterinsurgency	   102	  
 5	  
2.0	  The	  Multiple	  Military	  Masculinities	  of	  Counterinsurgency	   107	  
2.1	  The	  ‘Killing	  and	  Caring’	  of	  Counterinsurgency	   111	  
2.2	  ‘War	  is	  Better	  than	  Sex’	   115	  
2.3	  Emotions,	  Sexuality	  and	  Heteronormativity	   119	  
2.4	  ‘Fobbits’,	  ‘Ducks’	  and	  ‘Turtles’	   121	  
Conclusion	   127	  
	  
Chapter	  5	  -­‐	  The	  Practice	  of	  ‘Population-­‐Centric	  Counterinsurgency’:	  Writing	  
Women’s	  Bodies	  in	  War	   130	  
1.0	  Female	  Engagement	  Teams	  (FETs)	  and	  the	  ‘Gender	  Perspective’	   133	  
2.0	  Creating	  Potential	  Allies	   140	  
2.1	  Women	  as	  Eyes	  and	  Ears	   142	  
2.2	  Armed	  Empowerment	   146	  
3.0	  A	  Woman’s	  Touch	  to	  Counterinsurgency	   149	  
3.1	  A	  Feminine	  Labour	  of	  Care	   150	  
3.2	  The	  Politics	  of	  Martial	  Femininity	   154	  
Conclusion	   158	  
	  
Chapter	  6	  -­‐	  (Re)Producing	  Martial	  Bodies	  and	  Military	  Masculinities:	  The	  
Training	  of	  the	  Afghan	  National	  Army	  (ANA)	  and	  the	  ‘Exit	  Strategy’	   161	  
1.0	  Enabling	  the	  ‘Exit	  Strategy’	  and	  Handing	  over	  Security	   163	  
2.0	  Moulding	  the	  Afghan	  Soldier	  Body	   166	  
2.1	  ‘Strong	  fighters	  don’t	  always	  make	  good	  soldiers’	  	   168	  
2.2	  Holding	  Hands	  and	  Watching	  Porn	   171	  
2.3	  To	  help	  them	  become	  better	  Afghans	   177	  
3.0	  Producing	  the	  Oriental	  Other	  in	  ‘the	  Land	  that	  Time	  Forgot’	   180	  
3.1	  The	  Politics	  of	  Cultural	  Incompatibility	   186	  
Conclusion	   189	  
	  
Chapter	  7	  -­‐	  Conclusions	   192	  
1.0	  Writing	  Martial	  Bodies	  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan	   195	  
2.0	  Counterinsurgency	  as	  ‘Killing	  and	  Caring’	   199	  
3.0	  Towards	  a	  Feminist	  Reading	  of	  Late	  Modern	  Warfare	   206	  
	  







I	   enjoy	   reading	   acknowledgements.	   They	   remind	   me	   that	   academic	   work	   is	  
always	   a	   collective	   process	   that	   draws	   on	   a	   number	   of	   people’s	   kindness,	  
generosity,	  knowledge,	  engagement,	  criticism	  and	  support.	  No	   less	  so	  with	  this	  
work,	  and	  I	  am	  glad	  to	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  thank	  those	  whose	  company	  and	  
time	   has	   engaged	   and	   sustained	  me	   through	   the	   ups	   and	   downs	   of	   the	   thesis	  
writing	  process.	  	  
First	   and	   foremost,	   a	   huge	   amount	   of	   gratitude	   is	   owed	   to	   my	   wonderfully	  
generous	   and	   intellectually	   stimulating	   supervisors	   Louiza	  Odysseos	   and	  Anna	  
Stavrianakis.	   Your	   gracious	   combination	   of	   pushing	   me	   in	   new	   and	   exciting	  
directions,	   giving	   me	   a	   break	   when	   I	   needed	   it,	   calming	   me	   down	   and	  
challenging	  me	  with	   new	   ideas	   and	   perspectives	   has	   truly	   driven	   this	   research	  
forward.	   I	   could	  not	  have	  completed	   this	  process	  without	  you	  and	   I	   thank	  you	  
both	  so	  very	  much!	  	  	  
I	   am	   also	   grateful	   to	   the	   wider	   academic	   community	   at	   Sussex	   and	  my	  many	  
friends	  and	  colleagues	  there.	  Thanks	  to	  Beate	  Jahn,	  Sam	  Knafo,	  Lara	  Montesinos	  
Coleman,	  Kamran	  Matin,	  and	  Paul	  Kirby	  for	  academic	  advice	  and	  support.	  Also	  
thanks	  to	  Claire	  Duncanson	  and	  Cynthia	  Weber	  for	  agreeing	  to	  examine	  me	  and	  
for	  providing	  me	  with	  great	  advice	  on	  the	  road	  ahead.	  	  
Thanks	  also	  to	  Lisa	  Smirl,	  who	  was	  always	  supportive	  of	  this	  work.	  You	  lit	  up	  the	  
Sussex	  IR	  corridor	  for	  too	  short	  a	  time.	  
Thanks	   to	   all	   round	   good	   people	   –	   Ana,	   Andrei,	   Can,	   Clemens,	   Ishan,	   Katie,	  
Richard,	  Steffan,	  Tom,	  and	  Yuliya	  for	  discussions,	  laughs,	  drinks	  and	  good	  times.	  
Thanks	   to	  my	  office	   crew	  –	  Neil,	  Darius,	   Tom	  and	   Sam	  –	   you’ve	   sustained	  me	  
with	  ample	  supplies	  of	  tea,	  penguins	  and	  jokes	  of	  questionable	  standard.	  Thanks	  
to	  Lauren	   for	   letting	  me	  pick	  your	  brain	  and	  discussing	  my	  thoughts	  with	  you.	  
Thanks	  to	  Rehab	  for	  being	  there	  from	  the	  start	  and	  for	  your	  loving	  and	  generous	  
spirit.	   A	   massive	   thanks	   also	   to	   my	   proofreading	   and	   copyediting	   crew	   for	  
meticulous	  comments	  and	  suggestions.	  To	  my	  darling	  friends	  Maia	  and	  Cherine	  
(aka	  the	  DLF)	  –	  thanks	  for	  all	  your	  love,	  comfort	  and	  interesting	  conversation.	  In	  
the	  end,	  I	  did	  regulate!	  	  	  
I	   am	   also	   grateful	   to	   dear	   friends	   back	   home,	   Ane,	   Anne	   Kari,	   Anne	   Karin,	  
Behnaz,	   Caroline,	   Christiane,	   Hildegunn	   and	   Sunniva	   for	   love	   and	   support.	  
Thanks	   to	   Helene	   and	   Erlend	   for	   dinners,	   advice,	   kindness	   and	   road	   trips.	  
Thanks	  to	  Emma,	  Jonathan,	  Stine,	  Silas,	  Ulrik,	   Jacob	  Emil	  and	  Jacob	  for	  games,	  
laughter	  and	  play.	  My	  siblings,	  Ane,	  Lars	   Jacob	  and	  Jenny,	  and	  to	  my	  extended	  
family,	  in	  particular	  Sigrid	  and	  Peter	  Emil	  –	  I	  am	  so	  grateful	  to	  you	  for	  hosting,	  
visiting	  and	  being	  a	   joyful	   refuge	   from	  work.	  To	  my	   loving	  parents	  Reidun	  and	  
 7	  
Odd,	   I	   am	   eternally	   thankful.	   You	  have	   sustained	  me	  with	   generosity,	   prayers,	  
love	  and	  solace	  –	  I	  thank	  you	  from	  the	  bottom	  of	  my	  heart.	  	  
Last,	  but	  hardly	   least,	   to	  my	  dearest	  Ole	   Johannes.	  You	  have	  been	  my	  constant	  
source	  of	   intellectual	  and	  emotional	  support,	  always	  allowing	  me	  to	  discuss	  my	  
thoughts	  and	  never	  faltering	  in	  your	  efforts	  to	  cheer	  me	  up	  when	  I	  was	  down.	  I	  
am	  grateful	  for	  your	  compassion,	  endurance	  and	  patience	  in	  these	  last	  weeks	  and	  
I	  can	  only	  hope	  to	  repay	  your	  kindness	  when	  your	  turn	  comes	  around.	  	  
There	   are	   many	   more	   that	   should	   have	   been	   thanked,	   not	   least	   the	   many	  
inspiring	   feminists	   I	   have	   met	   at	   conferences,	   in	   particular	   the	   ISA	   Annual	  
Conference	   in	   San	  Diego	   in	   2012.	   You	   are	   too	  numerous	   to	   be	  mentioned,	   but	  
know	  that	  these	  ‘random	  meets’	  have	  been	  very	  meaningful.	  	  
This	   thesis	   is	  dedicated	   to	  my	  dearest	  grandmother	   Jenny	  Laastad,	  who	  since	   I	  
started	   this	  PhD	  has	   asked	  me	  when	   I	  will	   become	  a	  professor.	  Thank	   you	   for	  
















Abbreviations,	  Acronyms	  and	  Glossary:	  	  
ABP	  –	  Afghan	  Border	  Police	  
ANA	  –	  Afghan	  National	  Army	  
ANA	  3-­‐24	  –	  Afghan	  National	  Army	  Counterinsurgency	  Field	  Manual	  
ANP	  –	  Afghan	  National	  Police	  
ANSF	  –	  Afghan	  National	  Security	  Forces	  
AR	  670-­‐1	  –	  US	  Army	  Regulation	  Wear	  and	  Appearance	  of	  Army	  Uniforms	  and	  
Insignia	  	  
Arbakee	  –	  Local,	  neighbourhood,	  community	  police	  force	  in	  Afghanistan	  
CALL	  –	  Centre	  Army	  Lessons	  Learned	  
CIMIC	  –	  Civil-­‐Military	  Cooperation	  
COIN	  –	  Counterinsurgency	  
COMISAF	  –	  Commander	  International	  Security	  Assistance	  Force	  	  
CWINF	  –	  Committee	  on	  Women	  in	  NATO	  Forces	  
EMSI	  -­‐	  Equipes	  Medico-­‐Sociales	  Itinérantes	  
ETT	  –	  Embedded	  Training	  Team	  
FET	  –	  Female	  Engagement	  Team	  
FM	  3-­‐24	  –	  US	  Army	  and	  Marine	  Corps	  Counterinsurgency	  Field	  Manual	  	  
FMF	  –	  Feminist	  Majority	  Foundation	  
FOB	  –	  Forward	  Operating	  Base	  
Forsvaret	  –	  Norwegian	  Armed	  Forces	  
GIRoA	  –	  Government	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Afghanistan	  
HTS	  –	  Human	  Terrain	  System	  
HTT	  –	  Human	  Terrain	  Teams	  
IO	  –	  Information	  Operations	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ISAF	  –	  International	  Security	  Assistance	  Force	  
Kandak	  –	  Pashto	  word	  for	  battalion	  	  
KMTC	  –	  Kabul	  Military	  Training	  Centre	  
Loya	  Jirga	  –	  Pashto	  word	  meaning	  ‘grand	  assembly’.	  	  
NAP	  –	  National	  Action	  Plan	  
NATO	  –	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organisation	  
NCO	  –	  Non-­‐Commissioned	  Officer	  
NCGP	  –	  National	  Committee	  on	  Gender	  Perspectives	  (NATO)	  
NMAA	  –	  National	  Military	  Academy	  of	  Afghanistan	  
NRC	  –	  Norwegian	  Refugee	  Council	  
NTM-­‐A	  –	  NATO	  Training	  Mission	  Afghanistan	  
RAWA	  –	  Revolutionary	  Association	  Women	  of	  Afghanistan	  
OEF	  –	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  	  
OMLT	  –	  Operational	  Mentoring	  and	  Liaison	  Team	  	  
PRT	  –	  Provincial	  Reconstruction	  Team	  
Shura	  –	  Arabic	  word	  for	  ‘consultation’,	  commonly	  used	  for	  local	  negotiations	  in	  
	   Afghanistan	  
Stortinget	  –	  Norwegian	  Parliament	  	  
T3R	  –	  Tooth	  to	  Tail	  Ratio	  
UN	  –	  United	  Nations	  
UNAMA	  –	  United	  Nations	  Assistance	  Mission	  Afghanistan	  
UNIFIL	  –	  United	  Nations	  Interim	  Force	  Lebanon	  
UNSC	  –	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  
UNSCR	  1325	  –	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1325	  on	  Women,	  Peace	  
and	  Security	  (2000)	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UNSCR	  1386	  –	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1386	  on	  the	  Situation	  
in	  Afghanistan	  (2001)	  
US	  –	  United	  States	  of	  America	  
WPS	  –	  Women,	  Peace	  and	  Security	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  ‘The	  Grammar	  of	  Orientalization	  or	  Reverse	  Mirror-­‐Imaging’.	  Page	  236.	  
From:	  Baumann,	  G.	  2004.	  'Grammars	  of	  Identity/Alterity.	  A	  Structural	  
Approach',	  in	  Baumann,	  G.,	  Gingrich,	  A.	  (ed.)	  Grammars	  of	  













-­‐	  Chapter	  1	  -­‐	  
Introduction	  
On	   October	   7th	   2001,	   the	   United	   States	   (US)	   together	   with	   a	   ‘coalition	   of	   the	  
willing’,	  and	  backed	  by	  what	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  called	  ‘the	  collective	  will	  
of	  the	  world’	  launched	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  (OEF)	  on	  Afghanistan	  (CNN	  
2001).	  Less	   than	  a	  month	  earlier,	  on	  September	   11th,	   the	   iconic	   images	  of	  planes	  
hitting	  the	  twin	  towers	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  Centre	  were	  carved	  into	  the	  memory	  
of	  people	  across	  the	  globe.	  Almost	  immediately,	  rallying	  cries	  for	  war	  began,	  and	  
Afghanistan,	  a	  country	  many	  in	  the	  West	  had	  barely	  heard	  about,	  let	  alone	  could	  
place	   on	   a	  map,	   became	   the	   centre	   of	   these	   attacks	   as	   part	   of	   a	  wider	   ‘war	   on	  
terror’.	  While	  the	  US	  and	  Great	  Britain	  were	  the	  greatest	  contributors	  to	  OEF,	  the	  
‘coalition	  of	  the	  willing’	  was	  formed	  of	  members	  in	  NATO	  and	  beyond,	  including	  
Norway.	  	  
The	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  coincided	  with	  international	  media	  outlets	  filling	  up	  
with	  images	  and	  stories	  of	  Afghan	  women’s	  suffering	  under	  the	  misogyny	  of	  the	  
Taliban	  regime	  and	  a	  proliferation	  of	   ‘Blue	  Burqa	  Books’	   (Kolhatkar	  and	   Ingalls	  
2006:	  180).	  This	  sudden	  concern	  for	  the	  lives	  of	  Afghan	  women	  served	  to	  justify	  
the	  invasion,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  saving	  women’s	  lives	  and	  securing	  their	  
rights.	  Western	  politicians,	  performing	  a	  version	  of	  ‘protective	  masculinity’	  were	  
thereby	  able	  to	  cast	  themselves	  as	  saviours	  and	  liberators	  of	  the	  Afghan	  people,	  
and	  Afghan	  women	  in	  particular.	  	  
Since	  the	  invasion,	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  has	  become	  the	  longest	  war	  fought	  by	  
the	   US	   and	   the	   biggest	   NATO	   operation	   since	   its	   inception.	   It	   eventually	  
developed	   into	   a	   fully-­‐fledged	   counterinsurgency	   campaign,	   paired	   with	  
numerous	   efforts	   towards	   democratisation,	   reconstruction,	   and	   a	   form	   of	  
‘statebuilding	   craze’	   (Azarbaijani-­‐Moghaddam	   2007).	   Around	   2000	   Americans	  
and	  10	  Norwegians	  have	  been	  killed,	  along	  with	  at	  least	  20,000	  civilians,	  though	  
these	   latter	   figures	   might	   well	   be	   higher	   (BBC	   2012).	   European	   and	   American	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support	   for	   the	  war	   has	   since	  waned,	   and	  most	   international	   troops	   are	   set	   to	  
withdraw	  in	  2014	  (CNN	  2011,	  Tisdall	  2012).	  	  
Feminists	  have	  for	  decades	  shown	  how	  gender	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  what	  enables	  
war	  and	  how	  it	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  its	  practice.	  Working	  in	  the	  tradition	  
of	  feminists	  who	  seek	  to	  study	  war	  and	  gender	  as	  concepts	  with	  a	  history	  of	  co-­‐
constitution,	   this	   thesis	   aims	   at	   tracing	   the	  production	  of	   gendered	  bodies	   and	  
the	   multiplicity	   of	   gendered	   performances	   in	   the	   invasion,	   the	   practice	   of	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	  and	   the	  NATO	   ‘Exit	  Strategy’	  of	   training	  
Afghan	   National	   Security	   Forces	   (ANSF).	   It	   shows	   how	   in	   all	   three	   instances,	  
gendered	  productions,	  performances	  and	  bodies	  are	  central.	  	  
While	  much	  has	  been	  written	  on	  the	  gendered	  discourse	  of	  the	  	   ‘war	  on	  terror’,	  
which	  enabled	  Afghan	  women	  to	  become	  a	  pretext	  for	  the	  invasion,	  less	  attention	  
has	   been	   placed	   on	   the	   role	   that	   gendered	   bodies	   and	   gendered	   performances	  
have	   played	   in	   counterinsurgency	   and	   in	   the	   training	   of	   Afghan	   troops.	   This	  
thesis	   seeks	   to	   rectify	   this	   by	   showing	   how	   counterinsurgency	   calls	   into	   being	  
particular	  gendered	  bodies	  and	  relies	  on	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  gendered	  performances	  
for	   its	   practice,	   including	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’,	   ‘warriors’	   and	   Female	   Engagement	  
Teams	   (FETs).	   This	   multiplicity	   is	   argued	   to	   be	   crucial	   for	   understanding	   the	  
practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   which	   is	   conceptualised	   as	  
being	   situated	  within	   a	   gendered	  dynamic	  of	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’.	   This	   dynamic	  
manifests	  itself	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  war	  in	  different	  ways;	  as	  a	  tension,	  contradiction,	  
balancing	  act	  and	  at	   times,	  with	   the	  one	  enabling	  or	   restricting	   the	  other.	  As	  a	  
whole,	   this	   thesis	   aims	   at	   showing	   the	   complexity,	   multiplicity	   and	   fluidity	   of	  
gendered	  performances	  in	  the	  ‘theatre	  of	  war’.	  	  
	  
1.0	  Situating	  the	  Project	  and	  the	  Empirical	  Focus	  
As	  most	  academic	  projects,	  this	  thesis	  has	  gone	  through	  several	  iterations	  before	  
reaching	   its	   current	   state.	   In	   the	   beginning,	   my	   focus	   was	   squarely	   on	   the	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discourse	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  its	  policy	  implications	  for	  women	  in	  the	  
different	   modes	   of	   the	   war.	   However,	   halfway	   through	   the	   project	   it	   became	  
more	   and	  more	   apparent	   to	  me	   that	   this	   only	   got	   at	   half	   the	   story.	  What	  was	  
missed	   was	   how	   masculinities	   and	   femininities	   become	   integral	   to	   enabling	  
practices	  of	  war	  and	  how	  fluid	  and	  multiple	  gendered	  bodies	  are	  called	  into	  being	  
at	  various	   times	  during	   the	  course	  of	   the	  war.	  My	  original	   research	  plan	  would	  
not	   have	   got	   at	   the	   ‘hard	   gendered	   work’	   that	   is	   involved	   in	   ‘doing’	   invasion,	  
counterinsurgency	   and	   the	   training	   of	   another	   nation’s	   troops.	   It	   would	   have	  
missed	  how	  particular	  performances	  of	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  are	  crucial	  to	  
the	   justification	   and	  practice	  of	  war	   in	   its	   various	   stages	   and	  how	   these	   ‘travel’	  
between	   foreign	  policy	  discourse,	  military	  doctrine	   and	   the	   gendered	  bodies	   of	  
soldiers	  and	  civilians.	  	  
Through	  the	  course	  of	  writing	  the	  thesis,	  bodies	  kept	  popping	  up.	  The	  bodies	  of	  
burqa	  clad	  Afghan	  women	  on	  the	  front	  of	  newspapers,	  the	  bodies	  of	  male	  soldiers	  
posing	   on	   the	   top	   of	   tanks,	   the	   bodies	   of	   female	   counterinsurgents	   holding	  
Afghan	   babies	   and	   the	   bodies	   of	   Afghan	   soldiers	   learning	   how	   to	   march	   and	  
stand	   in	   a	   straight	   line.	   Increasingly	   it	   seemed	   that	   these	   bodies	   were	   worth	  
taking	   notice	   of	   and	   studying	   as	   bodies.	   More	   accurately,	   to	   study	   how	   these	  
bodies	  perform	  gender	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  both	  produced	  by	  and	  productive	  of	  war.	  	  
The	  thesis	  provides	  a	  feminist	  reading	  of	  this	  war	  and	  wishes	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  
growing	  field	  of	  critical	  feminist	  scholarship	  on	  war	  and	  security.	  While	  feminist	  
approaches	   to	   International	   Relations	   (IR)	   remain	   at	   the	  margins	   and	   are	   very	  
much	  an	  ‘unfinished	  journey’	  (Sylvester	  2002),	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  feminists	  in	  IR	  
have	  made	   inroads	   in	   the	   last	   three	  decades,	   along	  with	  other	   approaches	   that	  
seek	  to	  shift	  the	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  basis	  of	  mainstream	  IR	  theory.	  
Millennium’s	   seminal	   conference	   ‘Women	   and	   IR’	   in	   1988	   is	   often	   hailed	   as	   an	  
important	  turning	  point,	  and	  despite	  great	  variations	  within	  the	  field,	  the	  starting	  
point	   for	  many	   feminists	  at	   this	   time	  was	  asking	  the	  question	  of	   ‘where	  are	   the	  
women	   in	   international	   relations?’	   (see	   for	   instance	   Elshtain	   1987,	   Enloe	   1990,	  
Tickner	  1992,	  Enloe	  1993).	  Feminists	  have	  since	  broadened	  this	  scope	  to	  include	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questions	   about	   how	   IR	   and	   politics	   produce	   certain	   gendered	   subjects,	  
particularly	  through	  dominant	  narratives	  of	  security	  and	  war	  (see	  among	  others	  
Hooper	  2001,	  Odysseos	  and	  Seckinelgin	  2002,	  Hunt	  and	  Rygiel	  2006,	  Parpart	  and	  
Zalewski	   2008,	   Sjoberg	   and	  Gentry	   2008,	  Riley	   et	   al.	   2008,	  Bhattacharyya	   2008,	  
Shepherd	  2008,	  Sjoberg	  et	  al.	  2010,	  Wibben	  2011).	  	  
Feminism	  is	  understood	  here	  to	  be	  a	  social	  and	  political	  movement,	  a	  practice,	  a	  
theoretical	  and	  analytical	  framework	  and	  a	  societal	  critique.	  Its	  theories	  resist	  the	  
inconsistent	  division	  between	  ‘theory’	  and	  ‘practice’	  (Mohanty	  1988,	  hooks	  2000,	  
Wibben	  2011)	   or,	  what	   is	   at	   times	   called,	   ‘theory’	   and	   the	   ‘real	  world	  out	   there’	  
(Zalewski	   1996).	  As	   such,	   it	   opens	  up	  new	  avenues	   for	   research	   that	   previously	  
have	   not	   been	   seen	   to	   have	   anything	   to	   do	   with	   gender.	   That	   said,	   as	   will	   be	  
discussed	   in	   chapter	   two,	   feminists	   have	   for	   decades	   disputed	   what	   gender	  
actually	  constitutes,	  what	  shapes	  it,	  how	  it	  is	  visible	  and	  how	  to	  best	  study	  it	  1.	  
In	  addition	  to	  feminist	  theory,	  this	  thesis	  benefits	  from	  and	  contributes	  to	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  critical	  readings	  of	  war	  and	  security.	  Counterinsurgency	   is	   increasingly	  
being	   interrogated	   from	   critical	   security	   studies’	   and	   critical	   war	   studies’	  
perspectives.	   Scholars	   have	   studied	   its	   relationship	   to	   culture	   and	   colonialism	  
(Gregory	  2004,	  Gonzalez	  2007,	  Gregory	  2008b,	  Porter	  2009);	  as	  a	  biopolitical	  and	  
embodied	  practice	  (Reid	  2006,	  Bell	  2011,	  McSorley	  2013b);	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  
liberal	  war	  and	  humanitarian	  intervention	  (Slim	  2004,	  Bell	  2011,	  Feichtinger	  et	  al.	  
2012).	   However,	   counterinsurgency	   studied	   as	   a	   gendered	   practice	   or	   from	   a	  
                                                
1	  There	   are	  many	  ways	   in	  which	   divisions	  within	   feminist	   theory	   and	   gendered	   analysis	   can	   be	  
drawn	  up.	  Christine	  Sylvester	  argues	  for	  a	  threefold	  division	  of	  feminist	  epistemologies	  consisting	  
of	   ‘empiricist’,	   ‘standpoint’	   and	   ‘postmodern’	   (1994:	   9-­‐14);	   Charlotte	   Hooper	   divides	   feminist	  
theory	  around	  ‘three	  dimensions	  of	  analysis’,	  namely	  ‘physical	  embodiment’,	  ‘institutions	  and	  the	  
gendered	   social	   processes	   they	   encompass’	   and	   the	   ‘discursive	   dimension’	   (2001:	   20-­‐34).	   Lene	  
Hansen	   prefers	   a	   division	   between	   ‘rationalist’,	   ‘standpoint’	   and	   ‘poststructuralist’	   feminist	  
perspectives	  in	  IR	  (2010:	  17-­‐28).	  While	  ‘rationalist’	  approaches	  are	  mainly	  state	  centric	  and	  can	  be	  
based	  in	  biological	  gender,	  the	  main	  difference	  between	  ‘standpoint’	  and	  ‘poststructuralist’	  lies	  in	  
who	   the	   referent	  object	   is,	  where	   the	   former	   sees	   ‘women’	   as	   the	  main	   referent	  object	  within	  a	  
‘real-­‐world	   existence	   based	   on	   biological	   gender’	   and	   the	   latter	   instead	   sees	   gender	   as	   mainly	  
performative’	   (Hansen	   2010:	   24).	   Annick	   T.H.	   Wibben,	   rather	   than	   dividing	   different	   feminist	  
perspectives,	   argue	   that	   most	   of	   them	   stem	   from	   wanting	   to	   raise	   questions	   about	   what	   is	  
considered	   ‘normal’	   (2011:	   12).	   She	   argues	   that	  many	   important	   and	   challenging	   questions	   have	  
been	   raised	   by	   women	   within	   the	   movement,	   particularly	   though	   Black,	   Chicana,	   lesbian	   and	  
postcolonial	   feminism	   which	   raises	   questions	   about	   the	   validity	   of	   and	   limitations	   of	   liberal	  
feminism	  (Wibben	  2011:	  13-­‐16).	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feminist	   perspective	   has,	   with	   a	   few	   notable	   exceptions	   (Khalili	   2010a,	   Christie	  
2012,	   McBride	   and	   Wibben	   2012,	   Duncanson	   and	   Cornish	   2012),	   received	  
relatively	   little	   attention.	   This	   thesis	   draws	   on	   these	   works	   and	   wishes	   to	  
contribute	  to	  further	  feminist	  interventions	  into	  counterinsurgency	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
gendered	  late	  modern	  warfare.	  	  
While	  the	  general	  development	  in	  Western	  militaries	  in	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  has	  
been	   geared	   towards	   technological	   advancements,	   cyber	   warfare	   and	   drones	  
(McSorley	   2013a:	   4-­‐5	   see	   also	   ,	  Der	  Derian	   2001),	   counterinsurgency	   is	   in	  many	  
ways	   a	   war	   of	   neo-­‐traditionalists.	   Steeped	   in	   colonial	   nostalgia,	  
counterinsurgency	  warfare	  emphasises	  the	  personal	  qualities	  of	  soldiers,	  intimate	  
relations	  with	   civilians,	   knowledge,	   understanding	   and	   above	   all,	   embodiment.	  
Far	  removed	  from	  drones	  and	  over	  zealous	  technologically	  savvy	  engineers,	  this	  
type	  of	  warfare	  situates	  the	  population	  as	  a	  malleable	  mass	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  won	  
over	   and,	   ultimately,	   transformed.	   As	   the	   thesis	   shows,	   this	   calls	   into	   being	  
distinct	   gendered	   bodies	   and	   relies	   on	   a	   range	   of	   gendered	   performances.	   It	  
shows	   these	   to	   be	   crucial	   to	   understanding	   not	   only	   the	   development	   of	  
counterinsurgency	  as	  a	  doctrine,	  but	  also	  its	  practice	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  
	  
1.1	  US	  and	  Norway	  in	  Afghanistan	  
The	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  two	  countries’	  policies	  and	  practices	  in	  Afghanistan.	  While	  
the	   US	   is	   in	  many	   ways	   an	   obvious	   choice	   of	   focus	   when	   studying	   the	   war	   in	  
Afghanistan,	   there	   are	   good	   reasons	   for	   integrating	  Norwegian	   operations	   into	  
the	   analysis	   as	  well.	   I	  will	   here	   account	   for	   this	   choice	   and	   show	  what	   is	   to	  be	  
gained	  from	  this	  dual	  focus.	  
Firstly,	   the	   choice	   of	   cases	   is	   a	   particularly	   gendered	   one	   and	   the	   dynamic	  
between	   the	   two	   can	   be	   conceptualised	   as	   one	   of	   ‘big	   boys’	   and	   ‘small	   boys’.	  
Norway	   has	   long	   had	   a	   reputation	   for	   being	   a	   country	   associated	   with	  
humanitarian	  aid	  and	  peace,	  and	  this	  has	  been	  nurtured	  and	  actively	  sought	  by	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various	  Norwegian	  governments	  (Leira	  et	  al.	  2007,	  Tvedt	  2009).	  However,	  when	  
the	  (rushed)	  decision	  to	  join	  the	  US	  led	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  was	  taken	  in	  2001,	  
the	  need	  to	  reinforce	  its	  masculine	  and	  ‘hard’	  credentials	  was,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  more	  
detail	   in	   chapter	   three,	   decisive.	   Secondly,	   studying	   two	   countries	   such	   as	  
Norway	  and	  the	  US	  alongside	  each	  other	  troubles	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘the	  West’	  acting	  
in	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  coherent	  and	  unitary	  entity.	  These	  are	  two	  Western	  powers,	  
both	   founding	   and	   active	   members	   of	   NATO,	   with	   similar,	   albeit	   different,	  
approaches	   and	   concerns	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   conducting	  warfare	   in	  Afghanistan.	  
The	   dual	   emphasis	   points	   to	   how	   military	   cultures,	   histories	   and	   multiple	  
military	   masculinities	   shape	   the	   policies	   pursued	   and	   influence	   outcomes.	  
Furthermore,	  it	  enables	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  what	  kinds	  of	  concerns	  
are	  balanced	  in	  performances	  of	  foreign	  policy	  in	  this	  type	  of	  warfare.	  Thirdly,	  the	  
choice	  is	  a	  personal	  one.	  Having	  lived	  for	  some	  time	  in	  the	  US	  and	  having	  grown	  
up	  in	  Norway,	  the	  choice	  is	  driven	  by	  an	  urge	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  politics	  of	  
a	  country	  I	  feel	  close	  to	  and	  the	  place	  I	  call	  home	  and	  their	  role	  in	  a	  war	  that	  has	  
defined	  much	  of	   these	   countries	   foreign	  and	  domestic	  policies	   for	  more	   than	  a	  
decade.	  	  
The	   US	   and	   Norway	   share	   a	   long	   and	   strong	   alliance.	   Norway	   has	   always	  
nurtured	   strong	   security	   ties	   to	   the	  US	   and	  was	   a	   founding	  member	  of	  NATO.	  
Gro	  Harlem	  Bruntland	  famously	  said	  that	  ‘Norway	  is	  a	  country	  with	  her	  back	  to	  
Europe	   and	   facing	   the	   Atlantic’,	   a	   phrase	   that	   captures	   both	   a	   geographical	  
description	  and	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  (Græger	  and	  Leira	  2005:	  47).	  NATO	  membership	  
has	  had	  a	  defining	  role	   for	   the	  development	  of	  Norwegian	  security	  and	  defence	  
policy.	   As	   Nina	   Græger	   argues,	   ‘during	   the	   Cold	  War,	   the	   US	   always	   enjoyed	  
primacy	  and	  it	  still	  does’	  (2005a:	  97).	  	  
Even	  though	  its	  armed	  forces	  have	  historically	  been	  organised	  around	  ‘territorial	  
defence’,	   since	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Second	  World	  War,	  Norway	  has	   supplied	   troops,	  
material	   and	   funding	   for	   several	  peacekeeping	   forces	  under	   the	   auspices	  of	   the	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UN2.	   However,	   following	   the	   changes	   in	   NATO	   and	   the	   alliance	   taking	   on	   an	  
increased	   international	   role	   (Ringsmose	   and	   Rynning	   2009),	   particularly	   since	  
the	   war	   in	   Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	   in	   1995,	   political	   authorities	   argued	   that	  
Norwegian	  contributions	  had	  to	  become	  ‘tougher’,	  and	  that	  the	  ‘image	  of	  a	  small	  
nation	  playing	  a	  support	  role	   in	  military	  matters	  had	  to	  be	  replaced	   in	  order	  to	  
maintain	  influence	  and	  prestige	  within	  the	  alliance’	  (Haaland	  2010:	  545	  see	  also,	  
Edstrøm	   et	   al.	   2009).	   This	   assumed	   need	   for	   Norwegian	   forces	   to	   become	  
‘tougher’,	  more	   ‘international’	  and	  more	   ‘deployable’	  guides	  much	  of	  Norwegian	  
security	   and	   defence	   policy	   and	   is	   visible	   in	   several	   key	   strategy	   documents	  
produced	   by	   successive	   governments	  3.	   They	   all	   indicate	   a	   shift	   in	   priorities,	  
structures,	  funding	  and	  organisation	  from	  a	  ‘territorial	  defence’,	  to	  a	  military	  with	  
a	  greater	  capacity	  to	  take	  on	  international	  operations,	  led	  increasingly	  by	  NATO.	  
It	   is	   believed	   that	   the	   changes	   put	   in	   place	   have	   ‘granted	   Norway	   a	   great	  
reputation	   and	   strengthened	   our	   trustworthiness	   as	   a	   serious	   contributor	   and	  
alliance	   partner’	   (Forsvarsdepartementet/MoD	   2003-­‐2004:	   9),	   along	   with	   a	  
capacity	   to	   meet	   ‘new	   threats’	   through	   creating	   a	   force	   with	   ‘swift	   reaction	  
capacity,	   availability,	   flexibility	   and	   deployability’	   (Forsvarsdepartementet/MoD	  
2003-­‐2004:	  14	  see	  also,	  Vigeland	  Rottem	  2007).	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  the	  common	  sense	  
in	   the	   Norwegian	   military	   and	   political	   elite	   is	   that	   because	   of	   Norway’s	  
dependence	   on	   allied	   support,	   ‘Norway	   could	   best	   ensure	   its	   own	   security	   by	  
supporting	   the	  common	  NATO	  structure	  and	  new	  NATO	  tasks’	   (Græger	  2005a:	  
89-­‐90).	  	  
While	   these	   two	   countries	   share	   a	   strong	   alliance,	   particularly	   through	  NATO,	  
there	  are	  some	  obvious	  differences	  between	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  sheer	  size,	  role	  on	  
the	  international	  stage	  and	  influence.	  There	  are	  also	  some	  important	  differences	  
in	  their	  Armed	  Forces.	  Norway	  still	  maintains	  conscription	  for	  all	  fit	  men	  over	  the	  
age	  of	   18.	  Since	  2009,	  all	   female	  citizens	  are	  obligated	   to	  meet	   the	  conscription	  
board,	  but	  national	  service	  is	  ultimately	  voluntary	  (Forsvaret	  2012a).	  This	  policy	  is	  
                                                
2	  The	  longest	  deployment	  of	  Norwegian	  troops	  abroad	  was	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Interim	  Force	  in	  
Lebanon	  (UNIFIL),	  which	  lasted	  from	  1978	  to	  1998	  (for	  more	  examples	  see	  Haaland	  2010).	  	  
3	  There	  are	  multiple	  government	  documents	  that	  guide	  and	  highlight	  the	  necessity	  for	  change	  in	  
defence	   spending	   and	   priorities	   (see	   for	   instance	   Forsvarsdepartementet/MoD	   2000,	  
Forsvarsdepartementet/MoD	  2003-­‐2004,	  Forsvarsdepartementet/MoD	  2009a)	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currently	  under	  review	  with	  politicians	  discussing	  if	  women	  should	  be	  drafted	  on	  
the	  same	  grounds	  as	  males.	  Since	  1984	  women	  have	  had	  the	  same	  rights	  to	  work	  
in	  all	  sectors	  of	  the	  military,	  including	  combat,	  but	  despite	  efforts	  to	  increase	  the	  
number	   of	   women	   in	   the	  Norwegian	   Armed	   Services,	   the	   numbers	   have	   stood	  
still	  at	  around	  8%	  for	  the	   last	   ten	  years.	  This	   is	   lower	  than	  several	  other	  NATO	  
countries	  like	  France	  (14%),	  Canada	  (17,3%),	  and	  Lithuania	  (12%)	  (Skjelsbæk	  and	  
Tryggestad	  2011:	  59-­‐60).	  	  
Conversely,	   the	   US	   armed	   forces	   are	   based	   on	   voluntary	   service.	   Out	   of	   the	  
almost	   1,5	   million	   strong	   force	   (USDoD	   2011)	   around	   68,000	   are	   serving	   in	  
Afghanistan	  (NBCNEWS	  2012),	  though	  numbers	  are	  currently	  decreasing	  in	  line	  
with	  plans	  for	  withdrawal	  in	  2014	  .	  Around	  15%	  of	  its	  forces	  are	  women	  and	  the	  
US	   has	   long	   had	   a	   combat	   ban	   in	   place	   for	   women.	   However,	   following	   the	  
combat	   intensive	  operations	   in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  where	  many	  women	  have	  
actually	  been	  in	  combat,	  and	  the	  case	  of	  four	  servicewomen	  having	  recently	  filed	  
a	   law	   suit	   against	   the	   US	  military	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   the	   exclusion	   policy	   is	  
unconstitutional	   (Guardian	   2012b),	   this	  policy	  was	   changed	   in	   January	   2013.	  US	  
Secretary	   of	   Defence	   Leon	   Panetta	   announced	   that	   there	   would	   be	   increased	  
openings	  for	  women	  in	  combat	  duty,	  though	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  take	  some	  time	  and	  
not	   involve	   all	   sectors	   of	   the	  military	   (Barnes	   2013).	   The	   experiences	   from	   Iraq	  
and	   Afghanistan,	   and	   the	   roles	   that	   female	   soldiers	   have	   played	   here	   are	  
frequently	  cited	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  change.	  That	  said,	   the	  various	  services	  have	  
until	  May	  2013	  to	  submit	  plans	  for	  carrying	  out	  the	  policy,	  and	  have	  until	  January	  
2016	  to	  determine	  whether	  their	  service	  should	  be	  exempt	  (Bumiller	  and	  Shanker	  
2013).	  	  
Bearing	  in	  mind	  these	  differences	  is	  important	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  analysis	  and	  it	  
is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  the	  US	  and	  Norwegian	  armed	  forces	  operations	  in	  
Afghanistan	  are	  quite	  different.	  One	  element	  here	  is	  the	  sheer	  size	  of	  the	  forces	  
deployed	   to	   Afghanistan,	   another	   being	   location.	   Whereas	   US	   troops	   are	  
stationed	   across	   the	   country,	   and	   also	   in	   the	   volatile	   Southern	   and	   Eastern	  
Regions,	  Norwegian	  forces	  have	  been	  confined	  mainly	  to	  the	  north,	  in	  Meymaneh	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and	  Ghowrmach	  in	  Faryab,	  Mazar	  e	  Sharif	  in	  Balkh	  and	  a	  few	  stationed	  in	  Kabul.	  
Norway	  significantly	  cut	  down	  on	  its	  military	  presence	  in	  Faryab	  in	  October	  2012	  
(Gahr	   Støre	   2012)	   and	   the	   contingent	   that	   recently	   returned	   from	   Faryab,	  
Provincial	  Reconstruction	  Team	   (PRT)	   18	   (denoting	   the	  number	   of	   contingents	  
that	  have	  served	  in	  the	  PRT)	  was	  the	  last	  one	  of	  its	  kind	  (Forsvaret	  2012b).	  While	  
most	   of	   its	   combat	   intensive	   forces	   have	   withdrawn,	   Norway	   still	   maintains	  
forces	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  training	  and	  mentoring	  capacity.	  	  
Norwegian	  military	   presence	   in	   Afghanistan	   has	   gone	   through	   several	   changes	  
and	   it	   is	   estimated	   that	   roughly	   8000	   Norwegian	   personnel	   have	   served	   in	  
Afghanistan	   (Stensønes	   2012:	   8).	   While	   OEF	   may	   have	   been	   mainly	   a	   UK/US	  
endeavour	   in	   Afghanistan,	   Norway	   was	   quick	   to	   offer	   assistance	   and	   became	  
formally	  involved	  as	  early	  as	  14th	  December	  2001	  (Lurås	  2009).	  However,	  its	  main	  
mission	  has	  been	  through	  the	  International	  Security	  Assistance	  Force	  (ISAF).	  	  
Contrary	   to	  US	   politicians,	   Norwegian	   politicians	   have	   never	   called	   the	  war	   in	  
Afghanistan	   a	   war.	   Terms	   such	   as	   ‘warlike	   actions’	   or	   ‘military	   operations’	   are	  
preferred,	   referencing	   legal	   requirements	   for	   what	   constitutes	   a	   war	   (Faremo	  
2012).	  While	  the	  choice	  of	  wording	  is	  justified	  with	  reference	  to	  technicalities	  and	  
the	   law	   (which	   may	   or	   may	   not	   be	   correct),	   it	   has	   political	   consequences.	  
Importantly,	   it	   creates	   a	   distance	   between	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘Norway’	   and	   ‘war’,	  
reinforcing	   a	   self-­‐image	   of	   Norway	   as	   a	   ‘peace	   nation’.	   While	   politicians	   may	  
avoid	  using	  the	  term,	  as	  shown	  throughout	  the	  thesis,	  Norwegian	  soldiers	  have	  a	  
different	   embodied	   sense	   of	   Norway’s	   presence	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   have	   no	  
qualms	  about	  calling	  it	  a	  war	  (Stensønes	  2012:	  8).	  Overall,	  while	  the	  justifications	  
for	  Norwegian	  presence	  in	  Afghanistan	  have	  been	  flexible	  and	  varied	  in	  emphasis	  
since	  2001,	  the	  government	  has	  maintained	  that	  Norway	  is	   ‘doing	  good’	  and	  has	  
mainly	  humanitarian	  aims	  (Leira	  et	  al.	  2007,	  Haaland	  Matlary	  2009,	  Dommersnes	  
2011).	  	  
While	   Norway	   has	   contributed	   significant	   funds	   in	   aid	   and	   development	   to	  
Afghanistan,	   the	   US	   has	   been	   the	   main	   provider	   of	   funding,	   troops	   and	  
equipment	   in	  Afghanistan.	  While	   the	  US	  originally	  advocated	  a	   ‘light	   footprint’	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approach	  to	  Afghanistan	  (Suhrke	  2011),	  the	  situation	  quickly	  escalated	  along	  with	  
ambitions	  and	  aims	  on	  behalf	  of	  Afghanistan.	  The	  ISAF	  was	  set	  up	  in	  December	  
of	  2001	  along	  with	  the	  UN	  Special	  Political	  Mission	  for	  Afghanistan	  (Masadykov	  
et	   al.	   2010)4	  under	   the	   United	   Nations	   Security	   council	   resolution	   1386	   (UNSC	  
2001),	  and	   it	   is	  under	   the	  NATO	  command	  that	  most	  US	  and	  Norwegian	   forces	  
have	  been	  deployed.	  In	  the	  first	   instance	  ISAF	  was	  deployed	  for	  only	  6	  months,	  
and	  its	  deployment	  was	  limited	  to	  Kabul	  where	  it	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  security	  for	  the	  
interim	  government	  and	  government	  officials	  (Giustozzi	  2007b).	  ISAF	  command	  
originally	   rotated	   between	   governments,	   but	   NATO	   eventually	   took	   over	   the	  
command	   in	   August	   2003	   (ISAF	   2011b).	  While	  OEF	   and	   ISAF	   are	   two	   separate	  
missions,	   since	   2006	   though,	   the	   ‘distinctions	   between	   these	   two	   military	  
missions	  have	  blurred’	  (Olson	  2006:	  4)5.	  	  
The	  US	  was	  strongly	  in	  support	  of	  NATO	  taking	  on	  a	  greater	  leadership	  role,	  and	  
ISAF	   eventually	   expanded	   its	   forces	   outside	   of	   Kabul6.	   The	   expansion	   of	   ISAF	  
happened	   in	   four	   different	   stages	   in	   the	   period	   between	   2003-­‐2006	   and	   was	  
coordinated	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  much-­‐criticized	  (Stapleton	  2007,	  Perito	  2005,	  
Dommersnes	  2011)	  establishment	  of	  PRTs	  (ISAF	  2011b)7.	  The	  Bonn	  Conference	  of	  
December	  2001	  had	  the	  aim	  of	  setting	  up	  an	  interim	  government	  and	  uniting	  the	  
country,	  which	  had	  not	  had	  a	  nationally	  recognized	  government	  since	  1978.	  The	  
agreement	   stated	   that	   a	  Loya	   Jirga8	  should	  be	   set	   up	  by	   2002	   to	  decide	   on	   the	  
future	   of	   the	   country,	   headed	   by	   Hamid	   Karzai.	   Elections	   were	   scheduled	   for	  
2004,	  and	  have	  been	  held	  in	  2005,	  2009	  and	  2010.	  Karzai	  is	  still	  the	  President	  of	  
                                                
4	  The	  latter	  was	  later	  renamed	  as	  UN	  Assistance	  Mission	  Afghanistan	  (UNAMA)	  
5	  The	   two	   structures	   have	   operated	   under	   the	   same	   command,	   but	   formally	   maintain	   their	  
separate	  structure.	  Norway	  pulled	  out	  its	   forces	  from	  OEF	  in	  2006,	  following	  the	  change	  from	  a	  
Conservative/Centre	  coalition	  to	  the	  ‘Red/Green’	  coalition	  (Lurås	  2009).	  	  
6	  Thomas	   Barfield	   argues	   that	   by	   the	   time	   the	   US	   eventually	   supported	   the	   ISAF	   expansion,	  
support	   for	  this	   in	  NATO	  countries	  had	  partially	  waned.	  This	  he	  explains	  by	  the	  split	  of	  among	  
NATO	   countries	   over	   the	   next	   target	   in	   the	   ‘war	   on	   terror’,	   namely	   Iraq.	   Barfield	   argues	   that	  
‘Afghanistan	  got	  the	  worst	  of	  both	  worlds:	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain	  argued	  that	  they	  could	  
not	   send	   any	  more	   troops	   because	   of	   their	   commitments	   in	   Iraq,	   while	   France,	   Germany	   and	  
Turkey	   expressed	   their	   displeasure	   with	   the	   United	   States’	   Iraq	   policy	   by	   being	   less	   helpful	   in	  
Afghanistan’	  (Barfield	  2010:	  314).	  	  
7	  The	  first	  PRT	  was	  established	  in	  November	  2002.	  	  
8	  Loya	   Jirga	   is	   a	  Pashto	  word	  meaning	   ’grand	  assembly’	   or	   ’grand	   council’.	   It	  was	   considered	   as	  
customarily	  prior	   to	  major	  decisions	  and	   involves	   representatives	   from	  throughout	   the	  country,	  
though	  this	  is	  disputed	  by	  some	  (Barfield	  2010).	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Afghanistan,	   though	   has	   stated	   that	   he	   is	   stepping	   down	   in	   the	   next	   round	   of	  
elections,	  scheduled	  for	  2014.	  	  
There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   the	   US	   and	   Norway	   play	   different	   roles	   on	   the	  
international	  stage	  and	  in	  Afghanistan.	  Likewise,	  their	  military	  forces	  have	  served	  
quite	   different	   purposes	   in	   shaping	   their	   history	   and	   the	   histories	   of	   others.	  
However,	   analysing	   the	   policies	   and	   practices	   of	   the	  US	   and	  Norway	   alongside	  
each	   other	   is	   a	   fruitful	   way	   of	   not	   only	   showing	   similarity	   and	   differences	  
between	   them,	   which	   in	   turn	   shows	   the	   importance	   of	   military	   culture	   and	  
domestic	  politics	  on	  practices	  of	  war,	  but	  it	  also	  reveals	  interesting	  things	  about	  
how	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   is	   fought	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   what	  
gendered	  performances	  it	  produces.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   is	   conceptualised	   as	   encompassing	   a	  
gendered	   dynamic	   of	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’	   in	   its	   combination	   of	   kinetic	   (killing)	  
and	  non-­‐kinetic	   (caring)	   activities.	  While	   it	  might	   be	   expected	   that	  Norwegian	  
soldiers,	  with	  their	  history	  of	  peacekeeping	  forces	  and	  emphasis	  on	  humanitarian	  
aid	   would	   emphasize	   this	   element	   of	   counterinsurgency	   the	   most,	   this	   thesis	  
shows	   that	  Norway's	  historic	  and	  politically	   important	  emphasis	  on	  caring	   is	   in	  
part	   resisted	   by	   the	   soldiers	   themselves	   who	   feel	   that	   there	   is	   a	   discrepancy	  
between	  what	  they	  see	  themselves	  doing	  (killing)	  and	  how	  they	  are	  represented	  
(carers).	   Conversely,	   most	   of	   the	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   that	   advocate	   a	   less	   ‘kinetic	  
style’	  counterinsurgency	  are	  US	  trained	  and	  working	  within	  the	  US	  military,	  and	  
it	   is	  the	  US	  who	  have	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  developing	  concept	  of	  FETs,	  who	  
remain	  firmly	  within	  the	  ‘caring’	  of	  counterinsurgency.	  In	  other	  words,	  analyzing	  
two	   such	   different	   forces	   with	   divergent	   histories,	   compositions	   and	   cultures,	  
which	  are	  nevertheless	  strong	  allies,	  shows	  the	  complexity	  and	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  
gendered	  performances	  in	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan.	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2.0	  Methodological	  and	  Epistemological	  Reflections	  	  
This	  research	  draws	  on	  a	  range	  of	  materials,	  most	  of	  which	  are	  publicly	  available	  
documents,	  in	  both	  Norwegian	  and	  English9.	  The	  sources	  consist	  of	  press	  releases,	  
speeches,	   parliamentary	   procedures,	   military	   doctrines	   and	   training	   manuals,	  
along	  with	   blogs,	   interviews,	   and	   soldier	  memoirs.	  Using	   such	   a	  wide	   range	   of	  
sources	   as	   ‘data’	   emphasises	   that	   the	   specific	   texts	   are	   ‘not	   entities	   standing	  
separately	   from	  wider	   societal	  discourses	  but	   as	   entities	   located	  within	  a	   larger	  
textual	  web’	  (Hansen	  2006:	  55).	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  aforementioned,	  a	  number	  of	  
interviews	   in	   both	   Norway	   and	   the	   US	   were	   conducted	   in	   preparation	   for	   the	  
research	  and	  as	  a	  means	  to	  gain	  information.	  While	  some	  of	  them	  are	  cited,	  they	  
mainly	  form	  a	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  preparation	  for	  the	  study.	  This	  chapter	  will	  now	  
outline	  some	  elements	  related	  to	  the	  methodological	  and	  conceptual	  framework	  
of	   this	   thesis,	   however	   most	   of	   this	   will	   be	   expanded	   on	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	  
Particular	   attention	   will	   be	   given	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   discourse	   and	   the	   use	   of	  
memoirs	  as	  a	  source.	  	  
	  
2.1	  Discourse,	  Productions	  and	  Performances	  
Since	  the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War,	  questions	  of	   identity	  and	   ‘identity	  politics’	  have	  
become	  increasingly	   important	   in	  a	  range	  of	  academic	  fields	  such	  as	   linguistics,	  
sociology,	  cultural	  studies	  and	  eventually	  also	  in	  IR.	  Several	  scholars	  (see	  among	  
others	  Doty	  1996,	  Campbell	  1998),	  began	  analysing	  the	  state	  and	  its	  foreign	  policy	  
as	  produced	  by	  and	  productive	  of	  particular	   identities.	  These	  authors	  sought	   to	  
challenge	   the	  ways	   theories	   of	   IR	   for	   a	   long	   time	   assumed	   stable	   categories	   of	  
actors	  and	  policies,	  which	  themselves	  were	  largely	  seen	  as	  having	  no	  identity	  (or	  
of	  little	  meaning).	  This	  left	  the	  discipline	  poorly	  fit	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  complexities	  
of	   identities,	  how	   these	   shape	   foreign	  policy	  and	  how	  we	  understand	   the	   state.	  
Many	   worked	   from	   a	   poststructuralist	   framework,	   though	   not	   necessarily	   a	  
                                                
9	  The	  author	  has	  personally	  translated	  all	  instances	  of	  Norwegian	  into	  English.	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feminist	   perspective	  10.	   Regardless,	   their	   work	   has	   been	   hugely	   influential	   in	  
terms	   of	   bringing	   identity	   explicitly	   into	   consideration	   and	   by	   expanding	   the	  
possibilities	   of	   poststructuralist	   approaches	   in	   IR.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   they	   share	   a	  
common	  aim	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  why	  question	  to	  the	  how	  question	  and	  build	  
an	  analysis	  that	  ‘examines	  not	  only	  how	  social	  identities	  get	  constructed,	  but	  also	  
what	  practices	   and	  policies	   are	   thereby	  made	  possible’	   (Doty	   1996:	   4).	   In	  other	  
words,	  following	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  direction	  in	  studying	  ‘power’:	  	  
‘If,	   for	   the	   time	   being,	   I	   grant	   a	   certain	   privileged	   position	   to	   the	   question	   of	   “how”,	   it	   is	   not	  
because	  I	  would	  wish	  to	  eliminate	  the	  questions	  of	  “what”	  and	  “why”.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  
present	   these	  questions	   in	  a	  different	  way	  –	  better	   still,	   to	  know	   if	   it	   is	   legitimate	   to	   imagine	  a	  
power	  that	  unites	  in	  itself	  a	  what,	  a	  why	  and	  a	  how’	  (Foucault	  1994:	  336)	  
David	  Campbell	  uses	  Judith	  Butler’s	  theory	  of	  gender	  as	  performative	  in	  order	  to	  
show	  how	  national	   identities	   are	  produced	  and	  performed	   (Campbell	   1998:	   10).	  
However,	   this	   does	   not	   necessarily	   imply	   that	   identity	   ‘works’	   through	   a	  
conscious	  or	  deliberative	  process.	  This	  would	  logically	  suggest	  that	  foreign	  policy	  
agents	  and	  policy	  makers	  are	  outside	  the	  ‘domain	  of	  constitution’	  (Bialasiewicz	  et	  
al.	  2007).	  Rather,	  such	  a	  theory	  suggests	  that	  given	  subjects	  within	  foreign	  policy,	  
or	  any	  policy	  for	  that	  matter,	  are	   ‘performers’	  of	  any	  given	  identity.	  In	  addition,	  
the	   ‘continuities	   between	   groups	   of	   security	   officials	   and	   the	   arguments	   they	  
propagate	   demonstrate	   the	   importance	   of	   performativity	   (especially	   recitation	  
and	  reiteration	  as	  constraints	  on	  those	  performances)	  in	  the	  production	  of	  policy’	  
(Bialasiewicz	   et	   al.	   2007:	   408).	   In	   this	   sense	   ‘it	   is	   only	   through	   the	   discursive	  
enactment	   of	   foreign	   policy,	   or	   in	   Butler’s	   terms	   “performances”,	   that	   identity	  
comes	   into	   being,	   but	   this	   identity	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	   constructed	   as	   the	  
legitimization	   for	   the	   foreign	   policy	   proposed’	   (Hansen	   2006:	   21).	   Therefore,	  
performativity	  is	  not	  a	  ‘singular	  or	  deliberative	  “act”,	  but	  rather,	  as	  the	  reiterative	  
and	   citational	   practice	   by	   which	   discourse	   produces	   the	   effects	   that	   it	   names’	  
                                                
10	  The	   authors	   selected	   here	   are	   by	   no	  means	   alone	   in	   being	   central	   to	   rethinking	   identities	   in	  
relation	   to	   foreign	  policy	   and	   the	   state.	  Others	   include	  R.B.J.	  Walker	   (1990),	   James	  Der	  Derian	  
(1990),	  Cynthia	  Weber	  (1995),	  Iver	  B.	  Neumann	  (1996)	  and	  William	  E.	  Connolly	  (2002).	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(Butler	   1993:	  xii	  emphasis	  added).11	  This	  point	   is	  particularly	   relevant	   in	  chapter	  
three	  where	  it	   is	  argued	  that	  the	  legitimation	  for	  the	  invasion	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  
2001	   was	   partially	   enabled	   by	   the	   claim	   of	   the	  West	   coming	   to	   the	   rescue	   of	  
Afghan	   women	   from	   the	   oppressive	   Taliban	   regime.	   Here,	   the	   identity	   is	   not	  
‘invasion’	  but	  it	  is	  enabled	  by	  a	  foreign	  policy	  identity	  that	  is	   ‘pro-­‐women’,	   ‘just’	  
and	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  save	  (Young	  2003b	  see	  also,	  Shepherd	  2006).	  
Discourse	  means	  different	  things	  to	  different	  scholars,	  but	  common	  to	  them	  all	  is	  
recognition	  that	  language	  and	  terminology	  matters	  for	  the	  production	  of	  objects	  
and	  subjects.	  The	  analysis	  of	  discourse	  therefore	  works	  from	  the	  ‘assumption	  that	  
all	  objects	   and	  actions	  are	  meaningful’	   (Howarth	  2000:	  8).	  This	   thesis	  does	  not	  
offer	  a	   strict	   textual	  approach	   to	  discourse	  analysis	   (see	   for	   instance	  Fairclough	  
1992),	   but	   rather	   understands	   discourse	   as	   that	   which	   ‘delineates	   the	   terms	   of	  
intelligibility	  whereby	  a	  particular	  “reality”	  can	  be	  known	  and	  acted	  upon’	  (Doty	  
1996:	   6).	   In	   this	   sense,	   it	   employs	   the	   language	   of	   discourse	   theorists,	   but	   not	  
necessarily	  all	  of	  its	  methods.	  	  
Roxanne	  Lynn	  Doty	  (1996:	  10-­‐11)	  argues	  that	  discourses	  include	  certain	  strategies	  
that	   seek	   to	   ‘naturalize’,	   ‘classify’,	   ‘survey’,	   ‘negate’,	   and	   ‘position’	   subjects.	  
Naturalization	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  set	  of	  ‘facts’	  become	  the	  context	  from	  which	  
subjects	  are	  theorized	  and	  understood	  –	  ‘facts’	  enables	  us	  to	  say	  it	  just	  ‘is’;	  this	  in	  
turn	   enables	   a	   hierarchical	   classification	   of	   where	   people	   ‘naturally’	   belong;	  
Surveillance	   is	   that	   which	   ‘renders	   subjects	   knowable,	   visible	   objects	   of	  
disciplinary	   power’;	   alongside	   this	   is	   a	   process	   of	   ‘denial	   of	   effective	   agency’	  
where	  particular	  subjectivities	  are	  negated	  prior	  to	  an	  imagined	  ‘coming	  of	  being’	  
by	  us	  in	  the	  West;	  finally,	  recognizing	  that	  subjects	  and	  objects	  acquire	  meaning	  
when	  they	  are	  seen	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  are	  therefore	  positioned	  vis-­‐à-­‐
vis	   one	   another	   (see	   also	   Laclau	   and	  Mouffe	   2001,	   Shepherd	   2008).	   The	   latter	  
strategy	  allows	  us	  to	  critically	  reflect	  not	  only	  on	  how	  ‘we’	  represent	  the	  Other,	  
                                                
11	  Again,	  to	  say	  that	  gender,	  or	  indeed	  foreign	  policy	  is	  performative	  is	  not	  analogous	  to	  an	  actor	  
choosing	   to	   perform	   a	   given	   script	   thereby	   being	   separate	   from	   the	   act	   itself.	   Butler	   has	  
emphasized	  this	  throughout	  her	  work.	  It	   is	  therefore	  not	  a	   ‘theatrical’	  notion	  of	  gender	  that	  she	  
argues	  for,	  but	  rather	  one	  based	  on	  a	   ‘poststructuralist	  understanding	  of	  subjectivity’	  (Gill	  2008:	  
21).	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but	   also	   implicitly,	   how	   ‘we’	   represent	  ourselves.	  Through	   these	   strategies	   it	   is	  
possible	   to	   identify	   the	   way	   in	   which	   particular	   representations	   become	  
hegemonic,	  if	  they	  succeed.	  12	  	  
Taking	  discourses	  seriously	  requires	  acknowledgement	  of	  their	  relation	  to	  power.	  
Foucault	   famously	   argued	   that	   ‘power	   is	   everywhere;	   not	   because	   it	   embraces	  
everything,	  but	  because	  it	  comes	  from	  everywhere’	  (1998:	  93).	  As	  alluded	  to	  above,	  
Foucault	   is	   less	  concerned	  with	   locating	  where	  power	  can	  be	   found	  rather	  with	  
how	   it	   functions.	   He	   argues	   that	   ‘what	   is	   questioned	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	  
knowledge	  circulates	  and	  functions,	  its	  relations	  to	  power.	  In	  short,	  the	  regime	  of	  
power’	   (Foucault	   1994:	   331).	   In	   this	   it	   is	   closely	   connected	   to	   the	  production	  of	  
knowledge,	   though	   power	   and	   knowledge	   are	   not	   the	   same.	   Laura	   Jenkins	  
explains	  that	  
‘the	  power	  to	  incite,	  to	  inspire,	  to	  govern,	  to	  make	  easier	  or	  more	  difficult,	  to	  control,	  to	  produce:	  
all	   these	   relations	   of	   force	   also	   imply	   a	   power	   relation.	   In	   contrast,	   knowledge	   is	   a	   relation	  
between	   forms:	   a	   way	   of	   ordering	   social	   reality	   in	   order	   to	   define,	   to	   judge	   or	   to	   understand’	  
(2005:	  4).	  
However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  Foucault’s	  conception	  of	  discourse	  is	  
not	   consistent	   throughout	  his	  work	   and	   is	   therefore	  not	  necessarily	   a	   coherent	  
‘theory’	  as	  such.	  Oftentimes,	  a	  shift	  in	  Foucault’s	  approach	  is	  identified	  consisting	  
of	   a	   development	   from	   an	   earlier	   ‘archaeological’	   to	   a	   later	   ‘genealogical’	  
approach	  (Fairclough	  1992:	  49,	  Howarth	  2000:	  49).	  Broadly	  one	  can	  say	  that	  the	  
archaeological	   approach	   is	   in	   search	   of	   rules	   and	   systems	  while	   a	   genealogical	  
approach	   is	   more	   concerned	   with	   the	   historical	   emergence	   of	   discursive	  
formations.	   A	   central	   element	   in	   both	   however,	   is	   Foucault’s	   conception	   that	  
‘objects	   of	   knowledge’	   are	   constituted	   through	   discourse	   and	   that	   these	  
‘contribute	   to	   the	   production,	   transformation,	   and	   reproduction	   of	   objects	   of	  
social	   life’	   (Fairclough	   1992:	  41).	   In	   this	   sense	  any	  object	   is	  constructed	   through	  
                                                
12	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  no	  representation	  or	  discourse	  is	  ever	  completely	  
fixed.	  As	  Doty	  says,	  ‘[A]ny	  fixing	  of	  a	  discourse	  and	  the	  identities	  that	  are	  constructed	  by	  it…can	  
only	  ever	  be	  of	  a	  partial	  nature.	  It	  is	  the	  overflowing	  and	  incomplete	  nature	  of	  the	  discourses	  that	  
opens	  up	  spaces	  for	  change,	  discontinuity,	  and	  variation’	  (Doty	  1996:	  6).	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discourse	   and	   only	   enters	   into	   the	   domain	   of	   human	   comprehension	   through	  
discourse.	  Ernesto	  Laclau	  and	  Chantal	  Mouffe	  argue	  similarly	  that	  	  
‘the	  fact	  that	  every	  object	  is	  constituted	  as	  an	  object	  of	  discourse	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  
there	   is	   a	  world	   external	   to	   thought…what	   is	  denied	   is	  not	   that	   such	  objects	   exist	   externally	  of	  
thought,	   but	   the	   rather	   different	   assertion	   that	   they	   could	   constitute	   themselves	   as	   objects	  
outside	  any	  discursive	  condition	  of	  emergence’	  (2001:	  108).	  	  
Another	   central	   Foucauldian	   concern	   is	   outlined	   in	  Discipline	   and	   Punish.	  This	  
work	   details	   how	   discourse	   manifests	   itself	   on,	   and	   is	   productive	   of	   bodies	  
through	   a	   range	   of	   disciplinary	   techniques.	   This	   element	   is	   central	   to	   the	  
understanding	  of	  discourse	  that	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  since	  it	  wants	  to	  highlight	  
the	   intimate	   relation	   between	   discourse,	   performance	   and	   bodies.	   A	   central	  
technique	  of	  power	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  ‘discipline’,	  and	  its	  manifestation	  on	  bodies	  is	  
particularly	   visible	   in	   the	  military.	  Disciplinary	   power	   is	   the	   ‘exercise	   of	   power	  
over	  and	  through	  the	  individual,	  the	  body	  and	  its	  forces	  and	  capacities,	  and	  the	  
composition	   of	   aggregates	   of	   human	   individuals’	   (Dean	   2009:	   29).	   Through	  
repetitive	   drills	   and	   rigorous	   training	   regimes,	   discipline	   works	   to	   normalize	  
forms	   of	   control	   over	   bodily	   dispositions,	   habits,	   movements,	   and	   desires	  
(Fairclough	   1992:	   52,	   see	   also	   Myrttinen	   2008).	   Foucault	   notes	   how	   soldiers	  
bodies	  are	  ‘made;	  out	  of	  a	  formless	  clay’	  (1991:	  135	  see	  also,	  Woodward	  2000)	  and	  
a	  primary	  symbol	  of	  the	  modern	  age’s	  ‘docile	  bodies’.	  A	  more	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  discourse,	  bodies	  and	  performativity	  follows	  in	  the	  next	  
chapter.	  	  
Whether	   in	   the	   case	   of	   foreign	   policy	   or	   the	  military,	   all	   discourses	   aim	   to	   ‘fix	  
meaning’	   which	   construct	   the	   ‘Other’,	   and	   simultaneously	   construct	   the	   ‘Self’.	  
The	   construction	   occurs	   through	   a	   process	   of	   linking	   and	   differentiation.	   For	  
example,	  ‘woman’	  may	  be	  linked	  to	  motherly,	  reliant,	  simple	  and	  emotional,	  and	  
differentiated	   from	   the	   ‘male’,	   which	   is	   linked	   to	   intellectual,	   independent,	  
complex	   and	   rational	   (Hansen	   2006:	   19-­‐20).	   These	   linkages	   are	   discussed	   at	  
length	  in	  chapter	  three	  where	  it	   is	  argued	  that	   ‘Afghan	  women’	  were	  by	  George	  
W.	   Bush	   linked	   to	   being	   ‘oppressed’,	   ‘illiterate’	   and	   ‘victims’	   (Bush	   2001i).	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Likewise,	   the	  US	  was	   in	   the	  narrative	  a	   ‘great	  country’	  of	   ‘patient	   justice’	   (Bush	  
2001a),	  and	  its	  military	  the	  restorer	  of	  rights	  and	  bringers	  of	  light	  (Powell	  2001).	  
However,	  these	  ‘fixings’	  will	  always	  be	  open-­‐ended,	  incomplete	  (Doty	  1996:	  10-­‐12,	  
Shepherd	  2008:	  20-­‐22),	  and	  there	  is	  therefore	  scope	  for	  them	  to	  be	  contradicted.	  	  
A	  national	  identity,	  such	  as	  ‘American’	  or	  ‘Norwegian’	  is	  therefore	  not	  something	  
that	   states	   have	   independently	   of	   discursive	   practices	   and	   performances,	   and	  
poststructuralist	  approaches	  to	  understanding	  foreign	  policy	  enable	  us	  to	  see	  the	  
use	   of	   language	   and	   rhetoric	   as	   ‘relationally	   structured	   and	   ontologically	  
productive’	   (Hansen	   2006:	   17).	   The	   relationality,	   or	   dependency,	   is	   crucial,	  
because	   it	   highlights	   how	  meaning	   is	   constructed	   through	   a	   series	   of	   binaries,	  
with	  a	  privileged	  sign	  on	  the	  one	  side	  and	  the	  devalued	  one	  on	  the	  other	  (Hansen	  
2006:	   19),	   for	   example	  male/female,	   masculine/feminine,	   soldier/insurgent	   and	  
modern/traditional.	  It	  is	  this	  dependency	  that	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  forth	  
that	  which	  is	  defined	  (Reeser	  2010:	  37).	  This	  relationality	  is	  shaped	  by	  a	  series	  of	  
identifications	  of	  the	  Other	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  Self,	  and	  crucial	  to	  this	  relationship	  
is	  that	  none	  can	  come	  forth	  without	  the	  other.	  	  
Lene	  Hansen’s	  book	  Security	  as	  Practice	  argues	  that	  the	  Self/Other	  binary	  is	  often	  
viewed	  in	  too	  absolute	  terms.	  She	  opens	  up	  the	  binary	  to	  allow	  for	  ‘gradients’	  of	  
Otherness	   from	   ‘radical’	   to	   ‘less	   than	   radical’.	   She	   argues	   that	   ‘even	   if	  
constructions	  of	  radical	  Otherness	  constitute	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  foreign	  and	  
security	   policy,	   it	   is	   only	   parts	   of	   foreign	   policy	   that	   appropriate	   such	   radical	  
measures,	  and	  even	  the	  radical	  Other	  is	  often	  situated	  within	  a	  more	  complicated	  
set	  of	  identities’	  (Hansen	  2006:	  37).	  This	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  Other	  enables	  one	  to	  
identify	   degrees	   of	   Othering,	   avoiding	   generalisations	   and	   perhaps	   even	  
recognizing	  moments	  of	  bridging	  and	  understanding	  between	  different	  subjects.	  
This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  soldier	  memoirs	  discussed	  mainly	  
in	   chapters	   four	  and	   six.	  The	  NATO	  strategy	  of	   training	   the	  ANSF	   to	   take	  over	  
control	  of	  security	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  2014,	  relies	  on	  them	  being	  seen	  as	  ‘less	  than	  
radical	   others’,	   more	   accurately	   as	   temporal	   Others.	   The	   notion	   of	   temporal	  
others	   is	   influenced	   by	   Doty’s	   work	   on	   North-­‐South	   relations	   in	   Imperial	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Encounters	   (1996).	   This	   shows	   that	   the	   Self-­‐Other	   relationality/dependency	   is	  
often	   temporally	   disjointed	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   difference	   between	   the	  North	  
and	   the	   South	   can	   be	   bridged	   if	   the	   latter	   develops	   under	   the	   tutelage	   of	   the	  
North.	   This	   is	   an	   identity	   that	   is	   temporally	   in	   flux,	   and	   can	   be	   altered	   and	  
perfected	  under	  the	  right	  conditions.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  Other	  is	  
redeemable.	   	  This	  means	  that	  while	  the	  Other	  may	  have	  started	  off	  as	  a	   ‘radical	  
Other’,	   she/he	   does	   not	   necessarily	   remain	   there	   indefinitely,	   given	   the	   right	  
conditions.	   This	   ‘temporality’	   of	   the	   ‘radical	   Other’	   is	   clearly	   present	   in	   many	  
colonial	   discourses,	   and	   indeed	   in	   both	   US	   and	   Norwegian	   discourses	   about	  
Afghanistan,	  and	  particularly	  visible	  in	  the	  building	  up	  of	  the	  ANSF.	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  temporality	  therefore	  requires	  a	  splitting	  of	  the	  Other.	  An	  example	  
here	   is	   the	  role	  that	  Hamid	  Karzai	  gained	  through	  the	  Bonn	  process	   in	  2001,	  as	  
opposed	   to	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   Taliban	   who	   were	   not	   included	   at	   the	  
negotiating	  table.	  Both	  were	  Others,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  ‘radical	  Others’.	  Likewise,	  
the	   ‘radical	  Other’	   remains	   the	  Taliban,	  whereas	   the	  population	  of	  Afghanistan	  
(Afghan	   women	   and	   members	   of	   the	   Afghan	   National	   Army	   for	   instance),	  
function	   as	   ‘less	   than	   radical	   Others’.	   The	   notion	   of	   splitting	   and	   temporality	  
allows	   the	  Other	   to	   become	   redeemable,	   through	   particular	   actions	   and	   under	  
Western	  guidance	  (e.g.	  training	  of	  Afghan	  security	  forces).	  The	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  
Other	  in	  this	  way	  helps	  us	  grasp	  the	  flexibility	  and	  dynamism	  of	  discourses.	  	  	  
	  
2.2	  Memoirs,	  Experience	  and	  Embodiment	  
A	  central	   source	  of	  data	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	  memoirs	  written	  by	   soldiers	  who	  have	  
served	   in	  Afghanistan.	  The	  autobiographies	  and	  memoirs	  selected	  require	  some	  
mention,	   and	   the	   usage	   of	   such	   material	   is	   neither	   straightforward,	   nor	   is	   it	  
unproblematic.	  While	  memoirs,	  journals	  and	  autobiographies	  are	  central	  sources	  
of	  data	  for	  historians	  (Scott	  1992),	  they	  are	  not	  often	  used	  in	  IR.	  In	  this	  research,	  
while	  soldier	  memoirs	  are	  used	  as	  a	  means	  to	  collect	  information	  about	  the	  day-­‐
to-­‐day	  activities,	  their	  main	  role	  as	  a	  data	  source	  is	  to	  show	  how	  the	  identity	  of	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the	   soldier	   is	   constructed,	   how	   they	   contribute	   to	   the	   production	   of	   military	  
masculinities	  and	  how	  they	  call	  into	  being	  particular	  gendered	  bodies.	  	  
The	  autobiographies	  selected	  are	  all	  written	  by	  Norwegian	  or	  US	  soldiers	  serving	  
in	  Afghanistan	  during	  one	  or	  more	  tours	  of	  duty.	  While	  there	  is	  a	  rich	  and	  long	  
tradition	   of	   soldiers	   writing	   their	   memoirs	   in	   the	   British	   military	   (Duncanson	  
2009,	   Woodward	   and	   Jenkins	   2012),	   there	   are	   comparatively	   far	   fewer	   in	   the	  
Norwegian	  tradition.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  not	  necessarily	  surprising,	  recognizing	  that	  
there	  are	  vast	  differences	   in	   the	  sizes	  of	   these	   forces.	  However,	   since	  2010,	   four	  
memoirs	   have	   been	  written	   by	   soldiers	   on	   their	   experiences	   in	  Afghanistan,	   in	  
addition	  to	  others	  written	  by	  journalists	  about	  soldiers	  and	  by	  family	  members	  of	  
soldiers	   deployed.	   This	   thesis	   makes	   use	   of	   all	   of	   the	   soldier	   memoirs.	   The	  
increase	   in	   literature	   from	   soldiers’	   perspectives	   suggests	   that	   they	   themselves	  
feel	  a	  need	  to	  explain	  and	  account	  for	  their	  experiences.	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  four,	  
this	  is	  partly	  because	  they	  feel	  politicians	  do	  not	  accurately	  represent	  them	  in	  the	  
media.	  All	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  memoirs	  are	  written	  by	  white	  males,	  deployed	  either	  
as	  snipers	  or	  as	  part	  of	  the	  infantry	  battalion	  Telemarksbataljonen.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  US,	   there	  has	  recently	  been	  a	  surge	  of	  memoirs	  written	   from	  both	  Iraq	  and	  
Afghanistan	  veterans,	  several	  of	  which	  attract	  big	  audiences	  at	  book	  launches	  and	  
are	   found	   on	   the	   best-­‐seller	   lists	   (Bosman	   2012).	   While	   the	   memoirs	   differ	   in	  
terms	  of	  rank,	  roles,	  length	  of	  service	  and	  amount	  of	  tours,	  all	  of	  the	  authors	  are	  
white	  and	  male.	  	  
Below	  is	  a	  list	  of	  memoirs	  analysed:	  	  	  
American	  memoirs:	  	  
• Jeff	  Courter	  (2008)	  -­‐	  Afghan	  Journal.	  A	  Soldier’s	  Year	  in	  Afghanistan.	  
• Benjamin	  Tupper	  (2010)	  –	  Greetings	  from	  Afghanistan.	  Send	  More	  Ammo.	  	  
• Sean	  Parnell	  (2012)	  –	  Outlaw	  Platoon.	  Heroes,	  Renegades,	  Infidels	  and	  the	  
Brotherhood	  of	  War	  in	  Afghanistan	  




Norwegian	  Memoirs:	  	  
• Skarpskyttere	  (2010)	  –	  Med	  Mandat	  til	  å	  drepe.	  Norske	  skarpskyttere	  
forteller	  (A	  Licence	  to	  Kill.	  Norwegian	  Snipers	  Recount)	  	  
• Emil	  Johansen	  (2011)	  –	  Brødre	  i	  Blodet	  (Blood	  Brothers)	  
• Erik	  Elden	  (2012)	  –	  Krig	  og	  Kjærlighet	  (Love	  and	  War)	  	  
• Henning	  Mella	  (2013)	  –	  For	  Konge	  og	  Fedreland	  (For	  King	  and	  Country)	  	  
	  
Using	  memoirs	  as	  data	   sources	  has	  both	  benefits	   and	   limitations,	   though	   these	  
are	  dependent	  upon	  the	  purposes	  for	  using	  them.	  Being	  written	  after	  the	  event,	  
they	   are	  ultimately	   reliant	   on	   the	   ‘fragility	   of	  human	  memory’	   (Woodward	   and	  
Jenkins	   2012:	   120)	   so	   they	   cannot	   uncritically	   be	   relied	   upon	   in	   terms	   of	  
establishing	  the	  correct	  order	  of	  events	  or	  factuality.	  Verifying	  particular	  stories	  
or	  events	  would	  be	  extremely	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  In	  addition,	  parts	  of	  the	  
stories	  will	  likely	  have	  been	  left	  out,	  due	  to	  forgetfulness	  or	  for	  unwillingness	  to	  
disrupt	  a	  particular	  narrative	  and	  one	  can	  expect	  there	  to	  be	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  self-­‐
censoring	  involved	  in	  the	  writing	  of	  these	  books.	  While	  none	  of	  the	  authors	  claim	  
to	  have	  been	  directly	  censored	  by	  their	  respective	  militaries,	  military	  officials	  are	  
likely	  to	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  some	  way	  or	  other,	  particularly	  if	  soldiers	  are	  still	  
serving	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  restricting	  sensitive	  and	  confidential	  information.	  	  
Claire	   Duncanson	   argues	   that	   while	   interviews,	   surveys	   and	   documentaries	   no	  
doubt	   add	   to	   knowledge	   about	   soldiers’	   identities,	   ‘there	   is	   something	   about	  
soldiers’	  personal	  narratives,	  their	  story	  as	  they	  want	  to	  tell	  it,	  that	  is	  particularly	  
revealing	  about	  identity’	  (2013:	  7).	  However,	  as	  she	  also	  points	  to,	  it	  is	  important	  
not	  to	  rely	  solely	  on	  soldiers	  memoirs	  as	  representative	  for	  what	  all	  soldiers	  ‘are	  
like’	  (Duncanson	  2013:	  9).	  To	  account	  for	  this,	  the	  research	  triangulates	  the	  data	  
gathered	   in	   memoirs	   with	   scholarly	   research	   based	   on	   interviews	   and	  
ethnographies,	  journalistic	  accounts	  and	  blogs.	  While	  one	  can	  of	  course	  never	  be	  
certain	   that	   the	  sources	  selected	  are	   thorough	  enough	  (and	   in	  a	  sense	   they	  can	  
never	  be),	  remaining	  aware	  of	  such	  issues	  throughout	  minimises	  the	  dangers	  of	  
overemphasising	   certain	   elements.	   	   Despite	   these	   limitations,	   I	   argue	   that	  
memoirs	  remain	  a	  very	  rich	  data	  source,	  one	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  ‘inform	  accounts	  
 31	  
of	   armed	   conflict	   both	   as	   reports	   of	   lived	   experience	   and	   as	   socially	   situated	  
records	  which	  go	  on	  to	  shape	  wider	  public	  imaginations’	  (Woodward	  and	  Jenkins	  
2012:	  120).	  	  
However,	   the	   challenges	  discussed	  above	   are	  not	   the	  only	  ones	   that	   arise	  here.	  
Joan	  W.	  Scott	  raises	  some	  relevant	  methodological	  and	  epistemological	  concerns	  
against	  using	  ‘experience’,	  less	  so	  because	  of	  the	  ‘fragility	  of	  human	  memory’	  than	  
about	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  subject	   in	  using	  materials	   like	  
memoirs,	   letters	   or	   journals.	   She	  writes	   that	   studies	   that	   rely	   on	   experience	   as	  
evidence	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  ‘taking	  as	  self-­‐evident	  the	  identity	  of	  those	  experiencing’	  
and	   questions	   about	   ‘how	   subjects	   are	   constituted	   in	   the	   first	   place’	   are	   not	  
engaged	   with	   (Scott	   1992:	   25).	   Rather,	   the	   focus	   should	   lie	   on	   ‘processes	   of	  
identity	  production,	  insisting	  on	  the	  discursive	  nature	  of	  “experience”	  and	  on	  the	  
politics	  of	  its	  construction’	  (Scott	  1992:	  37).	  	  
The	  usage	  of	  memoirs	  as	  testaments	  of	  soldiers’	  ‘experience’	  and	  performances	  of	  
particular	   identities	   in	  this	   thesis	  aims	  to	  answer	  this	  call	   in	  the	  sense	  that	   it	   is	  
not	   the	   ‘experience’	   as	   such	   that	   is	   used	   as	   data,	   but	   rather	   how,	   and	   through	  
what	   means,	   different	   soldier	   identities	   are	   claimed	   and	   performed.	   In	   other	  
words,	  memoirs	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  writing	  of	  bodies	  in	  war,	  discussed	  at	  
length	   in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  As	  Woodward	  and	  Jenkings	  argue,	   following	  Harari,	  
soldier	   memoirs	   should	   be	   viewed	   as	   ‘flesh-­‐witnessing’	   (Harari	   2008),	   and	  
testaments	   to	   how	   the	   ‘military	   experience	   is	   a	   totality	   of	   bodily	   engagements’	  
(Woodward	  2013:	  153).	  When	  analysing	  the	  memoirs,	  attention	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  
ways	   in	   which	   the	   memoirs	   participate	   in	   writing	   the	   body	   in	   war	   and	   how	  
soldiers	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  experiences	  of	  war	  as	  an	  embodied	  practice.	  	  
	  
3.0	  The	  Argument	  and	  Structure	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
From	   the	   invasion,	   through	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	  and	  the	  training	  of	  ANSF,	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  has	  relied	  on	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various	   productions,	   transformations	   and	   rearticulations	   of	   gender	   in	   order	   to	  
function.	  It	  has	  called	  into	  being	  particular	  gendered	  bodies	  and	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  
gendered	  performances.	  	  
This	   thesis	   draws	   on	   poststructuralist	   feminist	   approaches	   to	   analyse	   the	   way	  
that	  this	  war	  is	  gendered	  and	  embodied.	  Central	  here	  is	  a	  conception	  of	  gender	  as	  
performative;	  in	  other	  words,	  gender	  constitutes	  the	  doing	  rather	  than	  the	  being	  
of	  an	  identity.	  Judith	  Butler	  is	  central	  to	  this	  framework,	  and	  she	  calls	  gender	  	  ‘a	  
kind	   of	   imitation	   for	   which	   there	   is	   no	   original’	   (1996:	   378).	   Understanding	  
gender	   as	   performative	   offers	   therefore	   a	   particularly	   embodied,	   active	   and	  
dynamic	  approach	  to	  studying	  gender,	  one	  that	  remains	  open	  to	  the	  conflictual	  
and	  unpredictable	  productions	  of	  gendered	  performances	  on	  and	  by	  bodies.	  This	  
means	  that	  the	  categories	  like	  ‘woman’	  and	  ‘man’	  become	  deeply	  problematic	  to	  
maintain,	  as	  this	  approach	  recognises	  not	  only	  that	  specifically	  gendered	  bodies	  
are	  historical	   ideas	  but	   they	  are	   ‘a	   set	  of	  possibilities	   to	  be	  continually	   realized’	  
(Butler	   1997b:	   403).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   means	   that	   gender	   is	   a	   slippery,	  
multiple	   and	   flexible	   concept	   that	   can	   therefore	   become	   difficult	   to	   ‘handle’.	  
However,	   rather	   than	   trying	   to	   ‘fit’	   various	   gendered	   embodiments	   and	  
performances	   into	   a	   rigorous	   binary,	   this	   approach	   and	   this	   research	  means	   to	  
shed	  light	  on	  its	  various	  manifestations	  and	  inconsistencies.	  	  
War	  is,	  like	  gender,	  a	  ‘bodily’	  thing.	  As	  Victoria	  Basham	  suggests,	  ‘we	  need	  to	  pay	  
more	   attention	   to	   how	   people	   come	   to	   understand	   their	   bodies	   and	   those	   of	  
others	  in	  order	  to	  appreciate	  how	  war	  and	  military	  violence	  occurs’	  (2012:	  2).	  War	  
can	  literally	  be	  the	  destroyer	  of	  bodies	  through	  killing	  and	  maiming,	  but	  practices	  
of	  war	  also	  create	  gendered	  bodies.	  Think	  for	  instance	  of	  the	  toning	  and	  honing	  
of	   soldiers	   bodies.	   The	   disciplining	   of	   bodies	   in	   the	   military	   and	   its	   various	  
manifestations	  in	  practices	  of	  war	  are	  therefore	  crucial	  to	  what	  war	  is.	  	  	  
While	   this	   thesis	   concentrates	  mainly	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   gender	   and	  
war,	  it	  conceptualises	  gendered	  bodies	  as	  already	  imbued	  with	  a	  range	  of	  ‘other’	  
components,	   such	   as	   class,	   race,	   ethnicity,	   religion,	   sexuality	   and	   culture.	   It	  
therefore	  draws	  on	  postcolonial	  critiques,	  particularly	  in	  chapters	  two,	  three	  and	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six,	   in	   order	   to	   show	   the	   centrality	   of	   and	   peculiarities	   of	   particular	   racial	   and	  
gendered	   bodies	   to	   the	   justifications	   for	   the	   invasion	   in	   Afghanistan	   in	   2001.	  
Chapter	  three	  also	  emphasises	  the	  relations	  between	  these	  various	  gendered	  and	  
racialized	   bodies,	   conceptualised	   through	   Spivak’s	   famous	   critique	   against	  
neocolonial	  and	  imperial	  practices	  –	   ‘White	  men	  are	  saving	  brown	  women	  from	  
brown	  men’	  (1999:	  303).	  By	  emphasising	  the	  conflictual	  and	  dynamic	  productions	  
and	   co-­‐constitutions	   of	   femininities	   and	  masculinities	   during	   the	   course	   of	   the	  
war	  in	  Afghanistan	  it	  argues	  that	  these	  enable	  particular	  practices	  of	  war.	  	  	  
The	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  laid	  out	  in	  chapter	  two,	  
which	  follows.	   It	  begins	  by	  accounting	  for	  the	  particular	  feminist	  approach	  that	  
guides	   the	   analysis,	   emphasising	   its	   relationship	   with	   poststructuralism	   and	  
postcolonialism.	   After	   discussing	   what	   is	   meant	   by	   performative	   gender	   and	  
racialized	  bodies,	  it	  sets	  up	  the	  analytical	  framework	  for	  studying	  the	  production	  
of	  gendered	  bodies	  in	  war.	  Building	  on	  Foucault’s	  work	  on	  ‘disciplined’	  or	  ‘docile	  
bodies’	   (1991),	   and	  Michel	   De	   Certeau’s	   notion	   of	   ‘writing	   on’	   bodies	   (1984),	   it	  
argues	   that	   both	   gender	   and	   war	   are	   written	   on	   bodies.	   Said	   differently,	   the	  
military	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   war	   writes	   gendered	   bodies.	   It	   contends	   that	  
performances	  of	  masculinity	  within	  the	  military	  should	  always	  be	  viewed	  in	  the	  
plural,	  as	  masculinities	  (see	  among	  others	  Connell	  1995,	  Woodward	  2000,	  Higate	  
2003b,	  Hockey	  2003,	  Higate	  and	  Henry	  2004,	  Duncanson	  2009,	  Duncanson	  and	  
Cornish	  2012).	  Drawing	  on	  Judith	  Halberstam	  (1998),	  this	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  
male-­‐masculine/female-­‐feminine	   binary	   is	   flawed	   when	   dealing	   with	   martial	  
bodies.	   Troubling	   this	   binary	   allows	   us	   to	   better	   analyse	   and	   examine	   the	  
development	  of	  FETs	  in	  chapter	  five.	  With	  reference	  both	  to	  the	  memoirs	  and	  to	  
numerous	  military	  documents	  such	  as	  training	  manuals	  and	  guidebooks,	  chapter	  
two	  shows	  how	  gendered,	  and	  particularly	  women’s	  bodies	  are	  called	  into	  being	  
through	  detailed	  disciplining	  and	  regulation.	  It	  also	  situates	  the	  present	  analysis	  
in	  relation	  to	  biopolitical	  explanations	  of	  counterinsurgency	   in	  Afghanistan	  and	  
argues	   that	   these	   types	   of	   explanations	   for	   war	   are	   aided	   by	   gendering	  
counterinsurgency’s	  biopolitical	  endeavours.	  More	  specifically,	  it	  argues	  that	  the	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gendered	   dynamic	   of	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’	   reveals	   a	   biopolitical	   logic	   within	  
‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency.	  	  
Following	   the	   theoretical	   framework,	   chapter	   three	   analyses	   the	   invasion	   of	  
Afghanistan	  in	  2001,	  through	  the	  foreign	  policy	  discourses	  of	  the	  US	  and	  Norway	  
and	  shows	  that	  repeated	  and	  consistent	  references	  to	  the	  invasion	  being	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  Afghan	  women	  were	  decisive	  in	  terms	  of	  harnessing	  public	  support	  and	  
glazing	   the	   invasion	   in	   a	   ‘feminist	   veneer’	   (Kolhatkar	   and	   Ingalls	   2006).	   The	  
gendered	   and	   racialized	   discourse	   was	   enabled	   through	   appropriating	   the	  
(in)visible	   body	   in	   the	   burqa	   and	   through	   performances	   of	   ‘protective	  
masculinity’.	  The	  burqa	  worked	  to	  cement	  the	  links	  between	  Afghan	  women	  and	  
victimhood	  in	  the	  Western	  discourses	  of	  invasion,	  a	  move	  that	  has	  a	  long	  colonial	  
history.	   By	   paying	   attention	   to	   how	   Afghan	   women’s	   bodies	   became	   sites	  
whereby	  ‘progress’	  could	  be	  made	  and	  measured,	  chapter	  three	  shows	  how	  bodies	  
themselves	  are	  imbued	  with	  political	  contention.	  The	  US	  and	  Norway	  are	  shown	  
to	  have	  performed	  a	  kind	  of	   ‘protective	  masculinity’,	   a	   combination	  of	   violence	  
and	   military	   power,	   softened	   by	   appeals	   to	   humanitarian	   ideals	   which	   further	  
legitimated	  the	  invasion.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  performance	  of	  protective	  masculinity	  
by	   politicians	   during	   the	   course	   of	   the	   invasion	   has	   a	   lot	   in	   common	  with	   the	  
production	   of	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	   masculinity,	   and	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  	  
Chapter	   four	   argues	   that	   the	   chosen	   military	   strategy	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   in	   Afghanistan	   is,	   like	   the	   invasion,	   enabled	   by	   a	   range	   of	  
gendered	  performances	  and	  cannot	  be	  understood	  fully	  without	  taking	  these	  into	  
account.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  by	  outlining	  the	  key	  tenets	  of	  this	  doctrine,	  which	  is	  
seen	  as	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  asymmetric	  warfare,	  where	  greater	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  
on	   ‘winning	   hearts	   and	   minds’	   rather	   than	   on	   annihilating	   the	   enemy,	   and	  
counterinsurgency	  as	  a	  policy	  is	  situated	  within	  a	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  
As	   such,	   it	   has	  much	   in	   common	   with	   previous	   colonial	   versions	   of	   the	   same	  
doctrine.	  In	  this	  vein,	  ‘knowing’	  the	  Other	  and	  ‘understanding’	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  
region	  are	  hailed	  as	  particularly	   important,	  something	  which	  arguably	  has	  as	  as	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much	  to	  do	  with	  this	  type	  of	  warfare’s	  links	  with	  colonialism	  as	  it	  has	  to	  do	  with	  a	  
pragmatic	  adjustment	  to	  ‘operational	  environments’.	  The	  practice	  of	  ‘population-­‐
centric’	   counterinsurgency	   relies	   on	   the	   production	   of	   contradictory,	   albeit	  
complementary	  forms	  of	  military	  masculinity,	  such	  as	  ‘soldier-­‐scholars’,	  ‘warriors’	  
and	  ‘Fobbits’.	  The	  memoirs	  analysed	  show	  that,	  while	  elements	  of	  ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  
and	  ‘protective	  masculinity’	  surface	  as	  important	  in	  the	  experiences	  of	  soldiers	  in	  
Afghanistan,	   the	   experience	   of	   fighting	   and	   being	   in	   combat	   emerges	   as	  
particularly	   valued.	   ‘Population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   therefore,	   does	   not	  
produce	   a	   singular	   gentle,	   intelligent,	   protective,	   cooperative,	   communicative	  
and	  culturally-­‐savvy	  military	  masculinity.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  as	  chapter	  four	  shows,	  
this	   type	  of	  warfare	   requires	  a	  plurality	  of	  embodied	  military	  masculinities	   that	  
do	  not	  necessarily	  ‘sit	  easily’	  with	  one	  another.	  
Chapter	   five	   argues	   that	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   produces	   a	  
particularly	   striking	   example	   of	   the	   intimate	   relationship	   between	   gender	   and	  
war	   in	   the	   shape	  of	   the	   female	   counterinsurgent	   and	   soldier	  deployed	   in	  FETs.	  
These	  all-­‐female	  teams	  are	  considered	  a	  progressive	  addition	  to	   ‘winning	  hearts	  
and	  minds’,	  necessitated	  by	   the	  cultural	   realities	  on	   the	  ground	   in	  Afghanistan,	  
and	  with	  an	  aim	  to	  collect	   intelligence	  from	  and	  to	  influence	  Afghan	  women	  in	  
various	   ways.	   The	   inclusion	   of	   women	   as	   ‘practitioners’	   and	   ‘targets’	   of	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   and	   the	   detail	   by	   which	   their	   roles	   are	  
laid	  out,	  illuminates	  not	  only	  to	  the	  complexities	  of	  military	  masculinity,	  but	  also	  
how	  war	  is	  ‘written	  on	  bodies’	  in	  particular	  ways.	  However,	  the	  practice	  of	  using	  
‘women	   to	   reach	   women’	   is	   shown	   to	   be	   a	   chosen	   strategy	   of	   American	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   and	   also	   the	   most	   frequently	   cited	  
example	  of	  NATO’s	  particular	  interpretation	  of	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  
Resolution	  1325	  (UNSCR1325)	  and	  its	  implementation	  of	  a	  ‘gender	  perspective’	  in	  
its	   operations.	   In	   both	   instances,	   there	   is	   a	   repositioning	   of	   the	   role	   of	  Afghan	  
women,	   from	   the	   passive,	   burqa-­‐clad	   and	   silent	   victims	   of	   the	   invasion,	   to	  
knowledgeable	  and	  influential	  persons	  in	  their	  families	  and	  communities.	  This,	  in	  
turn,	   makes	   them	   valuable	   allies	   for	   the	   US	   and	   NATO	   missions.	   While	   the	  
previous	   chapter	   conceptualised	   counterinsurgency	   through	   the	   dynamic	   of	  
 36	  
‘killing	  and	  caring’,	  with	  male	   soldiers	  operating	   in	  both	   spheres,	  FETs,	  despite	  
being	  trained	  as	  soldiers	  are	  conceptualised	  solely	  as	  ‘carers’.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  
are	   set	   to	   carry	   out	   a	   feminine	   labour	   of	   care	   for	   the	   practice	   of	  
counterinsurgency,	   something	   that	   raises	   questions	   about	   what	   this	   type	   of	  
practice	  does	  for	  gender	  equality	  within	  the	  US	  military.	  	  
The	   final	   chapter	   analyses	   the	   efforts	   to	   forge	   a	   new	   military	   in	   Afghanistan	  
through	  the	  training,	  mentoring	  and	  advising	  role	  that	  US	  and	  Norwegian	  forces	  
have	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ANSF,	  with	  particular	  attention	  paid	  to	  the	  training	  of	  the	  
Afghan	  National	  Army	  (ANA).	  It	  argues	  that	  while	  this	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  part	  of	  
state	   building,	   counterinsurgency,	   and	   as	   a	   means	   to	   enable	   a	   withdrawal	   of	  
NATO	   troops	   by	   2014,	   this	   relies	   on	   individual	   bodies	   being	   disciplined	   and	  
remade.	   Despite	   Afghan	   soldiers	   being	   recognized	   as	   brave	   and	   capable	   of	  
fighting,	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  become	  ‘proper’	  soldiers,	  their	  bravery	  needs	  to	  be	  
sanitised	  and	  controlled.	  The	  rebuilding	  of	  the	  ANA	  therefore	  requires	  particular	  
versions	   of	   the	  martial	   body	   to	   be	   called	   into	   being,	   one	   that	  mirrors	  Western	  
military	   forces	   in	   terms	   of	   discipline	   and	   heterosexuality.	   In	   addition,	   these	  
bodies	  need	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  standardised	  notion	  of	  hierarchy	  and	  be	  instilled	  with	  
a	   sense	  of	  national	  unity.	  As	   such,	   the	   rebuilding	  of	   the	  ANA	   is	  not	  only	  about	  
disciplining	   individual	   soldier	   bodies	   but	   also	   a	   collective	   process	  whereby	   the	  
entire	  ‘body	  politic’	  is	  remade	  to	  transcend	  the	  ‘traditional’	  in	  order	  to	  mirror	  the	  
‘modern’.	   However,	   this	   chapter	   shows	   that	   this	   rebuilding	   and	   ISAF	   soldiers	  
conceptions	   of	   it	   reveals	   a	   reiteration	   of	   complex	   orientalist	   tropes.	   The	  
orientalisation	   of	   Afghanistan	   involves	   both	   fascination/exotification	   and	  
condemnation,	  and	  Afghan	  men	  are	  perceived	  as	  simultaneously	  hypermasculine	  
and	  effeminate.	  This	  chapter	  therefore	  shows,	  as	  do	  its	  predecessors,	  that	  the	  also	  
the	  ‘Exit	  Strategy’	  is	  gendered	  and	  embodied	  through	  calling	  into	  being	  a	  range	  of	  
complex,	  contradictory	  and	  fluid	  gendered	  bodies.	  	  
The	  concluding	  chapter	  draws	  together	  the	  central	  themes	  and	  arguments	  of	  the	  
thesis.	   It	   shows	   the	   connection	   between	   the	   production	   of	   particular	   types	   of	  
gendered	   martial	   bodies	   in	   war	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	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counterinsurgency,	   emphasising	   the	   relationship	   between	   embodiment	   and	  
performativity.	  This	  chapter	  also	  includes	  reflections	  on	  feminist	  readings	  of	  late	  

















-­‐ Chapter	  2	  –	  
Performing	  Gender	  in	  the	  ‘Theatre	  of	  War’	  
	  
‘All	  the	  world’s	  a	  stage’	  	  
William	  Shakespeare,	  As	  You	  Like	  It	  
	  




As	   outlined	   in	   the	   introduction,	   this	   thesis	   has	   as	   its	   aim	   to	   show	   how	   the	  
invasion,	   counterinsurgency	   and	   ‘Exit	   Strategy’	   of	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan	   is	  
gendered	   and	   embodied.	   Before	   showing	   this	   empirically,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  
account	  for	  the	  theoretical	  orientations	  that	  enable	  the	  subsequent	  analysis	  and	  
to	  clarify	  the	  theoretical	  contributions	  this	  thesis	  hopes	  to	  make.	  This	  thesis	  sees	  
war	   as	   an	   embodied	   and	  gendered	  practice.	   It	   calls	   into	  being	   a	  multiplicity	   of	  
gendered	  bodies	  and	  gendered	  performances	  that	  operate	  together	  in	  the	  ‘theatre	  
of	  war’.	   These	   performances	   of	   femininity	   and	  masculinity	   are	   relational,	   fluid,	  
complementary	   and	   contradictory	   –	   and	   they	   feed	   off	   each	   other	   and	  manifest	  
themselves	  differently	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  war.	  	  
Central	   to	   this	   claim	   is	   conceptualising	   gender	   as	   performative,	   drawing	   in	  
particular	   on	   the	  work	  of	   Judith	  Butler.	  While	   gender	   is	   produced	  discursively,	  
this	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   it	   is	   not	   performed	   or	   experienced	   as	   an	   embodied	  
practice.	  Quite	  the	  contrary,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  necessary	  and	  intimate	  relation	  between	  
discourse,	   performativity	   and	   bodies.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   chapter	   emphasises	  
this	   and	   outlines	   the	  main	   tenets	   of	   performative	   gender	   and	   poststructuralist	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approaches	  to	  gender.	  It	  also	  accounts	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  gender,	  race	  
and	  other	  ‘identity	  markers’.	  	  
Section	   two	  discusses	   how	  military	  masculinities	   need	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   the	  
plural	   rather	   than	   the	   singular.	  Drawing	  on	  Foucault	   and	  De	  Certeau,	   it	   shows	  
how	   the	   military	   disciplines	   and	   calls	   into	   being	   particular	   bodies	   through	  
detailed	   technologies	   of	   power,	   and	   how	   women’s	   bodies	   in	   particular	   pose	  
intricate	  problems	   for	   the	  military.	  Following	   this,	   the	   last	   section	  expands	   this	  
Foucauldian	  frame	  to	  not	  only	  include	  disciplinary	  techniques	  of	  power,	  but	  also	  
biopolitical	   ones,	   which	   are	   particularly	   important	   when	   understanding	   the	  
practice	  of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	   in	  Afghanistan.	  This	  practice,	  
as	  the	  subsequent	  chapters	  show,	  is	  driven	  by	  a	  gendered	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  
caring’,	  where	  both	  parts	  signify	  particular	  performances	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  
As	  a	  while,	  this	  chapter	  emphasises	  the	  intimate	  connection	  between	  discourse,	  
bodies	   and	   performances	   and	   how	   these	   connections	  manifest	   themselves	   in	   a	  
multiplicity	  of	  military	  masculinities.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  is	  produced	  and	  productive	  of	  
the	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  dynamic	  of	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency.	  	  
	  
1.0	  Sex,	  Gender,	  Bodies	  and	  Performativity	  	  	  
Poststructuralist 13 	  feminist	   approaches	   to	   IR	   seek	   to	   shake	   the	   core	   of	   its	  
ontological	   and	   epistemological	   categories.	   Categories	   like	   ‘women’,	   ‘men’,	  
‘soldiers’	   and	   ‘war’	   all	   need	   to	   be	   interrogated	   and	   deconstructed,	   through	  
emphasising	  their	  ‘artificiality	  and	  fluidity’	  (Duncanson	  2013:	  16).	  When	  gender	  is	  
studied	   from	  a	  poststructuralist	  perspective,	   it	   is	   simultaneously	  a	  noun,	  a	  verb	  
and	   a	   logic	   that	   is	   both	   a	   product	   of	   and	   productive	   of	   particular	   practices	  
(Shepherd	  2008:	  3).	  In	  other	  words,	  gender	  is	  studied	  analytically,	  meaning	  that	  it	  
                                                
13	  The	   term	   ‘poststructuralist’	   is	  preferred	   rather	   than	   ‘post-­‐structuralist’.	  The	   same	  goes	   for	   the	  
term	   ‘postcolonial’	   and	   ‘neocolonial’	   throughout	   the	   thesis	   to	   indicate	   a	   closer	   connection	  with	  
‘structure’	  and	  ‘colonial’	  than	  the	  hyphen	  may	  indicate.	  Thus	  it	  wishes	  to	  emphasise	  that	  there	  is	  
not	  a	  definitive	  ‘post’	  in	  either	  of	  the	  ‘posts’,	  but	  rather	  a	  trajectory	  that	  involves	  a	  change,	  but	  not	  
a	  radical	  detachment.	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is	   treated	   as	   ‘more	   than	   an	   ‘added	   value’	   or	   a	   ‘perspective’	   (Cockburn	   2010,	  
Peterson	   2010).	   Instead	   of	   studying	   gendered	   effects	   or	   consequences	   of	   a	  
particular	   policy,	   gender	   is	   seen	   as	   constitutive	   of	   that	   policy	   to	   begin	   with.	  
Crucially	   it	   also	   maintains	   that	   gender	   is	   ‘systemic’	   so	   that	   ‘manifestations	   of	  
gender	  are	  less	  individual	  “choices”	  than	  effects	  of	  institutionalized	  codes,	  norms	  
and	  rules’	  (Peterson	  2010:	  18)	  
Building	  on	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  conception	  of	  power,	  Laura	  J.	  Shepherd	  argues	  that	  
‘power	  produces	  conditions	  of	  meaning,	  instances	  of	  meaning,	  webs	  of	  meaning	  
that	  are	  both	  locally	  specific	  and	  “run	  through	  the	  whole	  social	  body”	  –	  or,	  rather,	  
are	  productive	  of	  the	  “social	  body”’	  (2008:	  23).	  Studying	  how	  gender	  is	  produced	  
through	   particular	   discourses	   or	   ‘webs	   of	   meaning’	   -­‐	   such	   as	   foreign	   policy	  
discourse	  or	  military	  discourses,	  and	  through	  practices	  such	  as	  war,	  we	  can	  begin	  
to	   understand	   not	   necessarily	   what	   gender	   ‘is’	   but,	   more	   importantly,	   what	   it	  
‘does’.	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  thesis,	  discourse	  is	  not	  seen	  here	  to	  be	  
the	  opposite	  of,	  or	  detached	  from	  practice.	  While	  gender	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  constituted	  
in	   discourse,	   it	   is	   a	   performance	   constantly	   being	   acted	   and	   reacted	  on	   and	  by	  
bodies	  through,	  a	  series	  of	  ‘identifiable	  linguistic	  and	  non-­‐linguistic	  practices	  that	  
constitute	   our	   understanding	   of	   gender’	   (Shepherd	   2010:	   13).	   Poststructuralist	  
feminist	  approaches	  therefore	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  how	  power	  is	  embedded	  into	  
the	   ‘conceptual	   apparatus’	   as	   this	   is	   considered	   ‘the	   very	   precondition	   of	   a	  
politically	   engaged	   critique’	   (Butler	   1992:	   6-­‐7).	   Butler	   draws	   on	   Foucault’s	  
conception	   of	   discourse	   and	   power,	   discussed	   in	   the	   introduction,	   in	   order	   to	  
examine	  not	  only	  how	  power	  disciplines	  bodies,	  but	  also	  how	  it	  is	  productive	  of	  
those	  bodies.	  Since	  Foucault	  emphasised	  how	  power	  works	  through	  technologies	  
that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  immediately	  visible,	  the	  common	  sense	  ‘truth’	  about	  sex,	  
gender	  and	  bodies	  needs	  to	  be	  questioned	  and	  picked	  apart	  (Jegerstedt	  2008:	  75).	  	  
The	  doing	  rather	  than	  the	  having	  of	  gender	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  gender	  as	  
performative.	   In	   Butler’s	   framework,	   identities	   are	   ‘fictional’	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  
they	  do	  not	  exist	  prior	  to	  the	  power/knowledge	  nexus,	  and	  that	  they	  ‘produce	  the	  
identity	  they	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  simply	  representing’	  (Gill	  2008:	  17).	  Therefore	  the	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gendered	  body	  has	  no	   ‘ontological	   status’	   beyond	   the	   various	   acts	   that	   bring	   it	  
into	   reality	   (Butler	   1999:	   185).	  To	  study	   the	  production	  of	   subjects	   in	  discourse,	  
therefore,	   requires	   one	   to	   view	   subjects	   as	   being	   continuously	   subject	   to	   and	  
participants	  of	   those	   productions,	   in	   other	  words,	   they	   are	   both	   produced	   and	  
productive,	  both	  discursively	  constituted	  and	  embodied14.	  Butler	  writes,	  	  
‘To	  claim	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  itself	  produced	  in	  and	  as	  a	  gendered	  matrix	  of	  relations	  is	  not	  to	  do	  
away	  with	  the	  subject,	  but	  only	  to	  ask	  after	  the	  conditions	  of	   its	  emergence	  and	  operation.	  The	  
“activity”	   of	   this	   gendering	   cannot,	   strictly	   speaking,	   be	   a	   human	   act	   or	   expression,	   a	   wilful	  
appropriation,	  and	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  question	  of	  taking	  on	  a	  mask;	  it	  is	  the	  matrix	  through	  which	  
all	   willing	   first	   becomes	   possible,	   its	   enabling	   cultural	   condition.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   matrix	   of	  
gender	  relations	  is	  prior	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  “human”’	  (Butler	  1993:	  xvi-­‐xvii)15.	  	  
In	  this	  framework	  it	  makes	  little	  sense	  to	  speak	  about	  a	  biologically	  grounded	  ‘sex’	  
and	  a	  socially	  constructed	  ‘gender’,	  since	  the	  former	  neither	  exists	  independently,	  
nor	  neutrally	  of	   the	   latter.	   In	   the	  words	  of	  Elizabeth	  Grosz,	   it	   is	   ‘not	   clear	  how	  
one	   can	   eliminate	   the	   effects	   of	   (social)	   gender	   to	   see	   the	   contributions	   of	  
(biological)	  sex.	  The	  body	  cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  neutral	  screen,	  a	  biological	  
tabula	   rasa	   onto	  which	  masculine	  or	   feminine	   could	  be	   indifferently	  projected’	  
(1994:	   18).	  Rather,	  people	  perform	   their	  gender	   in	  accordance	  with	  recognizable	  
cultural	  and	  historical	  boundaries,	  and	  the	  possibilities	  are	  not,	  as	  in	  the	  logical	  
extension	   of	   the	   sex/gender	   binary	   would	   suggest,	   infinite.	   An	   example	  
frequently	   referred	   to	  by	  Butler	   to	   illustrate	  and	   trouble	   this	  binary	   is	   that	  of	  a	  
drag	  performance.	  However,	  the	  use	  of	  this	  example	  has	  arguably	  fostered	  a	  great	  
                                                
14	  Butler	   argues	   that	   many	   of	   the	   critiques	   against	   postmodernism/poststructuralist	   feminist	  
approaches	  are	  centred	  on	  this	  question	  of	  the	  subject.	  She	  writes,	  ‘Against	  this	  postmodernism,	  
there	   is	   an	   effort	   to	   shore	   up	   the	   primary	   premises,	   to	   establish	   in	   advance	   that	   any	   theory	   of	  
politics	   requires	   a	   subject,	   need	   from	   the	   start	   to	   presume	   its	   subject,	   the	   referentiality	   of	  
language,	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   institutional	   descriptions	   it	   provides.	   For	   politics	   is	   unthinkable	  
without	   a	   foundation,	  without	   these	  premises.	  But	  do	   these	   claims	   seek	   to	   secure	   a	   contingent	  
formation	  of	  politics	  that	  require	  that	  these	  notions	  remain	  unproblematized	  features	  of	  its	  own	  
definition?	  Is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  all	  politics,	  and	  feminist	  politics	  in	  particular,	  is	  unthinkable	  without	  
these	  prized	  premises?	  Or	  is	  it	  rather	  that	  a	  specific	  version	  of	  politics	  is	  shown	  in	  its	  contingency	  
one	  those	  premises	  are	  problematically	  thematized?’	  (Butler	  1992:	  3-­‐4).	  	  
15	  A	  related	  debate	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  subject	  and	  object	  in	  discourse	  is	  discussed	  
in	   Ernesto	   Laclau	   and	   Chantal	   Mouffe’s	   seminal	   book	  Hegemony	   and	   Socialist	   Strategy.	   They	  
argue	  that	  ‘the	  fact	  that	  every	  object	  is	  constituted	  as	  an	  object	  of	  discourse	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  
whether	   there	   is	   a	   world	   external	   to	   thought…what	   is	   denied	   is	   not	   that	   such	   objects	   exist	  
externally	  of	  thought,	  but	  the	  rather	  different	  assertion	  that	  they	  could	  constitute	  themselves	  as	  
objects	  outside	  any	  discursive	  condition	  of	  emergence’	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001:	  108).	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deal	   of	   misunderstandings	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   radical	   availability	   of	   gender	  
performances,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  one	  can	  choose	  one’s	  gender.	  As	  Kari	  Jegerstedt	  
clarifies,	   the	   example	  of	   ‘drag’	  does	  not	  primarily	   show	  how	  people	   can	   choose	  
subversive	  gender	  performances,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  inner	  
and	   the	   outer,	   between	   the	   essence	   and	   the	   replica,	   is	   deconstructed	   once	   we	  
start	   to	  question	  which	  gender	   is	   the	  primary	  one	   in	  drag	  performances	   (2008:	  
78).	   As	   Butler	   argues	   the	   ‘cultural	   matrix’	   that	   enables	   gender	   identities	   to	  
become	   intelligible,	   particularly	   in	   the	   West,	   are	   limited	   and	   requires	   that	  
‘certain	  kinds	  of	  “identities”	  cannot	  “exist”	  –	  that	  is,	  those	  in	  which	  gender	  does	  
not	   follow	   from	   sex	   and	   those	   in	  which	   the	   practices	   of	   desire	   do	   not	   “follow”	  
from	  either	  sex	  or	  gender’	  (1999	  :24).	  	  
In	  Butler’s	  work,	  performativity	   is	   related	  both	   to	  gender	   identity,	   as	   in	  Gender	  
Trouble,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  repetitive	  act	  of	  how	  bodies	  become	  constituted	  as	  matter,	  
as	   illustrated	   in	   Bodies	   that	   Matter 16 .	   In	   the	   latter	   the	   emphasis	   is	   on	  
understanding	  the	  body	  less	  as	  a	  construction	  and	  more	  as	  a	  materialisation	  ‘that	  
stabilises	  over	  time	  to	  produce	  the	  effect	  of	  boundary,	  fixity	  and	  surface	  we	  call	  
matter’	   (Butler	   1993:	   xviii).	   While	   this	   chapter	   will	   not	   examine	   in	   depth	   the	  
difference	   between	   construction	   and	  materialisation,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   in	  
Bodies	  that	  Matter,	  increased	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  repetition	  
and	   continuation.	   Because	   the	   ‘ideal	   is	   never	   accomplished,	   it	   must	   always	   be	  
attempted	   again’	   such	   that	   we	   end	   up	   with	   nothing	   but	   a	   series	   of	   repetitive	  
performances	  (Loxley	  2007:	  124).	  In	  this	  sense,	  performativity	  can	  be	  understood	  
as	   a	   ‘reformulation	   of	   Foucault’s	   concept	   of	   discourse’,	   where	   the	   performative	  
aspects	   of	   discourse	   work	   through	   repetitions	   and	   citations	   which	   in	   turn	  
produce,	  regulate	  and	  destabilise	  the	  subject	  (Jegerstedt	  2008:	  83).	  This	  illustrates	  
the	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  performative	  bodies	  and	  discourse,	  which	  will	  
be	  analysed	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
	  
                                                
16	  Performativity	   is	   also	   a	   central	   category	   in	   Excitable	   Speech.	   Here	   the	   emphasis	   is	   on	   the	  
performativity	   of	   speech	   acts,	   particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   hate	   speech	   and	   pornography	   (Butler	  
1997a)	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1.1	  Intersections,	  Assemblages	  and	  Racialized	  bodies	  
Feminism	  has	   in	  many	  respects	  successfully	  changed	  the	  perception	  of	   ‘women’	  
and	   their	   role	   in	   society,	   particularly	   from	   the	   1960s	   and	   onward.	  However,	   in	  
doing	   so,	   it	   has	   also	   produced	   its	   own	   limiting	   view	   of	  what	   a	  woman	   ‘is’	   and	  
‘should	  become’	  (hooks	  2000,	  Mohanty	  1988,	  Spivak	  1993).	  ‘Third	  wave	  feminists’,	  
transnational,	   black	   and	   postcolonial	   feminists	   have	   raised	   critiques	   against	  
white	  feminism’s	  own	  implication	  in	  justifying	  imperial	  and	  colonial	  projects	  and	  
for	   excluding	   ‘other’	   and	   ‘different’	   bodies.	   For	   instance,	   bell	   hooks	   argues	   that	  
‘second	   wave’	   feminism	   in	   the	   US	   excluded	   the	   histories	   of	   non-­‐white	   women	  
and	   that	   ‘racism	   abounds	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   white	   feminists,	   reinforcing	   white	  
supremacy	  and	  negating	   the	  possibility	   that	  women	  will	  bond	  politically	   across	  
ethnic	  and	  racial	  boundaries’	  (hooks	  2000:	  3,	  see	  also	  hooks	  1982)17.	  	  	  	  
Chandra	  Talpade	  Mohanty	  argues	  that	  the	  simplified	  and	  universalising	  notion	  of	  
a	   global	   patriarchy,	   particularly	   common	   in	   the	   1980s,	   produces	   a	   ‘third	  world	  
difference’	  –	   ‘that	  stable	  ahistorical	  something	  that	  apparently	  oppresses	  most	  if	  
not	   all	   the	   women	   in	   these	   countries’	   which	   enables	   Western	   feminists	   to	  
‘appropriate	   and	   “colonize”	   the	   fundamental	   complexities	   and	   conflicts	   which	  
characterize	   the	   lives	   of	  women’	   (Mohanty	   1988:	   335).	   Colonialism,	   understood	  
not	   only	   as	   the	   appropriation	   of	   land,	   wealth	   and	   people,	   but	   also	   as	   the	  
appropriation	  of	  knowledge	  production	  and	  representation,	  emphasises	  that	  the	  
production	  of	  knowledge	  is	  by	  no	  means	  objective	  -­‐	   ‘it	  is	  a	  directly	  political	  and	  
discursive	  practice	  in	  that	  it	  is	  purposeful	  and	  ideological’	  (Mohanty	  2003:	  19).	  In	  
a	  similar	  vein,	  Antoinette	  M.	  Burton	  argues	  that	  British	  feminists	  were	  engaging	  
in	   feminism	   in	   conjunction	   with	   actively	   supporting	   the	   British	   Empire,	   and	  
thereby	   remaining	   uncritical	   towards	   the	   nature	   of	   imperialism	   and	   racial	  
inequality.	  Therefore,	   feminists	   ‘reproduced	  the	  moral	  discourse	  of	   imperialism’	  
                                                
17	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  hooks’	  title	  Ain’t	  I	  a	  Woman	  is	  taken	  from	  Sojourner	  Truth’s	  famous	  
speech	  in	  1851,	  thereby	  establishing	  a	  link	  between	  herself	  and	  Truth.	  She	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  
question	   is	   still	   relevant,	   as	   Black	   women	   are	   still	   not	   seen	   as	   ‘women’	   in	   the	   limited	   white	  
feminist	  understanding	  of	  it.	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and	   ‘they	   embedded	  modern	  Western	   feminism	  deeply	  within	   it’	   (Burton	   1990:	  
295).	  This	  recognition	  becomes	  particularly	  important	  in	  chapter	  three.	  	  
Increasingly	  through	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  feminism	  in	  the	  West	  was	  confronted	  
with	   its,	   at	   times,	   unequivocal	   collaboration	  with	   empire	   and	   its	   invisibility	   to	  
race	  and	  class.	  These	  critiques	  along	  with	  poststructuralism	  challenged	  the	  ways	  
that	   the	   category	   ‘woman’	   can	   act	   as	   an	   exclusionary	   category.	   As	   Butler	   also	  
notes,	   the	   ‘political	  assumption’	   that	   there	   is	  a	  universal	   category	  of	   ‘woman’	   is	  
often	   aligned	   with	   a	   ‘notion	   that	   the	   oppression	   of	   women	   has	   some	   singular	  
form	   discernable	   in	   the	   universal	   or	   hegemonic	   structure	   of	   patriarchy	   or	  
masculine	   domination’	   (1999:	   5).	   In	   order	   to	   respond	   to	   this	   critique,	   the	  
language	  of	  ‘intersectionality’	  is	  increasingly	  being	  employed	  in	  order	  to	  account	  
for	  the	  various	  vectors	  of	  identity	  that	  work	  alongside	  and	  together	  with	  gender,	  
such	  as	  race,	  class,	  nationality	  and	  religion	  (Lutz	  et	  al.	  2011).	  Leslie	  McCall	  argues	  
that	   intersectionality	   came	   out	   of	   the	   critique	   of	   gender-­‐based	   and	   race-­‐based	  
research	   that	   failed	   to	   ‘account	   for	   lived	   experience	   and	   neglected	   points	   of	  
intersection’	   which	   meant	   that	   it	   was	   impossible	   to	   study	   black	   women’s	  
experiences	   since	   gender	   studies	   focused	   on	   white	   women	   and	   race	   studies	  
focused	  on	  black	  men	  (McCall	  2005:	  1780).	  	  
While	  I	  share	  the	  fundamental	  aim	  of	  scholars	  deploying	  this	  framework,	  namely	  
the	  ‘need	  to	  account	  for	  multiple	  grounds	  of	  identity	  when	  considering	  how	  the	  
social	  world	  is	  constructed’	  (Crenshaw	  1991:	  1245),	  my	  concern	  is	  mainly	  with	  the	  
language	  of	  intersectionality	  and	  what	  it	  seems	  to	  imply18.	  Oftentimes	  the	  image	  
of	  an	  intersection,	  or	  a	  criss-­‐cross	  of	  roads,	   is	  used	  to	  describe	  intersectionality,	  
where	   at	   any	   given	   point	   an	   individual	   is	   situated	   in	   the	   intersection	   of	   these	  
roads	   (Lykke	   2011).	   Problematically,	   this	   metaphor	   suggests	   that	   these	   roads	  
(gender,	  class,	  race,	  sexuality)	  exist	  independently	  of	  each	  other	  and	  that	  they,	  at	  
                                                
18	  Jasbir	   Puar	   presents	   a	   strong	   critique	   against	   the	   notion	   of	   intersectionality	   in	   her	   broader	  
critique	  of	  identity	  politics.	  Preferring	  the	  Deleuzian	  concept	  of	  ‘assemblages’	  instead,	  she	  argues	  
that	   ‘intersectionality’	   assumes	   that	   the	   different	   sections	   are	   separable	   analytically	   and	   can	  
therefore	  be	  picked	  apart,	  an	  assemblage	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  more	  ‘attuned	  to	  interwoven	  forces	  
that	   merge	   and	   dissipate	   time,	   space	   and	   body	   against	   linearity,	   coherency,	   and	   permanency’	  
(Puar	  2005:	  128).	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times,	   converge,	   but	   presumably,	   at	   other	   times	   do	   not.	   Is	   it	   ever	   possible,	  
however,	  that	  any	  of	  these	  roads	  exist	  independently	  of	  each	  other?	  A	  member	  of	  
the	  working	  class	  will	  always	  be	  embodied	  as	  gendered	  and	  racialized.	  Likewise,	  a	  
man	  will	   always	  be	  of	  a	   colour	  and	  class.	  While	   it	   is	   emphasised	   that	   there	  are	  
‘different	  kinds	  of	  differences’	  and	  that	  these	  manifest	  themselves	  as	  important	  at	  
different	  times	  and	  in	  different	  localities	  (Yuval-­‐Davis	  2006:	  199),	  such	  assertions	  
do	  not	   illustrate	  how	  and	  whether	  any	  of	   them	  can	  exist	   independently	  of	  each	  
other.	  	  
This	  research	  does	  not	  deploy	  the	  language	  of	  intersectionality.	  However,	  I	  would	  
like	   to	   emphasise	   that	   while	   this	   research	   mainly	   utilises	   the	   term	   ‘gender’	  
analytically,	  this	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  a	  term	  deemed	  to	  be	  neutral	  of	  class,	  race,	  
nationality,	   ethnicity,	   sexuality,	   culture	   and	   religion.	   Rather,	   since	   bodies	   are	  
central	   to	   the	  conception	  of	  gender	   that	  guides	   this	   research,	  multiple	   ‘identity	  
markers’	  are	  already	  embedded	  into	  bodies.	  When	  challenged	  to	  ‘think	  of	  a	  body’,	  
I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  picture	  a	  body	  that	  is	  not	  already	  
inscribed	  as	  gendered	  and	  racialized.	  In	  other	  words,	  bodies	  are	  always	  gendered	  
and	  gendered	  bodies	  will	  always	  already	  be	  racialized.	  As	  Grosz	  argues,	  	  
‘There	   is	  no	  body	  as	  such:	   there	  are	  only	  bodies	  –	  male	  or	   female,	  black,	  brown,	  white,	   large	  or	  
small	  –	  and	  the	  gradations	  in	  between.	  Bodies	  can	  be	  represented	  or	  understood	  not	  as	  entities	  in	  
themselves	  or	  simply	  on	  a	  linear	  continuum	  with	  its	  polar	  extremes	  occupied	  by	  male	  and	  female	  
bodies	  (with	  the	  various	  gradations	  of	  “intersexed”	  individuals	  in	  between)	  but	  as	  a	  field,	  a	  two-­‐
dimensional	   continuum	   in	   which	   race	   (and	   possibly	   even	   class,	   caste	   or	   religion)	   form	   body	  
specifications’	  (1994:	  19).	  
As	   argued	   throughout	   this	   thesis,	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan	   relies	   on	   familiar	  
dichotomies	   like	   modern/traditional,	   civilized/barbaric,	   warrior/terrorist,	  
liberated	   Western	   women/subjugated	   Muslim	   women,	   masculine	   Western	  
men/hypermasculine	   Afghan	  men	   –	   none	   of	   which	   can	   be	   understood	   outside	  
simultaneously	   racialized	   and	   gendered	   terms.	   These	   are	   all	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	  
how	  particular	  gendered	  bodies	  are	  called	  into	  being	  in	  discourses,	  to	  which	  we	  
now	  turn.	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2.0	  Military	  Masculinities	  and	  War	  Writing	  (on)	  Bodies	  
Much	   like	   ‘third	   wave	   feminists’	   with	   regards	   to	   feminism,	   R.W.	   Connell	   has	  
argued	   that	   there	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   masculinity,	   only	   masculinities	   (1995).	  
However,	  within	  any	  given	  historical	  context	  and	  locality,	  there	  will	  be	  particular	  
forms	  of	  masculinity	  that	  are	  organized	  hierarchically	  above	  others.	   ‘Hegemonic	  
masculinity’,	  understood	  as	  the	  ‘culturally	  exalted’	  form,	  relies	  on	  subordination,	  
complicity	   and	   marginalization	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   its	   position	   as	   the	   most	  
valued	   form	   of	  masculinity,	   and	   it	   therefore	   positions	   alternative	  masculinities	  
accordingly	  (Connell	  1995:	  76-­‐81).	  	  
While	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘hegemonic	  masculinity’	  emphasises	  multiple	  masculinities	  
and	   the	   unequal	   relationship	   between	   them,	   it	   is	   not	   without	   its	   critiques	  
(Demetriou	   2001,	   Connell	   and	   Messerschmidt	   2005).	   Invariably	   it	   is	   largely	  
maintained	   within	   the	  male-­‐masculine	   and	   female-­‐feminine	   binary,	   and	   is	   not	  
necessarily	  useful	  in	  order	  to	  study	  the	  fluidity	  of	  masculinities	  and	  femininities	  
between	   different	   bodies.	   While	   Connell	   is	   open	   to	   masculinity	   being	   a	   fluid	  
concept	   that	   moves	   between	   bodies	   (2000:	   16-­‐17),	   the	   main	   attention	   is	  
nevertheless	   on	  men	   and	   ‘their’	  masculinities.	   Judith	  Halberstam	   argues	   in	   her	  
ground-­‐breaking	  book	   that	   female	  masculinity	   is	  not	  taken	  seriously	  enough	  by	  
scholars19	  and	  is	  often	  framed	  as	  the	   ‘rejected	  scraps	  of	  dominant	  masculinity	  in	  
order	  that	  male	  masculinity	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  real	  thing’	  (1998:	  1).	  Through	  a	  
wealth	   of	   examples	   from	   film	   and	   fiction	   which	   show	   masculinities	   on	   ‘other	  
bodies’,	   she	   argues	   that	   masculinity	   is	   only	   made	   visible	   ‘where	   and	   when	   it	  
leaves	   the	   white	   male	   middle-­‐class	   body’	   (Halberstam	   1998:	   2).	   Halberstam’s	  
radical	  release	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  masculinity	  from	  solely	  ‘white	  male	  middle-­‐class’	  
bodies	  shows	  how	  masculinity	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  alongside	  class	  and	  race,	  
or	  as	  an	   ‘assemblage’,	  and	  that	   it	   is	   fluid	  so	   far	  as	  bodies	  are	  concerned20.	  Even	  
though	  Halberstam	  draws	  her	  examples	  from	  film	  and	  fiction,	  her	  insistence	  on	  
                                                
19	  Interestingly,	   as	   early	   as	   1792	  Mary	  Wollstonecraft’s	  Vindication	   of	   the	   Rights	   of	  Women	   sees	  
masculinity	   as	   not	   contained	  within	   only	  male	   bodies.	   She	  makes	   becoming	  more	  masculine	   a	  
feminist	  agenda	  and	  wishes	  that	  women	  ‘may	  every	  day	  grow	  more	  and	  more	  masculine’	  (quoted	  
in	  Reeser	  2010:	  135)	  
20	  For	  problems	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘fluidity’	  see	  Todd	  W.	  Reeser	  (2010:	  39-­‐40)	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breaking	   up	   the	   male-­‐masculine	   binary	   has	   potential	   also	   for	   research	   on	   the	  
military	   and	  war.	   Since	   ‘military	   prowess’,	   ‘courage’,	   and	   ‘strength’	   function	   on	  
male	  and	   female	  bodies,	   though	  not	  necessarily	   in	   the	   same	  way,	   this	  does	  not	  
mean	  that	  a	  version	  of	  military	  masculinity,	  or	  ‘being	  martial'	  is	  unattainable	  for	  
female	   soldiers,	   as	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   five.	   Studying	  military	  masculinities	   as	  
not	   necessarily	   ‘male	   bounded’,	   allows	   us	   to	   push	   the	   notion	   of	   fluidity	   and	  
multiplicity	   of	   performances	   of	   masculinity	   and	   femininity	   on	   both	   male	   and	  
female	  bodies	  alike	  (Reeser	  2010:	  132).	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  here	  to	  emphasise	  
that	   performances	   of	   femininity	   and	   masculinity	   are	   neither	   the	   same,	   nor	  
equally	  accessible	  to	  male	  and	  female	  bodies.	  	  
	  
2.1	  The	  Military	  Writing	  (on)	  Bodies	  
Before	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  development	  of	  military	  masculinities	  in	  greater	  
depth,	  and	  analyses	  its	  relationship	  to	  male	  and	  female	  bodies,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
outline	   the	  military’s	   role	   in	  producing	   and	  calling	   into	  being	  particular	  bodies.	  
Here	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  take	  from	  two	  central	  thinkers	  of	  ‘the	  body’,	  namely	  
Michel	  de	  Certeau	  and	  Michel	  Foucault.	  Speaking	  of	  the	  body	  as	  produced	  means	  
rejecting	  the	  body	  as	  something	  ‘given’	  and	  ‘natural’.	  Instead	  the	  body	  is	  seen	  to	  
be	  ‘directly	  involved	  in	  a	  political	  field;	  power	  relations	  have	  an	  immediate	  hold	  
upon	   it;	   they	   invest	   it,	  mark	   it,	   train	   it,	   torture	   it,	   force	   it	   to	  carry	  out	   tasks,	   to	  
perform	   ceremonies,	   to	   emit	   signs’	   (Foucault	   1991:	   25).	   One	   of	   the	   places	   this	  
happens	  is	  in	  the	  military	  and	  in	  practices	  of	  war.	  	  
For	   Foucault,	   ‘war	   is	   the	   problem	   of	   political	   modernity	   par	   excellence’	   (Reid	  
2006:	  127).	  In	  his	  genealogical	  study	  of	  the	  prison	  system	  in	  Discipline	  and	  Punish,	  
Foucault	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  modern	  age,	  technologies	  of	  power	  take	  hold	  of	  the	  
body	  to	  shape	  it	  in	  different	  ways	  than	  before.	  The	  modern	  age	  saw	  the	  birth	  of	  
‘meticulous	   military	   and	   political	   tactics	   by	   which	   the	   control	   of	   bodies	   and	  
individual	  forces	  was	  exercised	  within	  states’	  (Foucault	  1991:	  168).	  The	  example	  of	  
a	  soldier’s	  body	  is	  central	  to	  this:	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‘The	  soldier	  has	  become	  something	  that	  can	  be	  made;	  out	  of	  a	  formless	  clay,	  an	  inapt	  body,	  the	  
machine	  required	  can	  be	  constructed;	  posture	  is	  gradually	  corrected;	  a	  calculated	  constraint	  runs	  
slowly	  through	  each	  part	  of	  the	  body,	  mastering	  it,	  making	  it	  pliable,	  ready	  at	  all	  times,	  turning	  
silently	  into	  the	  automatism	  of	  habit’	  (Foucault	  1991:	  135)	  
Attention	   in	   the	  modern	   age	   is	   therefore	   placed	   on	   the	   body	   –	   ‘it	   is	   the	   body	  
susceptible	  to	  specific	  operations’	  that	  becomes	   ‘the	  target	  for	  new	  mechanisms	  
of	  power’	   (Foucault	   1991:	   155).	  The	  disciplining	  of	   the	  body	   through	  breaking	   it	  
down	   and	   subsequently	   rearranging	   it	   produces	   what	   he	   calls	   ‘docile	   bodies’	  
(Foucault	  1991:	  138).	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  is	  done	  are	  often	  meticulous,	  minute,	  
trivial	   and	   seemingly	   unimportant,	   and	   generally	   work	   through	   enclosures,	  
partitions,	   functional	   sites	   and	   rank.	   Within	   the	   military,	   drills	   and	   repetitive	  
training	  is	  central	  to	  the	  production	  of	  bodies	  fit	  for	  fighting	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  in	  
combat,	  when	  it	  counts,	  	  ‘you	  do	  not	  rise	  to	  the	  occasion,	  you	  sink	  to	  the	  level	  of	  
training’	  (Grossman	  2000).	  As	  Julian	  Reid	  explains,	  	  
‘War	  is	  fought	  for	  political	  order	  not	  among	  states,	  or	  on	  the	  territorial	  battlefields	  where	  military	  
forces	   clash,	  but	  on	   the	   terrain	  of	   the	  human	  body.	   It	   is	   the	  order	   that	   life	   assumes	  within	   the	  
human	  body	  that	  is	  at	  stake,	  Foucault	  argues,	   in	  the	  struggles	  to	  discipline	  the	  body	  that	  define	  
the	  remits	  of	  modern	  military	  sciences’	  (2006:	  130)	  
Ben	  Wadham,	  building	  on	  Erving	  Goffman	  and	  Foucault,	  argues	  that	  the	  process	  
through	  which	  military	  recruits	  are	  trained,	  represents	  a	  combination	  of	  physical	  
and	  psychological	  death	  and	  rebirth	  -­‐	   ‘a	  process	  of	  the	  mortification	  of	  the	  self,	  
where	  the	  civilian	  is	  destroyed	  and	  remade	  as	  soldier’	  (2004:	  7).	  As	  Emil	  Johansen,	  
a	  soldier	  in	  the	  Norwegian	  army	  puts	  it,	  
‘from	   2nd	   September	   2006	   I	  was	   no	   longer	   the	   civilian	   individual	   Emil	   Johansen.	   I	  was	   a	   battle	  
soldier,	   a	   warrior	   and	   enlisted	   in	   the	   Mechanized	   Infantry	   Company	   4,	   TMBN	   [Telemark	  
Battalion].	   I	  no	   longer	  decided	  what	   clothes	   to	  wear,	  how	  my	  hair	  would	   look,	  or	  how	   I	  would	  
shape	  my	  beard.	  Now	  I	  represented	  something	  more	  than	  myself.	  ’	  (2011:	  34).	  	  
As	   Foucault	   notes,	   discipline	   employs	   the	   technique	   of	   enclosure,	   a	   place	   of	  
‘disciplinary	  monotony’	  (Foucault	  1991:	  141)	  of	  which	  the	  Forward	  Operating	  Base	  
(FOB)	  is	  a	  good	  example.	  In	  Afghanistan,	  the	  FOB	  acts	  as	  the	  ‘inside’,	  the	  private,	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and	  the	   ‘home’	  of	  soldiers.	  Crucial	   to	  this,	  as	  shown	  in	  chapter	   four,	   is	  how	  the	  
division	   between	   the	   inside/private	   of	   the	   FOB	   and	   the	   outside/public	   is	   a	  
gendered	   construction	   and	   the	   disciplining	   of	   bodies	   that	   happens	   internally	  
within	  the	  FOB	  bears	  witness	  to	  this.	  	  
For	  De	  Certeau,	  the	  structuring	  of	  bodies	  in	  the	  everyday	  is	  intimately	  related	  to	  
law.	  He	  argues	  that	  ‘every	  law	  has	  a	  hold	  on	  the	  body	  …	  from	  birth	  to	  mourning	  
after	  death,	  law	  “takes	  hold	  of”	  bodies	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  its	  text’	  (De	  Certeau	  
1984:	   139).	   ‘Law’	  can	  here	  be	  understood	  as	  working	  on	   two	   levels,	  broadly	  as	  a	  
norm	   or	   a	   discourse,	   but	   also	   in	   a	   more	   narrow	   sense,	   such	   as	   a	   particular	  
legislation,	  treaty	  or	  regulation.	  For	  example,	  the	  laws	  and	  regulations	  produced	  
by	  the	  military	  are	  important	  examples	  of	  the	  production	  of	  gender	  in	  war.	  The	  
subsequent	   chapters	   analyse	   military	   field	   manuals	   (such	   as	   US	   Army	   and	  
Marines	   Counterinsurgency	   Field	   Manual	   FM	   3-­‐24),	   and	   military	   guides	  
(Commanders	  Guide	  to	  Female	  Engagement	  Teams)	  in	  order	  to	  detail	  how	  war	  is	  
an	   embodied	   and	   gendered	   practice	   and	   how	   particular	   gendered	   bodies	   are	  
called	   into	   being	   through	   war.	   Likewise,	   the	   soldiers	   memoirs	   analysed	  
throughout	  this	  thesis	  contribute	  to	  illuminating	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  body	  in	  war.	  
In	  this	  sense,	  these	  books,	  as	  all	  books	  do,	  become	  ‘metaphors	  for	  the	  body’	  (De	  
Certeau	   1984:	   140),	   something	   that	   can	  be	  written	  and	   read,	  but	  also	  noted	  on,	  
scribbled	  in,	  underlined,	  cut	  from,	  added	  to.	  We	  can	  remove	  from	  the	  body	  what	  
is	  deemed	  to	  be	   in	  excess	  (hair,	   fat,	  nails,	  bodily	   fluids)	  and	  to	  add	  to	  the	  body	  
what	   it	   lacks	  (muscle,	  make	  up,	  paint,	  clothes).	   Indeed,	   ‘clothes	  themselves	  can	  
be	   regarded	   as	   instruments	   through	   which	   a	   social	   law	   maintains	   its	   hold	   on	  
bodies	   and	   its	  members,	   regulates	   them	  and	  exercises	   them	   though	  changes	   in	  
fashion	  as	  well	  as	  through	  military	  manoeuvres’	  (De	  Certeau	  1984:	  147).	  	  
Wadham	  argues	  that	  the	  military	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  ‘total	  institution’,	  as	  this	  
is	  a	  place	  where	  a	  subject’s	  every	  movement,	  choice,	  body	  and	  mind	  is	  regulated	  
and	  disciplined	   (2004:	   6-­‐7).	   The	  US	  Army	   for	   instance,	   regulates	   bodily	  weight	  
and	  percentages	  of	  body	  fat	  (in	  the	  age	  group	  21-­‐27	  males	  are	  allowed	  22	  %	  and	  
women	  32%)	  (USArmy	  2006).	  Similarly,	  while	  uniform	  and	  grooming	  are	  crucial	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ways	   to	   ‘reduce	   the	   individual	   to	  a	  mere	  member	  of	   a	  group’,	   there	  has	  been	  a	  
certain	   degree	   of	   flexibility	   that	   allows	   the	   ‘individual’	   to	   sneak	   itself	   back	   in,	  
such	   as	   the	  use	  of	   shades	  or	  bandanas	   (Myrttinen	  2008:	   143).	  However,	   the	  US	  
Army	  recently	  revised	  its	  grooming	  regulations	  and	  tightened	  its	  restrictions	  on	  
‘individual’	   expressions.	   This	   included	   a	   cut	   down	   on	   allowed	   lengths	   for	  
sideburns	  and	  regulations	  on	  women’s	  fingernails	  which	  cannot	  be	  longer	  than	  a	  
quarter	   of	   an	   inch	   (ArmyTimes	   2012).	   In	   total,	   the	   revised	   edition	   of	   the	   US	  
Army’s	  Wear	  and	  Appearance	  of	  Army	  Uniforms	  and	  Insignia	  Regulation	  (AR	  670-­‐
1)	   is	  a	  357	  page	   long	  document,	  complete	  with	  detailed	  sketches	  and	   figures.	   In	  
explaining	  the	  importance	  of	  regulating	  ‘personal	  appearance’	  it	  states,	  	  
‘The	  Army	   is	  a	  uniformed	  service	  where	  discipline	   is	   judged,	   in	  part,	  by	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  a	  
soldier	  wears	  a	  prescribed	  uniform,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  individual’s	  personal	  appearance.	  Therefore,	  
a	  neat	  and	  well-­‐groomed	  appearance	  by	  all	  soldiers	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  Army	  and	  contributes	  
to	  building	   the	  pride	  and	  esprit	  essential	   to	  an	  effective	  military	   force.	  A	  vital	   ingredient	  of	   the	  
Army’s	  strength	  and	  military	  effectiveness	  is	  the	  pride	  and	  self	  discipline	  that	  American	  soldiers	  
bring	  to	  their	  Service	  through	  a	  conservative	  military	  image’	  (USArmy	  2012:	  2).	  
In	   responding	   to	   criticism	   from	   soldiers,	   particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   new	  
regulations	  on	  tattoos	  (should	  not	  to	  be	  visible	  above	  the	  neck	  line	  or	  below	  the	  
wrist	   line	   in	  the	  new	  regulations),	  Sergeant	  Major	  Raymond	  Chandler	  who	  is	   in	  
charge	  of	  the	  review	  stated	  that	  	  
‘…	  we	  all	  generally	  look	  the	  same.	  Now,	  if	  you	  have	  a	  tattoo	  that	  draws	  attention	  to	  yourself,	  you	  
have	  to	  ask	  the	  question,	  are	  you	  a	  person	  who	  is	  committed	  to	  the	  Army?	  Because	  the	  Army	  says	  
you	  are	  part	  of	  the	  same	  organization.	  We	  all	  generally	  look	  the	  same.	  And	  we	  do	  not	  want	  you	  to	  
stand	  out	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Army.	  Yes,	  we	  want	  you	  to	  set	  yourself	  apart	  and	  do	  great	  things	  
and	   so	  on,	   but	   that	   does	  not	  mean	   tattooing	   yourself	   or	   doing	  other	   extreme	   things	   that	   draw	  
attention	  to	  you,	  the	  individual.	  You	  are	  part	  of	  something	  larger’	  (ArmyTimes	  2012).	  	  
For	  de	  Certeau,	  the	  adding	  or	  taking	  away	  from	  the	  body,	   ‘making	   the	   body	   tell	  
the	   code’	   or	   ‘“machining”	   bodies’	   (1984:	   148	   emphasis	   in	   original),	   is	   what	  
produces	  bodies	  as	  bodies.	  He	  writes	  that	   ‘to	  tell	  the	  truth,	  they	  become	  bodies	  
only	  by	  conforming	  to	  these	  codes’	   (De	  Certeau	   1984:	   147).	   In	  other	  words,	   it	   is	  
the	  ‘machining’	  of	  bodies	  that	  materialises	  them,	  something	  that	  enables	  them	  to	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perform	   as	   martial	   bodies.	   In	   the	   military,	   this	   is	   done	   in	   ways	   that	   regulate	  
soldier’s	   masculinity	   and	   femininity,	   in	   addition	   to	   signalling	   their	   role	   as	  
representatives	  and	  protectors	  of	  the	  state	  and	  nation.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Military	  Masculinities	  	  -­‐	  Multiplicity,	  Fluidity	  and	  Change	  
A	  central	   element	   to	  understanding	  gender	  productions	   is	   the	  discursively	  and	  
politically	  constituted	  binary	  relationship	  between	  masculinity/femininity,	  which	  
works	   to	   enable	   and	   limit	   possible	   gender	   performances.	   In	   its	   simplest	   form,	  
speaking	  about	  this	  relationality	  means	  that	  what	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  masculine	  
stands	  in	  opposition	  to	  what	  is	  deemed	  feminine,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  something	  is	  
masculine	  because	   it	  is	  not	  feminine.	  However,	  inherent	  to	  gender	  relations	  are	  
also	   regimes	   of	   power,	   which	   means	   that	   masculinity	   and	   femininity	   are	   not	  
organized	   as	   a	   binary	   that	   works	   horizontally,	   but	   rather	   hierarchically.	  
Therefore	  determining	  who	  or	  what	   is	  considered	  masculine	  or	  masculinized	  is	  
‘inextricable	  from	  devaluing	  who	  and	  what	  is	  feminized’	  (Peterson	  2010:	  18).	  	  
Feminists	  have	   long	  been	  concerned	  with	   the	  relationship	  between	  gender	  and	  
war	   (Enloe	   1990,	   Elshtain	   1987)	   and	   have	   shown	   how	   women	   and	   men	   are	  
constructed	   as	   playing	   radically	   different	   roles	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   war.	   More	  
recently	   however,	   several	   scholars	   have	   focused	   in	   greater	   detail	   on	   the	  
production	   of	  military	  masculinities	   and	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  military	  
and	  gender	  (see	  among	  others	  Woodward	  2000,	  Higate	  2003b,	  Whitworth	  2004,	  
Woodward	   and	   Winter	   2007,	   Haaland	   2008,	   Basham	   2008,	   Duncanson	   2009,	  
Belkin	  2012),	   emphasising	   that	  gender	   ‘invariably	   involves	  masculinity	   as	  much	  
as	   femininity’	   (Peterson	   2010:	   18).	   Arguably	   the	  most	   expected	   and	   commonly	  
envisaged	  type	  of	  military	  masculinity,	  the	  ‘warrior	  masculinity’,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
the	   infantry	   and	   combat	   divisions	   -­‐	   the	   only	   section	   that	   normally	   kills	   the	  
enemy	  at	   close	   range,	   and	  where	   ‘failure	   to	  perform	   is	  often	   linked	  with	  being	  
feminine	   and	   thus	   deemed	   to	   be	   the	   antithesis	   of	   infantry	   behaviour’	   (Hockey	  
2003:	  17).	  While	  ‘warrior	  masculinity’	  is	  still	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  wars,	  this	  literature	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argues	   that	   the	   production	   of	   military	   masculinities	   is	   complex,	   nuanced	   and	  
often	   contradictory.	  What	   is	   often	   seen	   to	   characterise	   military	   masculinity	   –	  
‘violence,	   aggression,	   rationality,	   and	   a	   sense	   of	   invulnerability’	   (Higate	   2003c:	  
29)	  –	   	   is	  only	  part	  of	   the	   story,	   and	  dependent	  not	  only	  on	   segment,	   rank	  and	  
unit,	  but	  also	  on	  strategy	  and	  type	  of	  warfare.	  Military	  masculinities	  are	  shown	  to	  
be	  in	  a	  process	  of	  change,	  following	  restructuring	  policies	  in	  the	  military	  arising	  
from	   the	   introduction	   of	  more	   women,	   gays	   and	   ethnic	  minorities.	  Moreover,	  
changes	  in	  the	  types	  of	  wars	  fought	  have	  produced	  a	  range	  of	  new	  masculinities	  
from	   the	   ‘heroic	   peacekeeper’	   during	   the	   1990s,	   to	   the	   ‘humanitarian	   soldier-­‐
scholar’	   of	   the	   wars	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   Iraq	   (Duncanson	   2013:	   12).	   The	  
multiplicity	  of	  masculinities	  in	  counterinsurgency	  warfare	  is	  discussed	  at	  length	  
in	   chapters	   four	   and	   six	   and	   shows	   how	   counterinsurgency	   relies	   on	   this	  
multiplicity	  and	  the	  gendered	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  	  
As	  shown	  above,	  laws	  (gender	  norms,	  systems	  and	  ideologies)	  are	  ‘written	  on	  the	  
body’	   and	   the	   production	   of	  military	  masculinities	   often	   becomes	   internalised	  
through	  repetition	  and	  drill	  (Myrttinen	  2008:	  135).	  Through	  repetitive	  drills	  and	  
tasks,	   often	   aided	   by	   particular	   chants21,	  military	  masculinities	   are	   scripted	   on	  
bodies.	  In	  the	  production	  of	  ‘warrior	  masculinity’,	  being	  caricatured	  as	  ‘woman’,	  
‘girl’,	   ‘fag’,	   or	   any	   other	   ‘demeaning’	   name,	   is	   frequently	   used	   to	   ‘separate	   the	  
boys	   from	   the	  men’	   and	   instil	   the	   qualities	   deemed	   necessary	   to	   survive	   both	  
basic	   training	   and,	   later,	   combat.	   As	   shown	   in	   chapters	   four	   and	   six,	   despite	  
increased	  diversity	  in	  militaries,	  heteronormativity	  remains	  strong.	  	  
However,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  four,	  the	  production	  of	  	  ‘warrior	  masculinity’	  is	  
not	   entirely	   straightforward.	   Some	   show	   of	   emotion	   and	   vulnerability	   is	  
sanctioned	  that	  would	  ‘on	  other	  occasions	  [be]	  viewed	  as	  feminine	  and	  therefore	  
weak’	  (Hockey	  2003:	  23).	  Instances	  where	  displays	  of	  emotions	  are	  ‘accepted’	  are	  
often	   connected	   to	   seeing	  ones	   ‘mates’	   being	  killed	  or	   injured,	  where	   evidence	  
                                                
21	  An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  chant	  from	  the	  US	  Marines	  is	  quoted	  in	  (Myrttinen	  2008:	  138):	  	  
‘This	  is	  my	  rifle	  [holding	  up	  gun]	  
This	  is	  my	  gun	  [pointing	  at	  penis]	  
One’s	  for	  killing	  
The	  other’s	  for	  fun’	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reveals	   ‘soldiers	   showing	   emotion,	   crying	   and	   handling	   others’	   grief	   with	  
compassion	  and	  empathy’	   (Duncanson	  2009:	  65).	  This	  shows	  the	  complexity	  of	  
the	  production	  of	  military	  masculinities	  according	  to	  rank	  or	  regiment,	  as	  well	  as	  
illustrates	  that	  what	  is	  deemed	  feminine	  permeates	  these.	  As	  Erik	  Elden,	  another	  
of	  the	  memoir	  authors	  explains	  when	  recalling	  a	  debrief	  after	  a	  fallen	  comrade,	  
‘professional	  soldiers	  are	  not	  afraid	  of	  showing	  emotions’	  (2012:	  186).	  	  
‘Warrior	   masculinity’	   may	   therefore	   stand	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	   more	   ‘civilian’	  
notions	   of	   masculinity	   (Basham	   2008)	   and	   what	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   more	  
traditionally	  ‘feminised’	  roles	  within	  the	  armed	  forces,	  -­‐	  such	  as	  clerks,	  cooks	  or	  
stewards,	   all	   of	   which	   rarely	   involve	   direct	   experiences	   with	   combat	   (Higate	  
2003c).	   In	   the	   rich	   slang	   vocabulary	   of	   the	   US	   military,	   the	   derogatory	   term	  
‘Fobbit’	  is	  used	  for	  those	  who	  rarely	  see	  combat.	  The	  word	  is	  derived	  from	  FOB	  
and	   the	   Tolkien	   creation	   of	   Hobbits.	   ‘Fobbits,’	   like	   Hobbits,	   rarely	   venture	  
outside	  the	  shire/wire.	  This,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  four,	  is	  a	  central	  term	  in	  the	  
memoirs,	  and	  is	  frequently	  used	  to	  marginalise	  and	  subordinate	  those	  working	  in	  
administrative	   and	   logistical	   positions	   inside	   the	   FOB.	   As	   such	   the	   term	  
reiterates	   the	   familiar	   division	   of	   domestic/public	   -­‐	   situating	   ‘real’	   work	   and	  
soldiering	  within	  the	  latter.	  
As	   is	   illustrated	   throughout	   this	   thesis,	   with	   the	   transformation	   of	   Western	  
militaries,	  and	  their	  taking	  on	  of	  different	  roles	  and	  missions,	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  
masculinities	  increases,	  expanding	  far	  beyond	  clerks,	  cooks	  or	  stewards.	  Today’s	  
modern	  military	   employs	   engineers,	   computer	   experts,	  mechanics,	  medics	   and	  
logistical	   experts.	   It	   is	   argued	   by	   Moskos	   and	   others	   (Elliott	   and	   Cheeseman	  
2004),	   that	   Western	   militaries	   show	   a	   general	   trend	   away	   from	   a	   traditional	  
defence	  of	  the	  homeland,	  with	  close	  connections	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  nation	  state,	  	  
‘towards	   a	   volunteer	   force,	   more	   multipurpose	   in	   mission,	   increasingly	  
androgynous	  in	  make	  up	  and	  ethos,	  and	  with	  greater	  permeability	  with	  civilian	  
life’	   (2000:	   1).	  While	   this	  observation	   is	   in	  many	   instances	   true	  with	   regards	   to	  
volunteerism,	   multipurpose	   and	   civilian	   permeability,	   to	   equate	   that	   with	  
androgyny	   is	   an	   analytical	   mistake.	   While	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   there	   is	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increasingly	  a	  greater	  diversity	  in	  terms	  of	  gender	  and	  race	  in	  Western	  militaries,	  
this	   does	   not	   imply	   androgyny.	   Rather,	   as	   shown	   in	   chapters	   four	   and	   five	   in	  
particular,	   performances	  of	  multiple	   and	  diverse	   femininities	   and	  masculinities	  
are	  crucial	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  war,	  as	  is	  the	  managing	  and	  disciplining	  of	  gendered	  
bodies.	   So,	   if	   anything,	   the	   increased	   diversity	   leads	   to	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	  
gender	  differentiations,	  rather	  than	  to	  an	  erasure	  of	  these.	  	  
As	   discussed	   briefly	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   Norwegian	   and	   US	   military	  
cultures	  are	  not	  identical,	  nor	  is	  their	  ‘operational	  environment’	  in	  Afghanistan.	  
One	   can	   therefore	   expect	   there	   to	   be	   different	   productions	   of	   military	  
masculinity	   relevant	   to	   these	   two	   forces	   during	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan.	  
Norwegian	  armed	   forces	  have	   in	   the	   last	   fifteen	  years	  developed	  away	   from	   its	  
Cold	   War	   composition	   and	   towards	   a	   more	   ‘flexible’	   force	   that	   is	   capable	   of	  
contributing	   to	   international	   operations	   (Haaland	   2010,	   see	   also	  
Forsvarsdepartementet/MoD	  2003-­‐2004).	  Similar	  trends	  can	  be	  noted	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  the	  US,	  where	  one	  can	  observe	  a	  ‘fundamental	  shift	  in	  the	  emphasis	  of	  armed	  
forces	   from	   defence	   of	   the	   homeland	   to	   multinational	   peacekeeping	   and	  
humanitarian	   missions’	   (Moskos	   2000:	   17).	   These	   structural	   changes	   influence	  
how	  soldiers	  are	  supposed	  to	  behave	  and	  what	   is	  expected	  of	   them.	  As	  Former	  
Secretary	   of	   State	   Hillary	   Clinton	   remarked,	   the	   US	   needs	   ‘forces	   who	   are	   as	  
comfortable	   drinking	   tea	   with	   tribal	   leaders	   as	   raiding	   a	   terrorist	   compound’	  
(Turse	  2012).	  	  
Changing	   practices	   of	   warfare	   therefore	   have	   implications	   on	   the	   kinds	   of	  
masculinities	  produced.	  But	  this	  also	  works	  the	  other	  way.	  The	  revitalisation	  of	  
the	   colonial	   warfare	   of	   counterinsurgency,	   rebranded	   as	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency,	   requires	   multiple	   performances	   of	   military	   masculinity	  
operating	  at	  once.	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  four,	  this	  is	  not	  least	  driven	  by	  a	  notable	  
recent	   addition	   to	   military	   masculinity,	   namely	   the	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	   (Khalili	  
2010a).	   ‘Soldier-­‐scholars’	   have	   had	   a	   great	   influence	   on	   thinking	   and	  
operationalizing	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  in	  Afghanistan,	  through	  
the	  writing	  and	  advocacy	  of	  its	  doctrine.	  This	  is	  seen	  internally	  as	  being	  ‘radical’	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as	   their	  message	   ‘countermands	  decades	  of	   conventional	  U.S.	  military	  practice’	  
(USArmy	  et	   al.	   2007:	   xxvii).	   Largely	  white,	   academic,	   and	  high-­‐ranking	  officers	  
advocate	   for	   a	  military	   practice	   that	   seeks	   to	   adapt	   the	   use	   of	   force,	  maintain	  
good	  relations	  with	  the	  ‘locals’,	  and	  making	  the	  security	  for	  the	  population	  a	  key	  
strategy.	   Alternatively,	   in	   the	  words	   of	  David	  Kilcullen,	   fighting	   a	   ‘population-­‐
centric’	   counterinsurgency	   war	   requires	   ‘good	   governance,	   backed	   by	   solid	  
population	   security	   and	   economic	   development	   measures,	   resting	   on	   a	   firm	  
foundation	  of	  energetic	  IO	  [information	  operations],	  which	  unifies	  and	  drives	  all	  
other	   activity’	   (2009	   :	   60).	   However,	   and	   crucially,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	  
‘warrior	   masculinity’	   is	   no	   longer	   relevant	   for	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   operations.	   As	   shown	   in	   chapter	   four,	   while	  
counterinsurgency	   may	   be	   about	   more	   than	   ‘kinetic’	   operations,	   ‘there	   is	   no	  
known	   way	   of	   doing	   counterinsurgency	   without	   inflicting	   casualties	   on	   the	  
enemy:	  there	  is	  always	  a	  lot	  of	  killing,	  one	  way	  or	  another’	  (Kilcullen	  2006a:	  3).	  
This	  dynamic	  between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  is	  analysed	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  and	  
shown	  to	  manifest	  itself	  in	  various	  ways	  through	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war.	  As	  noted	  
above,	  De	  Certeau	  argues	  that	  bodies	  are	  ways	  of	  ‘making	  the	  body	  tell	  the	  code’	  
(1984:	   148	   emphasis	   in	   original)	   and	   the	   empirical	   chapters	   examine	   how	  
counterinsurgency	  in	   its	  dynamic	  between	   ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  produces	   its	  own	  
codes	  and	  its	  own	  multiplicity	  of	  gendered	  bodies.	  	  
These	   multiple	   masculinities	   do	   not	   necessarily	   stand	   on	   an	   equal	   footing	   in	  
relation	  to	  one	  another.	  As	  Duncanson	  points	  out,	  the	  ‘hegemonic	  masculinity’,	  
even	   in	   peacekeeping	   operations	   remains	   the	   ‘warrior	   model’	   (2009:	   65).	   This	  
implies	   that	   the	   other	   types,	  more	   concerned	  with	   stabilisation	   and	   providing	  
security	   to	   the	   civilian	   population	   can	   become	   subordinated	   and	  marginalised	  
(Connell	   1995:	   76-­‐86).	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   or	  
soldiers	   who	   are	   concerned	   with	   the	   wellbeing	   of	   local	   Afghans	   are	   always	  
subordinate,	   and	   that	   ‘warrior	   masculinity’	   is	   always	   superior.	   Rather,	   as	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discussed	   briefly	   below,	   and	   in	   later	   chapters,	   these	   multiple	   military	  
masculinities	  are	  continuously	  negotiated	  22.	  	  
Recent	   public	   discussions	   in	   Norway	   about	   the	   ‘warrior	   culture’	   in	  
Telemarksbataljonen	   (Telemark	   Battalion)	   represent	   an	   informative	   example	   of	  
how	  military	  masculinities	  can	  involve	  contestation,	  and	  how	  this	  in	  turn	  relates	  
to	  the	  gendered	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  in	  counterinsurgency.	  While	  this	  
example	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  chapter	  four,	  it	  is	  worth	  underlying	  here	  
that	  the	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  a	  Norwegian	  soldier	  in	  the	  national	  imaginary	  
is	  like	  that	  of	  the	   ‘wholesome	  boy	  living	  next	  door,	  who	  dons	  the	  uniform	  for	  a	  
limited	   time	  before	   returning	   to	   civilian	   life’	   (Haaland	  2008:	   175).	  What	  makes	  
Norwegians	   ‘good	   soldiers’	   in	   this	   imaginary	   is	   their	   ‘largely	   civilian	   values’,	  
which	   enable	   them	   to	   ‘handle	   difficult	   situations	   with	   flexibility	   and	   common	  
sense,	   not	   because	   of	   their	   toughness	   or	   bravery	   in	   combat’	   (ibid.).	   In	   other	  
words,	   the	  public	  perception	  of	  Norwegian	  soldiers	   is	  not	  marked	  by	   ‘violence,	  
aggression,	  rationality,	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  invulnerability’	  (Higate	  2003c:	  29).	  Rather,	  
they	   are	   viewed	   largely	   as	   embodying	   a	   peacekeeper	   masculinity	   (Higate	   and	  
Henry	  2004,	  Duncanson	  2009)	  and	  as	  ‘carers’.	  	  
However,	   this	   image	  was	   sharply	  countered	   in	   the	   fall	  of	  2010	  when	   the	   ‘men’s	  
magazine’	   Alfa	   did	   an	   interview	   with	   members	   of	   the	   infantry	   unit	  
Telemarkbataljonen.	  Here,	  soldiers	  expressed	  a	  rather	  different	  image,	  and	  stated	  
that,	   ‘It	  may	  sound	  stupid,	  but	  to	  be	  in	  battle	  is	  better	  than	  sex’	  and,	  ‘you	  don’t	  
sign	  up	  to	  go	  to	  Afghanistan	  to	  save	  the	  world,	  but	  to	  join	  a	  real	  war’	  (Hompland	  
2010).	   In	   the	   immediate	   aftermath,	  Norwegian	   news	   outlets	  were	   flooded	  with	  
articles,	   opinion	   pieces	   and	   debates	   expressing	   both	   dismay	   and	   sympathy	   for	  
the	   soldiers	   -­‐	   sparking	   a	   broader	   debate	   about	   ‘soldier	   culture’	   (Bisgaard	   2011).	  
Representatives	   from	  the	  military	   that	  expressed	  their	  views	  during	  this	  debate	  
were	  from	  different	  ranks	  within	  the	  army,	  which	  affected	  where	  they	  stood	  on	  
                                                
22	  Another	   way	   in	   which	   military	   masculinities	   are	   ‘multiple’	   is	   according	   to	   nationality	   since	  
‘military	  masculinities	  are	  embedded	  into	  discourses	  of	  nationalism’	  (Higate	  2003a:	  209).	  This	  is	  
not	  necessarily	  surprising	  given	  the	  symbolically	  important	  role	  gender	  plays	  in	  constructions	  of	  
nationalism	  and	  the	  nation	  state	  (Yuval-­‐Davis	  1997,	  Nagel	  1998).	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the	  matter.	  Generally,	  those	  of	  high	  rank	  and	  with	  a	  ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  masculinity	  
distanced	  themselves	  from	  these	  actions	  and	  statements	  as	  not	  being	  indicative	  
of	  the	  values	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  military,	  whereas	  those	  belonging	  to	  lower	  ranks	  
or	   combat	   forces,	   seemed	   relieved	   that	   these	   kinds	  of	   expressions	   came	   to	   the	  
fore	  and	  were	  critical	  of	  the	  way	  it	  was	  represented	  in	  the	  media	  (VGNett	  2010,	  
Elden	  2012,	  Johansen	  2011)23.	  This	  event	  and	  the	  ensuing	  debates	  show	  that	  there	  
is	  a	  particular	  national	  identity	  assumed	  embodied	  in	  the	  Norwegian	  soldier,	  and	  
also	  that	  this	  identity	  is	  partly	  contested	  from	  within.	  Furthermore	  it	  shows	  that	  
there	   is	   no	   necessary	   continuity	   between	   foreign	   policy	   discourse	   and	   internal	  
military	  identities.	  	  	  
To	   conclude	   this	   section,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   within	   the	   productions	   of	  
different	   kinds	   of	   military	   masculinities,	   femininity	   is	   always	   a	   factor.	   It	   may	  
appear	   to	   be	   entirely	   invisible,	   but	   it	   is	   very	   much	   an	   ‘absent	   presence’.	   This	  
works	   in	   two	   ways.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   femininity	   plays	   a	   central	   part	   in	   the	  
production	  of	  multiple	  forms	  of	  military	  masculinity	  more	  broadly	  because	  of	  its	  
function	  in	  the	  binary	  involving	  the	  devalorisation	  of	  femininity	  (Peterson	  2010).	  
In	   this	   sense,	   femininity	   is	   built	   into	   masculinity	   as	   that	   which	   masculinity	  
overcomes.	  And	  while	  masculinity	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  only	  accessible	  to	  male	  bodies,	  
male	   bodies	   become	   the	   ‘site	   and	   measure	   of	   military	   effectiveness	   only	   in	  
relation	   to	   the	   weakness	   and	   unsuitability	   of	   women’s	   bodies	   which	   are	   thus	  
themselves	   productive	   in	   their	   perceived	   docility’	   (Basham	   2012:	   13	   emphasis	  
added).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  femininity	  works	  as	  an	   ‘absent	  present’	   in	  that	   it	   is	  
the	  performance	  of	   invisible	  or	  silenced	  elements	  which	  allow	  the	  performance	  
of	   masculine	   elements	   to	   be	   highlighted.	   Hence,	   hierarchies	   and	   dichotomies	  
privilege	   particular	   performances	   of	   military	   masculinity,	   and	   exclude	   others.	  
This	  flexibility	  in	  military	  masculinity	  enables	  it	  to	   ‘take	  up’	  characteristics	  that	  
are	  traditionally	  assumed	  to	  be	  feminine	  and	  subsume	  them	  under	  the	  dynamic	  
                                                
23	  Largely,	   it	  was	   felt	   by	   several	   soldiers	  who	   had	   served	   in	  Afghanistan	   that	   it	  was	   about	   time	  
Norway	  had	  an	  honest	  debate	  about	  the	  role	  and	  actions	  of	  its	  armed	  forces	  serving	  there.	  This	  is	  
expressed	  in	  the	  autobiographical	  book	  Brødre	  i	  Blodet	  (Blood	  Brothers)	  by	  Officer	  Emil	  Johansen	  
in	   the	  Telemark	  Battalion,	  who	   calls	   himself	   a	   ‘professional	  warrior’	   (Johansen	   2011).	   This	   book	  
gained	  much	  attention	  when	  it	  came	  out	  and	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  memoirs	  that	  are	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  
to	  make	  sense	  of	  contestations	  within	  the	  production	  of	  Norwegian	  military	  masculinities.	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and	  unpredictability	  of	  military	  masculinity,	  thus	  producing	  yet	  another	  form	  of	  
military	  masculinity	   (Duncanson	   2009).	  This	   is	   captured	  nicely	  when	  Kilcullen	  
argues	   for	   a	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	   military	   masculinity	   fit	   for	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	  –	  	  ‘if	  this	  sounds	  unmilitary,	  get	  over	  it’	  (Kilcullen	  2006b:	  135).	  	  
	  
2.3	  Writing	  Women’s	  Martial	  Bodies	  
Women’s	  bodies	  have	   always	  proved	  difficult	   to	  manage	   in	  Western	  militaries.	  
For	  example,	  deciding	  what	  kinds	  of	  uniforms	  women	  can	  and	  cannot	  wear	  has	  
historically	   been	   a	   cause	   of	   great	   concern.	   As	   Enloe	   details,	   whether	   or	   not	  
female	   soldiers	   should	  wear	  high	  heels	   and	  have	  breast	  pockets	  on	   their	   shirts	  
was	  deemed	  crucial	   in	  order	   to	  ensure	   that	   they	   remained	  respectable,	  but	  did	  
not	   look	   like	   men	   (2000:	   261-­‐273).	   Enloe	   urges	   us	   to	   pay	   close	   attention	   to	  
women	   within	   the	  military,	   and	   identifies	   five	   major	   reasons	   why	   women	   are	  
increasingly	   being	   included	   in	  military	   ranks:	   	   a	  means	   to	  make	  up	   for	   loss	   in	  
conscription	  regulations	  in	  many	  countries	  (not	  Norway),	  as	  compensation	  for	  a	  
loss	  in	  birth	  rates	  (less	  male	  soldiers	  available),	  to	  enable	  less	  recruitment	  from	  
ethnic	  and	  racial	  groups	   that	  are	  viewed	  with	  suspicion,	   to	  add	  personnel	  with	  
high	   levels	   of	   formal	   education,	   and	   lastly,	   that	   having	   more	   women	   in	   the	  
armed	  forces	  make	  the	  military	  look	  ‘modern’	  (Enloe	  2007:	  65).	  This	  latter	  point	  
is	  central	   in	  the	  case	  of	   the	  Norwegian	  military.	  Former	  defence	  minister	  Anne	  
Grethe	   Strøm-­‐Erichsen	   made	   the	   point	   that	   ‘both	   at	   home	   and	   abroad	   our	  
Armed	  Forces	  should	  be	  a	  showcase	  for	  our	  democratic	  political	  system	  based	  on	  
human	  rights,	  ethnic	  diversity	  and	  equality	  between	  the	  genders’	  (2007a,	  see	  also	  
Skjelsbæk	  and	  Tryggestad	  2011).	  	  
As	   argued	   above,	   masculinity	   and	   femininity	   are	   seen	   as	   fluid	   and	   dynamic	  
concepts	  that	  can	  be	  attributed	  to,	  and	  appropriated	  by,	  male	  and	  female	  bodies	  
alike.	   Men	   can	   perform	   femininity	   and	   women	   can	   perform	   masculinity.	  
However,	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  femininity	  and	  masculinity	  exist	  as	  equals,	  nor	  
that	  men	  and	  women	  can	  pick	  and	  choose	  at	  will.	  That	  said,	  it	  does	  imply	  paying	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attention	   to	   the	  notion	  of	   female	  masculinity,	   and	   the	   challenges	   this	  poses	   to	  
the	  military.	  	  
As	  continuously	  highlighted	  in	  this	  chapter,	  and	  throughout	  the	  thesis,	  they	  way	  
in	   which	   gender	   is	   embodied	   is	   key	   to	   understanding	   the	   production	   and	  
performativity	  of	  gender	  in	  war.	  Grooming,	  physique,	  and	  clothes	  matter	  a	  great	  
deal	  in	  the	  production	  of	  soldiers.	  For	  female	  service	  members	  there	  is	  the	  added	  
balancing	   act	   of	   maintaining	   them	   as	   feminine,	   but	   not	   too	   feminine,	   and	  
masculine	  enough,	  but	  not	  ‘like	  men’.	  Everyday	  bodily	  practices	  such	  as	  perfume	  
and	  make	   up	   need	   to	   be	   disciplined	   in	   order	   to	   contain	   feminine	   expressions.	  
With	  regards	  to	  the	  British	  Military,	  Basham	  found	  that	  being	  in	  close	  proximity	  
to	   a	   servicewoman	   wearing	   perfume	   was	   argued	   to	   have	   a	   ‘big	   psychological	  
effect’	  on	  the	  men,	  and	  that	  women	  were	  seen	  to	  disrupt	  and	  distract	   from	  the	  
work	   of	   real	   soldiers	   (Basham	   2008).	   Similar	   sentiments	   are	   also	   expressed	   by	  
male	  Norwegian	  soldiers	  who	  would	  prefer	  the	  smell	  of	  sweat	  to	  perfume	  –	  ‘this	  
is	  a	  military	  unit	  goddammit’	  (Totland	  2009:	  69).	  A	  total	  of	  thirty	  six	  objects	  are	  
listed	  under	  ‘additional	  authorized	  items’	  of	  the	  packing	  list	  for	  FETs	  -­‐	  including	  
sunscreen	  and	  curling	  irons,	  and	  notably	  excluding	  cosmetics	  or	  perfumes	  (CALL	  
2011:	  87-­‐89).	  	  
These	  examples	  show	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  detailed	  gendered	  and	  racialized	  coding	  
that	   is	   involved	   in	   producing	   effective	   female	   soldiers	   in	   Afghanistan,	   and	   the	  
ways	   in	  which	  war	  writes	   itself	   on	  bodies.	   	   Seemingly	   trivial	   details	   (ponytails,	  
perfume,	   and	   cosmetics)	   tell	   us	   a	   great	   deal	   about	   how	   gender	   and	   race	   are	  
scripted	  on	  bodies	  to	  ensure	  that	   female	  soldiers	  remain	  appropriately,	  but	  not	  
excessively,	   feminine.	   Crucially,	   as	   demonstrated	   in	   chapter	   five,	   these	   small	  
gestures	   also	   signify	   to	   the	   local	   population	   that	   they	   are	   not	   dealing	   with	   a	  
dangerous,	  violent	  and	  culturally	  insensitive	  male	  -­‐	  but	  rather	  an	  unthreatening,	  
kind	  and	  gentle	  female.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  while	  women’s	  bodies	  in	  the	  military	  need	  to	  be	  disciplined	  to	  
ensure	   that	   they	   remain	   appropriately	   female,	   they	   also	   need	   to	   perform	  
according	  to	  traditional	  masculine	  characteristics	  -­‐	  such	  as	  physical	  strength	  and	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endurance.	  FETs	  in	  Afghanistan	  report	  that	  male	  soldiers	  frequently	  doubt	  their	  
ability	   to	  do	   the	  physically	  demanding	  work	  of	   soldiering	   (Bumiller	  2010b)	  and	  
female	  soldiers	  are	  often	  viewed	  sceptically	  on	  these	  grounds.	  Similar	  sentiments	  
are	   expressed	   by	   members	   of	   Telemarksbataljonen,	   a	   company	   that	   has	  
traditionally	   recruited	  very	   few	  women	  -­‐	   ‘I	   think	   I	   speak	   for	  99	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  
boys	  in	  the	  troop	  when	  I	  say	  that	  girls	  can’t	  do	  our	  job.	  We	  have	  so	  much	  heavy	  
gear,	  and	  work	  really	  hard	  and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  girls	  are	  made	  weaker	  than	  
boys’	  (Totland	  2009:	  62-­‐63).	  Likewise,	  out	  of	  all	  of	  the	  memoirs	  analysed	  for	  this	  
thesis,	  only	  two	  stories	  of	  female	  service	  personnel	  are	  included,	  and	  both	  appear	  
in	  Parnell’s	  book24.	  Both	  of	  these	  portray	  women	  in	  negative	  and/or	  derogatory	  
terms,	   further	   cementing	   the	   discursive	   link	   between	  men	   as	   soldiers/fighters	  
and	  women	  as	  peacemakers.	  	  
These	  examples	  illustrate	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  female	  body	  represents	  a	  
problem	  for	  the	  armed	  forces.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  what	  laws	  are	  
‘written	  on	  the	  body’	  of	  servicewomen	  at	  any	  given	  point	  in	  time	  -­‐	  since	  they	  are	  
expected	   to	   be	   feminine	   enough	   so	   as	   to	   not	   be	   mistaken	   for	   men,	   while	  
masculine	  enough	  so	  as	   to	  not	  upset	   ‘the	  boys’.	   Indeed,	   there	   is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
hard	  work	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  of	  military	  bodies	  in	  war.	  	  Even	  more	  so	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  to	  which	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  
	  
3.0	  Gender,	  Biopolitics	  and	  Counterinsurgency	  
While	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  primarily	  about	  exploring	  the	  biopolitical	  rationalities	  of	  
counterinsurgency	   and	   late	   modern	   warfare	   it	   does	   demonstrate	   how	  
understanding	  counterinsurgency	  as	  biopolitical	  requires	  recognising	  its	  various	  
gendered	   and	   embodied	   manifestations.	   Several	   scholars	   have	   recognized	  
counterinsurgency’s	   biopolitical	   dimensions	   (Gregory	   2008a,	   Gregory	   2008b,	  
                                                
24	  One	   is	   the	   ‘scowling	   Asian	   American	   physician’s	   assistant’	   and	   the	   other	   is	   the	   ‘rude	   and	  
officious	   Mail	   Bitch’	   who	   was	   eventually	   dismissed	   for	   having	   an	   affair	   with	   a	   fellow	   soldier	  
(Parnell	  2012:	  208,	  219).	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Anderson	  2011,	  Kienscherf	  2011),	  all	  of	  which	  constitute	   important	   interventions	  
in	  a	  critical	  examination	  of	  counterinsurgency.	  	  
Biopolitics	   represents	   a	   development	   from	  what	   Foucault	   describes	   as	   classical	  
conceptions	   of	   sovereignty,	   which	   entail	   the	   ‘right	   of	   life	   and	   death’.	   Foucault	  
writes,	  
‘The	  very	  essence	  of	  the	  right	  of	  life	  and	  death	  is	  actually	  the	  right	  to	  kill:	  it	  is	  the	  moment	  when	  
the	  sovereign	  can	  kill	  that	  he	  exercises	  his	  right	  over	  life.	  It	  is	  essentially	  the	  right	  of	  the	  sword.	  
So	  there	  is	  no	  real	  symmetry	  in	  the	  right	  over	  life	  and	  death.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  right	  to	  put	  people	  to	  
death	  or	  to	  grant	  them	  life.	  Nor	  is	  it	  the	  right	  to	  allow	  people	  to	  live	  or	  to	  leave	  them	  to	  die.	  It	  is	  
the	  right	  to	  take	  life	  or	  let	  it	  live’	  (Foucault	  1997:	  240-­‐241).	  	  
This	   type	  of	  sovereignty	   is	  contrasted	  to	  biopolitical	  governmentality,	  as	  power	  
does	  not	  only	  concern	  itself	  with	  the	  ‘right	  to	  take	   life	  or	  let	   live	  (Foucault	  1998:	  
138)	  but	   is	  expanded	   to	  also	   include	  a	  concern	   for	   the	  quality	  and	  wellbeing	  of	  
life	  itself	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  governed,	  the	  population.	  	  
So	   far	   in	   this	   chapter,	   the	   productive	   work	   of	   power	   on	   bodies	   has	   been	  
discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  disciplinary	  function.	  However,	  in	  Foucault’s	  later	  work	  
on	   governmentality,	   he	   began	   noting	   how	   power	   also	   works	   through	   these	  
different	   technologies	   of	   biopower	   or	   biopolitics	  25.	   While	   disciplinary	   power	  
works	  on	  bodies,	   ‘the	  new	  nondisciplinary	  power	  is	  applied	  not	  to	  man-­‐as-­‐body	  
but	   to	   the	   living	  man,	   to	  man-­‐as-­‐living-­‐being’	   or	   to	   ‘man-­‐as-­‐species’	   (Foucault	  
2004:	  242).	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  type	  of	  power	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  management	  
and	   administration	   of	   life	   itself,	   on	   the	   level	   of	   populations	   (Dean	   2009:	   118).	  
Foucault	  writes	   that	   ‘biopolitics	  deals	  with	   the	  population,	  with	   the	  population	  
as	   political	   problem,	   as	   a	   problem	   that	   is	   at	   once	   scientific	   and	   political,	   as	   a	  
biological	  problem	  and	  as	  power’s	  problem’	  (1997:	  245).	  	  
                                                
25	  While	   these	   two	   terms	   are	   sometimes	   used	   interchangeably,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   a	   distinction	  
between	  them.	  Biopower	  is	  a	  broad	  term,	  one	  that	  inhabits	  both	  anatomo-­‐politics	  (‘man-­‐as-­‐body’)	  
and	   biopolitics	   (‘man-­‐as-­‐species’)	   (Elbe	   2005:	   405-­‐406).	   Biopolitics	   therefore	   signifies	   the	  
governmental	  logic	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  population.	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Biopolitical	   logics	  work	   internationally,	  not	   just	  domestically,	  and	  are	  visible	   in	  
the	  way	  that	  security	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  being	  closely	  connected	  with	  levels	  of	  
development.	   The	   accepted	   ‘truth’	   guiding	   both	   the	   US	   and	   Norway	   in	  
Afghanistan	  is	  that	  ‘because	  development	  reduces	  poverty	  and	  hence	  the	  risk	  of	  
future	  instability,	  it	  also	  improves	  our	  own	  security’	  (Duffield	  2007:	  2	  emphasis	  in	  
original).	  As	  Mark	  Duffield	  points	  out,	  while	  this	  logic	  seems	  novel	  and	  ‘likely	  to	  
revolutionize	   the	   21st	   century’	   -­‐	   the	   fusing	   of	   development	   and	   security	   has	   a	  
much	   longer	   genealogy.	   He	   argues	   that,	   since	   modernity,	   the	   liberal	   problem	  
with	  security	  has	  been	  concerned	   ‘with	  people	  and	  all	  the	  multiform	  processes,	  
conditions	  and	  contingencies	   that	  either	  promote	  or	   retard	   life	  and	  well-­‐being’	  
(Duffield	   2007:	   4).	   In	   this	  way,	   ‘biopolitics	   is	   a	   security	  mechanism	   that	  works	  
through	  regulatory	  interventions	  that	  seek	  to	  establish	  equilibrium,	  maintain	  an	  
average	   or	   compensate	   for	   variations	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   populace’	   and	   that	  
‘security	   in	   this	  context	   relates	   to	   improving	   the	  collective	   resilience	  of	  a	  given	  
population	  against	  the	  contingent	  and	  uncertain	  nature	  of	  its	  existence’	  (Duffield	  
2006:	  16).	  Biopolitical	  logics	  working	  in	  this	  way	  enable	  governments	  to	  not	  only	  
become	   ‘promoters	   of	   the	   wellbeing	   of	   humanity’,	   but	   also	   to	   ‘command	   and	  
control’	  the	  understanding	  of	  that	  well	  being	  to	  begin	  with	  (Reid	  2007:	  5).	  
A	   similar	   kind	   of	   biopolitical	   logic	   and	   dynamic	   between	   classic	   sovereignty	  
(killing)	   and	   biopolitical	   governmentality	   (caring)	   is	   visible	   in	   the	   practice	   of	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency.	   It	   simultaneously	   casts	   itself	   as	   ‘armed	  
social	  work’	   (Kilcullen	  2006b:	   138,	  USArmy	  et	  al.	   2007:	   299),	  while	  at	   the	   same	  
time	   acknowledging	   that	   there	   is	   ‘always	   a	   lot	   of	   killing	   one	  way	   or	   the	   other’	  
(Kilcullen	   2006a:	   3).	   This	   type	   of	   logic	   therefore	   requires	   something	   different	  
from	   its	   soldiers	   as	   ‘modern	   liberal	   citizens’	   who	   no	   longer	   only	   serve	   in	   the	  
register	  of	  death,	  performing	  classical	   sovereignty	   -­‐	  but	  who	   ‘care	   for	   the	  body	  
politic	  as	  a	  way	  of	  caring	  for	  themselves’	  (Weber	  2008a:	  134).	  However,	  as	  shown	  
in	  chapters	  four	  and	  five	  particularly,	  this	  dynamic	  between	  ‘killing’	  and	  ‘caring’	  
in	   the	   practice	   of	   counterinsurgency	   works	   through,	   and	   is	   reliant	   upon,	   its	  
various	   gendered	   and	   embodied	   manifestations.	   The	   dynamic	   can	   at	   times	  
functions	  as	  a	  tension;	  at	  times	  a	  contradiction;	  while	  at	  other	  times	  the	  one	  is	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enabled	   through	   the	   other.	   This	   thesis	   contributes	   to	   the	   existing	   biopolitical	  
studies	  of	  counterinsurgency	  by	  showing	  how	  the	  dynamic	  between	  ‘killing’	  and	  
‘caring’	  requires	  a	  gendered	  manifestation.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  argues	  that	  only	  by	  
recognising	  biopolitics	  gendered	  manifestation	  can	  it	  fully	  be	  acknowledged.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  
As	  this	  chapter	  has	  argued,	  gender	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  performative	  act.	  
The	   disciplining	   of	   bodies	   is	   a	   crucial	   part	   of	   the	   production	   of	   militaries.	  
Speaking	   of	   the	   body	   as	   produced	   in	   this	   sense	   means	   rejecting	   the	   body	   as	  
something	   ‘given’	   and	   ‘natural’.	   Bodies	   are	   formed	   in	   the	   military	   through	   a	  
series	   of	   meticulous	   and	   detailed	   technologies	   that	   ultimately	   produce	   the	  
martial	  body.	  	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  outlined	  the	  theory	  of	  gender	  and	  feminist	  approach	  
that	  guides	  this	  research.	  It	  argued	  that	  gender	   is	  a	  series	  of	  performances	  that	  
rely	   on	   repetition	   in	   order	   to	   come	   into	   being.	   By	   analysing	   how	   gender	   is	  
produced	   through	   particular	   discourses,	   be	   that	   in	   foreign	   policy	   or	   military	  
discourses,	  and	  through	  practices	  such	  as	  war,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  understand	  not	  
necessarily	  what	  gender	  ‘is’	  but,	  more	  importantly,	  what	  it	   ‘does’.	  However,	  this	  
does	  not	  mean	   that	   gender	   trumps	  other	   ‘identity	  markers’	   such	  as	   race,	   class,	  
sexuality	   or	   religion.	   Rather,	   gendered	   bodies	   are	   already	   embedded	   into	  
racialized,	  classed,	  sexualised	  bodies.	  Hence,	  rather	  than	  seeing	  gender	  and	  race	  
as	  potentially	  existing	  outside	  of	  each	  other,	  this	  approach	  recognises	  that	  these	  
elements	  are	  inseparable	  interlinked.	  	  
Drawing	   on	   the	  work	   of	   Foucault,	  De	  Certeau,	   and	   numerous	   gender	   scholars	  
working	  on	  military	  masculinities,	  this	  chapter	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  development	  
of	   a	  modern	  military	   relies	   on	   the	   disciplining	   of	   bodies.	   Taking	   bodies	   as	   its	  
main	   component,	   and	   moulding	   them	   through	   meticulous	   and	   detailed	  
arrangements	  produce	  particular	  kinds	  of	  military	  masculinities.	  With	  reference	  
 64	  
to	   both	   the	   memoirs	   and	   numerous	   military	   documents	   (such	   as	   training	  
manuals	  and	  guides),	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  military	  is	  ‘writing	  (on)	  bodies’.	  And	  
since	  gender	  is	  produced	  in	  discourse,	  the	  writing	  of	  bodies	  is	  what	  brings	  them	  
into	   being	   -­‐	   in	   this	   case	   as	   differentiated	  martial	   bodies.	   Recognizing	  military	  
masculinities	  as	  a	  multiple	  and	  plural	  concept	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  chapter	  
four,	   where	   it	   is	   demonstrated	   that	   practices	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   rely	   on	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   military	   masculinities.	   The	  
management	  of	  women’s	  martial	  bodies	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  for	  militaries.	  As	  
shown	  above,	  and	  in	  chapter	  five	  of	  this	  thesis,	  women’s	  bodies	  are	  ‘odd	  bodies’	  
in	   the	   military	   -­‐	   required	   to	   perform	   a	   complex	   fusion	   of	   femininity	   and	  
masculinity	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   This	   is	   crucial	   in	   the	   deployment	   of	   FETs,	  
discussed	   in	   chapter	   five.	   Analysing	   the	   detail	   by	   which	   women’s	   bodies	   are	  
managed	  in	  the	  military	  to	  enable	  FETs	  to	  access	  the	  female	  population,	  tells	  us	  a	  
great	  deal	  about	  the	  militarised	  production	  of	  gender	  and	  what	  it	  requires.	  	  
Before	  exploring	  the	  multiple	  gendered	  performances	  in	  the	  ‘theatre	  of	  war’,	  this	  
thesis	   now	   turns	   to	   analysing	   the	   gendered	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan-­‐	   showing	  
how	  gendered	  bodies	  and	  gendered	  performances	  were	  crucial	  to	  enabling	  that	  










-­‐	  Chapter	  3	  -­‐	  	  	  
The	  Gendered	  Invasion	  of	  Afghanistan:	  The	  (In)Visible	  
‘Body	  in	  the	  Burqa’	  and	  Performances	  of	  ‘Protective	  
Masculinity’	  	  
	  
	  ‘Every	  man	  I	  meet	  wants	  to	  protect	  me.	  I	  can't	  figure	  out	  what	  from’	  
Mae	  West	  
‘It	  is	  precisely	  in	  this	  realm	  of	  escalated	  rhetoric	  and	  assured	  contrasts	  that	  women	  are	  more	  
absent	  than	  ever...	  Women	  are	  invoked,	  but	  are	  not	  present’	  	  
Mary	  Anne	  Franks	  
	  	  
	  
The	   invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	   in	  2001	  was	   the	   first	  of	   the	  two	  major	   invasions	   in	  
the	  name	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  (the	  second	  was	  Iraq)	  26	  and	  was	  partly	  justified	  as	  
an	   exercise	   in	  women’s	   liberation.	  Undoubtedly	   this	  was	   a	   time	   of	   heightened	  
public	  rhetoric	  that	  came	  to	  define	  so	  much	  of	  international	  relations	  in	  the	  first	  
decade	   of	   the	   21st	   century.	  While	   the	  previous	   chapter	   outlined	   the	   theoretical	  
framework	   for	   studying	   productions	   and	   performances	   of	   gender	   in	   war,	   this	  
chapter	  considers	  how	  gender	  became	   integral	   to	   justifying	   the	   invasion.	  What	  
kinds	   of	   gendered	   bodies	   were	   called	   into	   being	   in	   practicing	   invasion?	  What	  
gendered	  performances	  did	  it	  enable?	  	  
                                                
26	  This	   was	   not	   the	   first	   time	   in	   recent	   years	   that	   the	   US	   launched	   airstrikes	   on	   Afghanistan.	  
Bombs	  were	  also	  dropped	  in	  1998,	  following	  the	  attacks	  on	  the	  US	  embassies	  in	  Nairobi	  and	  Dar	  e	  
Salaam.	  These	  were	  also	   justified	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  Taliban	  and	  Osama	  bin	  Laden,	  who	  had	  




The	  chapter	  shows	  how	  particular	  productions	  of	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  in	  
the	   foreign	  policy	  discourse	  of	   the	  US	  and	  Norway	  enabled	   the	   legitimation	  of	  
the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  in	  2001	  through	  a	  framework	  of	  victimised	  femininity	  
and	   protective	   masculinity.	   	   It	   argues	   that	   gendered	   and	   racialized	   identities	  
constructed	  in	  foreign	  policy	  discourse	  ‘make	  various	  courses	  of	  actions	  possible’	  
(Doty	   1996:	   5),	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   invasion	  of	  Afghanistan,	   and	   that	   the	   invasion	  
cannot	   be	   fully	   understood	   without	   taking	   seriously	   the	   gendered	   and	   racial	  
discourse	  it	  relied	  on.	  	  
The	   dominant	   narrative	   told	   to	   the	   American	   public	   and	   the	  world	   about	   the	  
invasion	  in	  Afghanistan	  followed	  a	  particular	  gendered	  logic.	  Simplified,	   it	  held	  
that	   the	   US	   (and	   by	   extension	   the	   West)	   was	   attacked	   by	   the	   international	  
terrorist	  network	  Al	  Qaeda	  on	  September	  11th	  2001,	  and	  that	  this	  in	  turn	  required	  
some	   kind	   of	   retaliation.	   Since	   the	   Taliban	   was	   found	   to	   be	   harbouring	   and	  
training	  Al	  Qaeda,	  Afghanistan	  became	  a	  target	  early	  on.	  Hence,	  the	  US	  and	  its	  
allies	  would	  harm	  Al	  Qaeda	  by	  ridding	  them	  of	  supporters	  such	  as	  the	  Taliban,	  
destroying	  their	  training	  camps,	  killing	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  and	  through	  this,	  make	  
the	   world	   a	   safer	   place.	   The	   discursive	   slippage	   between	   Al	   Qaeda	   and	  
Afghanistan,	  the	  frequent	  references	  to	  Afghan	  women	  as	  victims	  represented	  by	  
the	   (in)visible	   ‘body	   in	   the	   burqa’,	   performances	   of	   ‘protective	   masculinity’	  
through	  a	  discourse	  that	  equated	  support	  for	  the	  war	  as	  believing	  in	  peace,	  were	  
only	   enabled	   through	   particular	   gendered	   and	   racial	   constructions	   (Shepherd	  
2006:	  20).	  	  
The	   chapter	   analyses	   American	   and	   Norwegian	   governmental	   discourses	   of	  
invasion	  and	   finds	   that	   there	   are	  both	   similarities	   and	  differences	  between	   the	  
two.	  The	  US	  narrative	  was	  one	  of	  ‘assured	  contrasts’	  (Franks	  2003:	  137)	  between	  
good	   and	   evil,	   just	   and	   unjust,	   heroes	   and	   cowards,	   light	   and	   dark.	  While	   the	  
dominant	  Norwegian	  narrative	  was	  no	   less	   self-­‐assured	   in	   the	   righteousness	  of	  
invading	  Afghanistan,	   it	  was	   at	   times	   framed	   slightly	  differently.	  While	   the	  US	  
government	   made	   frequent	   references	   to	   the	   invasion	   being	   an	   unequivocally	  
‘just’	  course	  of	  action	  in	  response	  to	  terror,	  Norway’s	  government	  legitimated	  its	  
 67	  
role	   also	   through	   references	   to	   maintaining	   strong	   alliances	   with	   the	   US	   and	  
NATO.	   The	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   should	   therefore	   be	  
understood	   as	   a	   particularly	   gendered	   one	   that,	   in	   the	  words	   of	   then	  Defence	  
Minister	  Kristin	  Krohn	  Devold	  enabled	  Norway	   to	   ‘play	  with	   the	  big	  boys	  even	  
though	  they	  are	  small’.	  	  
The	  chapter	  offers	  a	  feminist	  analysis	  of	  the	  gendered	  and	  racialized	  discourse	  of	  
the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  and	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan.	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction	  
of	   this	   thesis,	   discourse	   is	   constructed	   through	   a	   process	   of	   linking	   and	  
differentiation	   (Hansen	   2006:	   19-­‐20),	   which	   seeks	   to	   ‘naturalize’,	   ‘classify’,	  
‘negate’,	   and	   ‘position’	   subjects	   (Doty	   1996:	   10-­‐11	   ,	   Laclau	   and	   Mouffe	   2001,	  
Shepherd	   2008).	   These	   are	   strategies	   used	   to	   ‘fix’	   discourses	   so	   they	   become	  
common	   sense	   and	   it	   is	   through	   the	   performance	   of	   these	   discourses	   that	  
national	   identities	   are	   called	   into	   being.	   As	   Campbell	   argues,	   states	   are	  
‘inherently	   paradoxical’	   entities,	   that	   are	   ‘devoid	   of	   a	   prediscursive,	   stable	  
identity’	   (Campbell	   1998:	   197).	   In	   a	   similar	  way	   to	  how	  gender	   is	   performative,	  
national	   identity	   is	   also	   performative	   and	   therefore	   only	   comes	   into	   being	  
through	  a	  series	  of	  repetitive	  and	  citational	  practices.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
intent	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  suggest	  that	  either	  the	  ‘American	  state	  identity’	  nor	  the	  
‘Norwegian	   state	   identity’	   is	   inherently	   anything,	  but	   that	   that	   state	   identity	   is	  
called	  into	  being	  through	  the	  repetitive	  performances	  of	  particular	  gendered	  and	  
racialized	  narratives.	  	  
	  
1.0	  ‘A	  Fight	  for	  the	  Rights	  and	  Dignity	  of	  Women’	  	  
Almost	  immediately	  after	  9/11,	  the	  Bush	  administration,	  together	  with	  American	  
and	   international	  media,	   successfully	  constructed	  a	  narrative	  of	   ‘moral	  outrage’	  
against	   the	   Taliban.	   By	   focusing	   in	   particular	   on	   the	   Taliban	   edicts	   against	  
women	   in	   the	   period	   between	   1996-­‐2001	   and	   through	   casting	   itself	   as	   the	  
saviours	  and	  liberators	  of	  Afghan	  women’s	  rights,	  the	  US	  attempted	  to	  legitimate	  
the	   invasion	   (see	   among	   others	   Abu-­‐Lughod	   2002,	   Hirschkind	   and	  Mahmood	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2002,	  Weber	  2005,	  Russo	  2006,	  Shepherd	  2006,	  Hunt	  and	  Rygiel	  2006).	  This	  has	  
meant	   that	  one	  aspect	  of	   the	   ‘war	  on	   terror’	   overall	  has	  been	  a	  battle	  over	   the	  
meaning	   and	  ownership	   of	  women’s	   rights	   (Bhattacharyya	   2008:	   19).	   For	  while	  
the	  West	  claimed	  to	  be	  protecting	  women,	  the	  Taliban	  claimed	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  
leaving	  women’s	  rights	  and	  any	  meaningful	  public	  discussion	  about	  of	  feminism	  
and	  women’s	  rights	  between	  a	  rock	  and	  a	  hard	  place.	  
	  
1.1	  Reinventing	  President	  Bush	  
This	   message	   of	   saving	   women	   only	   strengthened	   through	   the	   course	   of	   the	  
autumn	   of	   2001.	   Roughly	   a	  month	   after	   the	   invasion,	   Bush	   addressed	   the	   UN	  
General	  Assembly	  and	  defended	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  invasion.	  He	  reiterated	  his	  
previous	   message	   that	   ‘either	   you	   are	   with	   us,	   or	   you	   are	   with	   the	   terrorists’	  
(Bush	   2001a)	   characterising	   terrorists	   as	   ‘parasites’	   and	  warning	   that	   ‘for	   every	  
regime	  that	  sponsors	  terror,	  there	  is	  a	  price	  to	  be	  paid’	  (Bush	  2001g).	  Part	  of	  his	  
pitch	  to	  the	  international	  community	  consisted	  of	  showing	  how	  Afghan	  women	  
had	   suffered,	   and	   how	   their	   suffering	  was	   now	   coming	   to	   an	   end.	  He	  made	   a	  
promise	   to	   the	   ‘victims	  of	   that	   [Taliban]	   regime’	   that	   their	  days	  of	   ‘harbouring	  
terrorists,	  dealing	   in	  drugs	  and	  brutalizing	  women’	  are	  soon	  coming	  to	  an	  end.	  
And	   when	   the	   US	   military	   has	   successfully	   ousted	   the	   regime	   ‘the	   people	   of	  
Afghanistan	  will	  say	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  –	  good	  riddance’	  (Bush	  2001g).	  	  
A	   similar,	   but	   even	   stronger	   message	   came	   in	   December	   2001	   in	   a	   speech	   to	  
Congress	  after	   the	  signing	  of	   the	  Afghan	  Women	  and	  Children’s	  Relief	  Act.	  He	  
emphasised	   how	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   bill	   by	   ‘this	   great	   nation’	   brings	   ‘hope	   and	  
help’	  to	  Afghanistan’s	  women	  and	  children,	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  ‘true	  compassion	  of	  this	  
great	  land’	  (Bush	  2001e).	  	  Bush	  stated	  that,	  	  
‘the	  central	  goal	  of	  the	  terrorists	  is	  the	  brutal	  oppression	  of	  women	  –	  and	  not	  only	  the	  women	  of	  
Afghanistan.	   The	   terrorists	   who	   help	   rule	   Afghanistan	   are	   found	   in	   dozens	   and	   dozens	   of	  
countries	  around	  the	  world	  –	  And	  that	  is	  the	  reason	  this	  great	  nation,	  with	  our	  friends	  and	  allies,	  
will	  not	  rest	  until	  we	  bring	  them	  all	  to	  justice’	  (2001e	  emphasis	  added).	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Three	   things	   are	   particularly	   important	   about	   this	   statement.	   First	   of	   all,	   it	   is	  
claimed	   that	   the	   ‘brutal	   oppression’	   of	   women	   is	   the	   main	   goal	   of	   terrorists	  
everywhere.	   In	   other	  words,	   terrorists	   are	   particularly	   interested	   in	   brutalizing	  
women,	   above	   and	   beyond	   any	   other	   aims	   they	   may	   have.	   Secondly,	   this	   is	  
identified	  as	   ‘the	   reason’	   for	   the	   ‘war	  on	  terror’	  and	   for	   the	  American	  efforts	   to	  
‘bring	   them	   all	   to	   justice’.	   Thirdly,	   and	   perhaps	  most	   exceptionally,	   Bush	   here	  
casts	  himself	  (and	  his	  military)	  not	  only	  as	  the	  saviour	  of	  Afghan	  women,	  but	  of	  
all	  women	  living	  ‘brutalized’	  lives	  in	  the	  ‘dozens	  and	  dozens	  of	  countries	  around	  
the	   world’.	   Bush’s	   metamorphosis	   into	   a	   saviour	   of	   women	   everywhere	   is	  
particularly	  extraordinary	   taking	   into	  account	   that	  prior	   to	  9/11	  he	  rarely	  spoke	  
about	   women’s	   rights,	   and	   that	   his	   first	   act	   as	   President	   was	   to	   reinstate	   the	  
‘Global	  Gag	  Rule’	  (Blackman	  2001)27.	  It	  is	  therefore	  perhaps	  tempting	  to	  interpret	  
this	   as	   a	   pure	   instrumentalisation	   of	   women.	   However,	   as	   this	   chapter	   shows	  
towards	   the	   end,	   there	   is	   a	   more	   sophisticated	   explanation	   to	   be	   had	   of	   the	  
sudden	  mobilisation	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  Bush	  administration.	  	  
While	  Bush	  promised	  to	  ‘bring	  them	  all	  to	  justice’,	  Former	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  
Colin	  Powell28	  described	  the	  US	  as	  bringers	  of	   light	  to	  the	  dark29	  corners	  of	  the	  
world.	   Afghan	  women,	  we	   are	   told,	   have	   been	  waiting	   for	   years	   for	   the	  US	   to	  
come	  and	  rescue	  them	  –	  	  
                                                
27	  The	   ‘Global	   Gag	   Rule’	   prevents	   funds	   being	   directed	   to	   development	   organizations	   or	   family	  
planning	  groups	  that	  counsel	  or	  offer	  abortions	  across	  the	  world.	  It	  was	  first	  initiated	  by	  Ronald	  
Reagan	  in	  1984,	  it	  was	  revoked	  by	  Bill	  Clinton,	  reinstated	  by	  Bush	  and	  revoked	  by	  Obama	  as	  one	  
of	   his	   first	   acts	   as	   President	   (Seager	   2012).	   For	   other	   examples	   of	   Bush’s	   pre	   9/11	   stance	   on	  
women’s	  rights	  see	  Nayak	  (2006:	  53-­‐54).	  	  
28	  Colin	  Powell	  was	  Secretary	  of	  State	  from	  2001-­‐2005,	  followed	  by	  Condoleezza	  Rice	  (2005-­‐2006),	  
Hillary	  Rodham	  Clinton	  (2009-­‐2013)	  and	  John	  Kerry	  (2013-­‐).	  Prior	  to	  Rice’s	  appointment	  at	  State,	  
she	  was	  the	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  and	  an	  influential	  player	  in	  Bush’s	  war	  cabinet.	  When	  Bush	  
gave	  his	  first	  speech	  to	  the	  US	  public	  after	  the	  attacks,	  on	  the	  evening	  of	  9/11,	  Powell,	  Cheney,	  and	  
Rumsfeld	  was	  not	  consulted,	  only	  Rice.	  She	  emphasised	  how	  ’first	  words	  matter	  more	  than	  almost	  
anything	   else’	   (Woodward	   2002:	   30-­‐31).	   In	   this	   speech	   a	   central	   element	   of	   the	   ’Bush	   doctrine’	  
emerged	  when	  he	  stated	  that	  ’we	  will	  make	  no	  distinction	  between	  the	  terrorists	  who	  committed	  
these	  acts	  and	  those	  who	  harbor	  them’	  (Bush	  2001f).	  	  
29	  The	   image	   of	   bringing	   light	   to	   darkness	   is	   was	   also	   a	   prominent	   part	   of	   Time	   Magazine’s	  
coverage	  of	  the	  events	  of	  2001-­‐2002,	  which	  was	  compiled	  in	  a	  photo	  essay	  entitled	  ‘From	  Shadow	  
to	  Dark’	  and	  set	   to	   sombre	  music.	  Dana	  L.	  Cloud,	  paying	  attention	   to	   the	   relationship	  between	  
the	  visual	  and	  the	  written	  argues	  that	  this	  acted	  to	  show	  what	  the	  ideograph	  ‘clash	  of	  civilization’	  
looks	  like	  (2004).	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‘They	  have	  helped	  one	  another	  and	  their	  children	  to	  keep	  hope	  alive	  for	  the	  moment	  when	  their	  
rights	   could	   be	   restored,	   for	   the	  moment	  when	   they	   could	   emerge	   into	   the	   sunlight	   and	   help	  
their	  county	  onto	  freedom’s	  path.	  That	  day	  is	  near,	  very	  near.	  In	  fact,	  the	  dawn	  has	  broken.	  And	  
when	   the	   light	   is	   fully	   shed	   throughout	   all	   of	   Afghanistan,	   the	  United	   States	   is	   committed	   to	  
working	  to	  ensure	  not	  only	  that	  the	  women	  of	  Afghanistan	  regain	  their	  place	  in	  the	  sun,	  but	  they	  
have	  a	  place	  in	  the	  future	  government	  as	  well’	  (Powell	  2001)	  
In	  the	  first	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  address	  after	  the	  invasion,	  Bush	  emphasised	  again	  
how	  the	  invasion	  had	  saved	  the	  women	  of	  Afghanistan	  –	  	  ‘The	  last	  time	  we	  met	  
in	  this	  chamber,	  the	  mothers	  and	  daughters	  of	  Afghanistan	  were	  captives	  in	  their	  
own	  homes,	  forbidden	  from	  working	  or	  going	  to	  school.	  Today	  women	  are	  free’	  
(2002).	  
	  
1.2	  Maternalism	  and	  Imperialism	  
Like	   her	   husband,	   Laura	   Bush	   reinvented	   herself	   during	   the	   autumn	   of	   2001.	  
While	   President	   Bush	   took	   on	   the	   role	   of	   ‘Commander	   in	   Chief’	   for	   women’s	  
rights	   everywhere,	   Laura	   Bush	   became	   the	   ‘Carer	   in	   Chief’	   and	   a	   fervent	  
supporter	  of	  her	  husband.	  9/11	  had,	   she	  argued,	  made	  the	  US	   ‘a	  kinder	  nation’,	  
one	  of	   ‘courage	  and	  hope’,	   ‘love	  and	  sacrifice’	   and	   she	  emphasised	  how	   ‘one	  of	  
the	  major	   differences	   between	   our	   country	   and	   the	   people	  we	   fight	   against’	   is	  
that	  ‘we	  believe	  that	  every	  person	  matters’.	  She	  encouraged	  American	  parents	  to	  
reassure	  children	  that	  ‘many	  people	  love	  them	  and	  care	  for	  them’	  and	  that	  ‘while	  
there	  are	  some	  bad	  people	  in	  the	  world,	  there	  are	  many	  more	  good	  people’	  (Bush	  
2001h).	  She	  is	  thankful	  that	  the	  ‘cynicism	  and	  distrust	  with	  which	  people	  viewed	  
government	   is	   replaced	   with	   a	   spirit	   of	   appreciation	   and	   respect	   for	   public	  
servants,	  and	  that	  is	  healthy	  for	  our	  democracy’	  (Bush	  2001h).	  	  Through	  sharing	  
her	  experience	  as	  a	  mother	  and	  a	  teacher	  and	  emphasising	  how	  ‘helping	  others	  
does	  make	  us	  feel	  good’,	  she	  performs	  a	  maternal	  femininity	  that	  acts	  to	  soften	  
the	   war	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   Bush	   administration	   and	   assures	   the	   American	   people	  
that	   they	   are	   in	   safe	   hands.	   In	   the	   State	   of	   the	   Union	   in	   2002,	   her	   husband	  
thanked	  her	  especially	  for	  ‘the	  strength	  and	  calm	  and	  comfort	  she	  brings	  to	  our	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nation	  in	  crisis’	  (Bush	  2002).	  
By	  Mid-­‐November	  2001	  Mrs	  Bush	  not	  only	  cared	  for	  Americans,	  but	  spread	  her	  
message	  of	   ‘love	  and	  sacrifice’	  (Bush	  2001h)	  also	  to	  Afghan	  women.	  In	  what	  has	  
been	  called	  the	   ‘women’s	  week	  in	  American	  politics’	  Mrs	  Bush	  became	  the	  first	  
‘First	   Lady’	   to	   ever	   hold	   a	   presidential	   address	   in	   its	   entirety,	   which	   aired	   on	  
November	   17th,	   2001	   (Cohn	   2003:	   1201).	   She	   spoke	   in	   sincere	   tones	   about	   the	  
situation	  of	  Afghan	  women	  and	  stated	  that,	  
‘Civilized	  people	  throughout	  the	  world	  are	  speaking	  out	  in	  horror	  -­‐	  not	  only	  because	  our	  hearts	  
break	   for	   the	  women	  and	   children	   in	  Afghanistan,	   but	   also	  because	   in	  Afghanistan	  we	   see	   the	  
world	  the	  terrorists	  would	  like	  to	  impose	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  us’	  (Bush	  2001i).	  	  
She	  highlighted	  how	  the	  advances	  that	  the	  US	  military	  had	  made	  in	  Afghanistan	  
benefited	  Afghan	  women	  and	  pointed	  out	   that	   they	  could	  now	   ‘listen	   to	  music	  
and	  teach	  their	  daughters	  without	  fear	  of	  punishment’	  and	  claimed	  that	  this	  war	  
was	  a	  ‘fight	  for	  the	  rights	  and	  dignity	  of	  women’	  (Bush	  2001i).	  As	  Shepherd	  notes,	  
the	  usage	  of	  the	  phrase	   ‘women	  and	  children’,	  reiterated	  a	  familiar	  trope	  which	  
denies	  Afghan	  women	  ‘both	  adulthood	  and	  agency,	  affording	  them	  only	  pity	  and	  
a	  certain	  voyeuristic	  attraction’	  (2006:	  20).	  This	  infantilisation	  signals	  that	  ‘their	  
lives	  depend	  on	  being	  saved	  from	  the	  vagaries	  and	  horrors	  of	  their	  cultures	  and	  
religions	   by	   rational,	   enlightened,	   civilized	   and	   strong	   political	   actors’	   (Nayak	  
2006:	  48).	  	  
Her	  radio	  address	  came	  the	  week	  before	  the	  first	  Thanksgiving	  holiday	  after	  9/11.	  
Thanksgiving,	   associated	   with	   consumption,	   abundance	   and	   families	   coming	  
together	   (Wallendorf	   and	   Arnould	   1991),	   will	   she	   argues,	   be	   special	   ‘this	   year’	  
given	  the	  ‘events	  of	  the	  last	  months’	  as	  ‘we’ll	  be	  holding	  our	  families	  ever	  closer’	  
(Bush	   2001i).	   This	   is	   the	   time	   to	   be	   ‘especially	   thankful	   for	   all	   the	   blessings	   of	  
American	  life’	  and	  she	  hopes	  that	  all	  of	  America	  will	  ‘join	  our	  family	  in	  working	  
to	   insure	   that	   dignity	   and	   opportunity	   will	   be	   secured	   for	   all	   the	   women	   and	  
children	  of	  Afghanistan’	  (Bush	  2001i).	  Here	  again	  we	  see	  her	  performing	  her	  role	  
as	  a	  maternal	  mother	  for	  America’s	  heterosexual	  families	  and	  for	  the	  ‘women	  and	  
children	  of	  Afghanistan’.	  For	  Zillah	  Eisenstein,	  this	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  ‘imperial	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feminism’	  –	  	  
‘And	  it	  should	  be	  no	  surprise	  that	  Bush’s	  cowgirls…who	  regularly	  dismiss	  and	  criticize	  feminism	  
of	   any	   sort	  were	   responsible	   for	   articulating	   this	   imperial	  women’s	   rights	   justification	   for	  war.	  
Imperial	  feminism	  utilizes	  a	  masculinist	  militarism	  in	  drag.	  Imperial(ist)	  feminism	  obfuscates	  the	  
use	  of	  gender	  decoys:	  women	  are	  both	  victims	  and	  perpetrators;	  constrained	  and	  yet	  free;	  neither	  
exactly	  commander	  nor	  victim’	  (2007:	  40).	  
The	   characteristic	   division	   of	   ‘civilized’	   and	   ‘barbarian’	   in	  Mrs.	   Bush’s	   address,	  
justified	  the	  invasion	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  women	  there	  needed	  saving	  from	  
their	   ‘barbaric’	  men.	   In	  doing	  so,	  while	  praising	   the	  US	  military’s	  efforts	  as	   the	  
saving	   grace	   of	   Afghan	   women,	   she	   reiterates	   what	   Spivak	   said	   defined	   neo-­‐
colonial	  practices	  of	  the	  West	  -­‐	  that	  of	  ‘white	  men,	  seeking	  to	  save	  brown	  women	  
from	  brown	  men’	  (1999:	  303).	  	  
Also	  in	  Norway	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  war	  being	  waged	  for	  Afghan	  women’s	  rights	  
gained	   prominence.	   However,	   this	   played	   itself	   out	   differently	   in	   Norway	   and	  
should	  be	  viewed	  in	  light	  of	  Norwegian	  histories	  of	  feminism,	  its	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐
vis	  the	  US,	  and	  trying	  to	  construct	  its	  foreign	  policy	  identity	  as	  humanitarian	  and	  
peace	   loving	  (Ottosen	  2004,	  Leira	  et	  al.	  2007).	  At	   the	  time	  of	   intervention,	   two	  
women	  held	  key	  positions	  of	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  foreign	  policy	  more	  broadly	  and	  
defence	   policy	   specifically30.	   While	   Mrs	   Bush	   appealed	   to	   an	   ‘all	   embracing	  
maternal	   “we”’	   in	   her	   balancing	   act	   between	   neoconservative	   and	   liberal	  
feminism,	   Norwegian	   female	   representatives	   of	   the	   power	   elite	   have	   other	  
concerns	  to	  balance	  (von	  der	  Lippe	  and	  Vyrynen	  2011:	  23).	  Maternal	  feminism,	  of	  
the	  kind	  that	  Mrs	  Bush	  espouses	  (Shepherd	  2006:	  24,	  Dubriwny	  2005),	  has	  little	  
resonance	   in	   the	   Norwegian	   context,	   where	   feminism	   can	   broadly	   be	  
characterised	  as	   ‘equity	  feminism’	  (von	  der	  Lippe	  and	  Vyrynen	  2011)	  or	  as	   ‘state	  
feminism’	   (Hernes	   2004).	   That	   said,	   references	   to	   the	   invasion	   being	   for	   the	  
benefit	   of	   Afghan	   women	   have	   been	   made	   specifically	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
                                                
30	  The	  Minister	   of	   Defence	   was	   Kristin	   Krohn	  Devold	   (Conservative	   Party,	   2001-­‐2005),	   and	   the	  
President	  of	  the	  Parliamentary	  Defence	  Committee	  was	  Marit	  Nybakk	  (Labour	  Party).	  Since	  the	  
change	  of	  government	  from	  the	  Conservative/Centre	  coalition	  in	  2005	  to	  the	  Red/Green	  coalition,	  
two	  out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  three	  Ministers	  of	  Defence	  (all	  Labour)	  have	  been	  women:	  Anne	  Grete	  Strøm-­‐
Erichsen	   (2005-­‐2009),	   Grete	   Faremo	   (2009-­‐2011),	   Espen	   Barth	   Eide	   (2011-­‐2012),	   and	   Strøm-­‐
Erichsen	  again	  in	  2012.	  
 73	  
Norwegian	   narrative	   as	   well.	   Marit	   Nybakk,	   a	   well	   known	   Labour	  
parliamentarian	  who	   identifies	   herself	   as	   an	   ‘old	   school	   feminist’	   (2010),	   called	  
the	  invasion	  ‘women’s	  liberation’	  and	  stated	  that	  ‘al	  Qaeda	  is	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  
threats	  to	  women’s	  rights	  in	  our	  time	  (Ellingsen	  2002)31.	  She	  emphasised	  that	  ‘the	  
issue	  of	  women	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  strong	  contributing	  factor	  for	  the	  Norwegian	  
public	  to	  support	  us	  being	  there’	  (Nybakk	  2010).	  A	  year	  after	  9/11,	  then	  Defence	  
Minister	  Kristin	  Krohn-­‐Devold	  emphasised	  how	  the	  invasion	  had	  rid	  Afghanistan	  
of	  the	  ‘terrorist,	  brutal	  and	  women	  hating	  Taliban’	  (2002).	  	  
Another	   aspect	   that	   is	   argued	   to	   be	   formative	   in	   Norway	   at	   the	   time	   is	   the	  
increased	   attention	   that	   the	   burqa	   and	  Afghanistan	   gained	   in	   popular	   culture.	  
Important	  here	   is	   the	  publication	  of	   the	  novel	  The	  Bookseller	   of	  Kabul	  by	  Åsne	  
Seierstad,	  which	  contributed	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  Norwegian	  interpretations	  of	  Afghan	  
culture.	   The	   book	   became	   immensely	   popular,	   was	   later	   translated	   into	   41	  
languages	  (Hill	  2010)	  and	  was	  based	  on	  Seierstad’s	  stay	  with	  the	  bookseller	  Shah	  
Mohammad	  Rais	   (aka	   ‘Sultan	  Khan’)	   and	  his	   family	   in	  Kabul	   for	   six	  months	   in	  
the	  spring	  of	  2002.	  In	  the	  forward	  to	  the	  book,	  Seierstad	  recounts	  what	  inspired	  
her	   to	   write	   the	   book	   -­‐	   ‘One	   day	   he	   [‘Sultan	   Khan’]	   invited	   me	   home	   for	   an	  
evening	   meal…the	   atmosphere	   was	   unrestrained…but	   I	   soon	   noticed	   that	   the	  
women	   said	   little…when	   I	   left	   I	   said	   to	   myself:	   ‘This	   is	   Afghanistan.	   How	  
interesting	  it	  would	  be	  to	  write	  a	  book	  about	  this	  family’	  (2008).	  	  
While	   the	   book	   is	   still	   widely	   read,	   it	   is	   also	   steeped	   in	   controversy.	   The	  
bookseller	  eventually	  sued	  Seierstad	  for	  the	  way	  she	  had	  portrayed	  him	  and	  his	  
family	   in	   her	   book	   and	   for	   breach	   of	   privacy32.	   While	   Seierstad	   has	   received	  
ample	   criticism	   from	   academics	   and	   other	   journalists	   for	   the	   way	   her	   novel	  
claims	  to	  speak	  the	  truth,	  privacy	  issues	  for	  interview	  objects	  and	  around	  issues	  
of	   representing	   the	   Other,	   she	   has	   largely	   received	   great	   praise	   for	   her	   book.	  
                                                
31	  Nybakk	   later	   modified	   her	   statements	   to	   me,	   but	   stood	   by	   her	   claim	   that	   ‘Afghan	   women	  
needed	  liberation’	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Northern	  alliance	  and	  OEF	  ‘threw	  out’	  the	  Taliban	  was	  a	  
‘condition’	  for	  ‘women’s	  liberation	  in	  Afghanistan’	  (Nybakk	  2010).	  	  
32	  In	  the	  case,	  the	  Rais	  family	  won	  in	  the	  district	  court	  (Tingrett),	  and	  Seierstad	  appealed	  to	  the	  
‘Court	  of	  Appeal’	  (Lagmannsretten)	  where	  she	  won.	  Reis	  then	  appealed	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  
(Høysterett)	  which	  denied	  his	  appeal.	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Myhre	  argues	  that	  this	  was	  because	  her	  representation	  of	  the	  Other	  and	  the	  Self	  
confirmed	  Norwegian	  imaginaries,	  	  
‘The	   representation	   of	   Afghan	   men	   as	   an	   abusive	   “other”	   conversely	   constituted	   Norwegian	  
“selves”	  as	  enlightened	  and	  liberated.	  Extolling	  the	  book	  meant	  furthering	  female	  liberation,	  even	  
if	  it	  entailed	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  neo-­‐colonial	  vision	  on	  Afghan	  women	  and	  men	  alike’	  (2004:	  22)	  
Beyond	  this,	  the	  wider	  narrative	  of	  the	  invasion	  cast	  it	  as	  being	  for	  humanitarian	  
reasons,	  and	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  Norwegian	  military	  presence	  there	  was	  bring	  peace,	  
development	   and	   gender	   equality	   (Ottosen	   2004).	   This	  was	   reiterated	   later	   by	  
Defence	  Minister	   Strøm-­‐Erichsen	  who	   explained	   that	   the	   invasion	  was	   ‘simply	  
put’	   to	   ‘help	   people	   in	   need’,	   emphasising	   how	   ‘this	   resonates	   with	   the	  
Norwegian	  people’.	  Since	  ‘we’	  can	  ‘benefit	  from	  material	  wealth	  in	  a	  peaceful	  part	  
of	  the	  world,	  we	  have	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  stand	  up	  for	  those	  who	  are	  in	  need’	  
(Strøm-­‐Erichsen	   2007b).	   While	   this	   is	   ideally	   done	   through	   development	   and	  
humanitarian	   aid,	   Strøm-­‐Erichsen	   contends	   that	   sometimes	   it	   is	   ‘unfortunately	  
necessary	   to	   deploy	  military	   forces’	   (2007b).	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   is	   not	   that	   the	  
Norwegian	   government	  necessarily	  wants	   to	   deploy	  military	   forces;	   it	   is	   rather	  
that	   it	   is	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   ‘build	   security’,	   ensure	   ‘our	   own	   security’,	   and	  
increase	   Norway’s	   commitment	   to	   having	   ‘strong	   international	   organisations’	  
such	  as	  the	  UN	  and	  NATO.	  The	  latter	  is	  described	  as	  an	  organisation	  to	  ‘preserve	  
peace	   and	   security	   and	   to	   strengthen	   our	   common	   freedom,	   culture	   and	  
civilization’	  (Strøm-­‐Erichsen	  2007b).	  In	  other	  words,	  NATO	  is	  much	  more	  than	  
simply	  a	  military	  organisation	  set	  to	  defend	  a	  specific	  territory,	  it	  the	  defender	  of	  
a	  particular	  way	  of	  life.	  As	  one	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  soldiers	  puts	  it	  	  
‘the	   argument	   for	   Norwegian	   presence	   in	   Afghanistan	   was	   shaped	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	  
development,	   democracy,	   children’s	   education	   and	  women’s	   rights	  were	   the	   focus.	  To	   say	   that	  
Norway	  was	  in	  Afghanistan	  of	  pure	  security	  political	  causes	  determined	  by	  the	  US	  perhaps	  didn’t	  
go	  down	  well	  with	  the	  population?’	  (Mella	  2013:	  89)	  
Both	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  American	  and	  Norwegian	  narratives	  therefore,	  claims	  are	  
made	   as	   to	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   invasion	  with	   reference	   to	   the	   oppression	   of	  
Afghan	  women	  and	  claiming	  humanitarian	  intent.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  
 75	  
this	  was	  enabled	  through	  an	  equation	  with	  the	  category	  of	  ‘Afghan	  women’	  with	  
the	   (in)	   visible	   ‘body	   in	   the	   burqa’,	   and,	   as	   discussed	   in	   section	   three,	  
performances	  of	  ‘protective	  masculinity’.	  	  
	  
2.0	  The	  (In)Visible	  ‘Body	  in	  the	  Burqa’	  
Words	  do	  not	  stand	  alone	  in	  the	  production	  of	  powerful	  narratives,	  but	  are	  aided	  
by	  the	  visual	  and	  audio	  accompaniments	  that	  help	  to	  emphasise,	  focus	  and	  draw	  
our	   attention	   to	   the	   cause	   (Weber	   2008b).	   As	   argued	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  
discourses	   are	   not	   just	   words,	   but	   they	   write	   the	   body	   (De	   Certeau	   1984)	   in	  
numerous	  ways,	  among	  which	  are	  clothing.	  Before,	  during	  and	  immediately	  after	  
the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan,	  one	  piece	  of	  clothing	  became	  particularly	  significant	  
as	   a	   symbol	   of	   Afghan	   women’s	   victimhood	   –	   the	   burqa.	   While	   attention	   to	  
pieces	   of	   clothing	  may	   seem	   insignificant,	   clothes	   can	  be	   seen	   as	   ‘instruments’	  
through	  which	  the	  law	  ‘maintains	  its	  hold	  on	  bodies’	  (De	  Certeau	  1984:	  147).	  This	  
was	  no	  doubt	  the	  case	  during	  the	  Taliban	  regime’s	  rule	  in	  Afghanistan	  between	  
1996-­‐2001	  where	  the	  burqa	  was	  imposed	  on	  women’s	  bodies	  and	  harsh	  penalties	  
were	   administered	   if	   women	   failed	   to	   wear	   it.	   However,	   as	   argued	   here,	   the	  
burqa	   also	   came	   to	  have	   significant	  meaning	   in	   the	  ways	  Afghan	  women	  were	  
understood	   in	   the	   West.	   The	   burqa	   as	   a	   form	   of	   clothing	   that	   signifies	   and	  
symbolises	  oppression	  in	  the	  Western	  public,	  disciplined	  Afghan	  women’s	  bodies	  
in	  Western	  imaginaries,	  and	  after	  9/11	  it	  became	  a	  powerful	  visual	  symbol	  of	  the	  
dichotomy	  between	  civilised/barbarian	  and	  modern/traditional.	  	  
	  
2.1	  Unveiling	  the	  Afghan	  Woman	  
During	   the	   weeks	   and	   months	   after	   9/11,	   ‘burqa-­‐clad	   figures,	   potent	   political	  
symbols	   of	   the	   “evil”	   of	   the	   Taliban	   were	   suddenly	   everywhere’	   (Ayotte	   and	  
Husain	  2005:	   117).	  This	  garment,	  which	   is	  uniquely	  able	   to	   render	  women	  both	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invisible	  and	  visible	  at	   the	  same	  time	  became	   increasingly	  prevalent.	   In	  the	  US	  
State	  Department’s	  report,	  The	  Taliban’s	  War	  Against	  Women,	  published	  on	  the	  
same	  day	  as	  Laura	  Bush’s	  radio	  address	  discussed	  above,	  significant	  attention	  is	  
placed	  on	  the	  burqa.	  	  It	  is	  described	  as	  a	  garment	  that	  ‘restricts	  movement’,	  is	  an	  
‘economic	  burden’,	  a	  ‘cloth	  prison’,	  and	  a	  ‘physical	  and	  psychological	  burden’	  and	  
importantly,	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  ‘basic	  principles	  of	  human	  rights’	  (USDoS	  2001).	  
It	  is	  noted	  that	  it	  features	  merely	  as	  one	  of	  many	  restrictions	  on	  women’s	  bodies,	  
and	   is	   ‘matched	   by	   other	   limitations	   on	   personal	   adornment’	   as	   ‘make	   up	   and	  
lipstick	  were	  also	  prohibited’	  (USDoS	  2001).	  Mavis	  Leno,	  along	  with	  the	  King	  of	  
Morocco	  and	  Vladimir	  Putin	  are	  quoted	  condemning	  the	  garment,	  and	  perhaps	  
to	  signify	  broad	  international	  denouncement	  of	  it,	  from	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  
alike.	  	  
The	  ease	  with	  which	  burqas	  become	  synonymous	  with	  Afghan	  women	  needs	  to	  
be	  placed	   in	  historical	   context.	  The	  use	  of	  veils	  has	   long	  served	  as	  a	   symbol	  of	  
Muslim	   women’s	   oppression	   for	   the	   west.	   As	   Leila	   Ahmed	   explains,	   veiling	  
remains	   the	   ‘most	   visible	  marker	   of	   the	  differentness	   and	   inferiority	   of	   Islamic	  
societies’	   and	   ‘the	   backwardness	   of	   Islam’	   (1992:	   152).	   The	   veil	   in	   its	   various	  
shapes	  and	  forms	  has	  historically	  been	  important	  as	  a	  garment	  to	  rally	  against	  for	  
Western	   neocolonial	   and	   imperial	   feminism,	   something	   that	   has	   ‘ever	   since	  
imparted	  to	  feminism	  in	  non-­‐Western	  societies	  the	  taint	  of	  having	  served	  as	  an	  
instrument	   of	   colonial	   domination’	   (Ahmed	   1992:	   167).	   	   For	   Frantz	   Fanon,	   the	  
obsession	  with	   unveiling	   the	   veiled	  women	   for	   French	   colonizers	   in	   Algeria	   is	  
driven	  in	  part	  by	  an	  obsession	  with	  the	  visual	  and	  is	  symbolic	  of	  conquering	  as	  	  
‘Unveiling	   this	  woman	   is	   revealing	   her	   beauty,	   it	   is	   baring	   her	   secret,	   breaking	   her	   resistance,	  
making	  her	  available	  for	  adventure.	  Hiding	  the	  face	  is	  also	  disguising	  a	  secret…this	  woman	  who	  
sees	  without	  being	  seen	  frustrates	  the	  colonizers.	  There	  is	  no	  reciprocity.	  ’	  (1980:	  43-­‐44)33.	  	  
                                                
33	  Fanon	   argues	   in	  Algeria	   Unveiled	   that	   the	   veil	   was	   worn	   partly	   also	   as	   a	   symbol	   of	   national	  
resistance	  to	  colonization.	  While	  this	  can	  hardly	  be	  said	  for	  the	  spread	  of	  burqas	  in	  Afghanistan	  
during	   the	   1990s	  when	   it	   was	   harshly	   enforced	   on	   Afghan	  women	   by	   the	   Taliban	   regime,	   it	   is	  
worth	  noting	   that	  Afghan	  women	   found	  uses	  of	   it	   that	  were	  hardly	   intended	  by	   the	  Taliban.	   It	  
‘provided	   an	   effective	   cover	   for	   smuggling	   books	   and	   supplies	   to	   a	   network	   of	   underground	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For	   both	   Ahmed	   and	   Fanon,	   the	   outcry	   against	   the	   veil	   speaks	   not	   only	   to	   a	  
misunderstanding	   of	   its	  multiple	   purpose	   and	   role	   in	   numerous	   very	   different	  
Muslim	  societies,	  but	  unveiling	  the	  veiled	  is	  also	  a	  significant	  symbol	  of	  colonial	  
feminism	  and	  the	  imperial	  conquering.	  	  
The	   burqa	   served	   as	   a	   part	   of	   the	   Feminist	   Majority	   Foundation’s	   (FMF)34	  
campaign	   that	   began	   in	   the	   mid	   1990s	   called	   ‘Stop	   Gender	   Apartheid	   in	  
Afghanistan’	   (Russo	   2006).	  Parts	   of	   this	   campaign	   included	   a	   fundraising	  drive	  
shortly	   after	   9/11,	   where	   pieces	   of	   burqa-­‐like	   cloth	   with	   the	   message	   ‘Wear	   a	  
symbol	  of	  remembrance	  for	  Afghan	  women’	  were	  sold	  on	  the	  FMF	  website	  (Hunt	  
2006:	  61).	  This	  followed	  a	  special	  performance	  of	  the	  Vagina	  Monologues	  where	  
Oprah	  Winfrey	   read	  a	  monologue	  entitled	   ‘Under	   the	  Burqa’.	  According	   to	   the	  
FMF,	   the	   performance	  was	   a	   ‘heart-­‐wrenching,	   spine-­‐tingling	   story’	   and	   at	   the	  
end	   ‘an	   Afghan	   woman	   wearing	   the	   all-­‐inhibiting	   burqa	   appeared	   as	   vocal	  
sounds	  of	  pain	  and	  agony	  filled	  Madison	  Square	  Garden’	  (FMF	  2001).	  The	  session	  
culminated	  with	   the	  Afghan	  woman	  being	  unveiled	  by	  Oprah	  Winfrey	   (Lerner	  
2001).	  The	  visual	  and	  politically	  important	  gesture	  of	  unveiling	  carried	  with	  it	  the	  
‘implicit	  assumption	  that	  the	  US	  embodies	  gender	  equality	  and	  women’s	  human	  
rights’	   and	   that	   ‘Western	  women	   and	   feminism	  become	   the	  Afghans’	   hope	   for	  
democracy’	  (Russo	  2006:	  559).	  	  
The	  burqa	  also	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  several	  documentaries	  and	  articles	  across	  the	  
US	   and	  more	   broadly	   in	   the	  West.	   The	   documentary	   ‘Beneath	   the	   Veil’35,	   was	  
broadcast	  at	  least	  ten	  times	  on	  CNN,	  including	  the	  night	  before	  the	  invasion	  of	  
                                                                                                                                          
schools,	   cameras	   for	  documenting	  Taliban	  abuses,	   and	  women	   fleeing	  persecution’	   (Ayotte	   and	  
Husain	  2005:	  117,	  see	  also	  Brodsky	  2003,	  Kolhatkar	  and	  Ingalls	  2006).	  	  
34	  This	   campaign	   and	   the	   Feminist	   Majority	   Foundations	   alignment	   with	   the	   Bush	   regime	   has	  
attracted	  significant	  criticism	  from	  several	  feminists	  who	  accuse	  them	  of	  allowing	  themselves	  to	  
be	   co-­‐opted	  by	   the	  Bush	   regime	   (see	   among	  others	  Ayotte	   and	  Husain	   2005,	  Russo	   2006,	   Fluri	  
2008).	  Much	  criticism	  has	  centred	  on	  their	  relationship	  to	  RAWA	  (Revolutionary	  Association	  of	  
the	  Women	   of	   Afghanistan)	   –	   an	   Afghan	   feminist	   and	   humanitarian	   organisation	   in	   existence	  
since	  1979	  –	  where	  they	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  opting	  for	  feminist	  rescue	  over	  feminist	  solidarity.	  
While	  RAWA	  originally	  worked	  with	  FMF,	  they	  eventually	   ‘gave	   little	  or	  no	  credit’	   to	  them	  and	  
RAWA	  in	  turn	  criticised	  them	  for	  being	  imperial	  feminists	  (Farrell:	  35).	  	  
35	  The	  documentary	  was	  produced	  by	  Saira	  Shah	  for	  Channel	  4	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  originally	  aired	  in	  
June	  of	  2001	  and	  later	  in	  August	  of	  2001.	  After	  9/11	  when	  it	  first	  appeared	  on	  the	  CNN,	  it	  became	  
its	  most	  watched	  documentary	  ever	  (McLarney	  2009:	  3)	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Afghanistan	  and	  the	  evening	  of	  Laura	  Bush’s	  radio	  address	  (McLarney	  2009:	  3).	  
Also	  in	  Norway,	  documentaries	  about	  Afghanistan	  were	  made,	  among	  others	  one	  
for	   TV2	   entitled	   ‘East	   of	   War-­‐Invited	   by	   the	   Taliban’36.	   This	   was	   filmed	   in	  
Peshawar,	   and	   gained	   additional	   attention	   since	   it	   featured	   author,	   TV-­‐
personality	   and	   soon	   to	  be	  husband	  of	   the	  Norwegian	  Princess	  Märtha	  Louise,	  
Ari	   Behn.	  With	   the	   stated	  purpose	   to	   ‘find	  Afghan	   culture’,	   a	   large	  part	   of	   the	  
focus	  is	  on	  the	  burqa,	  the	  Taliban	  and	  the	  challenges	  for	  Western	  journalists	  in	  
reporting	  in	  and	  understanding	  ‘Afghan	  culture’.	  A	  female	  journalist	  involved	  in	  
the	  project	  was	  interviewed	  about	  her	  experiences,	  mainly	  related	  to	  wearing	  the	  
burqa.	  She	  explained	  how	  she	  wore	  a	  burqa	   for	  parts	  of	   the	   trip	  as	  a	  means	   to	  
protect	   her	   against	   unwanted	   attention	   from	   men	   and	   described	   that	   in	   the	  
burqa	   ‘you	  become	  invisible	  not	   just	  from	  the	  men,	  but	  invisible	  for	  yourself…a	  
shadow	  without	  identity,	  place	  or	  function’	  (Kreutz-­‐Hansen	  2001).	  	  
For	  Butler,	  the	  symbolic	  importance	  of	  the	  veil	  is	  connected	  with	  making	  people	  
accessible	  through	  the	  visual.	  Through	  Emmanuel	  Levinas’	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘face	  of	  
the	  Other’	  she	  argues	  that	  while	  seeing	  faces	  is	  commonly	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  way	  of	  
humanising	   the	   Other,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   dehumanising.	   Violence	   can	   occur	  
‘precisely	  through	  the	  production	  of	  the	  face’	  (Butler	  2004:	  141).	  	  She	  writes	  that	  
‘the	  media’s	  evacuation	  of	  the	  human	  through	  the	  image	  has	  to	  be	  understood,	  
though,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  broader	  problem	  that	  normative	  schemes	  of	  intelligibility	  
establish	   what	   will	   and	   will	   not	   be	   human’	   (Butler	   2004:	   146).	   When	   Afghan	  
women	   showed	   their	   faces,	   it	   became	   understood	   in	   the	   US	   as	   an	   ‘act	   of	  
liberation,	  an	  act	  of	  gratitude	  to	  the	  US	  military,	  and	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  pleasure	  
that	  had	  become	   suddenly	   and	  ecstatically	  permissible’	   (Butler	   2004:	   142).	   It	   is	  
therefore	   not	   only	   the	   veil	   that	   is	   ‘pregnant	  with	  meaning’	   (Ahmed	   1992:	   166),	  
but	   also	   the	   act	   of	   unveiling	   itself.	   As	   former	  Norwegian	   Foreign	  Minister	   Jan	  
Petersen	  emphasised,	  seeing	  ‘whole	  faces,	  strong	  faces	  and	  not	  just	  the	  eyes	  that	  
we’ve	  grown	  accustomed	  to	  seeing’	  remind	  us	  of	  the	  ‘possibilities	  that	  now	  exist’	  
in	  Afghanistan	  (Stortinget	  2001a:	  292)	  
                                                
36	  The	  documentary	  was	  aired	  in	  January	  2002	  on	  TV	  2,	  and	  was	  the	  most	  watched	  show	  on	  that	  
channel	  the	  week	  it	  was	  broadcast	  (VG	  2001).	  	  
 79	  
2.2	  Beauty	  without	  Borders	  
In	  2002	  Mary	  McMakin	  along	  with	  a	  number	  of	  American	  hairstylists	  set	  up	  the	  
temporarily	   successful	   Kabul	   Beauty	   Academy.	   It	   received	   donations	   from	   a	  
number	   of	   fashion	   magazines	   and	   the	   project	   was	   spearheaded	   by	   Vogue’s	  
infamous	   editor	   Anne	   Wintour	   and	   an	   NGO	   called	   ‘Beauty	   without	   Borders’	  
(Fluri	  2009).	  The	  venture	  was	  widely	  reported	  in	  Western	  media,	  a	  documentary	  
film	   was	   made	   along	   with	   a	   bestselling	   novel	   written	   by	   Deborah	   Rodriguez.	  
Rodriguez	  claims	  to	  be	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  school,	  though	  her	  role	  and	  the	  some	  
of	   the	   stories	   in	   the	   book	   are	   disputed	   by	  many	   involved	   in	   the	   project	   (Ellin	  
2007).	   Articles	  were	   published	   on	   the	   venture	   in	   numerous	   fashion	  magazines	  
with	  explicit	  references	  to	  this	  being	  about	  more	  than	  simply	  exporting	  beauty,	  
but	  rather	  as	  a	  means	  of	  empowerment	  for	  women	  with	  titles	  like	  ‘Lipstick	  Power’	  
and	  ‘Life,	  Liberty	  and	  a	  Touch	  up’37.	  	  
The	  set	  up	  of	  the	  school	  largely	  displays	  the	  white	  woman	  as	  a	  modern	  saviour	  of	  
brown	  women,	   and	   as	   an	   image	  of	   true	  beauty.	  The	   story	   of	   the	  Kabul	   Beauty	  
Academy	  has	  several	  examples	  of	   ‘white	  US	  women’s	  disappointment	  when	  the	  
Afghan	   women	   do	   not	   properly	   perform	  modern	   liberation’	   (Fluri	   2009:	   249).	  
Deborah	  Rodriguez,	  illustrated	  this	  perfectly,	  	  
‘When	  I	  first	  came	  to	  Kabul,	  I	  was	  shocked	  at	  what	  these	  women	  did	  to	  their	  hair	  and	  faces...They	  
used	  henna,	  which	  is	  horrible	  for	  your	  hair.	  The	  scissors	  looked	  like	  hedge	  trimmers.	  They	  used	  
buckets	   from	  nearby	  wells	   to	   rinse	  hair.	   I	   asked	  one	  of	   the	  girls	   to	  do	  my	  make-­‐up	  once	  and	   I	  
looked	  like	  a	  drag-­‐queen’	  (Ghafour	  2004)	  
Only	  through	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  veil	  and	  through	  sanctioned	  grooming	  regimes	  
brought	   to	  Afghan	  women	   by	  white	  Western	  women	   can	   they	   become	   known	  
and	  visible	  to	  a	  Western	  public.	  As	  McLarney	  observes,	  	  
‘these	   signs	   of	   personhood	   –	   lipstick,	   dyed	   hair,	   eyeliner,	   miniskirt	   and	   heels	   –	   make	   Afghan	  
                                                
37	  The	  project	  was	  later	  placed	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Afghan	  Ministry	  of	  Women’s	  Affairs	  and	  
was	   eventually	   turned	   into	   a	   beauty	   parlour	   which	   ‘catered	   to	   the	   international	   worker	  
community	  and	  wealthy	  Afghans	  due	  to	  the	  high	  price	  the	  service	  offered’	  (Fluri	  2009:	  247).	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women	  intelligible	  to	  a	  Western	  audience.	  If	  fashion	  is	  a	  language,	  as	  some	  have	  argued,	  then	  the	  
burqa	  is	  incomprehensible.	  It	  also	  becomes	  a	  dividing	  line	  between	  the	  human	  and	  the	  inhuman,	  
the	  person	  and	  the	  non-­‐person,	  the	  normal	  and	  the	  abnormal’	  (McLarney	  2009:	  5-­‐6).	  	  
This	  venture	  and	  the	  excessive	  focus	  on	  the	  burqa	  shows	  how	  ‘Afghan	  women’s	  
bodies	   act	   as	   a	   spatial	   and	   social	   metaphor	   for	   deliverance	   by	   way	   of	   their	  
manufactured	   transformation	   into	  a	  modern,	  Western	  and	  hegemonic	  mode	  of	  
the	   global	   feminine	   subject’	   (Fluri	   2009:	   242).	   Initiatives	   like	   the	  Kabul	   Beauty	  
Academy	  and	  the	  unveiling	  of	  Afghan	  women	  in	  public	  by	  American	  celebrities	  
shows	   how	  orientalist	   and	   colonial	   discourses	   are	   reinvigorated	   in	   the	   ‘war	   on	  
terror’.	   The	   burqa	   operates	   in	   the	   West	   as	   	   ‘anticivilizational,	   a	   life-­‐negating	  
deindividuation	   that	   renders	   the	   Afghan	   woman	   passive	   and	   unwhole,	   while	  
beauty	   acts	   as	   a	   life-­‐affirming	  pathway	   to	  modern,	   even	   liberated,	  personhood’	  
(Nguyen	   2011:	   368).	   Therefore,	   the	   burqa,	   and	   its	   subsequent	   unveiling,	   along	  
with	  Kabul	  Beauty	  Academy	  aided	  a	  neocolonial	  discourse	  of	  civilian/barbarian,	  
modern/traditional	  and	  good/evil	   that	   took	  on	  a	  particular	   racial	  and	  aesthetic	  
logic.	   Both	   of	   these	   examples	   show	   how	  Afghan	  women’s	   bodies	   became	   sites	  
whereby	   the	   progress	   in	   Afghanistan	   could	   be	   measured	   through	   women’s	  
corporeal	  modernity.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Foucault,	  Afghan	  women’s	  bodies	  became	  a	  
‘political	  field’	  (1991:	  25).	  	  
As	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   biopolitics	   is	   a	   set	   of	   governmental	  
problematization	   in	   which	   the	   life	   of	   the	   population	   becomes	   the	   focus	   and	  
object	  of	  government,	  in	  the	  Foucauldian	  sense	  of	  ensuring	  the	  ‘right	  disposition	  
of	  things’	  (Foucault	  2007:	  96).	  Conversely,	  disciplinary	  power	  works	  on	  the	  level	  
of	   the	   individual,	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   level	   of	   population.	   The	   obsession	   with	  
unveiling	  the	  body	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  lessons	  taught	  in	  the	  Kabul	  Beauty	  
Academy	  show	  us	  how	  disciplinary	  and	  biopolitical	  dimensions	  of	  the	  war	  come	  
together.	   As	   Foucault	   makes	   clear,	   the	   one	   ‘technology	   of	   power’	   does	   not	  
exclude	   the	   other,	   but	   it	   exists	   on	   a	   ‘different	   level’	   (1997:	   242).	   Unveiling	   the	  
woman	  to	  liberate	  and	  educate	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  population	  works	  here	  together	  
with	  disciplining	   the	   individual	   body	   in	   accordance	  with	   a	   set	  Western	  beauty	  
regimes	  of	  what	  a	  liberated	  and	  educated	  woman	  looks	  like.	  As	  Mimi	  Thi	  Nguyen	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explains,	   the	   export	   of	   particular	   forms	   of	   beauty	   serves	   here	   as	   a	   part	   of	   this	  
logic,	  where	  beauty	  becomes	  a	  means	  whereby	  the	  ‘vitality	  of	  the	  body’	  is	  made	  
visible	  and	  as	  a	  site	  of	  ‘signification,	  power	  and	  knowledge	  about	  how	  to	  live’	  is	  
made	  and	  beauty	  itself	  	  ‘a	  form	  of	  right	  living’	  (2011:	  364).	  	  
As	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   biopolitical	   practice,	   claiming	   the	  
population	  as	  its	  central	  concern.	  However,	  already	  in	  the	  invasion,	  through	  the	  
ways	   in	   which	   Afghan	   women’s	   body,	   health,	   well-­‐being	   and	   beauty	   became	  
important	  to	  manage	  on	  the	  level	  of	  both	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  population	  this	  
is	  also	  evident.	  	  	  
	  
3.0	  Performances	  of	  Masculinities	  in	  Foreign	  Policy	  
So	  far,	  this	  chapter	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  way	  that	  saving	  Afghan	  women	  became	  a	  
central	   component	   of	   the	   justifications	   for	   the	   invasion	   in	  Afghanistan.	   In	   the	  
discourse	  of	  the	  invasion	  and	  in	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  more	  broadly,	  this	  is	  enabled	  
by	   dual	   productions	   of	   masculinities,	   as	   dangerous/benign,	   barbaric/civilized,	  
and	   threatening/protective,	   something	   that	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   ‘logic	   of	  
masculinist	  protection’	  (Young	  2003a,	  Young	  2003b,	  see	  also	  Stiehm	  1982).	  This	  
section	   focuses	   in	   particular	   on	   how	   protective	   masculinity	   is	   performed	   by	  
central	  politicians	   in	   the	  US	  and	  Norway	  around	   the	   time	  of	   the	   invasion.	  The	  
aim	  here	   is	   not	   to	   focus	   purely	   on	   embodiment	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	  
gendered	  bodies	  of	  the	  politicians	  that	  are	  of	  concern.	  Rather,	  it	  shows	  how	  these	  
politicians’	   performance	   of	   protective	   masculinity	   requires	   particular	  
embodiments	   in	   the	   launching	   of	   the	   invasion.	   Therefore	   it	   is	   not	   the	  
embodiments	  of	  President	  Bush	  or	  Prime	  Minister	  Kjell	  Magne	  Bondevik	  that	  are	  
of	  concern	  here,	  but	  what	  kinds	  of	  bodies	  are	  called	  into	  being	  by	  their	  political	  
and	  performative	  acts.	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This	   logic	   is	   founded	   on	   the	   masculine	   state	   being	   the	   supreme	   protector	   of	  
home	  and	  hearth,	   a	   form	  of	  power	   that	  Young	   relates	   to	  Foucault’s	   concept	  of	  
pastoral	  power.	  	  A	  form	  of	  power	  that	  is	  ‘salvation-­‐oriented’	  (Foucault	  1994:	  333)	  
and	   a	   ‘power	   of	   care’	   (Foucault	   2007:127).	   For	   Young,	   this	   logic	   relies	   on	   an	  
internal	  duality	  between	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’	  men,	  	  
‘The	  role	  of	   this	  courageous,	   responsible,	  virtuous	  and	  “good”	  man	   is	   that	  of	  a	  protector.	  Good	  
men	  can	  only	  appear	  in	  their	  goodness	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  lurking	  outside	  the	  warm	  familial	  walls	  
are	  aggressors,	  the	  “bad”	  men	  who	  wish	  to	  attack	  them’	  (Young	  2003a:	  224).	  	  
In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   ‘war	   on	   terror’	   and	   the	   invasion,	   the	   ‘terrorists’,	   and	   by	  
extension	  all	  Afghan	  and	  Muslim	  men	  could	  therefore	  not	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  ‘cut	  from	  
the	  same	  masculine	  cloth’	  as	  their	  Western	  counterparts	  (Lorber	  2002:	  383).	  This	  
section	  will	  proceed	  to	  discuss	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘protective	  masculinity’	  focusing	  on	  
three	  central	  aspects	  –	  its	  reiteration	  of	  particular	  colonial	  narratives,	  its	  claim	  as	  
the	   protector	   and	   proponent	   of	   particular	   liberal	   values,	   and	   its	   dualism	   as	   a	  
gendered	   performance	   that	   encompasses	   both	   violence	   and	   peace,	   or	   what	   is	  
later,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  called	  ‘killing	  and	  
caring’.	  	  
	  
3.1	  Performing	  ‘Protective	  Masculinity’	  
When	  Bush	  presented	  himself	  and	  his	  military	  as	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  save	  he	  
was	   invoking	   and	   performing	   particular	   notions	   of	   masculinity.	   Immediately	  
after	  the	  events	  of	  9/11	  he	  assured	  the	  American	  people	  that	  while	  they	  looked	  in	  
disbelief	  on	  to	  the	  rubble	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  Centre,	  ‘our	  country	  is	  strong’	  and	  
while	  steel	  has	  been	  shattered,	   ‘they	  cannot	  dent	  the	  steel	  of	  American	  resolve’	  
(Bush	  2001f).	  Bush	  spoke	  about	  the	  ‘daring	  of	  rescue	  workers’,	  the	  ‘powerful	  and	  
prepared’	  military,	  and	  how	  he	  had	  done	  everything	  in	  his	  power	  to	  ‘protect	  our	  
citizens	   at	   home	   and	   around	   the	   world’.	   Bush	   was	   here	   simultaneously	  
acknowledging	   the	   devastating	   effects	   of	   the	   attack,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	  
assuring	  the	  American	  people	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  that	  he	  was	  in	  control.	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The	  ‘logic	  of	  masculinist	  protection’	  therefore	  executes	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  power,	  
which	   might	   on	   the	   surface	   seem	   less	   problematic	   for	   feminists.	   This	   power	  
‘appears	  gentle	  and	  benevolent	  both	  to	  its	  wielders	  and	  to	  those	  under	  its	  sway’,	  
but	   Young	   warns,	   ‘it	   is	   no	   less	   powerful	   for	   that	   reason’	   (2003b:	   6).	   It	   only	  
functions	   insofar	   as	   the	   protector	   can	   claim	   not	   only	   what	   needs	   protection	  
(women	   and	   children	   as	   victims),	   but	   also	   the	   ‘bad	  men’	   they	  need	  protection	  
from.	  In	  this	  sense,	  while	  protective	  masculinity	  may	  be	  a	  welcome	  development	  
from	   more	   straightforwardly	   dominant	   masculinities,	   it	   also	   creates	   its	   own	  
oppressive	  characters	  as	   ‘ostensibly	  progressive	  masculinities	  can	  have	  a	  deeply	  
regressive	  effects’	  (Duncanson	  2013:	  12).	  	  
One	   of	   these	   regressive	   effects	   is	   seen	   in	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   post	   9/11	  
discourse	  nurtured	  and	  strengthened	  complex	  colonial	  notions	  of	  backward	  and	  
inferior	  masculinities	  of	  non-­‐Western	  or	  ‘dangerous	  brown	  men’	  (Bhattacharyya	  
2008),	  something	  that	  had	  been	  felt	  and	  negotiated	  by	  Muslim	  men	  in	  Western	  
localities	  as	  well	  (Dwyer	  et	  al.	  2008).	  The	  relationship	  between	  colonialism	  and	  
gender	   is,	  however,	  a	  complex	  and	  incoherent	  one.	  The	  British	  Empire	   in	  India	  
for	  instance,	  operated	  with	  a	  range	  of	  ‘inferior	  masculinities’,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  
granted	  a	   level	  of	  admiration,	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	   those	  determined	  to	  be	   ‘martial	  
races’	   and	   others	  were	   deemed	   to	   be	   ‘effeminate’,	   such	   as	   Bengali	  men	   (Sinha	  
1995,	  Streets	  2005,	  Rand	  and	  Wagner	  2012).	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  six	  of	  this	  thesis,	  
this	   history	   feeds	   into	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   ISAF	   soldiers	   relate	   to	   Afghan	  men,	  
through	  a	  complex	  mix	  of	  admiration	  and	  contempt.	  	  
The	  multiplicity	  of	  masculinities	  that	  the	  performance	  of	  ‘protective	  masculinity’	  
requires	   is	   therefore	   not	   inherently	   new,	   but	   it	   has	   a	   long	   colonial	   history.	   As	  
Edward	  Said	  argues	   in	  Orientalism,	   the	  production	  of	  a	  coherent	   ‘West’	  and	  an	  
‘East’	  has	  long	  relied	  on	  an	  ‘absolute	  and	  systematic	  difference	  between	  the	  West	  
which	   is	   rational,	   developed,	   humane,	   superior,	   and	   the	   Orient,	   which	   is	  
aberrant,	  underdeveloped,	  inferior’	  (1994:	  300).	  The	  identification	  of	  the	  Other	  as	  
a	   representative	   of	   all	   that	   ‘we’	   are	   not	   is	   clear	   in	   Bush’s	   second	   state	   of	   the	  
Union,	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‘Our	  cause	  is	  just	  and	  it	  continues.	  Our	  discoveries	  in	  Afghanistan	  confirmed	  our	  worst	  fears,	  and	  
showed	  us	  the	  true	  scope	  of	   the	  task	  ahead.	  We	  have	  seen	  the	  depth	  of	  our	  enemies’	  hatred	   in	  
videos,	  where	  they	  laugh	  at	  the	  loss	  of	  innocent	  lives.	  And	  the	  depth	  of	  their	  hatred	  is	  equalled	  by	  
the	  madness	   of	   the	   destruction	   they	   design…I’ve	   been	   humbled	   and	   privileged	   to	   see	   the	   true	  
character	   of	   this	   country	   in	   a	   time	   of	   testing.	   Our	   enemies	   believed	   America	   was	   weak	   and	  
materialistic,	  that	  we	  would	  splinter	  in	  fear	  and	  selfishness.	  They	  were	  as	  wrong	  as	  they	  are	  evil’	  
(Bush	  2002)	  
The	   narrative	   of	   the	   invasion	   is	   therefore	   ‘not	   only	   told	   in	   terms	   of	   American	  
manliness,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  victory	  of	  American	  manliness	  over	  the	  mistaken	  
and	  inferior	  masculinity’	  of	  their	  opponents	  (Sjoberg	  2007:	  95)38.	  	  
The	  second	  important	  feature	  of	  performances	  of	  protective	  masculinity	  is	  how	  it	  
appears	  as	  distinctly	  liberal.	  It	  seeks	  to	  be	  in	  defence	  of	  particular	  liberal	  values,	  
which	   are	   seen	   to	   be	   under	   threat	   by	   oppressive,	   dangerous,	   albeit	   inferior	  
Others.	  Bush	  explains	  that	  the	  reason	  for	  9/11	  was	  that	  America	  was	  the	  world’s	  
‘brightest	   beacon	   of	   freedom	   and	   opportunity’,	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   those	   who	  
attacked	   who	   represent	   ‘the	   worst	   of	   human	   nature’	   (2001f).	   America	   and	   its	  
allies	   are	   constructed	   as	   the	   defenders	   of	   ‘the	   civilized	   world’	   –	   ‘courageous’,	  
‘enduring’,	   ‘loving’,	   ‘giving’,	   ‘strong’,	   ‘the	   defenders	   of	   freedom’,	   ‘democratic’,	  
‘progressive’,	   ‘tolerant’	   and	   ‘just’.	   Conversely,	   the	   ‘terrorists’,	   a	   category	   that	  
historically	   has	   not	   been	   open	   to	   women	   (Sjoberg	   and	   Gentry	   2008),	   are	  
‘murderers’	  with	  the	  goal	  to	  ‘remake	  the	  world	  and	  impose	  its	  radical	  beliefs	  on	  
people	  everywhere’.	  They	  want	  to	  ‘kill	  Christians	  and	  Jews,	  to	  kill	  all	  Americans’	  
and	   they	   ‘hide	   in	   countries	   around	   the	   world	   to	   plot	   evil	   and	   destruction’.	   In	  
Afghanistan	   their	   vision	   of	   the	   world	   is	   realised,	   a	   place	   where	   people	   are	  
                                                
38	  Makau	  Mutua	  argues	  that	  a	  similar	  logic	  to	  ‘protective	  masculinity’	  is	  at	  work	  in	  human	  rights	  
discourses	  through	  a	  tripartite	  metaphor	  of	  savages,	  victims	  and	  saviours.	  While	  Mutua	  does	  not	  
explicitly	  gender	  this	  logic,	  it	  feeds	  into	  pre-­‐existing	  constructions	  of	  masculine	  as	  rational/strong	  
and	   feminine	   as	   irrational/weak.	   	   The	   savage	   often	   manifests	   itself	   as	   the	   state	   or	   another	  
powerful	   entity,	   but	   this	   is	   really	   an	   ‘empty	   vessel’	   that	   ‘conveys	   savagery	  by	   implementing	   the	  
project	  of	  the	  savage	  culture’	  (Mutua	  2001:	  203).	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  a	  state	  or	  regime	  is	  found	  
to	   be	   in	   violation	   of	   human	   rights,	   this	   is	   explained	   as	   stemming	   from	   culture.	   The	   slippage	  
between	   the	   Taliban	   and	   ‘Afghan	   culture’	   is	   an	   example	   of	   how	   this	   happens.	   The	   second	  
metaphor	  is	  that	  of	  the	  victim,	  powerless	  and	  innocent,	  whom	  the	  savage	  has	  violated.	  As	  shown	  
above,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   victim	   in	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   invasion	   was	   largely	   attributed	   to	   Afghan	  
women	  and	  children.	  The	  last	  part	  of	  this	  arrangement	  is	  the	  ‘saviour	  or	  redeemer,	  the	  good	  angel	  
who	  protects,	  vindicates,	  civilizes,	  restraints	  and	  safeguards’	  by	  granting	   ‘culturally	  based	  norms	  
and	  practices	  that	  inhere	  in	  liberal	  thought	  and	  philosophy’	  (Mutua	  2001:	  204).	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‘brutalized’,	  ‘starving’,	  ‘women	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  attend	  school’	  and	  ‘you	  can	  be	  
jailed	  for	  owning	  a	  television’	  (Bush	  2001a).	  	  
The	   protection	   of	   liberal	   values	   was	   also	   central	   to	   then	   Norwegian	   Prime	  
Minister	   Kjell	   Magne	   Bondevik	  39.	   Like	   Bush40,	   he	   saw	   the	   9/11	   attacks	   as	   a	  
‘declaration	  of	  war…against	  international	  law,	  international	  cooperation,	  free	  and	  
open	   societies,	   tolerance	   and	  human	  dignity’	   (Bondevik	   2001).	  While	  Bondevik	  
conceded	   that	   deploying	   military	   forces	   always	   sparks	   ‘ethical	   dilemmas’	   he	  
argued	  that	  it	  is	  justified	  when	  it	  can	  ‘limit	  evil	  –	  in	  this	  case	  the	  effects	  of	  terror’	  
(2001).	   While	   he	   is	   concerned	   for	   the	   loss	   of	   civilian	   life	   ‘he	   is	   certain	   that	  
everyone	   involved	   will	   do	   what	   they	   can	   to	   avoid	   harming	   innocent	   people’	  
(Bondevik	  2001).	  Several	  politicians	  emphasised	  how	  the	  invasion	  must	  be	  aimed	  
at	   securing	   the	   civilian	   population.	   Torbjørn	   Jagland	   argued	   that	   ‘never	   before	  
has	   the	   concept	   “humanitarian	   intervention”	   meant	   more	   than	   just	   now,	   and	  
never	   before	   has	   it	   been	  more	   required’	   (Torbjørn	   Jagland	   in	   Stortinget	   2001a:	  
272).	  These	  kinds	  of	  statements	  speak	  to	  how	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  came	  
to	  represent	  so	  much	  more	  than	  revenge	  or	  seeking	  out	  a	  particular	  enemy	  that	  
needed	  to	  be	  captured	  and/or	  killed.	  It	  was	  cast	  as	  being	  about	  the	  protection	  of	  
particular	  forms	  of	  liberal	  life,	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  illiberal	  forces.	  	  	  
On	   the	  whole,	  masculinist	   protection	   relies	   on	   a	   combination	   of	   violence	   and	  
military	   power,	   softened	   by	   appeals	   to	   humanitarian	   ideals	   and	   the	   saving	   of	  
civilians.	  Bush	  is	  determined	  to	  use	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  American	  military	  arsenal	  to	  
‘smoke	  out’	   the	  enemy	   (2001b)	   and	   show	  how	   the	  US	   is	   ‘fierce	  when	   stirred	   to	  
anger’	  (2001d)	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  constructing	  an	  image	  of	  the	  US	  as	  ‘good,	  
kind-­‐hearted,	  decent	  people’	  who	  are	  intent	  on	  ‘showing	  the	  world	  just	  that	  in	  its	  
compassion	   and	   resolve’	   (2001c).	   In	   this	   sense,	   it	   contains	   messages	   of	  
                                                
39	  Kjell	  Magne	  Bondevik	  (Christian	  Democratic	  Party)	  was	  the	  Norwegian	  Prime	  Minister	  between	  
2001-­‐2005,	  followed	  by	  Jens	  Stoltenberg	  (Labour)	  from	  2005-­‐.	  	  
40	  Bondevik	  and	  Bush	  got	  on	  well	  personally,	  something	  that	  is	  partly	  explained	  by	  them	  sharing	  a	  
religiously	  grounded	  view	  of	  politics	  where	  there	  are	  clear	  divisions	  between	  good	  and	  evil,	  right	  
and	  wrong.	  That	  said,	  Bush’s	  Christianity	  was	  far	  more	  conservative	  than	  Bondevik’s	  (Lundestad	  




compassion	   and	   peace,	   alongside	   violence	   and	   superior	   military	   might,	  
something	  that	  Christine	  Sylvester	  calls	  the	  ‘kill-­‐to-­‐be-­‐kind’	  logics	  (2012:	  488)	  
However,	  this	  duality	  is	  not	  necessarily	  something	  new.	  As	  Anne	  Orford	  shows,	  
the	   ‘heroic	  narratives’	   that	  were	  told	  during	  the	  NATO	  interventions	  Kosovo	  in	  
the	   late	   1990s,	   fostered	   identification	  with	   the	   ‘white	  male	  hero’	  who	   in	   turn	   is	  
defined	  against	  ‘characters	  who	  lack	  his	  potency	  and	  authority’	  in	  what	  she	  calls	  
‘muscular	   humanitarianism’	   (1999:	   688).	   Like	   Young	   she	   sees	   this	   form	   of	  
masculinity	  as	  different	  from	  the	  outright	  oppressive	  masculinity,	  but	  notes	  that	  
while	   this	   version	  might	   cast	   itself	   as	   something	   radically	  different	   ‘militarism,	  
dominance,	  nationalism,	   individualism	  and	  violence’	  continue	  to	  be	  at	   its	  heart	  
(Orford	  1999:	  692).	  Similarly	  Maria	  O’Reilly	  argues	  that	  the	  Kosovo	  intervention	  
produced	   an	   ‘interventionist	   model	   of	   masculinity’	   which	   ‘equates	   manliness	  
with	   a	   responsibility	   to	   protect	   the	   vulnerable/backward/Balkanized/feminized	  
“other”	   from	  violence	  and	  harm’	  (2012:	  536).	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	   this	  
combination	   and	   tension	   is	   continued	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	  in	  Afghanistan	  through	  its	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  	  
In	  this	  sense	  the	  interventions	  of	  Kosovo,	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  and	  the	  invasion	  
of	   Afghanistan	   share	   common	   features	   in	   the	   way	   that	   powerful	   white	   men	  
construct	   themselves	   as	   being	   defenders	   of	   freedom	   and	   civility	   against	   the	  
brutality	  and	  barbarism	  of	  other	  men.	  In	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  and	  
the	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan	   the	   Other	   becomes	   a	   representative	   for	   deviant	  
masculinity	   through	   particular	   racialized	   and	   gendered	   coding.	   As	   one	  
Norwegian	  parliamentarian	  claimed	  ‘around	  sixty	  years	  ago	  evil	  showed	  its	  true	  




3.2	  Playing	  with	  ‘the	  Big	  Boys’	  	  	  
As	  shown	  above,	  performing	  protective	  masculinity	   is	  central	   to	  understanding	  
the	   legitimation	   of	   the	   invasion,	   particularly	   in	   the	   case	   of	   American	   foreign	  
policy	   identity.	  While	  performances	  of	  protective	  masculinity	  were	  also	  central	  
to	  Norwegian	  governmental	  narratives	  of	   the	   invasion,	  another	  element	  should	  
be	   included	   in	   relation	   to	   this.	   Appreciating	   Norway’s	   strategically	   important	  
relationship	   with	   NATO	   and	   the	   US	   is	   key	   here,	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   how	  
smaller	  states	  like	  Norway	  navigated	  additional	  gendered	  waters	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
foreign	  policy,	  conceptualised	  here	  as	  one	  between	  ‘big	  boys’	  and	  ‘small	  boys’.	  	  
When	   the	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan	   and	   Norway’s	   potential	   contributions	   were	  
discussed	  in	  Parliament	  (Stortinget),	  the	  argument	  that	  Norway	  should	  adhere	  to	  
its	   responsibilities	   under	   Article	   5	   of	   the	   NATO	   charter	   was	   central41.	   Then	  
Foreign	  Minister	  Jan	  Petersen42	  emphasised	  in	  his	  advocacy	  for	  Norwegian	  troop	  
deployments	  that	  ‘our	  own	  security	  is	  only	  ensured	  by	  standing	  side	  by	  side	  with	  
our	  allies’	  (Stortinget	  2001b:	  599).	  Pledging	  troops	  would	  ensure	  that	  Norway	  was	  
not	  left	  out	  in	  the	  cold	  and	  it	  was	  made	  clear	  that	  this	  was	  in	  the	  country’s	  ‘self-­‐
interest’,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  ‘central	  for	  Norway	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  we	  have	  capacity	  
and	   willingness	   to	   fulfil	   our	   collective	   defence	   obligations’.	   Defence	   Minister	  
Krohn	  Devold	   emphasised	  how	   ‘smaller	   nations	  must	   prove	   their	   capacity	   and	  
willingness	  to	  be	  active	  participants	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  terror’	  (Stortinget	  2001b).	  
It	  was	  pointed	  out	  that	  countries	  like	  Denmark	  had	  already	  pledged	  troops	  and	  
that	  Norway	  was	  the	  ‘only	  allied	  country’	  with	  troops	  stationed	  in	  the	  American	  
headquarters	  that	  had	  ‘yet	  to	  concretise	  potential	  troop	  pledges’	  (Krohn	  Devold	  
in	   Stortinget	   2001b:	   600).	   It	   was	   decided	   that	   the	   Norwegian	   military	   would	  
contribute	   to	   OEF	   with	   Special	   Forces,	   mine	   clearing	   and	   transportation	  
assistance	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  but	  this	  was	  soon	  expanded	  to	  also	  include	  F-­‐16s	  
                                                
41	  The	  decision	   to	   contribute	  with	   troops	  was	   supported	  by	  60	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  population,	  with	  
around	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  men	  supporting	  it,	  and	  less	  than	  half	  of	  women.	  It	  was	  only	  opposed	  by	  the	  
Socialist	   Left	   party,	   who	   have	   historically	   been	   opposed	   to	   Norway’s	   membership	   in	   NATO	  
(Larssen	  2001).	  	  
42	  Jan	   Petersen	   (Conservatives)	   was	   Foreign	   Minister	   from	   2001-­‐2005,	   followed	   by	   Jonas	   Gahr	  
Støre	  (2005-­‐2012)	  and	  Espen	  Barth	  Eide	  (2012-­‐),	  both	  from	  Labour.	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(Forsvarsdepartementet/MOD	   2002).	   Norway’s	   ‘compliance’	   and	   eagerness	   to	  
serve	   was	   appreciated	   in	   the	   US,	   particularly	   by	   then	   Secretary	   of	   Defence	  
Donald	   Rumsfeld 43 	  who	   praised	   the	   ‘very	   strong	   and	   healthy	   relationship’	  
between	  the	  US	  and	  Norway,	  and	  the	   ‘wonderful	  contribution	  that	  Norway	  has	  
been	   giving	   to	   Operation	   Enduring	   Freedom’	   (USDoD	   2002).	   At	   the	   time,	  
maintaining	   the	   institutionalised	   ‘bilateral	   security	   partnership’	   with	   the	   USA	  
seemed	  ‘more	  important	  than	  how	  US	  foreign	  policy	  under	  Bush	  translates	  into	  
Norway’s	  foreign	  policy	  tradition	  and	  image’	  (Græger	  2005b:	  414).	  	  	  
The	   need	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   ‘competent’	   and	   ‘able’,	   two	   words	   frequently	   used	   to	  
explain	   the	   reasoning	   behind	   changes	   within	   the	   armed	   forces	   and	   Norway’s	  
contributions	  to	  OEF	  and	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’,	  are	  deeply	  gendered	  concepts.	  Such	  
terms	   are	   traditionally	   associated	   with	   masculine	   characteristics	   and	   stand	   in	  
opposition	   to	   being	   seen	   as	   ‘incapable’	   or	   ‘incompetent’,	  which,	   particularly	   in	  
the	   context	   of	   defence	   and	   security	   discourse,	   become	   particularly	   feminised	  
concepts.	   This	   eagerness	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   ‘capable’	   is	   therefore	   akin	   to	   a	   fear	   of	  
becoming	   feminised	   or	   being	   characterised	   as	   ‘impotent’,	   as	   etymologically	  
speaking,	  ‘impotent’	  in	  Latin	  means	  ‘not	  powerful’	  (Reeser	  2010:	  30).	  	  
The	   argument	  made	   here	   is	   therefore	   that	   it	   was	   important	   for	   Norway	   to	   be	  
seen	  to	  perform	  according	  to	  particular	  masculine	  ideals	  as	  a	  part	  of	   its	  foreign	  
policy	   identity.	  This	  performance	  comes	  out	  clearly	   in	  an	  article	   from	  the	  New	  
York	   Times	   entitled	  Who’s	   Afraid	   of	   Norway	   where	   the	   author	   follows	   then	  
Defence	  Minister	  Kristin	  Krohn-­‐Devold44	  on	  a	  tour	  of	  a	  Norwegian	  military	  base	  
(Brezinski	  2003),	  an	  article	  that	  is	  brimming	  with	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  gendered	  
and	   sexual	   references.	   Interestingly,	   it	   is	   a	   female	   defence	   minister	   who	   is	  
performing	  a	  masculinised	  foreign	  policy	  identity	  in	  this	  example.	  	  
                                                
43	  Rumsfeld	  was	   Secretary	   of	  Defence	  between	   2001-­‐2006,	   followed	  by	  Republican	  Robert	  Gates	  
(2006-­‐2011),	  Democrat	  Leon	  Panetta	  (2011-­‐2013)	  and	  Republican	  Chuck	  Hagel	  (2013-­‐).	  
44	  At	  the	  time,	  ‘the	  Bergmanesque’	  Devold	  was	  one	  of	  the	  top	  picks	  for	  becoming	  the	  next	  General	  
Secretary	   of	   NATO,	   though	   the	   job	   eventually	   went	   to	   Jaap	   de	   Hoop	   Scheffer	   from	   the	  
Netherlands	   (Black	   2003).	   Brezinski	   claims	   that	   she	  was	  Rumsfeld’s	   preferred	   choice	   (Brezinski	  
2003).	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Sat	   in	  a	   ‘helicopter	  plummeting	  backwards’,	  Brezinski	  grants	  Krohn-­‐Devold	  her	  
masculine	   credentials	   up	   front,	   stating	   that	   ‘anyone	   who	   says	   America’s	  
European	   allies	   have	   no	   stomach	   for	   action	   has	   never	   flown	   with	   Norway’s	  
defence	   minister’.	   In	   deeply	   gendered	   language,	   he	   explains	   how	   ‘size	   doesn’t	  
matter	  as	  much	  today’	  given	  the	  major	  technological	  developments	  available	  to	  
the	   armed	   forces	   and	   rather	   it	   is	   ‘speed	   and	   ability’	   that	   are	   essential	   in	   the	  
current	   security	   climate.	   This	   enables	   countries	   like	  Norway	   to	   ‘come	   into	   the	  
geopolitical	  picture’,	  or,	  if	  you	  like,	  ‘Davids’	  to	  fight	  alongside	  Goliaths’,	  provided	  
that	  they	  ‘bring	  the	  right	  slingshot’	  (Brezinski	  2003).	  He	  praises	  Krohn	  Devold’s	  
efforts	  to	  ‘make	  Norway	  as	  attractive	  a	  Pentagon	  partner	  as	  possible’	  through	  her	  
strategy	  to	  ‘spend	  heavily	  and	  cut	  radically’.	  Krohn	  Devold	  for	  her	  part	  explains	  
that	  ‘we	  want	  to	  be	  relevant’	  and	  that	  you	  need	  to	  ‘identify	  what	  you	  are	  good	  at,	  
and	   concentrate	   on	   it’,	   a	   discourse	   that	   is	   replicated	   in	   various	   restructuring	  
strategies	   for	   the	   Norwegian	   armed	   forces	   (Forsvarsdepartementet/MoD	   2000,	  
2003-­‐2004).	  She	  adds	  that	  this	  means	  ‘you	  can	  play	  with	  the	  big	  boys	  even	  if	  you	  
are	  small’	  (Brezinski	  2003).	  	  
Kristin	   Krohn-­‐Devold,	   the	   second	   of	   a	   series	   of	   Norwegian	   defence	   ministers	  
since	  1999,	   is	  keen	  to	  emphasise	   in	  the	  interview	  how	  she	  happily	   joins	   in	  with	  
army	  training	  and	  drills	  as	  her	  ‘ground	  rule’	  is	  ‘whatever	  they	  do,	  I	  should	  be	  able	  
to	   do’	   (Brezinski	   2003).	   As	   Shepherd	   argues,	   our	   understanding	   of	   gender	   is	  
constituted	  through	  ‘identifiable	  linguistic	  and	  non-­‐linguistic	  practices’	  (2010:	  13).	  
Here,	   masculinity	   is	   performed	   linguistically	   (‘playing	   with	   the	   big	   boys’),	   but	  
also	   non-­‐linguistically	   and	   embodied	   	   (being	   able	   to	   do	   what	   the	   soldiers	   do).	  
Together,	   these	   challenge	   male-­‐masculine	   and	   female-­‐feminine	   binary	  
(Halberstam	  1998)	  and	  shows	  that	  masculinity	  can	  be	  performed	  and	  attributed	  
to	   women	   and	  men	   alike.	   This	   performance	   of	   gendered	   foreign	   policy,	  made	  
visible	   in	  this	   interview,	   is	   in	  accordance	  with	  declared	  foreign	  policy	  aims	  and	  
shows	   that	   central	   to	   Norway’s	   invasion	   in	   Afghanistan	   was	   this	   fear	   of	   being	  




As	   shown	   above,	   both	   US	   and	   Norwegian	   narratives	   of	   the	   invasion	   followed	  
particular	   gendered	   and	   racialized	   logics.	   Such	   narratives	   relied	   on	   a	  
representation	  of	  Afghan	  women	  as	  victims	  and	  in	  need	  of	  rescue,	  by	  those,	  such	  
as	  the	  US	  and	  Norway,	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  save.	  The	  combination	  of	  maternal	  
and	  imperial	  feminism,	  along	  with	  performances	  of	  masculinist	  protection	  made	  
this	   a	  powerful	  narrative	   that	   reiterated	   familiar	   colonial	   tropes	  of	   ‘white	  men,	  
seeking	  to	  save	  brown	  women	  from	  brown	  men’	  (Spivak	  1999:	  303).	  	  
As	   argued	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   and	   shown	   above,	   masculinities	   and	  
femininities	   are	   not	   stable	   identities	   but	   should	   rather	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   being	  
continuously	  created	  and	  recreated	   through	  a	  series	  of	   repetitive	   linguistic	  and	  
non-­‐linguistic	   practices.	   This	   is	   also	   the	   case	   in	   the	   production	   of	   particular	  
gendered	  foreign	  policy	   identities.	  These	  are	   in	  turn	  always	  connected	  to	  range	  
of	   other	   gendered	   and	   racialized	   binaries	   such	   as	   rational/emotional,	  
civilized/barbarian,	   and	   modern/traditional,	   which	   all	   feed	   into	   how	  
masculinities	   and	   femininities	   are	   created	   in	   relation	   to	   one	   another.	   The	  
emphasis	   on	   the	   (in)visible	   ‘body	   in	   the	   burqa’	   as	   a	   means	   to	   write	   women’s	  
bodies	   in	   war	   (De	   Certeau	   1984),	   relied	   on	   reiterations	   of	   particular	   colonial	  
imaginations	   of	   Muslim	   femininity	   particularly	   on	   unveiling	   as	   the	   visual	  
symbolic	  of	  conquering	  (Fanon	  1980).	  
Recognising	   the	   co-­‐constitution	   of	   masculinity	   and	   femininity	   is	   important	  
because	  it	  leaves	  us	  better	  prepared	  to	  tackle	  the	  question	  of	  instrumentalisation	  
by	   illuminating	   how	   gendered	   national	   identities	   are	   inherently	   unstable	   and	  
therefore	  continuously	  in	  production.	  Moreover,	  it	  helps	  reveal	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  
production	  itself	  and	  how	  it	  feeds	  into	  the	  practice	  of	  war	  in	  Afghanistan.	  While	  
this	   chapter	   has	   discussed	   the	   centrality	   of	   particular	   gendered	   and	   racialized	  
narratives	  of	  the	  invasion,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  individual	  Afghan	  women’s	  
lives	   were	   Bush’s	   primary	   reason	   for	   invasion.	   Quoting	   Bush	   in	   stating	   that	  
preventing	  the	   ‘brutal	  oppression	  of	  women’	  everywhere	  is	   ‘the	   reason’	  the	   ‘war	  
on	  terror’	  and	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  (Bush	  2001e),	  this	  is	  not	  to	  claim	  that	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he	  mobilised	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  US	  military	  arsenal,	  and	  a	  fair	  bit	  of	  NATO’s	  too,	  
for	  the	  sake	  of	  women.	  This	  realisation,	  coupled	  with	  Bush’s	  sudden	  concern	  for	  
women,	   shows	   how	   Afghan	   women	   were	   clearly	   instrumentalised	   in	   order	   to	  
highlight	  the	  righteousness	  and	  altruism	  of	  the	  invading	  forces.	  	  
However,	   this	   chapter	   aimed	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   rather	   obvious	   point	   of	  
instrumentalisation	   by	   analysing	   how	   this	   discourse	   was	   constructed	   and	  
performed	   and	   what	   embodied	   practices	   it	   enables.	   The	  West	   sought	   to	   cast	  
itself	   as	   having	   the	   capacity	   to	   save	   both	  Afghan	  women	   and	   the	   liberal	  West	  
from	   oppressive	   and	   inferior	   masculinities	   by	   itself	   performing	   ‘protective	  
masculinity’.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  was	  only	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  violence	  
and	  military	  power,	  softened	  by	  appeals	  to	  humanitarian	  ideals.	  Put	  differently,	  
the	  discourse	  of	  victim-­‐saviour	  involves	  both	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  	  
While	   it	   is	   important	   from	   a	   feminist	   perspective	   to	   identify	   when	   women’s	  
bodies	   are	   being	   instrumentalised,	   the	   deeper,	   more	   interesting	   and	   complex	  
story	   of	   the	   invasion	   requires	   what	   we	   recognise	   what	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	  
invasion	   left	   in	   its	   wake	   and	   how,	   as	   discussed	   in	   the	   following	   chapters,	   it	  
influence	   on	   practices	   of	   warfare	   once	   the	   invasion	   became	   a	   reality.	   The	  
performance	   of	   ‘protective	   masculinity’	   discussed	   here	   feeds	   into	   the	  
construction	  of	  particular	  types	  of	  military	  masculinity,	  namely	  ‘soldier-­‐scholars’.	  
As	   the	  next	  chapter	  shows,	   these	  advocates	  of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  principles	  of	  
counterinsurgency	  similarly	  fluctuate	  between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  	  
The	  way	  that	  Afghan	  women’s	  bodies	  became	  political	  sites,	  where	  progress	  can	  
be	   measured	   corporally,	   is	   continued	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   counterinsurgency,	   as	  
shown	  in	  chapter	  five.	  Here,	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  Afghan	  women’s	  bodies	  occurs,	  
which	   partly	   runs	   counter	   to	   and	   troubles	   the	   passive,	   silent	   (in)visible	   victim	  
whose	  suffering	  justified	  the	  invasion.	  Read	  this	  way,	  the	  centrality	  of	  gendered	  
bodies	  in	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  invasion	  continues	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  war	  because	  it	  
is	  fought	  ‘on	  the	  terrain	  of	  the	  human	  body’	  (Reid	  2006:	  130).	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-­‐ Chapter	  4	  -­‐	  
The	  Practice	  of	  ‘Population-­‐Centric’	  
Counterinsurgency:	  Reimagining	  the	  ‘Battlefield	  
of	  War’	  and	  the	  Multiplicity	  of	  Military	  
Masculinities	  
	   	   	  
‘The	  whole	  point	  of	  the	  war	  is	  to	  take	  care	  of	  people,	  not	  just	  to	  kill	  them’	  
Stanley	  McChrystal	  
‘If	  this	  sounds	  unmilitary	  –	  get	  over	  it’	  	  
David	  Kilkullen	  
	  
The	   previous	   chapter	   provided	   a	   feminist	   analysis	   of	   the	   narrative	   that	  
legitimated	   the	   invasion	   and	   argued	   that	   both	   in	   the	   American	   and	   the	  
Norwegian	   case,	   this	   followed	   particular	   gendered	   and	   racialized	   logics.	  
Following	   the	   swift	   defeat	   of	   the	   Taliban	   in	   2001,	   many,	   including	   the	   US	  
administration,	   expected	   the	   dawn	   of	   a	   period	   of	   stability	   and	   reconstruction.	  
Donald	  Rumsfeld	  announced	   the	  end	  of	  major	  combat	  operations	   in	  May	  2003	  
and	   predicted	   a	   period	   of	   stability	   and	   reconstruction	   (CNN	   2003).	   But,	   the	  
summer	  of	  2006	  in	  particular	  proved	  to	  significantly	  dent	  this	  expectation	  with	  
sharp	   increases	   in	   attacks	   on	   ISAF,	   members	   of	   the	   NGO	   community	   and	  
civilians,	   and	   the	   security	   situation	   has	   deteriorated	   since	   (Giustozzi	   2007b,	  
NATO/ISAF	  2009).	  Hence,	  the	  US	  army	  and	  ISAF	  found	  themselves	  in	  a	  different	  
kind	  of	  war	  altogether,	  a	  war	  that	  much	  more	  resembled	  the	  Iraq	  war.	  It	  was	  also	  
from	  Iraq	  that	  many	  of	  the	  ‘lessons	  learned’	  would	  be	  transferred	  to	  Afghanistan,	  
becoming	  the	  second	  major	  counterinsurgency	  war	  the	  US	  army	  was	  engaged	  in.	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The	  following	  two	  chapters	  provide	  an	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  analysis	  of	  the	  
ways	   in	   which	   counterinsurgency	   should	   be	   considered	   an	   embodied	   and	  
gendered	   type	   of	   warfare.	   Both	   chapters	   emphasise	   different	   elements	   that	   in	  
totality	   show	  the	  complexity	  of	   this	  gendering	  and	   the	  multiplicity	  of	  how	  war	  
writes	   gendered	   bodies,	   conceptualised	   through	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency’s	  dualism	  of	   ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  This	  chapter	   focuses	  on	  the	  
production	   of	   multiple	   military	   masculinities	   and	   gendered	   performances	   in	  
counterinsurgency	   and	   the	   various	   ways	   in	   which	   these	   are	   seen	   to	   be	   in	  
contention	   with	   one	   another.	   Drawing	   on	   military	   literature	   and	   soldier’s	  
memoirs	  in	  particular,	  it	  finds	  that	  not	  only	  is	  there	  contention	  within	  what	  has	  
become	   known	   as	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   but	   that	   this	  
contention	   and	   multiplicity	   is	   built	   into	   its	   very	   doctrine.	   Said	   differently,	  
counterinsurgency	  relies	  on	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  gendered	  bodies	  and	  performances	  
in	  order	  to	  function	  and	  succeed.	  	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  accounts	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  counterinsurgency	  and	  
the	   development	   of	   its	   21st	   century	   version	   in	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency.	   It	   argues	   that	   central	   aspects	   of	   this	   involve	   a	  
reconceptualization	  of	  the	  role	  that	  civilians	  and	  the	  population	  play,	  along	  with	  
an	   increased	   emphasis	   on	   culture	   as	   an	   explanatory	   factor	   in	   understanding	  
conflict	  and	  war.	  This	  revamped	  version	  of	  colonial	  warfare	  is	  both	  a	  product	  and	  
productive	   of	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   military	   masculinity,	   expressed	   by	   the	  
vanguard	   of	   counterinsurgency	   theory	   –	   the	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’.	   This	   re-­‐
configuration	   of	   counterinsurgency	   with	   culture-­‐savvy	   soldiers	   and	   a	   focus	   on	  
non-­‐kinetic,	   or	   ‘caring’	   activities	   constitutes	   the	  war	   in	  Afghanistan	   as	   a	   softer	  
and	  more	  humanitarian	  way	   to	  wage	  war.	  This	   section	   shows	  how	   this	   type	  of	  
counterinsurgency	   reimagines	   the	   battlefield	   of	   war	   to	   now	   become	   the	  
population.	   This	   is	   important	   because	   it	   not	   only	   troubles	   classical	  
interpretations	   of	   war,	   but	   also	   uncovers	   the	   gendered	   biopolitical	   logics	  
underlying	  the	  practice	  of	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  enables	  the	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  
dynamic.	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Having	  outlined	  the	  particular	  military	  masculinity	  of	  ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	  as	  central	  
to	   performances	   of	   gender	   in	   counterinsurgency,	   this	   is	   then	   complicated	   and	  
troubled	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  masculinities	  that	  surface	  in	  soldier	  
memoirs.	   As	   argued	   in	   the	   introduction	   of	   this	   thesis,	   the	   narrative	   style	   and	  
quality	  of	   soldiers	  memoirs	  make	   them	   ‘particularly	   suited	   for	   studying	  gender	  
identities’	  (Duncanson	  2009:	  67).	  	  
R.	  W.	  Connell’s	  work	  on	  masculinities	  emphasises	  that	  masculinities	  are	  always	  
multiple	   and	   that	   they	   exist	   in	   hierarchical	   relations	   to	   one	   another	   (1995).	  
Rather	   than	   identifying’	   a	   hegemonic	   masculinity	   of	   counterinsurgency,	   this	  
chapter	   emphasises	   how	   what	   is	   often	   deemed	   as	   the	   hegemonic	   military	  
masculinity,	  namely	  the	  ‘warrior	  masculinity’,	  is	  continuously	  under	  threat,	  both	  
internally	   and	   externally,	   in	   part	   by	   the	   doctrine	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	  itself.	  This	  does	  not	  dispute	  the	  hierarchical	  ordering	  between	  
different	   types	  of	  military	  masculinity,	   as	   this	   is	   very	  much	  evident,	  but	   rather	  
wishes	  to	  identify	  how	  the	  subjugation	  of	  some	  forms	  of	  masculinity	  occurs,	  and	  
what	  it	  represents.	  ‘Population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  is	  therefore	  not	  only	  a	  
‘battle	  for	  hearts	  and	  minds’	  of	  the	  insurgent	  population,	  	  but	  also	  a	  competition	  
between	   competing	   notions	   of	   military	   masculinities	   among	   the	  
counterinsurgents	   themselves.	  While	   these	   competing	   ideals	   may	   not	   co-­‐exist	  
harmoniously,	   all	   are	   required	   for	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   in	   Afghanistan,	   conceptualised	   here	   as	   a	   combination	   of	  
‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  	  
	  
1.0	  Reimagining	  and	  Governing	  the	  ‘Battlefield	  of	  War’	  
Commonly,	   counterinsurgency	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   response	   from	   ‘conventional’	  
armies	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   threat	   of	   ‘unconventional’	   armies.	   These	   groups	   of	  
unconventional	  forces	  all	  signify	  an	  armed	  segment	  of	  a	  population	  unwilling	  to	  
submit	  themselves	  to	  a	  state	  authority,	  a	  regime	  or	  an	  ideology.	  Insurgency	  as	  a	  
concept	   therefore	   refers	   to	   the	   armed	   group	   and	   its	   strategy	   and	   tactic,	   and	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counterinsurgency	  mirrors	  this	  dual	  definition	  of	  both	  agent	  and	  act.	  It	  has	  ‘long	  
been	   an	   essential	   aspect	   of	   colonization’	   (McBride	   and	  Wibben	   2012:	   203)	   and	  
examples	  include	  decolonial	  wars	  like	  the	  British	  war	  in	  Malaya	  (1948-­‐1960)	  and	  
the	   French	   war	   in	   Algeria	   (1954-­‐1962).	   It	   is	   also	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘irregular	  
warfare’,	  ‘guerrilla	  warfare’	  or	  simply	  ‘small	  wars’.	  Tarak	  Barkawi	  reminds	  us	  that	  
historically,	   ‘small	  wars’	  were	  only	  small	  because	   few	  Europeans	  participated	   in	  
them,	   rather	   than	   an	   accurate	   assessment	   of	   the	   consequences	   they	   had	   on	  
societies	   in	   which	   they	   were	   fought.	   With	   decolonization	   these	   became	  
‘revolutionary	  guerrilla	  wars’	  and	  since	  1989,	  ‘complex	  humanitarian	  emergencies’	  
(Barkawi	   2004:	   21).In	   relation	   to	   US	   military	   doctrine,	   counterinsurgency	   first	  
became	  official	  policy	  during	  the	  1960s	  (Kienscherf	  2011),	  and	  today,	  experts	  and	  
proponents	   of	   the	   strategy	   argue	   that	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	  War,	   the	   US	  
military	  had	  ‘forgot’	  important	  lessons	  that	  would	  have	  proved	  beneficial	  during	  
the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  (USArmy	  et	  al.	  2007:	  xiii).	  	  
While	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   in	   Afghanistan	   is	   first	   and	  
foremost	   associated	   with	   the	   US,	   various	   NATO	  members	   pursue	   identical	   or	  
similar	  civilian-­‐military	  strategies	  across	  Afghanistan.	  However,	  there	  have	  been	  
numerous	   critiques	   against	   the	   lack	   of	   effectiveness	   of	   NATO’s	  
counterinsurgency	   strategies	   in	  Afghanistan	   (Lamb	  2009,	  Nagl	  and	  Weitz	  2010,	  
Shapiro	  and	  Witney	  2009).	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  European	  nations	  and	  
NATO	  as	  an	  organisation	  show	  a	   ‘marked	  reluctance	  to	  use	   lethal	   force’	   (Lamb	  
2009:	  9).	  While	  counterinsurgency	  may	  be	  about	  more	  than	  ‘kinetic’	  operations,	  
it	   is	   distinctly	   different	   from	   peacekeeping,	   as	   ‘fighting	   will	   be	   necessary	   and	  
cannot	  be	  avoided’	  (Kilcullen	  2009	  :	  60)45.	  This	  critique	  speaks	  to	  one	  of	  the	  key	  
elements	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   namely	   the	   dynamic	  
                                                
45	  This	  critique	  comes	  out	  strongly	  by	  counterinsurgency	  expert	  and	  US	  army	  veteran	  John	  Nagl,	  
author	  of	  a	  famous	  book	  on	  counterinsurgency	  entitled	  Learning	   to	  Eat	  Soup	  with	  a	  Knife	   (Nagl	  
2009).	  The	  European	  part	  of	  NATO	  are	  characterised	  as	  being	  too	   ‘soft’	  and	  its	  decision-­‐making	  
structure	  is	  too	  ‘consensual’.	  A	  key	  problem	  for	  NATO	  has	  been	  the	  lack	  of	  strong	  leadership	  and	  
he	  likened	  it	  to	  a	  (feminine)	  ‘potluck’	  dinner	  where	  everyone	  is	  free	  to	  bring	  what	  suits.	  The	  way	  
NATO	  makes	   decisions	   is	   also	   found	   wanting	   in	   (masculine)	   decisiveness	   as	   ‘consensus-­‐based	  
decision	  making	  cannot	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  immediacy	  of	  battlefield	  events	  that	  require	  real	  time	  
responses’	  (Nagl	  and	  Weitz	  2010:	  5).	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between	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’.	   Not	   only	   does	   this	   illustrate	   the	   biopolitical	  
rationality	  at	  play	  in	  counterinsurgency	  (Anderson	  2011,	  Kienscherf	  2011),	  but	  also	  
illuminates	  how	  it	  produces	  and	  requires	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  gendered	  bodies	  and	  
performances.	  	  
2006	   saw	   a	   renewed	   commitment	   to	   counterinsurgency	   doctrine	   through	   the	  
publication	  of	  the	  U.S	  Army	  and	  Marine	  Corps	  Counterinsurgency	  Field	  Manual	  	  
(FM	   3-­‐24)	   spearheaded	  by	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  David	  Petraeus.	   In	   Iraq,	   he	  was	   the	  
key	  proponent	  for	  this	  approach,	  and	  is	  said	  to	  have	  ‘inspired’	  his	  command	  with	  
the	  question	  -­‐	  ‘What	  have	  you	  done	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Iraq	  today?’	  (USArmy	  et	  al.	  
2007:	  xv).	  FM	  3-­‐24	  outlines	  counterinsurgency	  as	  operationalized	  through	  three	  
key	   stages:	   ‘clear,	  hold	   and	  build’.	  These	  operations	  have	   three	  primary	   aims	  –	  
‘create	   a	   secure	   physical	   and	   psychological	   environment,	   establish	   firm	  
government	  control	  of	  the	  populace	  and	  area,	  gain	  populace’s	  support’	  (USArmy	  
et	  al.	  2007:	  174).	  ‘Clear’	  operations	  are	  ones	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  ‘destroying,	  capturing	  
or	   forcing	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   insurgent	   combatants’,	   in	   other	   words,	   mainly	  
operations	   associated	   with	   combat	   and	   killing.	   The	   ‘hold’	   stage	   might	   still	  
include	  offensive	  operations	  against	  the	  insurgents,	  but	  have	  the	  following	  aims:	  
‘secure	   the	   people	   and	   separate	   them	   from	   the	   insurgents;	   establish	   firm	  
government	   control;	   recruit,	   organize,	   equip	   and	   train	   local	   security	   forces;	  
establish	   government	   political	   apparatus;	   develop	   dependable	   networks	   of	  
sources	   by	   authorized	   intelligence	   agents’	   (USArmy	   et	   al.	   2007:	   178).	   The	   last	  
stage,	  the	  ‘build’	  stage	  is	  envisaged	  to	  cement	  the	  new	  relationship	  between	  the	  
populace	   and	   the	   government	   by	  making	   sure	   the	   population	   feels	   secure	   and	  
that	   they	  can	  trust	   the	  government	  to	  provide	   for	   them,	   ideally	   through	  seeing	  
their	   own	   forces	   do	   most	   of	   the	   work.	   Examples	   of	   ‘build’	   operations	   include	  
‘collecting	   and	   clearing	   trash	   from	   the	   streets,	   removing	   or	   painting	   over	  
insurgent	   symbols	  or	   colours,	  building	  and	   improving	   roads,	  digging	  wells	   and	  
building	  and	   improving	  schools	  and	  similar	   facilities’	   (USArmy	  et	  al.	  2007:	   179-­‐
180).	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In	  relation	  to	  the	  dynamic	  between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two	  
and	   five,	   in	   addition	   to	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	   the	   ‘clear,	   hold,	   build’	   strategy	  
functions	  here	  as	  an	  ideal	  type	  of	  linear	  development.	  While	  it	  is	  conceded	  that	  
the	   stages	   are	   blurred	   and	   flexible,	   the	   dynamic	   between	   them	   still	   implies	   a	  
linear	   development	   from	   one	   to	   the	   other.	  While	   the	   dynamic	   of	   ‘killing	   and	  
caring’	   is	   argued	   to	  manifest	   itself	   in	   different	   ways	   at	   different	   times,	   here	   it	  
surfaces	  as	  the	  one	  enabling	  the	  other.	  ‘Killing’	  here,	  through	  the	  ‘clearing’	  stage	  
of	  counterinsurgency	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  ‘caring’	  stage	  of	  	  ‘holding	  
and	  building’.	  	  
FM	  3-­‐24	  directs	  the	  military	  ‘to	  make	  securing	  the	  civilian,	  rather	  than	  destroying	  
the	  enemy,	  their	  top	  priority’	  and	  holds	  that	  ‘the	  civilian	  population	  is	  the	  centre	  
of	  gravity	  –	   the	  deciding	   factor	   in	   the	   struggle’	   (USArmy	  et	  al.	   2007:	  xxv).	  This	  
followed	  a	  slow	  realisation	  within	  the	  US	  military	  that	   ‘killing	  the	  civilian	   is	  no	  
longer	   just	   collateral	   damage’	   (USArmy	   et	   al.	   2007:	   ixv).	   It	   therefore	   ‘signals	   a	  
movement	   away	   from	   exclusive	   reliance	   on	   the	   extermination	   of	   “enemies”	  
towards	  the	  targeting	  of	  whole	  populations	  for	  political	  support	  and	  a	  treatment	  
of	  those	  populations	  as	  the	  decisive	  variables	  that	  determine	  mission	  success	  or	  
failure’	   (Bell	   2011:	   310).	   This	   dual	   emphasis	   on	   ‘killing’	   and	   ‘caring’	   was	  
highlighted	  in	  a	  2013	  interview	  with	  General	  Stanley	  McChrystal	  where	  he	  stated	  
that	   ‘the	   whole	   point	   of	   the	   war	   is	   to	   care	   for	   people,	   not	   just	   to	   kill	   them’	  
(McChrystal	  2013).	  The	  21st	  century	  version	  of	  counterinsurgency46	  is	  therefore	  a	  
‘programme	   of	   both	   rule	   and	   warfare	   that	   seeks	   to	   assemble	   humans,	  
technologies,	  tactics	  and	  modes	  of	  knowledge’	  (Kienscherf	  2011:	  520).	  By	  making	  
the	  population	  its	  battlefield	  and	  shifting	  the	  emphasis	  from	  ‘killing’	  to	   ‘caring’,	  
counterinsurgency	   expresses	   a	   biopolitical	   aspiration,	   seeking	   to	   manage	   and	  
organise	   the	   life	   of	   the	   population,	   best	   captured	   in	   Kilcullen’s	   assertion	   that	  
counterinsurgency	  is	  ‘armed	  social	  work’	  (2006b:	  138).	  	  
                                                
46	  Ben	  Anderson	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  the	  US	  Army	  playing	  cards	  to	  illustrate	  the	  shift	  of	  emphasis	  
between	  ‘killing’	  and	  ‘caring’.	  Whereas	  the	  2003	  edition	  was	  a	  ‘most	  wanted’	  deck,	  complete	  with	  
names	   of	   wanted	   targets	   (Saddam	   Hussein	   was	   the	   Ace	   of	   Spades),	   the	   2006	   edition	   was	   a	  
‘Preserving	  Heritage’	  card	  deck,	  produced	  with	  the	  help	  of	  archaeologists.	  The	  Queen	  of	  Hearts	  
for	  instance	  declared	  that	  ‘Showing	  respect	  wins	  hearts	  and	  minds’	  (Anderson	  2011:	  205-­‐206)	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Part	  of	  this	  ‘armed	  social	  work’	  and	  the	  ‘caring’	  of	  counterinsurgency	  is	  enabled	  
through	   the	   deployment	   FETs,	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	   However,	   the	  
structure	   of	   PRTs	   have	   also	   been	   important	   in	   this	   regard,	   as	   an	  
institutionalisation	   of	   this	   dynamic.	   PRTs	   were	   introduced	   to	   Afghanistan	   in	  
2002,	  and	  their	  structure	  varies	  according	  to	  which	  country	  has	  command	  over	  it	  
–	  some	  are	  led	  militarily,	  others	  headed	  by	  civilians,	  and	  others	  again	  have	  a	  joint	  
command	  of	  both	  civilian	  and	  military	  leadership.	  They	  have	  three	  primary	  aims:	  
to	  extend	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Afghan	  Government	  to	  the	  provinces,	  to	  improve	  
security	   and	   to	   facilitate,	   coordinate	   and	   execute	   reconstruction	   (Perito	   2005).	  
Even	   though	   they	   include	  development	   and	  humanitarian	   assistance,	   ‘PRTs	  do	  
not	  conduct	  development	  for	  development’s	  sake.	  For	  the	  PRTs,	  development	  is	  
a	  means	  of	  turning	  Afghans	  away	  from	  the	  insurgency’	  (Malkasian	  and	  Meyerle	  
2009:	  6).	  Because	  ‘humanitarian	  assistance	  to	  win	  “hearts	  and	  minds”	  is	  provided	  
directly	  by	  military	  forces’	  in	  a	  much	  more	  institutionalized	  way	  than	  previously	  
(Olson	  2006:	  4),	  the	  once	  strict	  division	  between	  the	  military	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  
and	  humanitarian	  and	  development	  NGOs	  on	  the	  other	  are	  increasingly	  blurred.	  
According	   to	   ISAF’s	   PRT	   handbook,	   it	   is	   set	   up	   in	   order	   to	   assist	   the	   country	  
from	   ‘stability’	   towards	   ‘transformational	   development’	   and	   is	   aimed	   at	  
‘addressing	  the	  causes	  that	  enable	  insurgency’	  (ISAF	  2009:	  7).	  	  
PRTs	  act	  as	  particularly	  good	  examples	  of	  the	  biopolitical	  logic	  that	  the	  security-­‐
development	  nexus	  is	  grounded	  in.	  The	  belief	  that	  ‘because	  development	  reduces	  
poverty	  and	  hence	  the	  risk	  of	  future	  instability,	  it	  also	  improves	  our	  own	  security	  
(Duffield	  2007:	  2	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  is	  in	  turn	  complemented	  by	  a	  belief	  that	  
military	   forces	   play	   a	   role	   in	   promoting	   development	   (Christie	   2012:	   54).	   It	   is	  
therefore	   part	   of	   a	   ‘deepening	  nexus	   between	   security	   and	  development	  which	  
merges	   the	   social	   reconstruction	   and	   reform	   of	   societies	   and	   peoples	   to	   the	  
strategies	   of	   war	   and	   intervention’	   (Bell	   2011:	   310-­‐311).	   As	   shown	   below,	   this	  
biopolitical	   impetus	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   productions	   and	   performances	   of	  
masculinity,	  ones	  particularly	  suited	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  21st	  century	  warfare.	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1.1	  The	  Dawn	  of	  the’	  Soldier-­‐Scholars’	  
The	  vanguard	  of	  counterinsurgency	  theory,	  which	  bears	  much	  responsibility	  for	  
its	   re-­‐emergence,	   is	   a	   group	   of	   intellectual	   (ex)soldiers	   that	   combine	   a	   certain	  
‘humanitarian	   softness’	   with	   traditional	   masculine	   ideals	   of	   rationality,	   rigour	  
and	   authority,	   namely	   the	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   (Khalili	   2010a)47 .	   Through	   their	  
‘cultivated	  demeanor,	  careful	  diction	  and	  civil	  habitus’	  these	  present	  ‘population-­‐
centric’	   counterinsurgency	   as	   ‘military	   superiority	   with	   a	   human	   face’	  
(Feichtinger	  et	  al.	  2012:	  46-­‐47).	  As	  noted,	  they	  share	  many	  of	  the	  characteristics	  
of	   ‘protective	  masculinity’	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three	  and	  therefore	  constitute	  a	  
reiteration	  of	  a	  particular	  discourse	  of	  warfare.	  	  
Success	   in	   war	   has	   historically	   required	   several	   qualities,	   all	   of	   which	   are	  
considered	   the	   ‘exclusive	   province	   of	   men’	   –	   ‘superior	   physical	   strength,	  
incomparable	   male	   bonding,	   heroic	   risk	   taking,	   extremes	   of	   violence,	   and	  
readiness	   to	   sacrifice	   one’s	   life	   for	   the	   cause’	   (Peterson	   2010:	   23).	   Militarised	  
masculinity	   has	   long	   been	   a	   ‘central	   component	   of	  manhood’	   (Goldstein	   2003:	  
266),	  defined	  against	  and	  organized	  hierarchically	  above	  those	  cast	  as	   feminine	  
(Higate	  2003b,	  Duncanson	  2009,	  Via	  2010).	  This	  speaks	  not	   just	   to	  women,	  but	  
also	   to	   numerous	   state	   subjects	   characterised	   as	   ‘effeminate’	   and	   subordinate,	  
such	   as	   gay	   men	   or	   various	   ethnic	   minorities.	   As	   discussed	   below,	   this	  
feminisation	   also	   occurs	   within	   army	   ranks,	   and	   as	   chapter	   six	   shows,	   similar	  
strategies	  of	  subordination	  are	  visible	  in	  the	  relationships	  between	  ISAF	  and	  the	  
ANSF.	  	  
Despite	   the	   ‘rediscovery’	   of	   counterinsurgency	   in	   the	   21st	   century,	   and	   its	   shift	  
towards	   ‘population	   centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   elements	   of	   the	   classical	  
                                                
47	  Of	  the	  most	  prominent	  are	  David	  Patraeus	  (PhD	  in	  International	  History),	   John	  Nagl	  (PhD	  in	  
History)	   and	  David	  Kilcullen	   (PhD	   in	  Political	  Anthropology).	  Kilcullen	   serves	   as	   a	   particularly	  
good	  example	  of	  the	  merging	  between	  the	  military,	  academic	  and	  political	  world.	  	  He	  previously	  
served	  with	  the	  Australian	  Military,	  was	  Special	  Advisor	  to	  former	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Condoleezza	  
Rice	  and	  a	  senior	  advisor	  to	  General	  Patraeus.	  He	  was	  a	  notable	  opponent	  to	  the	  invasion	  in	  Iraq,	  
arguing	  that	  the	  US	  was	  ill-­‐prepared	  for	  what	  awaited	  them	  there	  (Giovanni	  2009).	  While	  ‘soldier-­‐
scholars’	  are	  particularly	  important	  for	  the	  current	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  counterinsurgency,	  it	  is	  worth	  
noting	   that	   a	   kind	   of	   ‘intellectual	   masculinity’	   was	   prominent	   also	   during	   the	   Kennedy	   years	  
(Dean	  1998).	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sovereignty	  ethos	  remain,	  as	  shown	  below	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  soldier	  memoirs.	  
Classical	  sovereignty,	  understood	  as	  ‘the	  right	  of	  life	  and	  death’	  and	  ‘the	  right	  to	  
kill’	   (Foucault	   1997:	   240)	   is	   not	   dissolved	   here,	   but	   it	   is	   accompanied	   by	   a	  
governmental	   rationality	   of	   care	   (Weber	   2008a).	   Accordingly,	   there	   is	   far	   less	  
emphasis	   on	   kinetic	   force,	   or	   killing	   capacity,	   and	   an	   increased	   emphasis	   on	  
‘winning	   hearts	   and	   minds’	   through	   building	   ‘population-­‐centred’	   capacity	  
(Khalili	  2010a).	  This	   therefore,	  argues	  Khalili,	  calls	   into	  being	  a	   	   ‘a	  new	  form	  of	  
masculinity’	   in	  which	   ‘“manliness”	   is	   softened,	   and	   the	   sensitive	  masculinity	   of	  
the	   humanitarian	   soldier-­‐scholar	   (white,	   literate,	   articulate	   and	   doctorate-­‐
festooned)	   overshadows	   the	   hyper-­‐masculinity	   of	   warrior	   kings’	   (2010a:	   5).	  
Importantly,	  ‘this	  new	  brand	  of	  soldier-­‐scholar	  is	  directly	  contrasted	  with	  images	  
of	   the	  misogynist	  warriors	  of	   the	  Taliban	  and	  Al	  Qaeda	  and	  more	  broadly	  with	  
the	  gender-­‐segregated	  society	  of	  Afghanistan’	  (McBride	  and	  Wibben	  2012:	  204).	  
In	  other	  words,	  there	  are	  strong	  resonances	  between	  this	  performance	  of	  gender	  
and	  protective	  masculinity	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  
As	  argued	  in	  chapter	  two,	   it	   is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  military	  masculinities	  as	  a	  
plural	   concept	   (Higate	   2003b,	   Higate	   2007,	   Duncanson	   2013)	   rather	   than	  
equating	   them	  solely	  with	  physical	  violence.	  As	  Ryerson	  Christie	  argues,	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   ‘militaries	   are	   now	  
deliberately	  pursuing	   alternative	  masculinities,	   at	   least	   for	   some	  of	   its	   soldiers,	  
that	   appear	   to	   be	   at	   odds	   with	   nominal	   hegemonic	   military	   masculinities’	  
(Christie	   2012:	   58).	   Similarly,	   Terrell	   Carver	   argues	   that	   we	   are	   witnessing	   a	  
merging	  of	   the	   ‘rational-­‐bureaucratic	  modern	  man’	   and	   the	  warrior	   (2008:	   78).	  
That	   said,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   only	  
produces	   a	   singular	   gentle,	   intelligent,	   protective,	   cooperative,	   communicative	  
and	  culturally-­‐savvy	  military	  masculinity.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  as	  this	  chapter	  shows,	  
this	   type	   of	   warfare	   requires	   a	   plurality	   of	   embodied	   military	   masculinities,	  
which	  do	  not	  necessarily	  ‘sit	  easy’	  with	  one	  another.	  Rather,	  this	  duality,	  and	  at	  
times	   tension,	   is	   written	   into	   the	   very	   doctrine	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency.	   This	   is	   evident	   in	   how	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	   David	   Kilcullen	  
summarizes	  effective	  counterinsurgency	  –	  ‘a	  matter	  of	  good	  governance,	  backed	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by	  solid	  population	  security	  and	  economic	  development	  measures,	  resting	  on	  a	  
firm	   foundation	   of	   energetic	   IO	   [information	   operations],	   which	   unifies	   and	  
drives	  all	  other	  activity’	  (2009	  :	  60).	  He	  encourages	  company	  level	  commanders	  
to	   ‘discuss	   ideas’	   and	   ‘seek	   consensus’	   rather	   than	   opt	   for	   violence,	   and	   states	  
that	   ‘if	   this	   sounds	  unmilitary,	  get	  over	   it’	   (Kilcullen	  2006b:	   135).	  The	  aim	   is	   to	  
‘provide	  protection,	   identify	  needs,	   facilitate	  civil	  affairs	  and	  use	   improvements	  
in	   social	  conditions	  as	   leverage	   to	  build	  networks	  and	  mobilise	   the	  population’	  
(Kilcullen	  2006b:	  138).	  However,	  as	  Kilcullen	  also	  reminds	  us,	  ‘if	  this	  sounds	  soft,	  
non-­‐lethal	  and	  non-­‐confrontational	  it	  is	  not:	  this	  is	  a	  life-­‐and-­‐death	  competition	  
in	  which	  the	  loser	  is	  marginalized,	  starved	  of	  support	  and	  ultimately	  destroyed.	  
The	  actors	  mount	  a	  lethal	  struggle	  to	  control	  the	  population’	  (2006a:	  11).	  There	  is	  
‘always	  a	  lot	  of	  killing	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other’	  (Kilcullen	  2006a:	  3).	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	   ‘winning	   hearts	   and	   minds’	   and	   governing	   of	   populations	   requires	   both	  
‘killing’	  and	  ‘caring’.	  	  
As	   a	   whole,	   this	   reframing	   of	   counterinsurgency	   as	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   ‘helps	  
reinforce	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐led	  intervention	  is	  humanitarian	  
and	   that	   the	   efforts	   in	   Afghanistan	   are	   geared	   mainly	   at	   saving	   the	   civilian	  
population’	  (McBride	  and	  Wibben	  2012:	  203).	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  this	  
framing	   is	  not	  only	  reliant	  on	  a	   ‘softened’	  conception	  of	  male	  soldiers,	  but	  also	  
on	   the	   appropriation	   of	   women’s	   bodies	   into	   counterinsurgency,	   as	   both	  
‘practitioners’	  (FETs)	  and	  ‘targets’	  (Afghan	  women).	  In	  fact,	  much	  of	  the	  ‘caring’	  
of	  counterinsurgency	  is	  provided	  by	  female	  counterinsurgents.	  	  
As	  noted	  above,	  this	  type	  of	  counterinsurgency	  constitutes	  a	  re-­‐imagining	  of	  the	  
population	   as	   the	   battlefield	   of	   war.	   The	   increased	   emphasis	   on	   winning	   the	  
civilian	  population	  over,	  rests	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  if	  insurgents	  lack	  the	  support	  of	  
the	   civilian	   population	   they	   will	   be	   easier	   to	   defeat.	   Historically,	   in	   war,	   the	  
category	  of	   the	  civilian	   is	   feminine.	  The	  culturally	   important	   term	   ‘women	  and	  
children’	  serves	  to	  signify	  those	  who	  do	  not	  fight,	  granting	  women	  and	  children,	  
but	   not	   adult	   men	   a	   civilian	   status	   associated	   with	   ‘material	   innocence	   and	  
vulnerability’	   (Carpenter	   2006:	   26,	   see	   also	   Kinsella	   2005).	   Cynthia	   Enloe	   has	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famously	  argued	  that	  what	  the	  phrase	  represents	  infantilises	  women,	  leading	  her	  
to	   coin	   the	   term	   ‘womenandchildren’	   (1993,	   see	   also	   Shepherd	   2006).	   In	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   however,	   ‘the	   civilian	   populations	   are	  
seen	   as	   malleable	   and	   calculating	   masses,	   subject	   to	   manipulation	   by	   the	  
“terrorists”	   and	   the	   counterinsurgents	   alike’	   (Khalili	   2010b:	   9).	   Through	   its	  
engagement	   with	   civilians,	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   aims	   to	  
change	   attitudes,	   reinforce	   what	   is	   considered	   a	   legitimate	   government	   and	  
‘liberate’	  minds	  to	  change	  sides	  –	  from	  passive	  or	  active	  support	  of	  the	  insurgent,	  
to	  backing	  the	  government	  and	  the	  counterinsurgency	  effort.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  
needs	  to	  manage	  and	  govern	  the	  population.	  	  
This	  type	  of	  warfare	  also	  blurs	  the	  lines	  between	  traditionally	  accepted	  categories	  
of	   ‘civilian’	   and	   ‘combatant’.	   In	   counterinsurgency,	   the	   formerly	   ‘innocent’	  
civilian	  is	  perhaps	  not	  so	  straightforwardly	  innocent	  after	  all,	  because	  the	  enemy	  
one	   is	   seeking	   to	  combat	  dwells	  within	  and	   is	  often	   indistinguishable	   from	  the	  
civilian	  community.	  As	  FM	  3-­‐24	  warns,	  while	  ‘civilian	  protection	  is	  more	  central	  
in	  COIN	  [counterinsurgency]	  than	  in	  conventional	  warfare’,	  achieving	  the	  social	  
and	   economic	   opportunities	   necessary	   for	   it	   to	   be	   deemed	   ‘successful’	   is	   very	  
difficult	   because	   ‘the	   insurgent	   exploits	   the	   civilian...[they]	   dress	   in	   civilian	  
clothes,	  hide	  behind	  women,	  use	  children	  as	  spotters’	  and	  so	  on	  (2007:	  xxvii).	  In	  
other	   words,	   the	   civilian	   population	   constitutes	   not	   only	   an	   aim	   for	  
counterinsurgency,	  but	  also	  a	  challenge	  and	  is	  an	  entity	  that	  can	  never	  really	  be	  
trusted.	  	  
	  
1.2	  Culture	  and	  Counterinsurgency	  
In	   order	   to	   manoeuvre	   this	   difficult	   terrain,	   cultural	   knowledge	   is	   deemed	  
essential	   for	   success	   and	   pre-­‐defined	   cultural	   divisions	   need	   to	   be	   interpreted,	  
understood	   and	   ultimately	  mastered	   if	   the	   enemy	   is	   to	   be	   defeated	   (Kilcullen	  
2006b).	   According	   to	   former	   ISAF	   Commander	   Stanley	   McChrystal,	   ‘success’	  
requires	   personnel	   to	   be	   ‘seen	   as	   guests	   of	   the	   Afghan	   people	   and	   their	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government’	  and	  they	  must	  ‘spend	  as	  much	  time	  as	  possible	  with	  the	  people	  and	  
as	   little	   time	   as	   possible	   in	   armoured	   vehicles	   or	   behind	   walls’	   (McChrystal	  
quoted	   in	   Caldwell	   2011a:	   241).	   This	   is	   of	   course	   nothing	   new,	   as	   cultural	  
knowledge	   has	   been	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   many	   previous	   counterinsurgency	  
operations	   as	   well	   (Feichtinger	   et	   al.	   2012)	   	   and	   militaries	   fighting	   in	  
counterinsurgency	   operations	   have	   long	   aligned	   themselves	   with	   ‘cultural	  
advisors’	   and	   anthropologists	   (Duyvesteyn	   2011).	   That	   said,	   the	   centrality	   of	  
‘cultural	  knowledge’	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  simply	  a	  pragmatic	  solution	  to	  finding	  
oneself	  fighting	  in	  a	  different	  and	  ‘complex’	  culture	  or	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  fighting	  
environment.	   As	   noted	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   particular	   racialized	   and	  
gendered	  assumptions	  have	  been	  embedded	  into	  the	  discourse	  and	  narrative	  of	  
this	   war	   from	   the	   outset.	   It	   relied	   on	   there	   being	   a	   fundamental	   difference	  
between	   ‘us’	   and	   ‘them’	   in	   order	   to	   function	   discursively	   and	   enable	   a	  
legitimation	  of	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ‘cultural	  turn’	  in	  
the	   way	   that	  Western	  militaries	   approach	   war,	   is	  much	  more	   than	   something	  
that	  functions	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  pre-­‐deployment	  strategy.	  
The	  rediscovery	  of	  culture	  and	  its	  role	  in	  counterinsurgency	  operations	  has	  led	  to	  
great	  changes	  within	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Defence,	  who	  have	  been	  hiring	  social	  
scientists,	   anthropologists,	   linguists,	   area	   specialists	   and	   political	   advisors	   en	  
masse	   in	   the	   last	   decade	   (SfAA	  2007).	  While	  Western	  powers,	   and	  particularly	  
the	  US,	  were	   ‘immensely	  capable	  of	  blowing	   the	  doors	  off	  of	  opposing	   regimes	  
with	   “shock	   and	   awe”’	   they	  were	   less	   capable	   of	   “forging	   the	   targeted	   societies	  
anew”’	  (Feichtinger	  et	  al.	  2012:	  45).	  The	  attempt	  to	  become	  a	  ‘world	  expert’	  in	  the	  
practices,	  values	  and	  histories	  of	  a	  particular	  people	  acts	  as	  an	  example	  of	  what	  
Patrick	   Porter	   argues	   has	   been	   a	   marked	   change	   in	   the	   way	   that	   Western	  
militaries	   approach	  war	   –	   ‘the	   cultural	   turn’	   (2009).	  He	   argues	   that	   strategists	  
within	  the	  Pentagon	  and	  elsewhere	  viewed	  the	  ‘global	  war	  on	  terrorism	  as	  a	  clash	  
of	  profoundly	  different	  cultures,	  between	  American-­‐led	   forces	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  
jihadist	  warriors	  or	  tribal	  warlords	  on	  the	  other’	  (Porter	  2007:45).	  This	  view,	  and	  
the	   continuous	   reference	   to	   the	   ‘culture’	   of	   the	   enemy,	   allows	   the	   military	   to	  
explain	   successes	   and	   failures	   as	   the	   result	   of	   long-­‐standing	   historical	   and	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cultural	   traits.	   While	   FM	   3-­‐24	   acknowledges	   that	   culture	   is	   learned,	   it	  
emphasises	  that	  it	  is	   ‘logically	  consistent,	  bounded,	  highly	  integrated,	  internally	  
coherent,	   and	   animated’	   (Porter	   2009:	   61).	   The	   obsessive	   focus	   on	   British	   and	  
French	  colonial	  experiences	  of	  warfare,	  exemplified	  with	   frequent	   references	   to	  
‘The	  Great	  Game’	  and	  T.E.	  Lawrence	  also	  speaks	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘colonial	  nostalgia’	  
where	   ‘modern	  soldier-­‐intellectuals	   looked	  to	  a	  mythologised	  history	  of	  Empire	  
as	  a	  guide’	  (Porter	  2009:	  58).	  	  
One	   example	   of	   how	   this	   ‘cultural	   turn’	   happens	   in	   practice	   is	   the	   Human	  
Terrain	  System	  (HTS)	  that	  has	  been	  employed	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  knowledge	  of	  
a	  given	  area’s	  ‘culture’	  and	  society	  in	  both	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  (Lucas	  Jr	  2009)48,	  
and	   as	  means	   to	   ‘triage	   between	   different	   levels	   of	   risk	   so	   that	  modes	   of	   both	  
lethal	   and	  non-­‐lethal	   targeting	  might	  be	   adapted	   accordingly’	   (Kienscherf	   2011:	  
527).	  Human	  Terrain	  Teams	  (HTTs)	  have	  recruited	  a	  number	  of	  anthropologists,	  
political	   scientists	   and	   area	   specialists	   in	   its	   service	   in	   order	   to	   conduct	  
ethnographies,	   teach	   soldiers	   ‘best	   practice’	   in	   a	   specific	   ‘cultural	   terrain’	   and	  
assist	   the	   military	   in	   their	   efforts	   to	   ‘secure	   the	   population’.	   These	   are	  
‘structurally	  very	  close	  to	  older	  traditions	  of	  the	  application	  of	  knowledge	  for	  the	  
organization	  of	  imperial	  rule’	  (Feichtinger	  et	  al.	  2012:	  48).	  	  
There	   have	   been	   several	   contentious	   debates	  within	   and	   outside	   the	   academic	  
community	  regarding	  the	  turn	  to	  ‘culture’	  and	  academia’s	  role	  within	  it	  (see	  for	  
instance	   Gonzalez	   2007,	   Kilcullen	   2007,	   McFate	   2007,	   Zehfuss	   2012).	   A	   key	  
anthropologist	  that	  has	  aided	  the	  ‘cultural	  turn’	  for	  the	  US	  army	  is	  Montgomery	  
McFate	  who	  attributes	  the	  renewed	  interest	  in	  cultural	  knowledge	  as	  stemming	  
‘directly	   from	   the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   the	   conflicts	   in	   Iraq	   and	   Afghanistan’	  
(2010:	   190).	  Arguing	   that	   ‘the	   centre	   of	   gravity	   in	   any	   counterinsurgency	   is	   the	  
                                                
48	  HTS	   is	   organised	   in	   teams	   known	   as	  Human	   Terrain	   Teams	   (HTTs)	   and	   vary	   in	   scope	   and	  
organization.	  Proponents	  of	  HTTs	  argue	  that	  ‘the	  Army,	  our	  Nation,	  and	  the	  people	  of	  Iraq	  and	  
Afghanistan	   will	   benefit	   from	   the	   fielding	   of	   this	   powerful	   new	   instrument	   for	   conducting	  
stability	   operations	   and	   reconstruction’	   (Kipp	   et	   al.	   2006:	   15).	   The	   budget	   of	   HTT	   is	  
approximately	   $	   60	   million,	   it	   has	   been	   called	   ‘the	   most	   expensive	   social	   science	   project	   in	  
history’	  (Gonzalez	  2008:	  22).	  In	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  human	  terrain	  agenda	  and	  system,	  Gonzalez	  
draws	   the	  history	  of	   this	  military	  practice	  back	   to	   the	  perceived	   threat	   in	   the	  US	  of	   the	   ‘Black	  
Panthers’	   and	   other	   militant	   groups.	   As	   such,	   the	   term	   is	   already	   embedded	   in	   a	   racial	   and	  
colonial	  history.	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civilian	  population’	   and	   the	  goal	  being	   to	   ‘shift	   the	  population	   from	  passive	  or	  
active	   support	   of	   the	   insurgents	   to	   support	   the	   legitimate	   host	   nation	  
government’	   (McFate	   2010:	   190),	   she	   cites	   knowledge	   and	   understanding	   of	  
culture	  as	  the	  key	  component	  of	  making	  this	  happen.	  In	  this	  quest,	  anthropology	  
can	  truly	  realise	  its	  potential,	  	  
‘Once	  called	  “the	  handmaiden	  of	  colonialism”,	  anthropology	  has	  had	  a	  long,	  fruitful	  relationship	  
with	  various	  elements	  of	  national	  power,	  which	  ended	  suddenly	  following	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  The	  
strange	  story	  of	  anthropology’s	  birth	  as	  a	  warfighting	  discipline,	  and	  its	  sudden	  plunge	  into	  the	  
abyss	  of	  postmodernism,	  is	  intertwined	  with	  the	  U.S.	  failure	  in	  Vietnam’	  (McFate	  2005:	  2).	  	  
Beatrice	  Heuser,	  another	  strong	  advocate	  of	   increasing	  the	   ‘cultural	  knowledge’	  
of	   militaries	   suggests	   that	   anthropologists	   ‘must	   be	   happy	   to	   get	   out	   of	   their	  
ivory	  tower	  of	  theory	  and	  get	  stuck	  into	  the	  practical	  application	  of	  their	  skills’	  
(2007:	  170).	  Kilcullen	  writes	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  anthropological	  knowledge	  
into	   counterinsurgency	  makes	   ‘counterinsurgency	  more,	  not	   less	  humane’.	  The	  
ethical	   questions	   about	   such	   research	   that	   several	   anthropologists	   have	   raised	  
are	  largely	  dismissed	  since	  ethics,	  understood	  by	  Kilcullen	  in	  utilitarian	  terms	  as	  
‘the	   greatest	   good	   for	   the	   greatest	   number’,	   should	   encourage,	   not	   discourage	  
anthropologists	  and	  other	  social	  scientists	  to	  get	  involved	  (2007:	  20).	  	  
Anthropologist	  Roberto	  J.	  Gonzalez	  warns	  against	  the	   ‘facile	  “unbiased”	  notions	  
of	   culture	   preferred	   by	   soldier-­‐scholars’	   as	   they	   seem	   to	   provide	   ‘ideological	  
justifications	   for	  military	  occupation	   through	  appeals	   to	  orientalist	   stereotypes’	  
(Gonzalez	   2007:18,	   see	   also	   Porter	   2009,	  Owens	   2010).	   Likewise,	   the	   American	  
Anthropological	   Association	   (AAA)	   has	   heavily	   criticized	   the	   practice	   of	  HTTs	  
and	  called	  it	  an	   ‘unacceptable	  application	  of	  anthropological	  expertise’	  (Quoted	  
in	  Lucas	  Jr	  2009:	  171).	  While	  Porter	  contends	  that	  much	  of	  the	  focus	  on	  culture	  
may	   be	   well-­‐intended,	   as	   Kilcullen	   argues,	   and	   aimed	   at	   fostering	   ‘greater	  
cultural	  awareness	  and	  sophistication	  among	  militaries	  and	  governments’	  (2007:	  
45-­‐46),	  and	  that	   it	  may	  well	  be	  a	   ‘healthy	  corrective	   to	   the	  overconfidence	  and	  
technological	   determinism	   that	   marked	   aspects	   of	   recent	   strategic	   thinking’	  
(2007:	  49),	  its	  downside	  is	  that	  it	  ‘risks	  replacing	  strategy	  with	  stereotypes’	  (2007:	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26).	  He	  points	  to	  the	  vast	  range	  of	  military	  literature	  written	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  
that	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  war	  fought	  by	  ‘men	  of	  the	  east’	  which	  is	  
seen	  as	  both	  ancient	  and	  unchangeable.	  However,	  ironically,	  ‘against	  a	  historical	  
model	  of	  continuity	  in	  which	  strategy	  is	  rooted	  in	  timeless	  traditions,	  it	  assumes	  
that	  its	  own	  institutions	  and	  doctrines	  are	  open	  to	  transformation’	  (Porter	  2007:	  
50).	   Similarly,	   Derek	   Gregory	   argues	   that	   the	   ‘mastering’	   of	   these	   ‘cultural	  
differences’	   may	   imply	   more	   than	   simply	   an	   obvious	   ‘practical’	   problem	   for	  
counterinsurgents;	   it	   may	   also	   imply	   a	   radically	   dichotomous	   relationship	  
between	  insurgents	  and	  counterinsurgents,	  	  
‘the	  emphasis	  on	  cultural	  difference	  –	  the	  attempt	  to	  hold	  the	  Other	  at	  a	  distance	  while	  claiming	  
to	  cross	  the	  interpretative	  divide	  –	  produces	  a	  diagram	  in	  which	  violence	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  “their”	  
space,	   which	   the	   cultural	   turn	   endlessly	   partitions	   through	   its	   obsessive	   preoccupation	   with	  
ethno-­‐sectarian	   division,	  while	   the	   impulse	   to	   understand	   is	   confined	   to	   “our”	   space,	  which	   is	  
constructed	  as	  open,	  unitary	  and	  generous:	  the	  source	  of	  a	  hermeneutic	  invitation	  that	  can	  never	  
be	  reciprocated’	  (2008b:	  18).	  	  
While	   it	   may	   be	   commonsensical	   to	   argue	   that	   in	   order	   to	   ‘win’	   a	  
counterinsurgency	  one	  needs	  to	  understand	  the	  society	  that	  one	  is	  stationed	  in,	  
to	  say	  that	  concerns	  with	  culture	  only	  arose	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  ‘doing	  
war’	  is	  something	  else.	  As	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  and	  shown	  in	  the	  next	  
chapter	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   deployment	   of	   FETs,	   how	   ‘women’	   and	   ‘men’	   are	  
understood	   and	   believed	   to	   interact	   with	   their	   surroundings	   is	   not	   something	  
that	  arose	  only	  after	  the	  invasion	  took	  place.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  conceptions	  of	  the	  
Other’s	   culture	   has	   been	   of	   immense	   importance	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   the	  
West’s	   own	   sense	   of	   Self,	   and	   is	   therefore	   not	   something	   that	   has	   surfaced	   as	  
relevant	  only	  after	  deployment	  of	  boots	  on	  the	  ground.	  ‘Knowledge’	  of	  the	  Other	  
is	  never	  neutral	  and	  as	  Edward	  Said	  argues	  in	  Orientalism,	  it	  ‘has	  much	  less	  to	  do	  
with	  the	  Orient	  than	  it	  does	  with	  “our”	  world’	  (1994:	  12).	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  six	  
of	   this	   thesis,	   soldiers	   themselves	   contribute	   to	   the	   production	   of	   knowledge	  
about	  Afghan	  society	  and	  its	  men,	  which	  in	  part	  replicate	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  
an	   ‘absolute	   and	   systematic	   difference	   between	   the	   West,	   which	   is	   rational,	  
developed,	  humane,	  superior,	  and	  the	  Orient,	  which	  is	  aberrant,	  underdeveloped,	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inferior’	  (Said	  1994:	  300).	  	  
	  
2.0	  The	  Multiple	  Military	  Masculinities	  of	  Counterinsurgency	  	  
As	   the	   above	   section	   shows,	   a	   central	   part	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   has	   been	   its	   emphasis	   on	   cultural	   knowledge,	   the	   gendered	  
performances	   of	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   and	   a	   reimagining	   of	   the	   population	   as	   the	  
battlefield	  of	  war.	  However,	  military	  masculinity	  is	  not	  one	  kind	  of	  performance,	  
but	  always	  exists	  in	  multiplicity	  and	  ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  masculinity	  is	  not	  the	  only,	  
nor	   even	   the	   most	   common,	   performance	   of	   military	   masculinity	   in	  
counterinsurgency.	   ‘Soldier-­‐scholars’	   are	   often	   a	   select	   elite	   that	   the	   lower	  
echelons	   frequently	   have	   difficulty	   identifying	   with.	   Military	   masculinities	   are	  
produced	   in	   complex	   gendered	   ways	   through	   military	   doctrine,	   recruitment	  
adverts,	   films,	   games	   and	   literature	   forming	   a	   complex	  web	   of	  meaning	  which	  
link	  the	  ideas	  of	  manhood	  and	  soldiering	  (Steans	  2006).	  Soldiers	  themselves	  are	  
therefore	   simultaneously	   products,	   and	   productive	   of	   these	   masculinities	   by	  
appropriating	  and	  adapting	  hegemonic	  ideals	  of	  masculinity	  in	  the	  military.	  How	  
soldiers	  themselves	  represent	  their	  experiences	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  therefore	  a	  part	  
of	   this	   production	   and	   the	   gendering	   of	   how	   they	   make	   sense	   of	   their	  
deployment	  provides	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  insights.	  	  
As	  Connell	  argues,	  the	  production	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity	  requires	  a	  strategy	  
of	  subordination	  of	  alternative	  expressions	  of	  masculinity	  (1995),	  which	  is	  partly	  
achieved	   through	   feminisation.	   With	   feminisation	   I	   am	   referring	   to	   discursive	  
links	  that	  are	  drawn	  between	  particular	  actions	  or	  traits	  and	  what	  is	  considered	  
feminine.	   Following	   Peterson,	   and	   emphasising	   that	   gender	   is	   produced	   as	  
relational,	   ‘privileging	   who	   and	   what	   is	   masculinized	   is	   inextricable	   from	  
devaluing	  who	  and	  what	  is	  feminized’	  (2010:	  18).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  production	  
of	  military	  masculinities	   relies	   on	   devaluing	   what	   is	   considered	   feminine,	   and	  
that	  neither	  can	  exist	  without	  the	  other,	  recognizing	  that	  the	  soldier	  exists	  in	  a	  
‘gendered	  matrix	  of	   relations’	   (Butler	   1993:	  xvi).	  The	   ‘weeding	  out’	  of	  particular	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practices	   or	   characteristics	   deemed	   feminine,	   internally	  within	   a	  military	   force	  
and	   later	   in	   relation	   to	   training	   ‘host	   forces’	   as	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   six,	   is	  
therefore	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  military	  masculinities.	  	  
As	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   thesis	   notes,	   soldiers	   writing	   about	   their	   wartime	  
experiences	   is	   a	   growing	   phenomenon.	   There	   are	   endless	   reasons	   why	   young	  
men	   and	   women	   become	   soldiers,	   and	   Norway	   and	   the	   US	   have	   different	  
traditions	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   recruitment	   to	   the	  military	   forces	  which	  no	  doubt	  
influences	   these.	   The	   analysis	   here	  makes	   use	   of	   four	   American	  memoirs	   and	  
four	   Norwegian	   ones,	   and	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   context	   and	   background,	   a	   brief	  
introduction	  to	  them	  is	  provided	  here.	  	  
Three	   of	   the	   Norwegian	   memoirs	   come	   from	   members	   of	   the	   same	   battalion	  
(Telemark	  Batallion)	   (Johansen	   2011,	   Elden	   2012,	  Mella	   2013),	   and	   they	  have	   all	  
been	  stationed	  in	  Meymaneh	  in	  Faryab,	  in	  the	  north	  of	  Afghanistan.	  For	  all	  three	  
of	  these	  authors,	  they	  explain	  their	  reasoning	  for	  writing	  memoirs	  as	  being	  about	  
giving	  the	  Norwegian	  public	  an	  insight	  into	  life	  as	  a	  soldier	  -­‐	   	   ‘how	  conscripted	  
soldiers	  are	  turned	  into	  professional	  warriors’	  (Johansen	  2011:	  11),	  and	  to	  ‘increase	  
the	  understanding	  and	  acceptance	  for	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  professional	  soldier’	  
(Mella	   2013:	   12).	   In	   some	   respects	   these	  memoirs	   are	   quite	   similar,	   in	   terms	   of	  
everyday	   experiences	   and	   reflections	   around	   how	   the	   Norwegian	   public	   and	  
Norwegian	   politicians	   do	   not	   have	   enough	   understanding	   or	   recognition	   for	  
what	  soldier’s	  abroad	  do,	  particularly	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Alfa	  scandal,	  discussed	  
in	  chapter	   two	  and	  below.	   In	  others	   they	  differ,	  with	   for	   instance	  Elden’s	  book	  
focusing	  not	  only	  on	  relationships	  in	  the	  field,	  but	  also	  follows	  the	  strains	  he	  and	  
his	  wife	  felt	  because	  of	  his	  deployment.	  The	  fourth	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  memoirs	  is	  
written	  by	  a	  selection	  of	  anonymous	  snipers	  and	  was	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  to	  come	  
out	  in	  Norway	  (Skarpskyttere	  2010).	  Because	  this	  book	  has	  a	  collection	  of	  authors,	  
it	  presents	  less	  of	  a	  chronological	  description	  of	  events	  but	  is	  rather	  a	  selection	  of	  
‘momentary	  pictures’.	  
The	   Norwegian	   soldiers	   express	   different	   reasons	   for	   signing	   up	   for	   service	  
overseas.	  In	  Skarpskyttere	  for	  instance,	  when	  answering	  this	  question,	  the	  author	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is	   conscious	  not	   to	   sound	   like	   a	   ‘blood	   thirsty	  Rambo,	  but	   also	  not	   like	   a	   cute	  
puppy	  who	  thinks	  he	  is	  going	  to	  a	  peace	  keeping	  mission’	  (2010:	  21).	  But	  really,	  
the	  answer	  is	  clear	  –	  ‘For	  extremists	  who	  support	  terror,	  howl	  Allah’s	  name	  and	  
burn	  flags,	  there	  is	  one	  cure,	  the	  vermin	  needs	  to	  be	  annihilated	  from	  the	  surface	  
of	   the	   earth,	   clear	   and	   simple’	   (Skarpskyttere	   2010:	   22).	   In	  Love	   and	  War,	  Emil	  
Elden	   states	   that	   going	   to	   Afghanistan	   was	   a	   part	   of	   achieving	   his	   three	   life	  
ambitions	   (become	   a	   platoon	   commander,	   experience	   combat	   and	   find	   a	   good	  
woman).	  He	  writes	  that	  achieving	  the	  second	  goal	  was	  the	  most	  difficult	  since	  it	  
would	   demand	   being	   stationed	   in	   a	   war	   zone	   and	   he	   hoped	   Norway	   would	  
deploy	  soldiers	  to	  the	  south	  of	  the	  country,	  like	  the	  Danes	  had	  done	  (Elden	  2012:	  
10).	   As	   it	   turns	   out,	   the	   situation	   in	   Faryab	   would	   afford	   him	   several	  
opportunities	   for	   combat	   experience.	   For	   Emil	   Johansen,	   going	   to	   Afghanistan	  
was	  simply	  a	  case	  of	  ‘doing	  his	  job’	  and	  he	  ‘goes	  where	  Stortinget	  asks	  him	  to	  go,	  
if	  that	  is	  Afghanistan	  or	  another	  conflict	  or	  war’.	  But	  he	  adds,	  ‘if	  that	  means	  I	  can	  
help	   other	   people	   in	   a	   difficult	   situation	   that	   is	   a	   major	   bonus’.	   But	  
fundamentally,	   he	   considers	   himself	   a	   ‘tool	   for	   Norwegian	   foreign	   policy’	  
(Johansen	   2011:	   45).	  Mella	  writes	   that	   for	  him	   it	  was	  part	   ‘excitement’,	   ‘putting	  
into	   practice	  what	   he	   had	   learned’,	   ‘making	   a	   difference’,	   well	   aware	   that	   as	   a	  
‘professional	  soldier	  I	  am	  a	  small	  piece	  in	  a	  political	  power	  game’	  (2013:	  34).	  	  
The	  American	  memoirs	  have	  a	  greater	  diversity	  in	  terms	  of	  type	  of	  deployment,	  
location,	   battalion,	   and	   reasons	   for	   signing	   up.	   Jeff	   Courter,	   author	   of	  Afghan	  
Journal	  writes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  deep,	  religious	  motivation	  in	  serving	  by	  seeking	  to	  
‘help	   those	   who	   cannot	   help	   themselves’	   (2008:	   10)49.	   Both	   him,	   Benjamin	  
Tupper	   and	  Matt	   Zeller	   were	   a	   part	   of	   an	   Embedded	   Training	   Team	   (ETT)	   to	  
train	  the	  ANA	  and	  the	  Afghan	  National	  Police	  (ANP).	  	  Tupper	  calls	  this	  the	  ‘tip	  
                                                
49	  He	  is	  far	  more	  outspoken	  about	  his	  religious	  views	  than	  many	  of	  the	  others,	  he	  is	  significantly	  
older	   (43)	   than	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   soldiers	   and	  his	   book	  has	   less	   descriptions	   of	   combat	   situations	  
than	  in	  the	  other	  books.	  Throughout	  his	  memoir,	  he	  is	  critical	  of	  other	  soldiers	  who	  nourish	  an	  
urge	  to	  kill,	  rather	  than	  more	  ‘humanitarian’	  aims	  –	  ‘Serving	  the	  poor	  Afghans	  is	  not	  a	  big	  part	  of	  
their	   vocabulary;	   killing	   the	   Taliban	   is’	   (Courter	   2008:	   352).	   He	   was	   previously	   a	   cook	   in	   the	  
Marines,	  ‘which	  was	  still	  better	  in	  my	  opinion	  at	  the	  time	  to	  being	  a	  “grunt”	  or	  Infantry’	  (Courter	  
2008:	  2).	  He	  considers	  the	  infantry	  units	  to	  be	  of	  ‘a	  different	  breed’	  who	  ‘see	  the	  world	  from	  only	  
one	  point	  of	  view	  –	  Army	  Green.	  They	  do	  things	  their	  own	  way.	  There	  may	  be	  better	  ways,	  but	  if	  
it’s	  not	  the	  Infantry	  way	  (i.e.	  their	  way),	  it	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  a	  better	  way’	  (Courter	  2008:	  218).	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of	   the	   counterinsurgency	   spear’.	   Courter’s	   motivation	   of	   ‘serving	   the	   poor	  
Afghans’	   is	   partly	   echoed	   in	   Tupper’s	   Greetings	   from	   Afghanistan.	   Having	  
previously	   been	   employed	   in	   an	   NGO	   in	   Afghanistan,	   Tupper	   ‘felt	   that	  
Americans	   had	   a	  moral	   and	   historical	   obligation	   to	   help	   stabilize	  Afghanistan,	  
after	   we	   had	   abruptly	   disengaged	   from	   the	   country	   at	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	  
Afghan-­‐Russian	  war’	   (2010:	   ii).	   He	  wanted	   to	   ‘work	   to	   undo	   this	   error,	   and	   to	  
ensure	   that	   the	   next	   generation	   of	   Afghan	   girls	   could	   attend	   school,	   and	   that	  
artists	  could	  paint,	  and	  musicians	  sing’	  (ibid.)50.	  	  
Sean	  Parnell’s	  book	  Outlaw	  Platoon	  is	  based	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  'legendary'	  
U.S.	  army	  10th	  Mountain	  division	  	  (aka	  Outlaw	  platoon	  or	  'Green	  Skulls')	  during	  
their	   16-­‐month	   stay	   in	   Bermel	   Valley,	   along	   the	   border	   of	   Pakistan.	   Parnell	  
considers	  himself	  both	  'blessed	  and	  cursed	  to	  have	  led	  one	  of	  the	  most	  valorously	  
decorated	   conventional	   combat	   units	   in	   the	   history	   of	   Operation	   Enduring	  
Freedom'	  (2012:	  vii)51.	  Matt	  Zeller	  book,	  Watches	  Without	  Time,	  is	  made	  up	  by	  a	  
selection	  of	  emails	  and	  letters	  sent	  home	  and	  is,	  according	  to	  Zeller,	  'as	  naked	  as	  
I	   can	   get'.	   Zeller	   was	   trained	   to	   be	   an	   Army	   advisor	   but	   ended	   up	   being	   an	  
operations	  mentor	   for	   the	  ANP	  and	  he	   felt	   '100	  percent	  unqualified	   to	   serve	   in	  
this	  role'	  (Zeller:	  62).	  Zeller	  distinguishes	  himself	  from	  many	  of	  the	  other	  soldiers	  
in	  that	  he	  is	  on	  several	  occasions	  explicitly	  concerned	  with	  US	  counterinsurgency	  
strategy,	  and	  emphasizes	  how	  important	  winning	  ‘hearts	  and	  minds’	  is.	  After	  his	  
                                                
50	  We	  learn	  later	  that	  one	  of	  Tupper’s	  nick	  names	  during	  his	  time	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  ‘Care	  Bear’,	  
due	  to	  his	  project	  aimed	  at	  getting	  people	  back	  home	  to	  send	  teddy	  bears,	  stuffed	  animals,	  clothes	  
and	  shoes	  to	  Afghan	  children	  (2010:	  102-­‐104)	  In	  one	  of	  the	  pictures,	  he	  poses	  in	  a	  military	  vehicle	  
surrounded	  with	  toys	  and	  stuffed	  animals.	  Tupper’s	  book	  is	  based	  on	  a	  series	  of	  blog	  entries	  and	  
he	  writes	  that	  none	  of	  these	  were	  at	  any	  point	  censored	  by	  the	  military,	  which,	  in	  Tupper’s	  view	  
reflects	  his	  obscure	  position	   in	   the	   army	  as	   an	  ETT,	   rather	   than	   the	   army	  not	  wanting	   to.	  One	  
entry	  about	  a	  suicide	  attack,	  which	  also	  featured	  on	  the	  Public	  Broadcasting	  Service	  (PBS),	  caught	  
the	   Army's	   attention	   though.	   Its	   description	   was	   deemed	   'too	   violent'	   and	   'contradicted	   the	  
themes	  of	  "construction"	  and	  "rebuilding"	  that	  the	  Army	  wanted	  to	  focus	  on’	   (Tupper	  2010:	  251-­‐
253).	  
51	  Parnell	  wants	  the	  book	  to	  'tell	  the	  world	  of	  their	  amazing	  accomplishments'	  and	  he	  argues	  that	  
'this	  book	  displays	  no	  political	   agenda	  nor	   is	   it	   a	   review	  of	  U.S.	   foreign	  policy'.	   It	   is	   also	  worth	  
noting	   that	  details	  about	   the	  personal	   lives	  and	   full	  names	  are	  given	  about	  various	  members	  of	  
the	   platoon,	   which	   indicates	   that	   Parnell	   has	   cleared	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   book	   with	   them	  
beforehand.	   The	   book	   is	   written	   together	   with	   John	   R.	   Bruning,	   a	   military	   historian.	   Bruning	  
writes	   that	   Sean	  was	   a	   ‘man	   of	   great	   character,	   a	   human	  with	   compassion,	   unique	   insight	   and	  
determination’	  (Parnell	  2012:	  366-­‐367).	  Out	  of	  all	  the	  books,	  this	  is	  the	  one	  that	  is	  the	  most	  action	  
packed	  and	  reads	  a	  bit	  like	  a	  movie	  script.	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deployment	  he	  ran	  for	  Congress	  as	  a	  Democratic	  nominee	  from	  New	  York	  State	  
in	  2010.	  	  
	  
2.1	  The	  ‘Killing	  and	  Caring’	  of	  Counterinsurgency	  
As	   is	   clear,	   there	  are	  a	  great	  variety	  of	   reasons	  why	   soldiers	   agree	   to	  deploy	   to	  
Afghanistan,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  world	  of	  difference	  in	  what	  they	  hope	  to	  achieve	  once	  
they	  arrive.	  While	  some	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘winning	  hearts	  and	  minds’,	  
aided	  by	  stories	  of	  helping	  Afghan	  civilians,	  others	  place	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
experience	   of	   fighting	   and	   detailed	   explanations	   of	   positions,	   strategies	   and	  
weaponry.	  In	  other	  words,	  these	  memoirs	  are	  all	  quite	  different	  in	  character,	  but	  
they	   share	   many	   similarities.	   In	   large	   part	   they	   confirm	   what	   Woodrow	   and	  
Jenkins’	   study	   of	   British	   soldier’s	   memoirs	   showed,	   namely	   that	   it	   is	   not	  
uncommon	   that	   the	   ‘enthusiasm	   for	   reconstruction	   work’	   is	   ‘tempered	   with	   a	  
parallel	   enthusiasm	   for	   direct	   combat’	   (Woodward	   and	   Jenkins	   2012:	   122).	  
However,	  what	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  counterinsurgency?	  
While	   this	   thesis	   emphasises	   the	   various	   performances	   of	  military	  masculinity	  
for	  the	  practice	  of	  counterinsurgency,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  these	  necessarily	  
exist	   harmoniously	   together,	   or	   that	   the	   different	   soldier	   types	   are	   always	  
consistent.	  In	  the	  memoirs,	  soldiers	  are	  continuously	  defining	  themselves	  against	  
various	  Others,	  be	  they	  civilians	  back	  home,	  other	  sections	  of	  the	  military,	  and	  as	  
discussed	   in	   chapter	   six,	   Afghan	   society	   and	   security	   forces.	   Soldier’s	  
performances	   of	   particular	   identities	   can	   also	   be	   understood	   through	   the	  
dynamic	  between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  	  
‘Population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   is	   conceptualised	   here	   as	   encompassing	  
this	  dynamic,	  which	   is	  deemed	  crucial	   to	   its	  practice.	  As	  noted	   in	  chapter	   two,	  
the	  dynamic	  is	  complex	  and	  is	  not	  always	  played	  out	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Different	  
aspects	  of	  counterinsurgency	  show	  the	  dynamic	  between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  as	  at	  
times	  being	  in	  contention,	  at	  time	  the	  one	  prevents	  or	  enables	  the	  other,	  and	  at	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times	  the	  one	  is	  placed	  above	  the	  other.	  How	   this	  dynamic	  is	  seen	  to	  work	  also	  
depends	  on	  who	  is	  speaking.	  	  
For	   instance,	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	  tend	  to	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  the	   ‘caring’	  
side	  of	  counterinsurgency,	  pointing	  to	  efforts	  to	  win	  ‘hearts	  and	  minds’	  through	  
conducting	   ‘armed	   social	   work’	   and	   increased	   cultural	   knowledge	   can	   reduce	  
levels	  of	  violence	  and	  prevent	  killing	  (Kilcullen	  2007).	  Increased	  intelligence	  and	  
surveillance	  is	  also	  said	  to	  reduce	  violence,	  and	  the	  FM	  3-­‐24	  urges	  commanders	  
to	   ‘Put	   the	   smartest	   Soldiers	   and	   Marines	   in	   the	   intelligence	   section	   and	   the	  
reconnaissance	  and	  surveillance	  element.	  This	  placement	  results	  in	  one	  less	  rifle	  
squad,	   but	   an	   intelligence	   section	   pays	   for	   itself	   in	   lives	   and	   effort	   saved’	  
(USArmy	   et	   al.	   2007:	   290).	   Here,	   the	   levels	   of	   intelligence	   and	   capacity	   for	  
comprehension	   and	   reasoning	   are	   qualities	   that	   are	   valued	   and	   lead	   to	   less	  
killing.	  	  
At	   times	   these	   performances	   of	   ‘protective	   masculinity’	   are	   mirrored	   in	   the	  
memoirs.	  Elden	   for	   instance	  notes	   that	   ‘to	  win	   the	  war	  we	  need	  a	   full	   backing	  
from	   the	   locals	   and	   thereby	   taking	   the	   enemy’s	   [support],	   and	   to	   get	   their	  
support	  we	  have	  to	  create	  security	  and	  contribute	  with	  humanitarian	  aid’	  (2012:	  
126-­‐127).	  Similarly,	  Courter	  explains	  that	  in	  their	  mission	  they	  eventually	  earned	  
the	   ‘trust	   and	   confidence	   of	   the	   local	   people’	   through	   ‘bringing	   medical	   care,	  
giving	   them	   food	   and	   clothing	   and	   encouraging	   them	   to	   start	   schools’	   (2008:	  
292).	  	  
Likewise,	  Tupper	  mentions	  several	  times	  how	  ‘this	  war	  cannot	  be	  won	  militarily’	  
(2010:	  58,	   108),	  and	  that	   ‘while	  we	  are	  badass	  Taliban	  hunters,	  and	  we	  have	  the	  
power	   to	   destroy	   the	   enemy	   that	   we	   find,	   medical	   clinics	   remain	   our	   most	  
powerful	  weapon	   in	  winning	   this	  war’	   (2010:	   60).	  Another	   powerful	  weapon	   in	  
the	  battle	  for	  hearts	  and	  minds	  is	  gaining	  the	  population’s	  support	  through	  gifts,	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such	  as	  Pop-­‐Tarts.52	  Tupper	  writes	  how	  they	  can	  be	  exchanged	  for	   information,	  
particularly	  from	  children	  who	  are	  	  
‘simpler,	   and	  don't	   fully	  understand	   the	   complex	  pressures	  being	   exerted	  by	   the	  Taliban.	  They	  
reveal	  things	  that	  elders	  will	  hide.	  So	  the	  lesson	  learned	  is	  simple:	  Don’t	  ignore	  the	  kids.	  Always	  
ask	  them	  what’s	  going	  on.	  And	  always	  pack	  loads	  of	  Pop-­‐Tarts!’	  (2010:	  101).	  
While	   these	   statements	   emphasise	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   ‘caring’	   side	   of	  
counterinsurgency,	   at	   other	   times	   the	   aims	   of	   it	   are	   unclear.	  Mella	   reflects	   on	  
how	  the	  strategy	  of	  winning	  hearts	  and	  minds,	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  combining	  
civilian	   and	  military	   efforts	   is	   both	  difficult	   and	  has	   ambiguous	   aims.	  He	   asks,	  
‘what	  kind	  of	  nation	  are	  we	  aiming	  to	  build?	  Are	  Western	  interests	  and	  thoughts	  
about	   Afghanistan	   compatible	   with	   their	   own	   wishes?	   And	   are	   Afghans	  
themselves	  in	  agreement	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  nation	  they	  want?	  I	  tend	  to	  doubt	  it’	  
(Mella	  2013:	  85).	  	  
Whatever	   the	   aims	   are,	   they	   are	   made	  more	   difficult,	   argues	  Mella,	   since	   the	  
Norwegian	   government’s	   decision	   pull	   out	   the	   civilian	   efforts	   from	   the	  
Norwegian	  PRT	  and	  instigate	  a	  clearer	  division	  between	  the	  civilian	  and	  military	  
missions	   (MFA/MOD/DOJ	   2009) 53 .	   This	   runs	   counter	   to	   FM	   3-­‐24,	   which	  
encourages	  a	  close	  integration	  of	  civilian	  and	  military	  operations	  (USArmy	  et	  al.	  
2007:	  299).	  Several	  Norwegian	  soldiers	  have	  reported	  that	  they	  find	  this	  division	  
problematic	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis,	  and	  express	  an	  urge	  to	  help	  Afghan	  civilians.	  
The	   Norwegian	   Ombudsman	   for	   the	   Forces	   report	   that	   there	   is	   a	   ‘tense	  
relationship	  between	  military	  and	  civilian	  organisations’	  and	  that	  the	  soldiers	  see	  
themselves	   as	   ‘soldiers	   with	   a	   human	   face’	   and	   that	   they	   consider	   themselves	  
                                                
52	  Pop-­‐tarts	  are	  pre-­‐packaged	  and	  pre-­‐baked	  toasties	  made	  by	  the	  Kellogg	  Company.	  They	  come	  
in	  various	  flavours	  such	  as	  chocolate	  and	  strawberry.	  Tupper	  is	  pictured	  in	  his	  book	  holding	  up	  a	  
box	  of	   ‘Disney	  Princess	  Pop-­‐Tarts’	  with	   the	  caption:	   ‘The	  secret	  weapon	   for	  getting	   information	  
from	  Afghans:	  Pop-­‐Tarts!’	  (Tupper	  2010:	  100)	  
53	  This	   decision	   was	   made	   after	   long	   discussion	   in	   the	   Norwegian	   public	   and	   pressures	   from	  
various	   NGOs	   that	   the	   military	   were	   encroaching	   on	   the	   humanitarian	   space	   of	   development	  
NGOs.	  The	  Norwegian	  Refugee	  Council	  (NRC),	  for	  example,	  has	  on	  several	  occasions	  highlighted	  
the	  problems	  associated	  with	  militaries	  taking	  on	  development	  work,	  such	  as	  building	  schools.	  In	  
2008,	   Elisabeth	   Rasmusson,	   then	   General	   Secretary	   in	   NRC,	   stated	   that	   ‘NRC	   encourage	   the	  
military	   leadership	   to	   let	   it	   sink	   in	   at	   all	   levels	   that	   the	   blending	   between	   military	   and	  
humanitarian	  missions	  are	  very	  problematic	  and	  can	  be	  extremely	  dangerous’	  (2008).	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‘fellow	   humans’	   to	   the	  Afghans.	   Consequently,	   they	   ‘would	   like	   to	   do	  more	   to	  
end	  suffering	  and	  help	  the	  population	  more	  directly’	  (Ombudsmannen	  2010).	  In	  
other	  words,	  Norwegian	  soldiers	  report	  back	  that	  they	  would	  like	  to	  contribute	  
more	  to	  the	  ‘caring’	  side	  of	  counterinsurgency,	  but	  find	  that	  this	  is	  inhibited	  by	  
military	   and	   political	   strategy.	   That	   said,	   this	   does	   not	   imply	   a	   negation	   or	   a	  
devaluation	  of	  combat	  and	  ‘kinetic’	  operations,	  as	  the	  next	  section	  shows.	  	  	  
Zeller	   reflects	   on	   how	   the	   doctrine	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	  
splits	  the	  soldiers,	  
‘The	  U.S.	  Army	  seems	  to	  be	  split	  in	  two	  camps:	  those	  who	  buy	  into	  COIN	  and	  those	  who	  ignore	  it	  
at	   all	   costs.	  More	   simply,	  post	  9/11	   soldiers	  and	  pre	  9/11	   soldiers,	   trained	   to	   fight	   the	   soviets	  or	  
some	  other	  grand	  nation	  vs.	  nation	  war.	  Everything	  about	  COIN	  flies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  what	  pre	  9/11	  
soldiers	  learned	  in	  their	  army	  careers.	  To	  them,	  COIN	  tastes	  too	  much	  like	  nation	  building…body	  
counts	   and	   enemy	   damage	   won’t	   win	   this	   war;	   if	   anything,	   it’ll	   hasten	   our	   defeat,	   as	   the	  
population	  will	  rapidly	  turn	  against	  us.	  No,	  to	  win	  here	  in	  Afghanistan,	  we	  must	  practice	  COIN;	  
we	  have	  to	  effectively	  build	  this	  nation.	  We	  win	  when	  the	  population	  determines	  it’s	  in	  their	  best	  
interest	  to	  reject	  the	  Taliban	  and	  its	  ideology	  in	  favour	  of	  something	  that	  benefits	  our	  interests’	  
(2012:	  220)54.	  	  
Zeller	   draws	   up	   a	   distinction	   between	   people	   like	   himself,	   who	   ‘get’	  
counterinsurgency	  and	  the	   ‘regular	  soldiers	  who	  have	  only	  been	  trained	  to	  kill,	  
kill,	  kill’.	  He	  does	  not	  consider	  himself	  up	  there	  with	  the	  best	  of	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  
combat,	  but	  is	  much	  more	  suitable	  for	  counterinsurgency	  which	  he	  considers	  ‘a	  
thinking	  man’s	   fight’	   (Zeller	  2012:	  221).	  As	   it	   is	  expressed	  here,	  Zeller	  places	  the	  
‘caring’	  side	  of	  counterinsurgency	  (intelligent	  and	  modern)	  hierarchically	  above	  
the	  killing,	  which	  is	  considered	  both	  out-­‐dated	  and	  short-­‐sighted.	  In	  other	  words,	  
a	  less	  valued	  military	  masculinity.	  	  
Therefore,	  while	   there	  are	  multiple	  military	  masculinities	   coexisting	  within	   the	  
same	   force,	   these	   are	   continuously	   re-­‐negotiated	   and	   contested.	   Contrary	   to	  
                                                
54	  Zeller	  suggests	  that	  the	  US	  military	  should	  be	  split	  in	  two	  between	  a	  ‘conventional	  state-­‐vs-­‐state	  
fighting	   force	   and	   a	   counterinsurgency/stabilisation	   force’.	   The	   former	   he	   argues	   is	   the	   kind	  
advocated	   by	   General	   Colin	   Powell,	   whereas	   the	   latter	   would	   focus	   on	   ‘cultural	   development,	  
societal	  progression,	  language	  training,	  community	  relations,	  civil	  affairs	  etc.,	  currently	  advocated	  
by	  Colonel	  Nagl’	  (Zeller	  2012:	  221).	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what	   was	   discussed	   above	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   developing	   of	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  
masculinity	   within	   Army	   leadership	   and	   amongst	   proponents	   of	   ‘population-­‐
centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   like	   Zeller,	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   ‘caring’	   of	  
counterinsurgency	  does	  not	  exclude	  recognizing	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘killing’.	  That	  
said,	  you	  cannot	  only	  have	  ‘caring’	  and	  not	  ‘killing’	  in	  the	  production	  of	  military	  
masculinities,	   as	   the	   remainder	   of	   this	   chapter	   shows.	   Having	   experienced	  
combat	   and	   being	   good	   at	   killing	   remains	   crucial.	   In	   other	   words,	   ‘warrior	  
masculinity’	   still	   remains	   a	   powerful	   force	   and	   gendered	   performances	   of	  
classical	   notions	   of	   sovereignty,	   associated	   with	   killing	   and	   dying	   for	   one’s	  
country	   (Weber	   2008a)	   are	   still	   important.	   Being	   ‘in	   the	   action’	   is	   central,	  
something	   that	   is	   ‘reinforced	   during	  military	   training,	   and	   results	   in	   a	   culture	  
where	  inaction	  is	  seen	  as	  feminine’	  (Duncanson	  and	  Cornish	  2012:	  155).	  
	  	  
2.2	  ‘War	  is	  Better	  than	  Sex’	  	  
As	  noted	  in	  chapter	  two	  of	  this	  thesis,	  in	  2010	  the	  Telemark	  battalion	  was	  hit	  by	  a	  
scandal.	  To	  recap	  briefly,	  this	  unit	  came	  under	  scrutiny	  after	  the	  ‘men’s	  magazine’	  
Alfa55	  did	  a	   feature	  on	  a	  group	  of	   them	   fighting	   in	  Afghanistan	  which	   included	  
quotes	  like	  ‘war	  is	  better	  than	  sex’	  and	  ‘you	  don’t	  sign	  up	  to	  go	  to	  Afghanistan	  to	  
save	   the	   world,	   but	   to	   join	   a	   real	   war’	   (Hompland	   2010).	   In	   addition	   to	   the	  
statements,	   the	   use	   of	   battle	   cries	   like	   ‘To	   Valhalla’	   was	   criticised,	   as	   was	   the	  
commander,	   Major	   Rune	   Wenneberg	   who	   was	   seen	   by	   large	   parts	   of	   the	  
Norwegian	  media	  as	  being	  the	  one	  responsible	  for	  the	  nurturing	  of	  this	  ‘warrior	  
culture’	  (VGNett	  2010).	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defence,	  Grete	  Faremo	  stated	  
that	  she	  had	  read	  ‘expressions	  by	  soldiers	  in	  Afghanistan	  that	  we	  cannot	  accept.	  
It	  expresses	  attitudes	  that	  the	  armed	  forces	  cannot	  support’	  (VGTV	  2010).	  
                                                
55	  The	  article	   ‘Norway	  at	  War’	  was	  a	   17-­‐page	   long	  report	   in	   the	   first	  edition	  of	   ‘Norway’s	  newest	  
men’s	  magazine’,	  which	  aimed	  at	  being	   ‘serious’	   and	  with	   ‘balls’.	   Fredrik	  Langeland	  argues	   that	  
the	   kind	   of	   masculinity	   it	   promotes	   is	   one	   of	   the	   ‘traditional	   Norwegian	   heterosexual	   man’,	  
something	  it	  establishes	  through	  a	  contrasting	  itself	  to	  notions	  of	  ‘metrosexuality’	  (2012:	  319).	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This	   example	   illustrates	   three	   important	   things.	   Firstly,	   it	   demonstrates	   the	  
tension	  of	  counterinsurgency	  between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  Having	  discussed	  this	  
earlier	   in	   the	   chapter,	   and	   through	   emphasising	   the	   ‘caring’	   aspect	   in	   the	  next	  
chapter	   in	  terms	  of	  deploying	  FETs,	  these	  statements	  stand	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  
the	  notion	  of	  ‘care’	  in	  counterinsurgency.	  The	  Alfa	  article	  and	  the	  discussions	  in	  
the	   wake	   of	   it	   also	   revealed	   a	   discrepancy	   between	   the	   public	   narrative	   told	  
about	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  it	  being	  a	  humanitarian	  war	  
as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  and	  the	  statements	  by	  Norwegian	  soldiers	  
in	   the	   Telemark	   Battalion	   (Langeland	   2012).	   This	   is	   further	   emphasised	   by	   a	  
sense	   of	   ‘disappointment’	   and	   ‘betrayal’	   felt	   by	   soldiers	   in	   the	   battalion,	   and	  
noted	   by	   Johansen,	   Elden	   and	   Mella,	   in	   relation	   to	   how	   this	   was	   handled	   by	  
politicians	  at	  the	  time.	  Thirdly,	  the	  explanation	  for	  some	  of	  the	  things	  that	  came	  
out	  in	  the	  Alfa	  article	  speaks	  to	  the	  centrality	  of	  embodiment	  in	  war,	  particularly	  
in	  terms	  of	  comparing	  battle	  to	  sex	  and	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  battle	  cry.	  	  
Johansen,	   Elden	   and	   Mella	   all	   make	   efforts	   to	   explain	   and	   contextualise	   the	  
problematic	  statements	  that	  came	  out	  in	  the	  Alfa	  piece.	  Johansen	  and	  Elden	  go	  
to	   great	   lengths	   to	   endorse	   the	   ‘warrior	   culture’	   and	   to	   support	   their	   former	  
commander.	  They	  explain	  the	   importance	  of	  creating	  a	   ‘warrior	  culture’	   for	  the	  
purposes	   of	   camaraderie,	   morale	   and	   determination.	   This	   culture	   needs	   to	  
nurture	  specific	  traits	  and	  values.	  Warriors	  need	  to	  be	  ‘aggressive’,	  ‘independent’,	  
‘brave’,	   ‘honourable’,	   ‘cooperative’	   and	   ‘resilient’	   (Johansen	  2011:	   32-­‐33	   see	  also	   ,	  
Elden	  2012:	  45-­‐47,	  Higate	  2003c).	  For	  Elden	  and	  Johansen	  both,	  their	  identity	  as	  
‘warriors’	   is	   important	   for	   the	   Norwegian	   public	   to	   understand	   and	   they	   both	  
seem	  to	  feel	  that	  there	  is	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  what	  they	  are	  trained	  to	  do	  and	  
how	  politicians	   represent	   them.	   In	  other	  words,	   there	   is	  a	   tension	  between	  the	  
kind	   of	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	   identity	   that	   politicians	   are	   proponents	   of,	   and	   what	  
soldiers	  see	  themselves	  doing.	  Elden	  explains	  that	  	  
‘When	   the	   overall	   perception	   is	   that	  Norwegian	   soldiers	   are	   peace	   keepers	   on	   a	  mission	   for	   a	  
peaceful	  nation,	  the	  soldiers	  get	  little	  or	  no	  recognition	  from	  the	  outside,	  from	  the	  civilian	  society.	  
The	  only	  recognition	  they	  get	  is	  from	  their	  closest	  colleagues'	  (2012:	  50).	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Mella	  is	  equally	  unimpressed	  with	  how	  the	  military	  leadership	  and	  politicians,	  in	  
particular	   the	   Minister	   of	   Defense	   Grete	   Faremo,	   handled	   this	   scandal	   as	   ‘it	  
seemed	   like	   they	   were	   out	   to	   save	   their	   own	   skins	   instead	   of	   building	  
understanding	   in	   the	   population	   for	   the	   complex	   emotions	   that	  many	   soldiers	  
feel’	  (2013:	  153)56.	  	  
How	   then	   should	   statements	   that	   equate	   war	   with	   sex	   be	   understood?	   Elden	  
explains	  that	  ‘for	  guys	  in	  their	  twenties,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  compare	  extreme	  battle	  with	  
sex…it	  is	  the	  closest	  you	  get	  to	  the	  euphoric	  joy	  when	  you	  win	  a	  battle’	  (2012:	  222).	  
Mella	   can	   also	   relate	   to	   this	   and	   explains	   that	   ‘if	   you	   look	   at	   the	   chemical	  
processes	  that	  arise	  in	  a	  person	  during	  battle,	  they	  are	  similar	  to	  emotions	  that	  
arise	   during	   sex’	   (2013:	   152).	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   experience	   of	   war	   is	   a	   deeply	  
embodied	  through	  its	  sexualisation,	  and	  this	  is	  central	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  soldiers	  
make	  sense	  of	  their	  experiences.	  The	  importance	  of	  emotions	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  
how	   Johansen	   explains	   the	   first	   time	   they	   used	   the	   infamous	   battle	   cry	   (‘To	  
Valhalla!’	  followed	  by	  ‘Orrha!’	  x3),	  
	  ‘warmth	   spread	  around	  my	  body	  and	   the	   sense	  of	  depression	  was	   transformed	   to	  an	   immense	  
fighting	  spirit.	  The	  grey	  faces	  around	  me	  lit	  up,	  now	  we	  were	  ready.	  This	  can	  sound	  like	  childish	  
“boy	  play”,	   but	   for	  us	   it	  was	  deadly	   serious.	  We	  knew	   it	  was	   just	   a	  question	  of	   time	  before	  we	  
would	  be	  sent	  to	  a	  foreign	  country,	  at	  war	  for	  Norway,	  where	  this	  training	  would	  decide	  whether	  
we	  succeed	  or	  not’	  (2011:	  43).	  	  
As	   Johansen	   explains,	   the	   experience	   of	   standing	   together	  with	   fellow	   soldiers	  
shouting	  the	  battle	  cry	  is	  a	  deeply	  embodied	  experience	  because	  of	  its	  collective	  
meaning.	  Johansen	  explains	  how	  the	  sensory	  euphoria	  of	  this	  filled	  his	  body	  with	  
warmth	   and	   lightness	   and	  how	   the	  use	  of	  Viking	   insignia,	   along	  with	  how	   the	  
battle	  cry	  works	  to	  cement	  the	  relationship	  between	   ‘the	  guys’	  and	  strengthens	  
                                                
56	  Mella	   writes	   that	   they	   were	   all	   ‘less	   surprised’	   at	   the	   statements	   by	   Defence	  Minister	   Grete	  
Faremo	   than	   how	   Harald	   Sunde	   (former	   head	   of	   the	   Special	   Forces,	   then	   head	   of	   the	   Joint	  
Headquarters	  of	   the	  Norwegian	  Military,	  now	  Chief	  of	  Defence)	  had	  handled	   the	   situation.	  We	  
had	   ‘lower	  expectations	  of	  her…when	  she	  in	  2009	  became	  the	  third	  female	  defence	  minister	  she	  
had	  no	  military	   background’	   and	  he	   quotes	   Faremo	   in	   saying	   that	   ‘I	   have	   been	   employed	   on	   a	  
(gender)	  quota	  basis	  several	  times	  in	  my	  life,	  also	  as	  Minister	  of	  Defence’	  (Mella	  2013:	  153-­‐154).	  In	  
other	   words,	   the	   explanations	   for	   why	   she	   did	   not	   understand	   the	   ‘warrior	   culture’	   was	   both	  
because	  she	  lacked	  embodied	  soldier	  experience,	  and,	  presumably	  also	  because	  she	  was	  a	  woman.	  	  
 118	  
the	  internal	  cohesion	  of	  the	  group.	  Ben	  Wadham	  explains	  how	  in	  the	  Australian	  
military	  this	  is	  enabled	  through	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘mateship’	  –	  ‘an	  individual	  at	  heart	  
who	  foregoes	  his	  individualism	  for	  the	  greater	  authority	  of	  his	  mates’	  (2004:	  11).	  
In	  the	  Norwegian	  military,	  the	  term	  ‘gutta’	  (literally	  meaning	  boys)	   is	  used	  in	  a	  
similar	  way,	  and	   referring	   to	  others	   ‘as	  one	   of	   the	   boys,	  places	   the	   soldiers	  and	  
their	   colleagues	   on	   the	   inside	   and	   outside	   of	   the	   operational	   community’	  
(Totland	  2009:	  56).	  The	  use	  of	  Viking	  insignia	  and	  standing	  shoulder	  to	  shoulder	  
shouting	   the	   battle	   cry	   are	   embodied	  ways	   of	   ensuring	   that	   a	   range	   of	  martial	  
bodies	  become	  collectivised.	  	  
Appealing	   to	   the	   past	   for	   inspiration	   and	   symbolism	   is	   also	   present	   in	  
Skarpskyttere	   where,	   from	   the	   outset,	   the	   snipers	   in	   their	   military	   role	   are	  
situated	   in	  a	  historical	  perspective	  by	   recalling	   the	   'first	  men	  who	   fought	  wind	  
and	   snow	   across	   the	   glaciers	   ten	   thousand	   years	   ago'.	   Today	   the	   sniper	   is	   'a	  
highly	   trained	   soldier	   with	   superb	   combat	   and	   shooting	   skills,	   and	   who	   can	  
deliver	   precise	   fire	   to	   selected	   aims	   across	   long	   distances',	   which	   is,	   the	   book	  
argues,	   the	   modern	   day	   equivalent	   of	   latter	   day	   Norwegian	   explorers	  
(Skarpskyttere	  2010:	  9).	  This	   is	  noteworthy,	   since	   the	  book	  deliberately	  appeals	  
to	  historically	  potent	   images	  of	   the	   lone	  man	   fighting	   the	  natural	  elements	  –	  a	  
significant	   and	   cherished	   image	   in	   the	   Norwegian	   self-­‐image	   and	   national	  
narrative.	  Appealing	  to	  historically	  significant	  martial	  symbols,	  stories	  and	  myths	  
is	  important	  also	  in	  relation	  to	  colonial	  constructions	  of	  ‘martial	  races’,	  discussed	  
in	  chapter	  three	  and	  six.	  	  
As	  a	  whole,	  the	  production	  of	  this	  new	  kind	  of	  ‘warrior	  culture’	  in	  the	  Norwegian	  
Armed	   Forces,	   with	   its	   emphasis	   on	   killing	   and	   combat,	   should	   be	   seen	   in	  
relation	  to	  a	  willed	  development	  in	  reforming	  the	  Norwegian	  forces,	  as	  discussed	  
in	   the	   introduction	   and	   in	   chapter	   three.	   It	   also	   shows	   as	  mentioned,	   the	  way	  
that	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  masculinity	   is	   contested	   internally	  within	   forces,	   pointing	  
to	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   counterinsurgency	   and	   how	   the	   dynamic	  
between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  can	  also	  manifest	  itself	  as	  a	  difficult	  balancing	  act	  for	  
the	  forces.	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2.3	  Emotions,	  Sexuality	  and	  Heteronormativity	  
A	   similarly	   specialised	   ‘warrior	   masculinity’	   is	   nourished	   in	   Outlaw	   Platoon,	  
where	  there	  are	  several	  mentions	  of	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  be	  an	  infantry	  soldier.	  Much	  
of	  the	  book	  deals	  with	  the	  relationships	  between	  different	  types	  of	  soldiers	  and	  
the	  internal	  discipline	  of	  the	  military	  where	  'those	  who	  appeared	  to	  measure	  up	  
earned	  respect'	  while	  those	  who	  did	  not	  were	  'regarded	  with	  distrust	  and	  became	  
outsiders'	   (Parnell	  2012:	  4).	  For	  him,	  there	   is	  a	  simple	   logic,	  –	   	   ‘in	  combat,	  men	  
measure	  up.	  Or	  don’t.	  There	   are	  no	   second	   chances’	   (Parnell	   2012:	   83).	   Parnell	  
represents	  infantrymen	  as	  ‘honourable’,	  ‘brave’,	  ‘tough’	  and	  with	  a	  ‘heart	  of	  gold’.	  
They	  are	  also	  better	  than	  the	  Special	  Forces	  (SF)	  –	  	  
‘There	  were	   attitude	  differences	  between	  us	   regular	   line	   infantry	  men	  and	   the	  SF	  guys…Rather	  
than	   focus	   on	   the	   enemy,	   they	   seemed	   to	   us	   to	   be	   preoccupied	  with	   frivolous	   and	   extraneous	  
details,	   such	   as	   what	   color	   they	   should	   paint	   their	   weapons…much	   of	   the	   time	   they	   walked	  
around	  nonchalantly	  in	  baseball	  caps.	  After	  what	  we’d	  gone	  through,	  that	  sort	  of	  theatrical	  stuff	  
came	  across	  as	  sheer	  stupidity’	  (Parnell	  2012:	  226).	  	  
This	  corresponds	  to	  Hockey’s	  argument	  that	  there	  is	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  identity	  
nurtured	  in	  infantry	  forces	  like	  Parnell’s,	  which	  is	  often	  pitted	  against	  the	  tech-­‐
savvy	  capabilities	  of	  other	  forces	  (2013:	  103).	  	  
Another	  aspect	  that	  is	  deemed	  central	  to	  ‘warrior	  masculinity’	  is	  the	  importance	  
of	   being	   unflappable	   in	   the	   face	   of	   danger.	   Failing	   to	   do	   so	   often	   results	   in	  
becoming	   feminised.	   This	   is	   highlighted	   in	   Zeller	  where	   during	   an	   ambush	   he	  
struggles	  with	  keeping	  his	  cool	  and	  feels	  like	  a	  ‘pussy’	  (2012:	  82).	  	  
'I	  was	  so	  afraid,	  I	  couldn't	  even	  cry.	  Yet	  I	  stayed	  in	  my	  position	  and	  continued	  to	  return	  fire.	  Even	  
now,	   I	   feel	   like	   a	   coward,	   like	   less	   of	   a	   man	   for	   being	   so	   acutely	   and	   visibly	   afraid.	  I	   was	   just	  
thankful	  my	  soldiers	  weren't	  around	  to	  see	  me	  break,	  to	  see	  me	  lose	  my	  military	  bearing	  to	  such	  a	  
degree'	  (Zeller	  2012:	  81	  emphasis	  added)	  
This	   quote	   tells	   us	   several	   things	   about	   showing	   emotion	   in	   war.	   As	   Michael	  
Kimmel	   notes,	   ‘masculinity	   is	   a	   homosocial	   enactment’	   (2005:	   33),	   something	  
that	   is	   emphasised	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   Zeller	   is	   relieved	   that	   no	   one	   saw	   him	   so	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‘acutely	   and	   visibly	   afraid’.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   crying	   is	   not	   necessarily	   always	  
considered	   feminine,	   something	   that	   is	   noted	   throughout	   the	   memoirs	   and	  
across	  ranks.	  There	  are	  numerous	  mentions	  of	  situations	  where	  soldiers	  cry,	  hug,	  
and	  comfort	  one	  another,	  often	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  soldiers	  being	  wounded	  and	  
killed57.	   As	   Elden	   emphasises,	   ‘Professional	   solders	   are	   not	   afraid	   of	   showing	  
emotions'	  (2012:	  186).	  That	  said,	  there	  are	  strict	  rules	  guiding	  how	  these	  emotions	  
can	   be	   expressed	   which	   speaks	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   remaining	   well	   within	  
accepted	  boundaries	   of	   heterosexuality.	  On	  one	  occasion,	  Parnell	   is	   so	  pleased	  
with	   his	   platoon	   that	   he	   feels	   a	   sense	   of	   love	   for	   them.	   But,	   he	   cannot	   find	   a	  
means	  to	  express	  his	  thoughts	  as	  
	  ‘men	  do	  not	  do	  well	  when	   tender	   emotions	   exist	   between	   them.	  They	   can	  be	   there.	  They	   can	  
even	   be	   tangentially	   recognized.	   But	   to	   acknowledge	   them	   directly	   would	   have	   violated	   the	  
structure	   of	   our	   relationship...love’s	   the	   only	   thing	   that	   will	   see	   us	   through	   this…I	   was	   glad	   I	  
hadn’t	   said	   that	   to	  my	   squad	   leaders.	   Just	   hearing	   it	   in	  my	   head	   sounded	   gay	   enough.	   I’d	  have	  
never	  lived	  it	  down’	  (2012:	  243-­‐245	  emphasis	  added)	  
Here,	  the	  strong	  bond	  created	  between	  soldiers	  needs	  to	  be	  disciplined	  through	  
codes	   that	   strictly	   delineate	   appropriate	   emotional	   masculine	   behavior	   from	  
being	   gay.	   Heteronormativity	   and	   valorising	   particular	   forms	   of	   sexuality	   has	  
historically	  been	  a	  strong	  organising	  principle	  for	  armed	  forces,	  and	  remains	  so,	  
despite	   increased	  diversity	   (Bulmer	  2013,	   	   see	  also	  Wadham	  2004,	  Belkin	  2012).	  
While	  some	  show	  of	  emotion	  and	  vulnerability,	  which	  would	  on	  other	  occasions	  
be	   viewed	   as	   feminine	   and	   weak	   can	   be	   sanctioned,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   expressed	  
‘properly’	   (Hockey	   2003:	   23).	   The	   importance	   of	   sexuality	   in	   the	   production	   of	  
particular	   forms	   of	   military	   masculinity	   is	   further	   emphasized	   in	   chapter	   six,	  
where	  certain	  behaviors	  of	  ANA	  soldiers	  are	  interpreted	  as	  being	  gay,	  something	  
that	  implies	  both	  subordination	  and	  distance.	  	  	  
                                                
57	  Additionally,	  there	  are	  several	  occasions	  where	  soldiers	  are	  clearly	  emotionally	  struck	  down	  by	  
poor	  living	  conditions	  for	  locals	  and	  particularly	  for	  children	  who	  are	  wounded,	  sick	  or	  dying.	  The	  
American	  memoirs	  contain	  stories	  about	  how	  soldiers	  try	  to	  bend	  the	  rules	  to	  ensure	  medical	  care	  
for	   particular	   children,	   how	  much	   the	   lack	   of	   care	   given	   to	   them	   by	   the	  military	   and/or	   their	  
families	  distresses	   them	  and	   incidents	  where	  children	  die	   in	   their	  arms	  (see	  Zeller	  2012,	  Parnell	  
2012,	  Courter	  2008,	  Tupper	  2010).	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As	  is	  clear,	  there	  are	  multiple	  layers	  also	  to	  performances	  of	  warrior	  masculinity	  
and	   these	   are	   connected	   to	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   the	   development	   of	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  
masculinity.	  As	  Parnell	  writes,	  ‘the	  nature	  of	  the	  war	  here	  required	  us	  lieutenants	  
to	   be	   warrior-­‐diplomats…the	   army	   counted	   on	   us	   to	   be	   emissaries	   and	   power	  
brokers’	   (2012:	   34)58.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   infantrymen	   is	   far	   more	  
complex	   than	   simply	   being	   reliable	   and	   aggressive	   in	   combat.	   To	   succeed	   you	  
also	  have	  to	  have	  good	  communication	  skills,	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  rapport	  with	  
local	  leaders,	  negotiate	  your	  way	  through	  difficult	  situations,	  and	  of	  course,	  you	  
have	   to	   maintain	   a	   good	   working	   relationship	   with	   Afghan	   security	   forces,	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  six.	  This	  shows	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  
masculinity	  discussed	  above	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  adaptability	  of	  the	   infantry	  soldier	  
masculinity	  to	  that.	  However,	  and	  importantly,	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  negation	  of	  
kinetic,	  or	  ‘killing’	  activity.	  	  	  
	  
2.4	  ‘Fobbits’,	  ‘Ducks’	  and	  ‘Turtles’	  	  
A	   defining	   difference	   and	   crucial	   internal	   division	   in	   the	   American	   memoirs,	  
with	   the	  exception	  of	  Courter,	  are	  between	   those	  who	  have	  combat	  experience	  
and	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  As	  mentioned,	  Courter,	  as	  an	  Army	  Reservist,	  represents	  
something	  of	  an	  anomaly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  focus	  on	  combat	  and	  fighting.	  This	  
is	   in	   accordance	   with	   Christie’s	   findings	   with	   regards	   to	   Army	   Reservists	   and	  
their	   role	   in	   Civil-­‐Military	   Cooperation	   (CIMIC).	   He	   argues	   that	   the	   tasks	   of	  
CIMIC	  officers	  (interacting	  with	  civilians	  and	  coordinating	  development	  projects	  
in	  PRTs),	  are	  ‘incompatible	  with	  the	  broader	  kinetic	  masculinity	  of	  soldiers’	  and	  
therefore	  reservists,	  who	  are	  seen	  as	  ‘less	  militarized	  and	  thus	  more	  “civilian”’	  are	  
preferred’	   (Christie	   2012:	   61).	   In	   other	   words,	   there	   is	   an	   ‘outsourcing’	   of	   the	  
‘armed	  social	  work’	  of	  counterinsurgency	  to	  those	  that	  are	  deemed	  more	  fitted	  to	  
                                                
58	  Similarly,	  Elden	  writes	  that	   ‘as	  a	  platoon	  commander	  you	  not	  only	  need	  to	  have	  initiative	  and	  
be	  brave,	  but	  also	  be	  an	  intellectual…it	  is	  expected	  that	  I	  am	  up	  to	  date	  on	  security	  and	  defence	  
policy,	  military	  theory,	  the	  culture,	  religion	  and	  history	  of	  the	  regions	  where	  we’ll	  be	  operating,	  in	  
addition	  to	  tactics	  and	  combat	  techniques	  (2012:	  40).	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fulfil	  these	  functions.	  Courter	  is	  one	  of	  these	  reservists	  and	  contrary	  to	  the	  other	  
memoirs,	  far	  more	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  interactions	  with	  Afghan	  civilians	  and	  
less	  on	  combat.	  However,	  as	  shown	  in	  chapter	  five,	  women,	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  
FETs,	  who	  also	  perform	  parts	  of	  the	  ‘caring’	  capacity	  of	  counterinsurgency.	  	  
Those	  who	  do	  not	  have	  combat	  experience	  and	  are	  reluctant	  to	  gain	  any,	  in	  other	  
words,	  those	  who	  do	  not	  do	  the	  ‘killing’,	  are	  known	  as	  ‘Fobbits’	  in	  US	  army	  slang.	  
The	  term,	  as	  explained	  in	  chapter	  two,	  is	  derived	  from	  FOB	  (Forward	  Operating	  
Base)	   and	   the	   Tolkien	   creation	   of	   Hobbits.	   The	   ‘Fobbits’,	   like	   Hobbits,	   rarely	  
venture	  outside	  the	  wire	  (alternatively,	  the	  Shire)59.	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘Fobbits’	  will	  
be	  dealt	  with	  here	  at	  some	  length	  as	  it	  emphasises	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  masculinity	  
in	   the	   US	  military	   and	   it	   shows	   how	   strategies	   of	   feminisation	   are	   commonly	  
used	   to	  distinguish	   those	  working	   in	   logistics	  and	   support	   from	  the	   ‘real	  men’.	  
While	  the	  category	  of	   ‘Fobbits’	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  potentially	  narrow	  one,	   it	  here	  
represents	  a	  wider	  discontentment	  with	  how	  the	  primacy	  of	  killing	  and	  fighting	  
is	   under	   threat.	   In	   other	   words,	   unhappiness	   about	   the	   ‘Fobbits’	   signifies	  
unhappiness	  about	  the	   ‘warrior	  masculinity’	  coming	  under	  threat	   from	  a	  whole	  
range	  of	  civilian,	  feminine	  and	  bureaucratic	  concerns.	  	  
Interestingly,	  a	  similar	  hostility	  between	  support/logistics	  and	  combat	  soldiers	  is	  
not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Norwegian	  memoirs,	  quite	  the	  opposite	  60.	  However,	  that	  
is	  not	   to	  say	   that	   there	   is	  not	  a	  hierarchy	   in	   terms	  of	  which	  positions	  are	  most	  
valued,	   nor	   that	   these	   distinctions	   are	   not	   gendered.	   Rather	   it	  may	   simply	   be	  
indicative	   of	   a	   more	   ‘collegial’	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   groups,	   partly	  
explained	   by	   the	   sheer	   size	   of	   the	   force	   and	   how	   in	   Afghanistan	   most	   are	  
deployed	  in	  the	  same	  area.	  When	  combat	  service	  and	  support	  are	  mentioned	  by	  
Johansen	  he	  praises	  them	  as	  ‘exceptional’	  and	  states	  that	  ‘these	  women	  and	  men	  
in	  the	  support	  staff	  are	  not	  the	  ones	  in	  the	  line	  of	  fire,	  but	  their	  role	  is	  decisive	  in	  
caring	  for	  those	  who	  do…I	  have	  great	  respect	  for	  these	  people’	  (2011:	  120).	  Elden	  
                                                
59	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  realisation	  that	  in	  the	  end,	  Hobbits	  are	  hailed	  as	  the	  true	  heroes	  in	  Lord	  of	  
the	  Rings	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  narrative	  here	  is	  not	  known.	  	  
60	  The	  only	  exception	  here	  is	  Mella,	  who	  complains	  that	  ‘Forsvarsbygg’	  (in	  charge	  of	  buildings	  and	  
maintenance	  of	  them)	  ‘don’t	  understand	  the	  seriousness	  of	  what	  goes	  on	  outside	  the	  wire.	  Besides	  
them,	  the	  support	  functions	  ‘delivered	  the	  goods	  every	  day’	  (Mella	  2013:	  174).	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mentions	  a	  time	  when	  they	  returned	  back	  from	  combat	  to	  be	  greeted	  by	  ‘the	  girls	  
in	   the	   kitchen’.	   They	   had	   ‘put	   together	   a	   special	   dinner	   for	   us,	   on	   their	   own	  
initiative…Just	  for	  us.	  The	  girls	  smiled…they	  asked	  nicely	  if	  they	  could	  sit	  and	  eat	  
with	  us.	   Incredible.	  The	  guys	  were	   lined	  up	  afterwards	  to	  thank	  the	  chefs,	  who	  
told	  us	  that	  they	  were	  simply	  doing	  their	  jobs'	  (2012:	  127).	  	  
Connell	   argues	   that	  while	  hegemonic	  masculinity	   surfaces	   as	   the	  most	   revered	  
and	  valorised	  form	  of	  masculinity,	  it	  need	  not	  be	  the	  most	  common,	  nor	  indeed	  
the	  most	  comfortable	  (2000:	  10-­‐11).	  Given	  that	  there	  are	  ‘eight	  to	  eleven	  Fobbits	  
for	   every	   fighting	   soldier’	   (Tupper	   2010)	   the	  majority	   of	   servicemen	   in	   the	   US	  
military	   are	   in	   support	   and	   logistic	   roles.	  While	   this	   chapter	   does	   not	  want	   to	  
identify	   ‘warrior	  masculinity’	  as	  necessarily	  always	   the	   ‘hegemonic	  masculinity’,	  
it	  wants	  to	  show	  how	  this	  kind	  of	  masculinity	  is	  contested	  and	  under	  threat.	  	  
In	   US	  military	   lingo,	   the	   number	   of	   combat	   troops	   relative	   to	   support	   staff	   is	  
known	   as	   the	   ‘tooth-­‐to-­‐tail’	   ratio	   (T3R)	   where	   the	   ‘teeth’	   are	   those	   actively	  
seeking	  out	   and	   combating	   the	   enemy	   and	   the	   tail	   is	   everyone	   else.	   In	   the	  US	  
military	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  average	  percentage	  of	  combat	  troops	  
has	  been	  around	  32	  per	  cent,	   leaving	  the	  rest	  to	  be	  filled	  by	  administrative,	   life	  
support	   and	   logistics.	  On	   the	  whole,	   the	   number	   of	   combat	   troops	   in	  military	  
operations	   such	   as	  Vietnam,	   Iraq	   and	  Afghanistan	  has	   steadily	   been	   in	  decline	  
(McGrath	  2007).	  In	  conjunction	  with	  the	  planned	  troop	  withdrawal	  in	  2014,	  the	  
ratio	   of	   support	   staff	   to	   combat	   personnel	   has	   come	   under	   scrutiny	   with	   one	  
administration	  official	  stating	  ‘Why	  would	  you	  send	  home	  gunfighters	  and	  keep	  
cooks?	  It	  doesn’t	  make	  any	  sense’	  (Barnes	  2012).	  In	  the	  US	  military,	  women	  are	  
still	   not	   (technically)	   deployed	   in	   combat	   positions,	   so	   they	   are	   by	   their	   very	  
nature	  ‘Fobbits’61,	  something	  that	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
Tupper	   dedicates	   three	  whole	   chapters	   to	   this	   group	   of	   soldiers	   and	  while	   the	  
nick-­‐name	   awarded	   them	  may	   sound	   ‘cute	   and	   fuzzy’	   it’s	   not	  meant	   to	   be,	   as	  
                                                
61 	  However,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   women	   within	   the	   US	   military	   do	   not	   have	   combat	  
experience,	   as	   they	   in	   reality	   have	   been	   in	   combat	   in	   both	   Iraq	   and	   Afghanistan	   both	   on	   the	  
ground	  and	  as	  pilots.	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‘many	   a	   fistfight	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   Iraq	   has	   started	   with	   the	   insult	   “Fobbit”	  
being	   levied	  by	  one	   soldier	   toward	   another’	   (2010:	   112)	   as	   they	   are	  nothing	  but	  
‘annoying	   reminders	   of	   the	   unequal	   risk	   distribution	   in	   Army	   life’	   (2010:	   114).	  
‘Fobbits’	   ‘have	   it	   easy’	  with	   ‘little	   to	  no	   exposure	   to	   the	   enemy’,	   they	   are	   ‘well-­‐
protected’	  within	  the	  comforts	  of	  the	  FOB	  and	  can	  revel	  in	  all	  kinds	  of	  feminine	  
pastimes	   ‘from	   massages	   to	   pedicures	   to	   smoothies	   to	   24-­‐7	   coffee	   shops	   and	  
deluxe	  chow	  halls’	  (Tupper	  2010:	  110)62.	  	  
The	   way	   ‘Fobbits’	   are	   demonized	   for	   their	   ample	   access	   to	   food,	   and	   bodily	  
comforts	  is	   important,	  because	  it	  points	  to	  the	  way	  war	  is	  both	  a	  gendered	  and	  
embodied	   practice.	   Higate	   argues	   that	   the	   body	   in	   the	   military	   is	   ‘a	   site	   of	  
suffering	  and	  a	  vital	  resource’	  (Higate	  1998:	  181)	  and	  an	  important	  part	  is	  soldier	  
identity	  is	  connected	  to	  this	  bodily	  suffering.	  Throughout	  the	  memoirs,	  emphasis	  
is	   placed	   on	   the	   role	   of	   the	   body	   and	   its	   ability	   to	   cope	   with	   lack	   of	   water,	  
strenuous	  climbs,	  injury,	  fatigue	  and	  heat.	  	  
Parnell	   is	   equally	   resentful	   towards	   ‘Fobbits’	   (or	  POGs	  –	  Personnel	  Other	   than	  
Grunts)	   and	   asks	   ‘Band	   of	   brothers?	   No.	   Battle	   shifts	   those	   relationships	   like	  
nothing	  else’	  (2012:	  206).	  	  
‘Our	   tolerance	   level	   for	   the	  petty	   rules	   and	  politics	  we	   faced	  on	  base	  diminished,	   even	  as	   they	  
seemed	   to	   grow	  more	   acute	   and	   offensive.	   Chickenshit	   squared.	  We	   internalised	   every	   slight,	  
noticed	  every	  inequity	  between	  us	  and	  the	  Fobbits,	  and	  fumed	  with	  resentment	  over	  the	  lack	  of	  
respect	   we	   thought	   they	   telegraphed.	   The	   platoon	   withdrew	   into	   itself,	   the	   men	   building	   a	  
protective	   wall	   around	   those	   they	   trusted.	   Everyone	   else	   was	   viewed	   with	   quiet	   suspicion’	  
(Parnell	  2012:	  218)	  
In	   a	   similar	   manner,	   Zeller	   draws	   up	   a	   distinction	   between	   those	   who	   have	  
experienced	  combat	  (turtles	  who	  are	  silent)	  and	  those	  who	  have	  not	  (ducks	  who	  
quack).	  	  
                                                
62	  ‘Fobbit	  nirvana’	   is	  Bagram	  Air	  Force	  base.	  Here,	   there	   is	  something	  else	  that	  the	   ‘Fobbits’	  can	  
enjoy,	  apart	   from	  the	  aforementioned	  goods	  and	  services,	  and	   ‘something	  extra-­‐special	   for	  your	  
average	   horny	   infantryman:	  Women!’	   Not	   only	   that	   but	   ‘most,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   Afghan	  
women,	   are	   bebopping	   around	   in	   shorts	   and	   skimpy	   T-­‐shirts.	   The	   scenery	   is	   deluxe!’	   (Tupper	  
2010:	  113-­‐114).	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‘With	   disdain,	   we	   looked	   around	   at	   all	   the	   “Fobbits”	   and	   marvelled	   at	   how	   different	   they	   all	  
suddenly	  appeared.	  Three	  weeks	  prior,	   these	  had	  been	  our	  fellow	  soldiers,	   friends	  of	  years,	  and	  
yet	  now	  they	  were	  like	  strangers	  to	  us	  all.	  They	  simply	  couldn’t	  relate	  –	  an	  abundance	  of	  ducks	  
surrounding	   a	   group	  of	   turtles.	  Alderson	   remarked	   that	  within	   the	   first	   24	  hours	   of	   his	   arrival	  
back	  at	  Camp	  Phoenix,	  he	  was	  ready	  to	  punch	  the	  next	  person	  who	  looked	  at	  him	  the	  wrong	  way’	  
(Zeller	  2012:	  92).	  	  
‘Fobbits’	   therefore	   seem	   to	   represent	   a	   fundamental	   division	   within	   the	   US	  
military.	  The	  ones	  outside	  do	  the	  hard,	  gruelling,	  honourable	  work,	  whereas	  the	  
ones	   inside	   are	   concerned	   with	   ‘manufactured	   threats’	   (Tupper	   2010:	   115)	   and	  	  
‘petty	  rules’	  (Parnell	  2012:	  218).	  The	  term	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  a	  series	  of	  satirical	  
drawings	  and	  cartoons,	  such	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  ‘Bob	  on	  the	  FOB’	  by	  SGT	  Albert	  J,	  
Merrifield63.	  In	  addition	  a	  song	  called	  ‘The	  Fobbit	  Song’,	  sung	  by	  ‘Fagan	  &	  Cotto’,	  
two	   army	   veterans,	   details	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   combat	   soldiers	   detest	   Fobbits.	  
The	  music	  video	  shows	  a	  series	  of	   ‘Fobbits’	  relaxing	  around	  the	  FOB,	  exhibiting	  
the	   range	  of	   services	  offered	   to	   them,	   including	  grocery	   stores	  and	   famous	   fast	  
food	  outlets	  such	  as	  Subway	  and	  the	  Dairy	  Queen.	  	  
‘You’re	  a	  Fobbit	  and	  you	  can	  never	   relate,	  coz	  while	   I’m	  out	   there	   fighting	  you’re	  watching	   the	  
gate.	  You’re	  putting	  guards	  on	  some	  shit	  that	  makes	  no	  sense,	  how	  can	  you	  say	  that	  being	  in	  the	  
FOB	  is	  intense.	  You	  fucking	  liar,	  callin’	  home	  and	  sayin’	  you	  go	  out	  the	  wire,	  and	  on	  top	  of	  that	  
your	  weapon’s	  never	  been	  fired…’	  (LiveLeak	  2008)	  	  
While	   this	   emphasises	   the	   importance	   of	   being	   actively	   a	   part	   of	   ‘killing’,	   in	  
addition	  to	  speaking	  to	  an	  annoyance	  at	  ‘Fobbits’	  ability	  to	  enjoy	  the	  comforts	  of	  
life	  and	  live	  in	  relative	  security	  matters,	  the	  term	  can	  also	  be	  read	  as	  emblematic	  
of	   a	   distaste	   for	   civilian/bureaucratic	   dimensions	   feeding	   into	   the	   military	  
through	  what	   is	   viewed	  as	   excessive	   attention	   to	   rules	   and	   regulations.	  One	  of	  
the	  health	  and	  safety	  rules	  that	  are	  mentioned	  both	  by	  Zeller	  and	  by	  Tupper	   is	  
the	  enforcement	  of	  high	  visibility	  safety	  belts	  when	  walking	  around	  in	  the	  dark	  
in	  at	  FOB	  Bagram.	  Tupper	  writes	   that	   this	  brings	  a	   ‘Queer	   Eye	   for	   the	   Straight	  
                                                
63	  Please	  see	  the	  following	  webpage	  for	  a	  selection	  of	  ‘Bob	  on	  the	  Fob’	  characters,	  including	  the	  
‘Fobbit’:	  http://rokdrop.com/2008/06/06/bob-­‐on-­‐the-­‐fobs-­‐creature-­‐gallery/	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Guy	   aspect	   to	  our	  uniform	  that	  was	   sorely	   lacking’64	  (Tupper	  2010:	   116	   see	  also,	  
Zeller	  2012:	  234).	  Parnell	  writes	  that	  there	  are	  two	  wars	  going	  on	  in	  Afghanistan	  
and	   there	   are	   two	   enemies,	   one	   is	   the	  Haqqani	   network	   that	   they	   are	   fighting	  
outside	   the	   wire	   and	   ‘those	   we	   could	   handle…but	   the	   other	   enemy	   was	   more	  
devious.	  How	  does	  one	  do	  battle	  with	  FOB	  politics?’	  	  (Parnell	  2012:	  265).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  ‘civilian’	  values	  and	  identities,	  which	  ‘Fobbits’	  are	  seen	  to	  profess,	  speak	  to	  a	  
longstanding	   division	   between	   civilian	   and	   military	   spheres.	   Victoria	   Basham	  
argues	   that	   several	   military	   sociologist’s	   have	   emphasised	   the	   centrality	   of	  
nurturing	   the	   military	   sphere	   as	   exempt	   from	   the	   civilian	   (see	   for	   instance	  
Huntington	  1981),	  something	  that	  affords	  militaries	  enough	  distinction	  from	  the	  
civilian	   sphere	   to	  maintain	  a	   separate	   sense	  of	   identity	   (Basham	  2008:	   151,	   	   see	  
also	   Goldstein	   2003).	   Failing	   to	   do	   so,	   she	   argues,	   is	   seen	   to	   jeopardize	   the	  
production	   of	   military	   masculinities	   as	   particular	   and	   distinct	   from	   civilian	  
versions	   of	   masculinity,	   something	   that	   is	   often	   visible	   in	   discussions	   about	  
diversifying	   the	  military	   forces	   in	   terms	   of	   race,	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   (Basham	  
2008:	   158).	   ‘Fobbits’	   in	   this	   regard	   represent	   this	   diluting	   of	   the	   centrality	   of	  
‘killing’	  in	  war.	  
This	  division	  is	  distinctively	  gendered	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Afghanistan,	  something	  that	  
is	  discussed	  at	   length	   in	   the	  next	  chapter.	  That	  notwithstanding,	   it	  can	  also	  be	  
explored	  through	  how	  the	  FOB	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  boundary	  that	  separates	  not	  
only	   the	   ‘inside’	   from	  the	   ‘outside’,	  but	  also	   the	   ‘safe’	   from	  the	   ‘unsafe’	  and	  the	  
‘home/private’	  from	  the	  ‘public’.	  In	  the	  military,	  as	  in	  society	  overall,	  masculine	  
roles	   are	   associated	  with	  work	   outside	   of	   the	   home	   and	   feminine	   one’s	  within	  
(Prokhovnik	  1998).	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  FOB	  in	  the	  ‘theatre	  of	  war’	  is	  as	  close	  as	  one	  
gets	  to	  a	  home	  away	  from	  home.	  Therefore	  the	  feminisation	  of	  soldiers	  who	  work	  
inside	   the	   FOB	   by	   the	   ‘real	   soldiers’	   who	   conduct	   the	   ‘real	  work’	   of	   soldiering	  
outside	  of	  the	  home	  (Sasson-­‐Levy	  2007)	  is	  emblematic	  of	  this	  distinction.	  These	  
                                                
64	  Queer	  Eye	  for	  the	  Straight	  Guy	  is	  an	  American	  reality	  TV	  show	  from	  Bravo	  TV	  that	  ran	  between	  
2003-­‐2007.	  The	  concept	  was	  that	  ‘the	  fabulous	  five’	  (all	  gay	  men)	  were	  sent	  to	  ‘help’	  straight	  guys	  
become	  more	  fashionable,	  knowledgeable	  about	  food,	  cooking,	  grooming	  and	  interior	  design.	  The	  
entire	  show	  was	  therefore	  premised	  on	  the	  stereotype	  that	  gay	  men	  are	  superior	  to	  straight	  men	  
in	  these	  areas.	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roles	   are	   produced	   through	   an	   emphasis	   on	   two	   separate	   spheres,	   where	   the	  
public	   role	   of	   the	  masculine	   combat	   soldier	   is	   highly	   regarded,	   cherished	   and	  
glorified.	  Conversely,	  the	  private	  role	  of	  the	  feminine	  ‘Fobbits’	   is	  represented	  as	  
being	   of	   low	   value,	   with	   little	   or	   no	   glory,	   and	   the	   one	   in	   need	   of	   protection.	  
Read	   this	   way,	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   military	   masculinities	   therefore	   produces	   a	  
schema	  whereby,	  ironically,	  the	  majority	  of	  soldiers	  are	  feminised	  as	  very	  few	  in	  
modern	   militaries	   actually	   experience	   combat,	   and	   the	   valorised	   few	   are	  
constructed	  as	  enablers	  of	  that	  protection.	  	  
Throughout	  the	  memoirs	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  feminised	  ‘Fobbits’	  are	  considered	  to	  
be	  lesser	  soldiers,	  and	  though	  it	  may	  be	  annoying	  that	  they	  are	  more	  comfortable	  
on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis,	  there	  are	  some	  things	  they	  cannot	  hope	  to	  achieve	  -­‐	  
‘And	  that	  is	  the	  honor	  and	  prestige	  of	  being	  in	  the	  worst	  places,	  at	  the	  worst	  times,	  and	  doing	  the	  
most	  difficult	  job	  in	  the	  world.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  respected	  awards	  you	  can	  get	  in	  the	  military	  is	  
the	  CIB,	  the	  Combat	  Infantry	  Badge.	  This	  badge	  shows	  all	  that	  you	  have	  been	  in	  combat	  and	  that	  
you	  lived	  to	  tell	  the	  tale.	  While	  the	  Army	  has	  recently	  created	  the	  Combat	  Action	  Badge	  (CAB)	  
for	  all	  non-­‐infantry	  soldiers	  who	  have	  been	  in	  combat,	  it	  remains	  the	  redheaded	  stepchild	  of	  the	  
CIB…The	   honor	   and	   respect	   earned	   in	   performing	   daily	   combat	   operations	   far	   outweigh	   the	  
enjoyment	  of	  Whoppers	  and	  movies’	  (Tupper	  2010:	  212).	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The	   development	   towards	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   entails	   a	  
revitalisation	  of	  particular	  colonial	  practices	  of	  war,	  complemented	  by	  campaigns	  
to	  emphasise	  ‘cultural	  sensitivity’	  waged	  by	  a	  military	  elite	  of	  ‘soldier-­‐scholars’.	  It	  
is	  enabled	  by	  an	  ‘ardent	  optimism	  of	  true	  believers,	  the	  engagement	  of	  thousands	  
in	  aid	  organizations,	  and	  not	  least	  the	  grand	  design	  of	  modernization	  theory	  and	  
modernizing	   plans’	   (Feichtinger	   et	   al.	   2012:	   53).	   In	   other	   words,	   ‘population-­‐
centric’	   counterinsurgency	   implies	   a	   host	   of	   interventions,	   policies,	   tactics	   and	  
strategies	   that	   aim	   at	   representing	   itself	   as	   a	  more	   ‘humanitarian’	   way	   of	   war,	  
‘reinforcing	  U.S.	  civilizational	  superiority	   to	   the	  audience	  back	  home’	   (McBride	  
and	  Wibben	  2012:	  210).	  However,	  the	  greater	  focus	  on	  ‘winning	  hearts	  and	  minds’	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through	   non-­‐kinetic,	   or	   ‘caring’	   activities	   associated	   with	   civilian	   and	  
development	  work	  is	  found	  to	  be	  in	  tension	  with	  more	  traditional	  military	  values	  
associated	   with	   combat	   and	   killing.	   They	   are	   also,	   as	   the	   next	   chapter	   shows,	  
often	  performed	  by	  female	  soldiers.	  	  
Reading	   the	   valorisation	   of	   ‘warrior	   masculinity’	   and	   the	   marginalisation	   of	  
‘Fobbits’	  in	  the	  memoirs	  alongside	  the	  production	  of	  ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  masculinity	  
tells	  us	  a	  number	  of	  things	  about	  the	  production	  of	  military	  masculinity	  and	  the	  
practice	   of	   war	   in	   Afghanistan.	   Fundamentally,	   it	   confirms	   what	   is	   argued	   by	  
several	  scholars	  (Connell	  1995,	  Higate	  2003b,	  Duncanson	  2009),	  that	  there	  is	  not	  
one	  but	  numerous	  military	  masculinities	  and	  that	  they	  are	  all	  relied	  upon	  in	  the	  
practice	  of	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  as	  the	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  
caring’	  shows.	  	  
The	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  is	  a	  complex	  one	  and	  can	  manifest	  itself	  as	  a	  
tension,	   balancing	   act,	   hierarchy	   and	   complementarity.	   These	   dynamics	   are	  
furthermore	   interwoven	   with	   how	   multiple	   military	   masculinities	   operate	  
alongside	  one	  another	  and	  how	  strategies	  of	  feminisation	  and	  subordination	  are	  
involved	   in	   disciplining	   and	   stratifying	   them.	   In	   this	   sense,	   while	   the	  military	  
relies	   on	   soldiers	   to	   fill	   support	   and	   logistic	   positions,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  
‘Fobbits’,	   this	  majority	  only	   acts	   as	   staging	  props	   for	   the	   few	  who	  are	   assigned	  
‘beyond	  the	  wire’.	  This	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  shows	  not	  only	  the	  relationality	  of	  
femininity	  and	  masculinity	  in	  war,	  but	  also	  how	  ‘killing’	  still	  surfaces	  as	  a	  central	  
component,	   despite	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   emphasis	   on	   ‘caring’.	   That	   said,	   the	  
historically	   valorised	   ‘warrior	   masculinity’	   is	   currently	   under	   threat	   by	   the	  
opening	  up	  of	   the	  military	   to	  multiple	  genders,	   sexuality	  and	  ethnicities,	   along	  
with	   the	   doctrine	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   which	   requires	   a	  
whole	   host	   of	   different	   gendered	   bodies	   and	   performances.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  
notion	   of	   ‘Fobbits’	   is	   here	   symbolic	   of	   a	   tension	   in	   counterinsurgency	   of	  what	  
war	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  about.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  female	  soldiers	  can	  
also	   be	   seen	   to	   disrupt	   and	   challenge	   particular	   forms	   of	  military	  masculinity,	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-­‐	  	  Chapter	  5	  -­‐	  
The	  Practice	  of	  ‘Population-­‐Centric	  
Counterinsurgency’:	  Writing	  Women’s	  Bodies	  in	  War	  
	  
	   	   	   ‘The	  empowerment	  of	  women	  in	  unstable	  countries	  benefits	  not	  only	  
them,	  but	  all	  of	  us.	  It	  is	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  approach	  to	  security	  challenges	  
in	  the	  21st	  century’	  	  
NATO	  Secretary	  General	  Anders	  Fogh	  Rasmussen	  
‘The	  United	  States	  is	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  people	  and	  it	  is	  in	  the	  people’s	  interest	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  
United	  	  States’	  	  
Commander’s	  Guide	  to	  FETs	  
	  
While	   the	   last	   chapter	   discussed	   the	   production	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   military	  
masculinities	  as	  crucial	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency,	  
this	   chapter	   continues	   this	   exploration	   by	   detailing	   how	   particular	   feminine	  
gendered	   bodies	   are	  written	   in	  war.	  More	   specifically,	   it	   analyses	   the	  multiple	  
and	   complex	  ways	   in	  which	  women’s	   bodies	   are	   called	   into	   being	   through	   the	  
deployment	  of	  FETs	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  US	  military	  operations,	  and	  interpretations	  
of	   a	   ‘gender	   perspective’	   in	   NATO	   and	   ISAF.	   The	   previous	   chapter	  
conceptualised	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	  as	   inhabiting	  a	  gendered	  
dynamic	   of	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’.	   This	   conceptualisation	   is	   further	   analysed	   and	  
problematized	  in	  this	  chapter.	  In	  particular,	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  how	  women’s	  
martial	  bodies	  in	  FETs	  are	  constructed	  as	  particular	  martial	  feminine	  bodies	  that	  
take	  on	  a	  feminine	  labour	  of	  ‘care’	  for	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency.	  In	  
other	   words,	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   resists	  
singular	   notions	   of	   femininity	   and	  masculinity,	   and	   instead	   relies	   on	  multiple	  
and	  fluid	  bodies	  and	  gender	  performances	  in	  the	  ‘theatre	  of	  war’.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   analysing	   the	   FETs,	   this	   chapter	   also	   examines	   NATO’s	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interpretation	  of	  UNSCR	  1325	  on	  Women,	  Peace	  and	  Security	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  
the	  integration	  of	  a	  ‘gender	  perspective’	  in	  their	  operations.	  The	  last	  decade	  has	  
increasingly	  placed	  the	  policy	  issue	  of	  ‘Women,	  Peace	  and	  Security’	  (WPS)	  on	  the	  
international	   agenda65.	   In	   2000,	   the	   United	   Nations	   Security	   Council	   (UNSC)	  
unanimously	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  UNSCR	  1325,	  a	  resolution	  that	  has	  subsequently	  
been	  followed	  by	  a	  series	  of	  other	  resolutions	  under	  the	  same	  rubric66.	  It	  is	  often	  
referred	  to	  as	  a	  landmark	  resolution	  and	  a	  ‘new	  norm	  in	  the	  making’	  (Tryggestad	  
2009:	   539)	   in	   that	   it	   represents	   the	   first	   time	   the	  UNSC	  directly	   addressed	   the	  
issue	  of	  armed	  conflict	  and	  gender	  (Cohn	  2008:	  185).	  The	  resolution	  itself	  was	  the	  
result	  of	   long	  and	  tedious	   lobbying	  activity	   from	  NGOs,	  anti-­‐war	   feminists	  and	  
human	  rights	  groups67,	  and	  since	  its	  inception,	  numerous	  organizations	  around	  
the	  world	  have	  been	  set	  up	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  its	   implementation	  and	  advocate	  
its	  usage68.	  The	  discourse	  of	  UNSCR	  1325	  and	  the	   ‘gender	  perspective’	   in	  war	   is	  
not	   only	   important	   as	   a	   background	   to	   studying	   FETs,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   discourse	  
that	   in	   and	   of	   itself,	   writes	   women’s	   bodies	   in	   war	   (Shepherd	   2008,	   Shepherd	  
2011).	  While	  most	  of	  the	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  the	  deployment	  of	  FET’s	  and	  their	  
crucial	  role	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency,	  the	  chapter	  
shows	  how	  the	  logic	  that	  drives	  them	  is	  reiterated	  in	  NATO’s	  ‘gender	  perspective’	  
efforts	  and	  in	  wider	  narratives	  of	  women’s	  roles	  in	  peacekeeping	  operations.	  	  
As	  the	  last	  chapter	  made	  clear,	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  calls	  into	  
being	   a	   series	   of	   gendered	   bodies	   and	   performances,	   such	   as	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’,	  
‘warriors’	   and	   ‘Fobbits’,	  which	   are	   all	   necessary	  not	   only	   for	   the	   functioning	  of	  
the	   military,	   but	   also	   the	   practice	   of	   counterinsurgency.	   The	   revamped	   21st	  
                                                
65	  It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   resolution	   has	   not	   been	   a	   central	   part	   of	   the	   efforts	   towards	  
peacebuilding	  in	  Afghanistan,	  though	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  resolution	  have	  been	  frequently	  
addressed	  by	  Afghan	   feminists	   and	  activists	   (Peacebuild	  2008).	  That	   said,	   the	  Afghan	  Women’s	  
Network	  (AWN)	  published	  a	  lengthy	  report	  in	  2011,	  which	  includes	  detailed	  recommendations	  on	  
how	   not	   only	   to	   implement	   the	   resolution,	   but	   to	   think	   beyond	   it	   (AWN	   2011,	   	   see	   also	  AWN	  
2007).	  	  
66	  These	  include	  UNSCR	  1820	  (2008),	  1888	  (2009),	  1889	  (2009)	  and	  1960	  (2010).	  	  
67Prior	  to	  the	  resolution,	  a	  working	  group	  on	  WPS	  was	  set	  down	  with	  the	  following	  six	  member	  
groups:	  Women’s	   International	  League	  of	  Peace	   and	  Freedom	   (WILPF),	  Amnesty	   International,	  
International	   Alert,	   Hague	   Appeal	   for	   Peace,	   Women’s	   Commission	   for	   Refugee	   Women	   and	  
Children	  and	  the	  Women’s	  Caucus	  for	  Gender	  Justice.	  	  
68	  There	  are	  several	  ‘Friends	  of	  1325’	  groups	  set	  up	  in	  numerous	  countries.	  See	  for	  instance:	  
http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/,	   http://www.fn1325.no/English,	   http://www.gaps-­‐
uk.org/,	  http://www.peacewomen.org.	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century	  version	  of	  counterinsurgency	  that	  places	  the	  population	  as	  the	  ‘centre	  of	  
gravity	  –	  the	  deciding	  factor	  in	  the	  struggle’	  (USArmy	  et	  al.	  2007:	  xxv),	  requires	  a	  
range	  of	   gendered	  bodies	   to	   access	   and	   transform	   the	  population.	  Because	   the	  
gendered	  body	  has	  no	   ‘ontological	   status’	  beyond	   the	  various	  acts	   that	  bring	   it	  
into	  reality	  (Butler	  1999:	  185),	  gendered	  performances	  are	  constantly	  being	  acted	  
and	  reacted	  on	  and	  by	  bodies	  through	  a	  series	  of	  ‘identifiable	  linguistic	  and	  non-­‐
linguistic	  practices	  that	  constitute	  our	  understanding	  of	  gender’	  (Shepherd	  2010:	  
13).	   Through	   studying	   key	   documents	   such	   as	   FM	   3-­‐24,	   AR	   670-­‐1	   and	   the	  
Commander’s	   Guide	   to	   FETs,	   alongside	   NATO	   documents	   that	   deal	   with	   the	  
integration	   of	   UNSCR	   1325	   in	   Afghanistan,	   this	   chapter	   shows	   that	   how	   war	  
writes	   women’s	   bodies	   is	   crucial	   for	   the	   practice	   of	   counterinsurgency,	  
particularly	   in	   terms	   of	   carrying	   out	   a	   feminine	   labour	   of	   care	   towards	   the	  
population.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  deployment	  of	  FETs	  also	  has	  implications	  into	  
on-­‐going	   domestic	   debates	   about	   ‘gender	   equality’	   within	   the	   military,	  
particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  ending	  the	  ‘combat	  ban’	  for	  women	  in	  the	  US	  military.	  
The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   chapter	   introduces	   the	   FETs	   and	   the	   ‘gender	   perspective’	  
more	  generally.	  It	  shows	  how	  UNSCR	  1325	  and	  FETs	  are	  commonly	  talked	  about	  
together	   and	   how	   this	   as	   a	   whole,	   speaks	   to	   a	   certain	   instrumentalist	   logic	  
behind	  the	  inclusion	  of	  women	  in	  forces.	  However,	  while	  this	  chapter	  recognises	  
this	  instrumentalist	  logic,	  it	  is	  not	  its	  main	  concern.	  Rather,	  this	  chapter	  intends	  
to	  move	  beyond	  arguments	  of	  instrumentalisation	  and	  questions	  how	  these	  two	  
policies	   call	   into	  being	  particular	  gendered	  bodies	   and	  what	  kinds	  of	  gendered	  
performances	   are	   found	   in	   their	   practice.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   will	   analyse	   how	  
these	  practices	  write	  women’s	  bodies	  in	  war.	  	  
The	  second	  section	  does	  this	  by	  analysing	  how	  the	  practice	  of	  FETs	  has	  altered	  
the	   role	   that	  Afghan	  women	  play	   in	   this	  war.	  By	   emphasising	   their	   knowledge	  
about	  and	  influence	  over	  their	   local	  communities,	  these	  women	  are	  placed	  in	  a	  
position	  where	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  worth	  being	  listened	  to.	  This	  is	  therefore	  a	  strong	  
contrast	  to	  how	  Afghan	  women	  became	  cast	  as	  passive	  and	  silent	  victims	  in	  the	  
invasion,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  Afghan	  women,	  through	  the	  practice	  of	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‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   are	   transformed	   from	   the	   silent	   and	  
passive	   victim	   of	   the	   invasion	   to	   becoming	   potential	   allies	   of	   the	   US	   forces,	  
something	  that	  also	  enables	  what	  I	  call	  ‘armed	  empowerment’.	  	  
The	  last	  section	  analyses	  how	  FETs	  bodies	  are	  written	  in	  war	  as	  a	  central	  part	  of	  
recasting	  counterinsurgency	  as	  ‘armed	  social	  work’.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim,	  
FET’s	  bodies	  are	  written	  as	  caring,	  communicative,	  unthreatening	  and	  desirable.	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  forget	  that	  these	  are	  martial	  bodies	  that	  
are	  able	   to	  perform	  to	  masculine	  standards.	   In	   this	  way,	  FETs’	  bodies	   illustrate	  
the	  ways	  that	  women’s	  bodies	  in	  war	  have	  traditionally	  proved	  difficult	  to	  code	  
within	   a	   singular	  notion	  of	  male-­‐masculine	   and	   female-­‐feminine.	  Nevertheless,	  
these	   bodies	   are	   primarily	   used	   to	   conduct	   a	   feminine	   labour	   of	   care	   and	   can	  
therefore	   be	   contrasted	   to	   the	   warrior	   masculinity	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	  
chapter.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   practice	   of	   FETs	   illustrates	   the	   duality	   in	  
‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  
	  
1.0	   Female	   Engagement	   Teams	   (FETs)	   and	   the	   ‘Gender	  
Perspective’	  
As	  discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   form	  of	   counterinsurgency	   fought	   in	  
Afghanistan	   claims	   the	   population	   as	   its	   main	   battlefield.	   In	   other	   words,	  
accessing	   local	   communities,	   maintaining	   good	   rapport	   and	   urging	   them	   to	  
support	   the	   government	   and	   the	  NATO/ISAF	   efforts	   are	   a	   crucial	   part	   of	   their	  
efforts.	  The	  rationale	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  FETs	  is	  to	  access	  a	  segment	  of	  the	  
population	  previously	  cut	  off	   to	   the	  US	   forces,	  namely	  women.	   In	  other	  words,	  
FETs	  are	  crucial	  to	  realising	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency.	  	  
FETs	   have	   existed	   as	   a	   volunteer	   assignment	   since	   2009	   in	   the	   US	   Marines	  
(Nelson	   2009),	   but	   became	   a	   more	   integrated	   part	   of	   the	   counterinsurgency	  
effort	  in	  the	  ISAF	  and	  the	  US	  Army	  in	  2010.	  In	  the	  beginning,	  these	  teams	  were	  
‘poorly	   trained	  but	   highly	  motivated’	   (McBride	   and	  Wibben	   2012:	   199),	   though	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considerable	   efforts	   have	   been	  made	   towards	   standardising	   their	   training	   and	  
deployment.	  Their	   training	  has	   been	   critiqued	   for	   being	   too	   ‘ad	  hoc’	   in	  nature	  
and	  it	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  the	  US	  Army	  needs	  to	  ‘better	  staff,	  employ	  and	  train’	  
them	   in	   order	   to	  meet	   the	   ‘strategic	   goals	   and	   objectives’	   set	   forth	   by	   the	   US	  
military	  (Holliday	  2012:	  90).	  
As	  they	  currently	  stand,	  the	  teams	  vary	  a	  great	  deal	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  scope	  and	  
size,	   with	   two	   members	   per	   team	   being	   the	   bare	   minimum.	   American	  
servicewomen’s	  exclusion	  from	  combat	  has	  meant	  that	  FETs	  need	  to	  be	  ‘attached’	  
to	  male	  units	  and	  that	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  patrol	  on	  their	  own.	  As	  Ann	  Jones	  notes,	  
‘it’s	  one	  of	  the	  ironies	  of	  FETs	  that	  women	  soldiers	  […]	  must	  still	  be	  escorted	  by	  
men,	   just	   like	   Afghan	   women’	   (2010)69.	   Since	   August	   2011,	   the	   Commander	  
International	   Security	   Assistance	   Force	   (COMISAF)	   requires	   a	  minimum	   of	   18	  
FET-­‐trained	  and	  qualified	   female	   soldiers	   (which	  equals	  nine	  FET	   teams)	   to	  be	  
assigned	   to	   each	   Brigade	   Combat	   Team	   (BCT)	   and	   that	   these	   are	   allowed	   to	  
function	  as	  FETs	  full	  time	  (CALL	  2011:	  9-­‐10).	  	  
FETs	  set	  out	  to	  provide	  basic	  medical	  services,	  conduct	  language	  training,	  go	  on	  
foot	   patrols	   and	   have	   conversations	   with	   local	   women	   in	   their	   homes.	   These	  
conversations	   are	   ideally	   facilitated	   through	   female	   linguists	   who	   accompany	  
FETs	  on	  their	  missions	  and	  who	  master	  both	  Pashto	  and	  Dari,	  qualifications	  that	  
make	  them	  ‘hard	  to	  get	  and	  hard	  to	  keep’	  (Montgomery	  2011,	  see	  also	  USArmy	  et	  
al.	   2007:	   335-­‐341,	   Solano	  2011).	  With	   regards	   to	   their	   current	   remit,	   one	  Master	  
Sgt.	   argues	   that	   this	   is	   too	   narrow	   and	   needs	   to	   be	   expanded	   to	   also	   include	  
‘plans	   for	   income-­‐generating	  projects,	   schools	  and	  clinics’	   (Bumiller	  2010b).	  On	  
the	   whole,	   they	   are	   envisioned	   to	   act	   in	   much	   the	   same	   way	   as	   ‘American	  
politicians	   who	   campaign	   door	   to	   door	   and	   learn	   what	   voters	   care	   about’	  
(Bumiller	   2010c).	   Evident	   here	   is	   an	   expectation	   that	   women	   have	   a	   unique	  
ability	  to	  speak	  to	  other	  women,	  an	  expectation	  that	  is	  also	  present	  in	  arguments	  
for	   increasing	  the	  number	  of	  women	  in	  peacekeeping	  forces.	  Kathleen	  Jennings	  
argues	  that	  ‘cynically,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  expectation	  that	  
                                                
69	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	   the	   ‘combat	  ban’	  has	  now	  been	   lifted	   in	   the	  US	  Military.	  How	  this	  
will	  affect	  FETs	  ‘operational	  environment’	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	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the	  simple	  act	  of	  being	  a	  woman	  will	  transcend	  the	  economic,	  cultural,	  linguistic,	  
and	   possibly	   religious,	   racial	   or	   ethnic	   differences	   and	   foster	   open	  
communication	  based	  on	  a	  kind	  of	  shared	  global	  sisterhood’	  (2011:	  9).	  	  
In	   2010	   former	   ISAF	   Commander	   General	   Stanley	   McChrystal	   issued	   the	  
Engagement	   with	   Afghan	   Females	   Directive	   with	   the	   stated	   purpose	   to	   ‘enable	  
ISAF	   units	   to	   conduct	   engagements	   with	   the	   Afghan	   female	   population	   in	   a	  
culturally	  respectful	  manner	  in	  order	  to	  build	  confidence	  and	  support	  for	  GIRoA	  
[Government	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Afghanistan]	  and	  ISAF’	  (NATO	  2010a:	  1).	  
While	  there	  is	  flexibility	  in	  the	  directive	  in	  terms	  of	  various	  national	  restrictions	  
towards	   women	   in	   the	   armed	   forces,	   it	   was	  McChrystal’s	   intent	   that	   ‘all	   units	  
implement	   this	   directive’	   and	   that	   contributing	   nations	   ‘train	   and	   employ	  
females	   for	   duty	   on	   engagement	   teams	   to	   the	   maximum	   extent	   practicable’	  
(NATO	  2010a:	   2).	  As	   shown	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   the	  emphasis	  on	  knowing	  
and	   understanding	   the	   cultural	   make	   up	   of	   the	   ‘theatre	   of	   war’	   surfaces	   as	  
increasingly	   important	   in	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency.	   The	  
deployment	   of	   FETs	   is	   perhaps	   one	   of	   the	   strongest	   indictors	   of	   this	   (see	   for	  
instance	   NATO	   2010a,	   Stence	   2011,	   Hughes	   2010,	   Faltas	   2011).	   One	  Master	   Sgt.	  
expresses	  the	  necessity	  of	  FETs	  by	  stating	  that	  ‘We	  need	  to	  be	  culturally	  sensitive,	  
and	  the	  need	  arose	   for	  us	   to	  have	  specially	   trained	   females	  who	  would	  go	  with	  
our	   special	   operators	   for	   that	   purpose’	   (Jordan	   2011).	  Here,	   ‘cultural	   sensitivity’	  
translates	   into	   having	   female	   counterinsurgents	   accessing	   Afghan	   women	   in	  
order	  to	  avoid	  garnering	  antagonism	  and	  hostility	  from	  the	  local	  population.	  	  
Like	   FETs,	   any	   substantial	   efforts	   on	   NATO’s	   part	   to	   include	   a	   ‘gender	  
perspective’	  came	  several	  years	  into	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  only	  really	  beginning	  
in	  2007.	  It	  is	  recognized	  that	  ‘today’s	  conflicts	  not	  only	  call	  for	  military	  responses,	  
but	   need	   “greater	   capacity”	   to	   bring	   all	   necessary	   civilian	   capacity	   to	   bear’	  
(NATO	   2009a:	   1-­‐1),	   which	   in	   turn	   requires	   higher	   numbers	   of	   servicewomen	  
deployed	   to	   the	   frontline.	   NATO’s	   work	   in	   this	   area	   has	   resulted	   in	   several	  
publications,	   training	   manuals,	   and	   recommendations	   for	   the	   integration	   of	  
‘gender	   dimensions’	   in	   operations	   and	   best	   practice	   sharing.	   In	   2009	   the	   pre-­‐
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existing	  NATO	  Committee	  on	  Women	  in	  NATO	  forces	  (CWINF)	  was	  revamped.	  
It	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  NATO	  Committee	  on	  Gender	  Perspectives	  (NCGP),	  and	  is	  
in	  charge	  of	  ensuring	  that	  any	  future	  UNSC	  resolutions	  dealing	  with	  WPS	  issues	  
are	  integrated	  (NATO	  2009b).	  In	  2012,	  the	  Norwegian	  diplomat	  and	  Civil	  Servant	  
Mari	  Skåre	  became	  the	  first	  person	  to	  hold	  the	  post	  of	  ‘Special	  Representative	  for	  
Women,	  Peace	  and	  Security’.	  Like	  most	  international	  organisations	  and	  national	  
governments,	   NATO	   integrates	   the	   WPS	   agenda	   through	   a	   ‘gender	  
mainstreaming’	  strategy	  (NATO	  2009b:	  9)70.	  	  
UNSCR	   1325	   is	   founded	   on	   the	   recognition	   that	   ‘women	   and	   children’	   are	  
particularly	   ‘adversely	   affected	   by	   armed	   conflict’	   and	   calls	   for	   ‘effective	  
institutional	   arrangements	   to	   guarantee	   [women’s]	   protection	   and	   full	  
participation	   in	   peace	   process’	   which	   ‘can	   significantly	   contribute	   to	   the	  
maintenance	  and	  promotion	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security’	  (UNSC	  2000).	  It	  
urges	   UN	  member	   states	   to	   ‘ensure	   increased	   representation	   of	   women	   at	   all	  
decision-­‐making	   levels’,	   and	   also	   to	   ‘increase	   in	   the	   participation	   of	  women	   at	  
decision	  making	   levels	   in	   conflict	   resolutions	   and	   peace	   processes’	   along	   with	  
training	   and	   educational	   guidance	   (UNSC	   2000).	   Along	  with	   this,	   it	   urges	   the	  
Secretary	   General	   to	   seek	   to	   ‘expand	   the	   role	   and	   contribution	   of	   women	   in	  
United	  Nations	  field-­‐based	  operations,	  and	  especially	  among	  military	  observers,	  
civilian	   police,	   human	   rights	   and	   humanitarian	   personnel’	   (UNSC	   2000).	   This	  
latter	  quotation	  is	  especially	  important	  since	  this	  is	  where	  the	  main	  argument	  of	  
how	   including	   a	   ‘gender	   perspective’	   and	   realising	   the	   aims	   of	   UNSCR	   1325	   is	  
achieved	  through	  deploying	  more	  female	  soldiers.	  	  	  
                                                
70Maitrayee	  Mukhopadhyay	  argues	  that	  while	  gender	  mainstreaming	  is	   ‘supposed	  to	  ensure	  that	  
everybody	  is	  answerable	  for	  gender	  equality	  commitments	  it	  has	  generally	  meant	  that	  nobody	  is	  
ultimately	  responsible	  for	  getting	  it	  done’	  (Mukhopadhyay	  2004:	  98).	  Others	  are	  less	  dismissive.	  
Jacqui	  True	  argues	  that	  despite	  its	  criticisms	  it	  can	  ‘balance	  the	  goal	  of	  gender	  equality	  with	  the	  
need	   to	   recognize	   gender	   differences	   to	   bring	   about	   a	   transformation	   of	   masculine-­‐as-­‐norm	  
institutional	  practices	  in	  state	  and	  global	  governance’	  (True	  2003:	  369).	  While	  NATO	  encourages	  
‘gender	  mainstreaming’	  as	  a	  strategy,	  one	  of	  their	  key	  guiding	  documents	  directs	  the	  organisation	  
to	  ‘specifically	  focus	  on	  women	  and	  girls,	  but	  also	  recognizes	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  all	  children	  is	  
an	  obligation’	   (NATO	  2009a:	   1-­‐1).	   In	   other	  words	  men	   are	   expressly	   excluded	   from	  any	   ‘gender	  
perspective’.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  resolution	  itself	  where	  ‘“man”	  is	  very	  much	  the	  
absent	  present’	  (Shepherd	  2008:	  121).	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The	   American	  military	   has	   been	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   developing	   the	   concept	   of	  
FETs	   and	  deploying	   them	   in	   the	   field.	  While	   other	  militaries	   also	  deploy	  FETs	  
(such	   as	   the	   British	   and	   the	   Swedish	   military),	   Norwegian	   forces	   have	   not	  
incorporated	  the	  concept	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  that	  the	  US	  forces	  have	  (Ellingsen	  
2013)71.	   That	   said,	   from	   2011-­‐2012,	   the	  Norwegian	   PRT	   in	  Meymaneh	   had	   a	   full	  
time	   ‘gender	   advisor’	   who	   heads	   up	   a	   FET	   (Departementene	   2011) 72 .	   The	  
Norwegian	  government’s	  definition	  of	  a	  	   ‘gender	  perspective’	  is	  to	  ‘acknowledge	  
that	   men	   and	   women	   in	   conflict	   experience	   this	   differently’	  
(Forsvarsdepartementet/MOD	  2009b:	  95,	  	  see	  also	  Ellingsen	  2013).	  	  
FETs	  and	  UNSCR	   1325	  are	   frequently	  mentioned	   together,	  and	  reference	   to	   the	  
former	  typically	  suggests	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  latter.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  
in	   Norwegian	   and	   NATO	   discourses,	   and	   less	   so	   in	   the	   US,	   where	   there	   is	   a	  
noticeable	   absence	   of	   references	   to	   UNSCR	   1325	   in	   military	   literature	   as	   a	  
justification	   for	   the	  deployment	  of	   FETs73.	  Rather,	   the	   emphasis	   in	  US	  military	  
discourses	   lies	   firmly	   on	   how	  FETs	   enhance	   operational	   effectiveness	   and	   how	  
they	   are	   crucial	   for	   information	   gathering	   purposes.	   Norway’s	   emphasis	   of	  
UNSCR	  1325	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  high	  standing	  that	  the	  UN	  has	  in	  general,	  
and	   also	   the	   importance	   of	   being	   seen	   to	   be	   in	   compliance	   with	   the	   UN	   for	  
public	  legitimacy	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  It	  may	  also	  indicate	  a	  broader	  knowledge	  and	  
emphasis	  on	  UNSCR	  1325	  in	  the	  Norwegian	  military	  compared	  to	  the	  US,	  given	  
that	  Norway	  has	  had	  a	  National	  Action	  Plan	  (NAP)	  since	  2006	  and	  the	  US	  only	  
produced	  one	  in	  2011.	  	  
References	   to	  UNSCR	   1325	  were	   therefore	   central	   for	   Lieutenant	  Colonel	   Rune	  
Solberg,	   former	   head	   of	   the	   Norwegian	   PRT	   in	   Meymaneh,	   who	   suggested	   in	  
2010	   that	   FETs	   should	   be	   adopted	   in	   the	   Norwegian	   army.	   He	   explains	   how	  
difficult	   it	   is	   for	  male	   soldiers	   to	   gain	   access	   to	  Afghan	  women	  because	   of	   the	  
                                                
71	  Norway	  has	  historically	  been	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	  UNSCR	  1325	  and	  in	  2006	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  
countries	   to	   produce	   a	   National	   Action	   Plan	   (NAP)	   that	   has	   since	   been	   revised	   and	   evaluated	  
(NMFA	  2006,	  NMFA	  2011,	  Departementene	  2011).	  
72	  Norway	  withdrew	  most	  of	  its	  forces	  from	  PRT	  Meymaneh	  in	  Faryab	  in	  October	  2012	  as	  a	  part	  of	  
the	  NATO	  withdrawal	  process	  and	  it	  was	  transferred	  to	  Afghan	  control.	  	  	  
73	  That	  said,	  FETs	  are	  mentioned	  in	  the	  US	  NAP	  on	  Women,	  Peace	  and	  Security,	  dealing	  with	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  UNSCR	  1325	  into	  US	  policy	  (WhiteHouse	  2011).	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Afghan	  ‘code	  of	  conduct’,	  and	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  having	  a	  (male)	  gender	  advisor	  
is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   fulfil	   the	   aims	   of	   UNSCR	   1325,	   NATO’s	   guidelines	   and	   the	  
Norwegian	   NAP.	   He	   argues	   that	   there	   are	   two	   main	   benefits	   to	   setting	   up	   a	  
Norwegian	   FET.	   Because	   of	   ‘increased	   information	   access’	   and	   ‘better	   contact	  
with	   the	   locals’	   the	   PRT	   will	   get	   ‘better	   force	   protection’.	   Furthermore,	   FETs	  
would	   ‘grant	   the	   Norwegian	   Military	   and	   the	   Norwegian	   Forces	   a	   very	   good	  
reputation’.	   Conversely,	   not	   operationalizing	   a	   FET	   shows	   a	   ‘negligence	   of	  
UNSCR	  1325	  which	  could	  potentially	  be	  very	  difficult	   for	  the	  Norwegian	  Armed	  
Forces	  to	  handle	  in	  the	  media’	  (Solberg	  2010,	  	  see	  also	  Ellingsen	  2013).	  	  
The	   first	   argument	   for	   FETs	   concerns	   access	   to	   ‘increased	   information’	   and	  
‘better	   contact	   with	   the	   locals’.	   While	   this	   is	   in	   and	   of	   itself	   integral	   to	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	   it	   is	   also	   something	   that	   grants	   ‘better	  
force	  protection’	  and	  deploying	  more	  women	  not	  only	  increases	  rapport	  with	  the	  
local	  population,	  but	  also	  is	  something	  that	  enhances	  the	  security	  of	  the	  armed	  
forces	   more	   broadly.	   These	   arguments	   are	   largely	   replicated	   in	   NATO’s	  
justifications	  for	  including	  a	  ‘gender	  perspective’	  in	  its	  operations,	  	  
‘More	  extensive	  information	  gathering	  capacities	  to	  improve	  access	  and	  communication	  with	  the	  
local	   population	   in	   order	   to	   make	   better	   and	   more	   balanced	   decisions;	   Overall	   situational	  
awareness	   of	   all	   parties	   involved	   in	   the	   conflict	   to	   increase	   credibility	   and	   acceptance	   of	   the	  
operation	  and	  the	  troops	  in	  theatre;	  Enhanced	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  respect	  to	  assure	  better	  
force	  protection’	  (NATO	  2009b:	  18	  emphasis	  added).	  	  
When	  the	  NATO	  General	  Secretary,	  Anders	  Fogh	  Rasmussen	  spoke	  in	  2010	  at	  a	  
conference	  on	  the	  ‘Role	  of	  Women	  in	  Global	  Security’	  he	  reiterated	  this	  emphasis	  
on	  female	  soldiers	  being	  important	  to	  better	  force	  protection.	  He	  stated	  that	  ‘in	  
most	   countries,	   women	   don’t	   want	   to	   be	   searched	   at	   checkpoints	   by	  men.	   In	  
some	  cultures,	  it	  is	  unacceptable.	  Female	  soldiers	  can	  conduct	  searches	  without	  
causing	   offence,	   which	   enhances	   our	   own	   security	   in	   a	   way	   that	   fits	   with	   the	  
culture’	   (NATO	  2010c).	  A	   ‘gender	  perspective’	  will	   also	   ‘increase	  credibility	  and	  
acceptance	  of	  the	  operation	  and	  troops’	  (NATO	  2009b:	  18).	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Solberg’s	   second	   concern	   is	   one	   of	   public	   relations	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   FETs	   are	  
seen	  to	  be	  beneficial	  for	  the	  forces’	  reputation.	  As	  McBride	  and	  Wibben	  argue	  in	  
relation	   to	   US	   FETs,	   the	   incorporation	   of	   women	   speaks	   of	   the	   way	   that	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   aims	   to	   represent	   itself	   as	   a	   more	  
‘humanitarian’	   way	   of	   war,	   ‘reinforcing	   U.S.	   civilizational	   superiority	   to	   the	  
audience	  back	  home’	  (2012:	  210).	  As	  noted	  in	  chapter	  two	  of	  this	  thesis,	  opening	  
up	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  women	  is	  generally	  something	  that	  is	  seen	  as	  beneficial	  in	  
that	   it	   makes	   militaries	   ‘look	   modern’	   (Enloe	   2007:	   65).	   For	   the	   Norwegian	  
government,	   this	  has	  been	  a	  central	  concern	  as	  Former	  Defence	  Minister	  Anne	  
Grete	  Strøm	  Eriksen	  points	  to	  when	  she	  says	  that	  ‘both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  our	  
Armed	  Forces	  should	  be	  a	  showcase	  for	  our	  democratic	  political	  system	  based	  on	  
human	   rights,	   ethnic	   diversity	   and	   equality	   between	   the	   genders’	   (2007a).	   As	  
discussed	   towards	   the	  end	  of	   this	   chapter,	  while	   the	  deployment	  of	  FETs	  are	  a	  
means	  of	   ‘softening’	  the	  US	  military,	  it	  is	  questionable	  as	  to	  what	  extent	  it	  does	  
‘gender	  equality’	  within	  the	  armed	  forces	  any	  real	  favours.	  	  
These	   statements	  might	   suggest	   that	   the	   inclusion	   of	  women	   follows	   a	  wholly	  
instrumentalist	   logic	   (Jennings	   2011).	  Clearly,	   there	   is	   little	  doubt	   that	  many	  of	  
the	   arguments	   for	   FETs	   and	   integrating	   a	   ‘gender	   perspective’	   into	   military	  
operations	   follow	   an	   instrumentalist	   logic.	   However,	   as	   discussed	   in	   chapter	  
three,	   while	   this	   might	   well	   be	   the	   case,	   this	   thesis	   is	   interested	   in	   how	   this	  
happens,	   what	   it	   speaks	   to	   and	   what	   bodies	   it	   produces	   in	   its	   wake.	   In	   other	  
words,	  how	  these	  practices	  of	  war	  write	  women’s	  bodies.	  	  
To	   this	   end,	   the	   chapter	  makes	  use	   of	   three	   important	  US	  military	   guides	   and	  
regulations,	  in	  addition	  to	  several	  NATO	  documents.	  The	  US	  military	  documents	  
include	   the	   aforementioned	   FM	   3-­‐24	   (USArmy	   et	   al.	   2007),	   AR	   670-­‐1	   (the	   US	  
Army’s	   uniform	   and	   insignia	   regulation)	   (USArmy	   2012)	   and	   the	  Commander’s	  
Guide	  to	  FETs	  (CALL	  2011).	  The	  uniform	  and	  insignia	  regulation,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  
chapter	   two,	  contains	  detailed	  guidelines	  on	  the	  appearance	  of	  military	  bodies,	  
and	   regulates	   these	   bodies	   to	   appear	   appropriately	   masculine	   and	   feminine,	  
while	   conforming	   to	   uniformed	   standards.	   Its	   357	   pages	  were	   recently	   revised,	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tightening	   up	   regulations	   on	   tattoos,	   cosmetics	   and	  makeup	   and	   hairstyles,	   to	  
name	  a	   few	  (ArmyTimes	  2012).	  The	  Commander’s	  Guide	   to	   FETs	   is	   the	   first	  US	  
Army	  document	  that	  details	   training	   for	  FETs	  and	   is	   intended	  for	  commanders	  
and	   staff	   as	   a	   ‘living	   document’	   that	   acts	   as	   an	   introduction,	   justification	   and	  
explanation	   of	   FETs.	   It	   is	   produced	   by	   the	   Centre	   for	   Army	   Lessons	   Learned	  
(CALL)	  and	  is	  a	  roughly	  120	  page	  long	  guide	  that	  includes	  detailed	  information	  as	  
to	  composition,	   recruitment	  and	  requirements	  of	  FETs,	   including	  annexes	  with	  
examples	   of	   anything	   from	   recruitment	   posters,	   mission	   and	   organisation,	  
packing	   lists	   and	  volunteer	   statement	  examples.	  NATO	  documents	   include	   the	  
Secretary	  General’s	  NATO	  Briefing	  on	  Women,	  Peace,	  and	  Security	  (NATO	  2010b),	  
How	   can	   gender	   make	   a	   difference	   in	   security	   operations?	   (NATO	   2011b),	  
Recommendations	   on	   implementing	   UNSCR	   1325	   (NATO	   2009b).	   These	   are	   all	  
examples	   of	   how	   laws	   and	   regulations	   are	   written	   on	   the	   body	   and	   how	   ‘law	  
“takes	  hold	  of”	  bodies	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  its	  text’	  (De	  Certeau	  1984:	  139).	  In	  
other	  words,	  these	  are	  texts	  that	  call	  particular	  gendered	  bodies	  into	  being.	  
	  
2.0	  Creating	  Potential	  Allies	  
The	  Commander’s	  Guide	  places	  FETs	  in	  a	  longer	  history	  and	  argues	  that	  ‘women	  
have	  exerted	  varying	  degrees	  of	   influence	  on	  men	  throughout	  history’	  and	  that	  
‘various	  military	   forces	   have	   learned	   this	   lesson’	   (CALL	   2011:	   2).	   The	   examples	  
chosen	   to	   explain	   ‘FET	   history’	   are	   interesting.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   of	   the	   Persian	  
King	   Xerxes	   who	   ‘took	   advice	   from	   his	   Queen’	   which	   purportedly	   ‘prevented	  
mass	   genocide’.	   Since	   ‘we	   are	   still	   in	   Persia’	   and	   ‘conversations	   still	   go	   on	  
between	  men	  and	  women	  behind	   closed	  doors’	   ‘we’	   need	   ‘to	  understand	   those	  
conversations	   and	   more	   importantly	   how	   we	   may	   be	   able	   to	   influence	   these	  
conversations’	   (CALL	   2011:	   2).	   Just	   like	   Xerxes	   listened	   to	   his	   Queen,	   the	   US	  
military	   is	   now	   positioning	   Afghan	   women	   where	   they	   can	   be	   listened	   to.	   In	  
other	  words,	  the	  practice	  of	  FETs	  claims	  Afghan	  women’s	  embodied	  experiences	  
and	   knowledge	   as	   important	   for	   the	   ‘success’	   of	   its	   operation.	  Hence,	   it	  writes	  
them	  as	  potential	  allies.	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The	  more	  recent	  example	  of	   ‘FET	  history’	  comes	  from	  France’s	  colonial	  warfare	  
in	  Algeria	  between	  1954	  and	  1962.	  This	  example	  is	  particularly	  telling	  in	  terms	  of	  
furthering	  a	   reading	  of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  as	  driven	   in	  part	  
by	   a	   biopolitical	   logic.	   The	  Commander’s	   Guide	   argues	   that	   the	   use	   of	   ‘female	  
engagements’	   through	   ‘Equipes	  Medico-­‐Sociales	   Itinérantes’	   (EMSI)	   to	   ‘support	  
pacification	   efforts…engage	   with	   Algerian	   women	   to	   enhance	   their	   living	  
conditions	   and	   to	   improve	   France’s	   reputation’	   was	   ‘one	   of	   the	   most	   efficient	  
ways	   to	   engage	   the	   population’	   and	   the	   ‘large	   numbers	   of	   Muslim	   Algerian	  
women	  who	  integrated	  into	  the	  EMSI	  program	  showed	  the	  relevance	  and	  success	  
of	  the	  concept’	  (CALL	  2011:	  3).	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  US	  military	  references	  the	  EMSI	  
as	   a	   part	   of	   FET	   history	   and	   as	   one	   of	   the	   historical	   examples	   that	   shows	   the	  
importance	  of	  engagement	  with	  local	  women	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  surprising	  since	  it	  so	  
unequivocally	  links	  US	  warfare	  in	  Afghanistan	  with	  colonial	  warfare.	  As	  noted	  in	  
the	   previous	   chapter,	   counterinsurgency	   has	   long	   been	   the	   colonial	  warfare	   of	  
choice	   for	   imperial	   forces	   (McBride	   and	  Wibben	   2012,	   Feichtinger	   et	   al.	   2012),	  
and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  FETs	  so	  clearly	  situates	  itself	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  
this	  history	  is	  noteworthy.	  	  
The	  French	  EMSI	  teams	  aimed	  to	  win	  local	  women	  to	  the	  French	  colonial	  cause	  
through	  hygiene,	  housekeeping	  and	  childrearing	  workshops	  (Lazreg	  2008:	   148),	  
all	  efforts	  that	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  biopolitical	  management	  and	  governing	  of	  
the	  population.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  combating	  the	  use	  of	  veils	  was	  a	  
central	   part	   of	   French	   ‘gendered	  warfare’	   in	  Algeria	   (Fanon	   1980).	   EMSI	   teams	  
preached	  that	  ridding	  the	  country	  of	  veils	  was	  ‘on	  par	  with	  getting	  rid	  of	  “flies”,	  
“ticks”	  and	  “lice”’	  (Lazreg	  2008:	   148)74.	  The	  French	  government’s	  policy	  towards	  
Algeria	  saw	  women’s	  development	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	   its	  mission	  civilisatrice.	  	  
‘[P]rotecting	  colonial	  women	  from	  their	  own	  society	  served	  as	  an	  illustration	  of	  
the	   humanitarian	   aims	   of	   colonial	   war’	   (Feichtinger	   et	   al.	   2012:	   41).	   Pre-­‐
deployment,	   the	   EMSI	   staff	   were	   warned	   against	   having	   ‘empathy’	   with	   the	  
                                                
74	  Overall,	   the	   importance	   of	   getting	   rid	   of	   ‘lice,	   ticks	   and	   fleas’	   speaks	   to	   broader	   biopolitical	  
intent.	  While	  this	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  efforts	  such	  as	  these	  
can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  medicalization	  of	  security.	  Adding	  to	  the	  already	  extensive	  list	  of	  what	  is	  
deemed	   security	   threats	   are	   also	   the	   spread	  of	  disease,	   aided	  by	  poor	  hygiene	   (see	   for	   instance	  
Elbe	  2010).	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impoverished	   conditions	   of	   the	   locals.	   It	   was	   feared	   that	   this	   may	   detract	  
attention	   from	   the	   ‘real	   objective’	   which	   was	   to	   ‘collect	   information	   on	   their	  
subjects,	   identify	   potential	   allies,	   disseminate	   government	   directives,	   and	   sell	  
colonial	   ideology	   through	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   role	   of	   women	   in	   native	   society’	  
(Lazreg	  2008:	  147).	  The	  	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  warfare	  fought	  in	  
Afghanistan	  today	  is	  a	   ‘remarkable	  (indeed	  disturbingly)	  similar	  mission	  to	  that	  
of	   the	   late-­‐colonial	   warrior:	   to	   construct	   a	   civil-­‐military	   war	   machine	   using	   a	  
complex	   combination	   of	   scholarly	   guidance,	   development	   expertise	   and	   both	  
metropolitan	  and	  local	  military	  forces’	  (Feichtinger	  et	  al.	  2012:	  37).	  	  
	  
2.1	  Women	  as	  Eyes	  and	  Ears	  
While	  FETs	  are	  a	  relatively	  recent	  addition	  to	  the	  counterinsurgency	  toolkit,	  the	  
necessity	   to	   have	   female	   soldiers	   perform	   certain	   duties	   because	   of	   ‘culture’	   is	  
recognized	   in	   FM	   3-­‐24	   under	   the	   heading	   ‘Engage	   the	   Women,	   Be	   Cautious	  
Around	  the	  Children’,	  which	  reads,	  	  
‘Most	  insurgent	  fighters	  are	  men.	  However,	  in	  traditional	  societies,	  women	  are	  hugely	  influential	  
in	   forming	   the	   social	   networks	   that	   insurgents	   use	   for	   support.	  When	   women	   support	   COIN	  
efforts,	   families	   support	   COIN	   efforts.	   Getting	   the	   support	   of	   families	   is	   a	   big	   step	   towards	  
mobilizing	   the	   local	   populace	   against	   the	   insurgency.	   Co-­‐opting	   neutral	   or	   friendly	   women	  
through	  targeted	  social	  and	  economic	  programs	  builds	  networks	  of	  enlightened	  self-­‐interest	  that	  
eventually	   undermine	   insurgents.	   Female	   counterinsurgents,	   including	   interagency	   people,	   are	  
required	  to	  do	  this	  effectively’	  (2007:	  296).	  
This	  article	  is	  almost	  identical	  to	  article	  19	  in	  Kilcullen’s	  Twenty-­‐Eight	  Articles	  on	  
the	   Fundamentals	   of	   Company-­‐level	   Counterinsurgency	   (2006b)75,	   albeit,	   with	  
                                                
75	  Kilcullen’s	   articles	   should	   be	   seen	   in	   relation	   to	   T.E.	   Lawrence’s	   aka	   ‘Lawrence	   of	   Arabia’s’	  
famous	  Twenty	   Seven	   Articles	   (Lawrence	   1917).	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   titles	   being	   similar,	  Gonzales	  
points	  out	  that	  several	  of	  the	  articles	  include	  comparable	  concerns.	  For	  instance,	  where	  Lawrence	  
writes	   ‘Go	  easy	   for	   the	   first	   few	  weeks.	  A	  bad	   start	   is	  difficult	   to	  atone	   for,	   and	   the	  Arabs	   form	  
their	   judgments	  on	  externals	  that	  we	  ignore.	  When	  you	  have	  reached	  the	  inner	  circle	  in	  a	  tribe,	  
you	   can	   do	   as	   you	   please	   with	   yourself	   and	   them’;	   Kilcullen	   writes,	   ‘Do	   not	   try	   to	   crack	   the	  
hardest	  nut	  first.	  Do	  not	  go	  straight	  for	  the	  main	  insurgent	  stronghold	  or	  try	  to	  take	  on	  villages	  
that	   support	   insurgents.	   Instead,	   start	   from	   secure	   areas	   and	  work	   gradually	   outwards.	   Extend	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some	  notable	  differences.	  For	  instance,	  where	  it	  reads	  ‘Female	  counterinsurgents,	  
including	   interagency	   people	   are	   required	   to	   do	   this	   effectively’,	   the	   original	  
states	   ‘You	   need	   your	   own	   female	   counterinsurgents,	   including	   inter-­‐agency	  
people,	   to	  do	   this	  effectively’	   (Kilcullen	  2006b:	   137).	  The	  change	   is	  no	  doubt	   in	  
part	  an	  attempt	  to	  ‘clean	  up’	  the	  language,	  but	  nevertheless,	  the	  original	  signifies	  
something	  important	  beyond	  this.	  In	  the	  original,	  the	  counterinsurgency	  soldier	  
is	  originally	  male,	  and	  he	  is	  the	  referent	  object	  of	  the	  articles.	  He	  needs	  to	  ensure	  
that	  he	   has	  his	   own	   female	   counterinsurgents	   in	  order	   to	   complete	   the	   task	  of	  
gathering	  valuable	   intelligence,	   ‘turning’	   local	  women	  to	  the	  counterinsurgents’	  
cause,	   and	   entering	   into	   spaces	   where	   male	   counterinsurgents	   may	   find	   it	  
difficult	   to	   enter	   without	   garnering	   substantial	   antagonism	   from	   the	   local	  
population.	  From	  the	  outset	  then,	  women	  are	  not	  considered	  the	  referent	  object	  
of	   counterinsurgency	   doctrine,	   nor	   are	   female	   soldiers	   necessarily	   regarded	  
primarily	  as	  soldiers,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
Matt	  Pottinger,	  who	   initiated	  one	  of	   the	   first	   FETs	   in	  Afghanistan,	   argues	   that	  
there	  are	  certain	  myths	  about	  the	  usefulness	  of	  speaking	  to	  Afghan	  women	  and	  
of	   including	   more	   women	   in	   counterinsurgency	   operations	   that	   need	   to	   be	  
dispelled.	   Contrary	   to	   the	   ‘conventional	   wisdom’	   of	   US	   military	   officers	   that	  
Afghan	   women	   ‘don’t	   have	   enough	   influence	   or	   knowledge	   to	   make	   valuable	  
allies’,	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   found	   that	   they	   ‘wield	   more	   influence	   in	   their	   homes	   –	  
including	  over	  their	  husbands	  and	  their	  sons	  –	  than	  people	  uninitiated	  in	  Afghan	  
family	  culture	  believe	  to	  be	  the	  case’	  (Pottinger	  et	  al.	  2010:	  2).	  Importantly,	  ‘they	  
know	  who	  is	  doing	  what,	  who	  should	  and	  should	  not	  be	  in	  the	  area’	  (Pottinger	  et	  
al.	  2010:	  2).	  Another	  proponent	  of	  FETs	  argues	  that	  ‘Westerners	  often	  think	  that	  
Afghan	  women	  are	  powerless,	  not	  only	  because	  of	  cultural	  constraints	  but	  also	  
because	   Afghan	   men	   do	   not	   support	   rights	   or	   opportunities	   for	   women.	   This	  
generally	  isn’t	  the	  case’	  (Holliday	  2012:	  91).	  Of	  course,	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  and	  
activists	   argued	   for	   years	   that	   the	  notion	  of	  Afghan	  women	  solely	   as	   victims	   is	  
deeply	   reductionist	   and	   negates	   important	   social	   and	   historical	   contingencies	  
                                                                                                                                          
influence	   through	   the	   local	   people’s	   networks.	   Go	   with,	   not	   against,	   the	   grain	   of	   the	   local	  
populace’	  (Lawrence	  and	  Kilcullen	  quoted	  in	  Gonzalez	  2007:	  16)	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(Brodsky	  2003,	  Daulatzai	  2006,	  Rostami-­‐Povey	  2007).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  practice	  
of	  FETs	  requires	  a	  repositioning	  of	  Afghan	  women	  in	  their	  society,	  from	  passive	  
victims	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  to	  influential	  in	  and	  knowledgeable	  about	  
their	   local	   communities.	   The	   necessity	   to	   point	   this	   out	   and	   to	   emphasise	   it	  
(Pottinger	  et	  al.	  2010,	  Holliday	  2012),	  speaks	  	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  discourse	  that	  
equated	   Afghan	   women	   to	   passive	   victimhood	   that	   was	   discussed	   in	   chapter	  
three.	  	  
The	  meetings	  that	  FETs	  have	  with	   local	  women	  are	   intended	  not	  only	  to	   ‘hand	  
out	  school	  supplies	  and	  medicine,	  drink	  tea	  and	  make	  conversation’.	  Ideally,	  they	  
will	   also	   result	   in	   FETs	   getting	   ‘information	   about	   the	   village,	   local	   grievances	  
and	  the	  Taliban’	  (Bumiller	  2010c).	  As	  a	  head	  FET	  officer-­‐in-­‐charge	  puts	  it	   ‘Their	  
primary	  purpose	  is	  intelligence	  gathering	  from	  Afghan	  women’	  (Stadtlander	  2011).	  
Since	   counterinsurgency	   needs	   to	   rest	   on	   ‘a	   firm	   foundation	   of	   energetic	   IO’	  
(Kilcullen	   2009	   :	   60)	   the	   belief	   is	   that	   deploying	   FETs	   potentially	   opens	   up	   a	  
wealth	  of	  information	  that	  is	  just	  waiting	  to	  be	  discovered.	  One	  Marine	  explains	  
that	  on	  several	  occasions	  the	  FETs	  got	  ‘different	  and	  better	  information’	  than	  the	  
male	   soldiers	   (Hlad	   2012).	   In	   the	   NATO/NCGP	   document	   entitled	   How	   can	  
gender	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  security	  operations?	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  FETs	  can	  ‘exploit	  
gender	  norms	   towards	  achieving	  a	  desired	  end’.	  They	   can	  get	   information	   that	  
would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  lost,	  which	  has	  included	  ‘details	  about	  the	  identities	  
of	  Taliban	  supporters’	  (NATO	  2011b:	  29).	  	  
As	   noted	   in	   chapters	   two	   and	   four,	   the	   dynamic	   of	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’	   in	  
‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  manifests	  itself	  in	  different	  ways.	  While	  it	  
can	  at	  times	  be	  said	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  two,	  a	  balancing	  act	  
or	   a	   hierarchy,	   as	   shown	   in	   chapter	   four	   the	   ‘clear,	   hold,	   build’	   strategy	   of	  
counterinsurgency	  expects	  a	   linear	  development	  where	   the	   ‘killing’	  or	   ‘clearing’	  
enables	  the	  ‘caring’	  of	  ‘hold	  and	  build’.	  In	  this	  context	  and	  in	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
importance	  of	  deploying	  FETs	  as	   seekers	  of	   intelligence,	   the	  dynamic	   seems	   to	  
work	   the	   other	   way	   around.	   The	   ‘caring’	   of	   FETs	   through	   their	   ‘social	   work’	  
engagement	   with	   local	   women	   is	   expected	   to	   provide	   them	   with	   valuable	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information	  about	   the	  Taliban,	   the	  primary	   targets	   for	   ‘killing’.	   In	  other	  words,	  
the	  complex	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  is	  such	  that,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  ‘caring’	  
perhaps	  enables	  the	  ‘killing’.	  	  
The	   providers	   of	   this	   valuable	   information	   are	   Afghan	   women	   and	   the	  
Commander’s	  Guide	  tells	  us	  that,	  
‘Men,	   women,	   and	   children	   are	   part	   of	   the	   triangle	   of	   knowledge	   that	   must	   be	   targeted	   for	  
information	   collection.	   In	   Afghanistan,	   we	   observe	   rather	   consistent	   themes.	   Men	   interpret	  
information	  and	  tell	  you	  what	  they	  think	  you	  want	  to	  hear.	  Women	  see	  and	  hear	  what	  goes	  on	  
behind	  the	  walls’	  (CALL	  2011:	  1).	  
Some	  of	   the	   imagery	  used	   to	  depict	   this	  kind	  of	   ‘triangulated	   information’	   and	  
the	  ‘human	  terrain’	  is	  very	  interesting76.	  Firstly,	  the	  image	  is	  a	  very	  embodied	  one,	  
representing	  the	  ‘human	  terrain’	  or	  the	  ‘body	  politic’	  as	  a	  body	  (albeit	  as	  a	  ‘stick	  
man’).	   It	   shows	  how	  women	  are	   the	   ‘eyes	  and	  ears’	  of	   the	  population,	   the	  men	  
are	  the	   ‘mouth’	  and	  the	  children	  are	  the	  feet.	   In	  this	  sense	  the	  image	  speaks	  to	  
the	  public/private	  distinction	  in	  that	  it	  represents	  women	  as	  those	  that	  hear	  and	  
see	  what	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  private,	  ‘behind	  the	  walls’.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  information	  that	  
is	  important	  to	  harness,	  this	  is	  the	  information	  that	  is	  valuable.	  	  
The	   valuable	   information	   that	   Afghan	   women	   have	   is	   also	   central	   in	   NATO’s	  
integration	   of	   a	   ‘gender	   perspective’.	   Several	   times	   in	   the	  NATO	   Briefing	   it	   is	  
mentioned	   how	   the	   information	   that	   Afghan	   women	   share	   with	   NATO	   is	  
important.	  It	  is	  noted	  that	  the	  interaction	  between	  ‘female	  officers’	  and	  ‘women	  
in	  the	  local	  community’	  can	  lead	  to	  ‘timely	  information	  being	  shared	  on	  critical	  
security	   situations’	   and	   that	   ‘beyond	   rights,	   it	   is	   smart	   to	   let	   [Afghan	  women]	  
participate’	  (NATO	  2010b:	  4-­‐5).	  Here,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  deploying	  FETs	  in	  the	  US	  
military,	  the	  case	  is	  made	  that	  Afghan	  women	  should	  be	  included	  because	  they	  
have	  important	  information	  that	  can	  prove	  useful	  to	  the	  operation.	  	  
                                                
76	  Please	  see	  the	  following	  webpage	  for	  images	  and	  power	  point	  slides.	  The	  discussion	  refers	  to	  
slide	  number	  5:	  http://openanthropology.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/comisaf.pdf	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This	  reframing	  of	  Afghan	  women,	  from	  being	  passive	  victims	  in	  need	  of	  rescue,	  
as	   was	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   three,	   to	   being	   seen	   as	   possessing	   valuable	  
information	   and	   being	   crucial	   actors	   in	   their	   families	   and	   communities	   is	  
significant.	  It	  implies	  not	  only	  that	  Afghan	  women	  are	  granted	  a	  position	  where	  
they	  can	  be	   listened	  to;	   it	  also,	  as	  argued	   in	   the	  next	  section,	   implies	   that	   they	  
can	  be	  transformed.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Armed	  Empowerment	  
The	   invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	   in	  2001	  was	  preceded	  and	   followed	  by	  a	  particular	  
vision	  of	  who	  Afghan	  women	  were	  and	  who	  they	  could	  become.	  As	  discussed	  in	  
chapter	  three,	  the	  invasion	  was	  steeped	  in	  a	  gendered	  discourse	  that	  framed	  the	  
invasion	   as	   an	   exercise	   in	   feminist	   liberation	   through	   war	   (see	   among	   others	  
Abu-­‐Lughod	   2002,	  Weber	   2005,	   Shepherd	   2006,	  Hunt	   and	  Rygiel	   2006,	  Khalid	  
2011).	  This	  discourse	  involved	  not	  only	  justifications	  of	  the	  war	  being	  ‘for	  women’,	  
but	  crucially	  required	  a	  self-­‐representation	  of	  the	  West	  as	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  
save	   (Young	   2003b).	   It	   therefore	   reiterated	   what	   Spivak	   argues	   defines	   neo-­‐
colonial	  practices	  of	  the	  West	  -­‐	  that	  ‘White	  men	  are	  saving	  brown	  women	  from	  
brown	  men’	  (1999:	  303).	  	  
However,	  as	  shown	  above,	  Afghan	  women’s	  bodies	  are	  no	  longer	  solely	  related	  to	  
passive	  victimhood,	  or	  represented	  as	  the	  silent	  and	  (in)visible	  body	  in	  the	  burqa.	  
Afghan	  women’s	  bodies	  are	  written	  differently	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  counterinsurgency.	  
In	   exchange	   for	   ‘targeted	   social	   and	   economic	   programs’	   (USArmy	   et	   al.	   2007:	  
296)	   they	   are	   expected	   to	   share	   their	   local	   and	   embodied	   knowledge.	   FM	   3-­‐25	  
tells	  us	  that	  ‘When	  women	  support	  COIN	  efforts,	  families	  support	  COIN	  efforts’	  
(USArmy	  et	  al.	  2007:	  296).	  The	  realisation	  of	  this	  is	  argued	  by	  advocates	  for	  FETs	  
to	   be	   ‘imperative’	   to	   ‘winning	   the	   war	   against	   terrorism	   in	   Afghanistan’,	   and	  
through	  the	  deployment	  of	  FETs	  ‘the	  U.S.	  military	  may	  gain	  a	  unique	  advantage	  
in	  demonstrating	  to	  the	  local	  population	  that	  America’s	  mission	  in	  Afghanistan	  
is	   not	   necessarily	   antithetical	   to	   preserving	   Afghani	   [sic]	   cultural	   integrity’	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(Faltas	  2011:	  102).	  The	  practice	  of	  FETs	  therefore	  enables	  the	  US	  not	  only	  to	  gain	  
valuable	  intelligence,	  but	  also	  to	  do	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  shows	  ‘cultural	  sensitivity’.	  	  
As	  discussed	   in	  chapter	   four,	  Kilcullen	   sees	   counterinsurgency	  as	   ‘armed	  social	  
work’	   (Kilcullen	  2006b:	   138).	  However,	   through	   the	  deployment	  of	  FETs	   it	   also	  
attempts	  to	  cast	  itself	  as,	  what	  I	  here	  call	  ‘armed	  empowerment’.	  FM	  3-­‐24	  holds	  
an	  expectation	  that	  the	  engagement	  with	  Afghan	  women	  will	  yield	  benefits	  not	  
only	   to	   the	   war	   effort	   in	   terms	   of	   gaining	   better	   intelligence	   and	   fostering	  
relations	   with	   the	   local	   population,	   but	   to	   individual	   Afghan	   women	   as	   well.	  
Provided	  that	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  potential	  allies	  in	  the	  war,	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  
that	   they	   can	   transform	   the	   societies	   they	   live	   in	   through	   the	   influence	   they	  
wield	  in	  their	  respective	  communities	  and	  families.	  FM	  3-­‐24	  tells	  us	  that	  Afghan	  
women	  can	  become	   ‘enlightened	   self-­‐interested	  beings’,	   if	   they	  are	   ‘friendly’	  or	  
‘neutral’	   (USArmy	  et	  al.	   2007:	  296).	   It	   is	  not	  necessarily	   clear	  what	   ‘friendly’	  or	  
‘neutral’	  means,	  and	  disregarding	  the	  patronizing	  assumption	  that	   they	  are	  not	  
already	  ‘enlightened’,	  one	  is	  left	  to	  wonder	  what	  becoming	  ‘enlightened’	  implies.	  	  	  
That	  the	  US	  military	   is	  developing	  a	  keener	   interest	   in	  Afghan	  women	  through	  
the	   deployment	   of	   FETs	   is	   often	   characterized	   as	   a	   ‘progressive’	   step	   both	   for	  
women	  as	  ‘practitioners’	  and	  ‘targets’	  of	  counterinsurgency77.	  Counterinsurgents	  
should	  understand	  that	  on	  a	  tactical	   level	  they	  can	   ‘positively	   influence	  men	  in	  
patriarchal	   society’	   and	   one	   Sergeant	   states	   that	   ‘we	   want	   to	   empower	   the	  
women	  to	  the	  point	  where	  they	  can	  have	  a	  positive	  influence	  on	  the	  men,	  when	  
they’re	  alone,	  in	  the	  home’	  (Loftus	  2008:	  15-­‐16).	  As	  Sasha	  Mehra	  argues,	  ‘there	  is	  a	  
space	  for	  the	  U.S.	  military	  to	  insert	  itself	  in	  the	  community-­‐level	  discourse’	  and,	  
if	   done	   correctly,	   the	   counterinsurgency	   forces	   ‘can	   leverage	   the	   community	  
discourse	  to	  build	  the	  trust	  of	  Afghan	  women’	  (2010:	  19).	  The	  Commander’s	  Guide	  
explains	  that	  part	  of	  the	  rationale	  behind	  FETs	  is	  to	  ‘empower	  [Afghan	  women]	  
                                                
77	  For	   instance,	   a	   report	   from	   a	   large	   international	   conference	   in	   Copenhagen	   in	   2010,	   entitled	  
‘The	  Role	  of	  Women	   in	  Global	  Security’	  concluded	  that	   ‘the	  existence	  of	   such	  teams	  recognizes	  
the	  importance	  of	  local	  women’s	  perspectives	  and	  their	  influence	  on	  local	  situations,	  to	  which	  the	  
all-­‐male	   forces	   in	   these	   cultures	  have	   limited	  or	  no	   access’	   (Norville	   2011:	   4,	   	   see	   also	  Ellingsen	  
2013).	  Furthermore,	  many	  of	  the	  articles	  that	  argue	  for	  expanding	  the	  role	  of	  FETs	  have	  ‘feminist	  
alluding’	   titles	   that	  speak	  to	   this	  being	  seen	  as	  a	   ‘progressive’	   step	  (Loftus	  2008,	  Pottinger	  et	  al.	  
2010,	  Mehra	  2010).	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to	  have	  a	  voice	  and	  ownership	  in	  solutions	  for	  problems	  in	  their	  families,	  villages	  
and	   country’	   (CALL	   2011:	   2).	   That	   said,	   there	   is	   recognition	   that	   this	   is	   a	   slow	  
process	  and	  since	  ‘rural	  Afghanistan	  is	  still	  a	  medieval	  society,	  development	  will	  
have	  to	  come	  in	  stages’	  (CALL	  2011:	  78).	  	  
Regardless	   of	   the	   effectiveness	   or	   substantial	   impact	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   ‘armed	  
empowerment’ 78 ,	   the	   belief	   that	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   has	  
transformational	  potential	  is	  written	  into	  its	  very	  doctrine,	  through	  FM	  3-­‐24.	  It	  is	  
also	   a	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   trend	   associated	   with	   the	   shift	   to	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency,	   with	   a	   ‘functional	   integration	   of	   destruction	   and	  
development,	  of	  military	  and	  civil	  forces’	  which	  together	  form	  a	   ‘transformative	  
invasion’	   (Feichtinger	   et	   al.	   2012:	   37).	   Through	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency,	  mediated	  by	  FETs,	  Afghan	  women	  can	  be	  transformed,	  away	  
from	   their	   current	   roles	   in	   their	   societies	   –	   to	   gain	   ‘enlightened	   self-­‐interest’.	  
They	  can	  be	  reshaped	  and	   ‘liberated’	   into	  understanding	  that	  the	  US	  forces	  are	  
there	   for	   their	   benefit	   and	   subsequently	   use	   this	   ‘enlightened	   self	   interest’	   to	  
transform	   and	   reshape	   their	   societies.	   To	   achieve	   this,	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   inserts	   itself	   into	   the	   private	   spheres	   where	   ‘women’	   dwell.	  
Since	  ‘local	  women	  raise	  future	  generations	  and	  exercise	  strong	  influence	  in	  the	  
family,	   including	   on	   their	   husbands’	   those	  with	   ‘positive	   attitudes	   towards	   the	  
Afghan	   government	   and	   ISAF	  will	   influence	   the	   perceptions	   of	   their	   sons	   and	  
daughters’	   (Haugegaard	   2010).	  What	   kind	   of	   influence	  women	  wield	   alongside	  
their	   men	   ‘when	   they’re	   alone,	   in	   the	   home’	   (Loftus	   2008:	   15-­‐16)	   therefore	  
becomes	   something	   that	   counterinsurgency	   is	   concerned	  with.	   As	  Miemi	   Byrd	  
and	   Gretchen	   Decker,	   warn	   -­‐	   ‘since	   women	   in	  most	   societies	   are	   traditionally	  
responsible	  for	  passing	  on	  the	  cultural	  expectations	  of	  their	  communities	  to	  their	  
children,	  women	  become	  vehicles	  for	  transmitting	  norms	  of	  violence,	  radicalism,	  
                                                
78	  Jonathan	   Gilmore	   warns	   that	   ‘the	   use	   of	   human	   security-­‐like	   principles	   and	   the	   concern	   for	  
local	   engagement	   and	   cultural	   sensitivity	   do	   not	   automatically	   equate	   to	   the	   genuine	  
empowerment	   of	   local	   populations	   in	   shaping	   the	   future	   of	   their	   country’	   (2011:	   22).	   Likewise,	  
Sippi	   Azarbaijani-­‐Moghaddam	   argues	   that	   ‘crude	   and	   unsophisticated	   methods,	   such	   as	   badly	  
designed	   and	   implemented	   projects	   to	   combat	  Taliban	   efforts	   on	   the	   non-­‐kinetic	   front,	   to	  win	  
hearts	  and	  minds,	  to	  ensure	  force	  protection,	  or	  to	  win	  support	  for	  the	  Afghan	  government,	  are	  
not	  currently	  helping	  build	  credibility	  and	  trust’	  (2008:	  66).	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and	   martyrdom’	   (2008:	   99).	   	   Hence,	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	  
needs	  to	  concern	  itself	  with	  the	  most	  intimate	  parts	  of	  life,	  the	  lessons	  taught	  to	  
children	  and	  the	  conversations	  had	  with	  husbands.	  	  
As	  the	  Commander’s	  Guide	  explains,	  the	  ‘desired	  end	  states	  are	  four	  fold’	  –	  	  
‘For	   women	   to	   influence	   families/communities	   not	   to	   support	   the	   Taliban;	   for	   women	   to	  
influence	  other	  women	  to	  demand	  basic	  services	  from	  the	  local	  government	  with	  coalition	  force	  
support;	   for	   women	   to	   influence	   family	   and	   community	   members	   to	   support	   GIRoA;	   and	   for	  
women	  not	  to	  support/enable	  the	  insurgency’	  (CALL	  2011:	  2)	  
	  
3.0	  A	  Woman’s	  Touch	  to	  Counterinsurgency	  
How	   is	   this	   all	   to	   be	   achieved?	  What	   kinds	   of	   gendered	  bodies	   are	   called	   into	  
being	  to	  do	  this	  part	  of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency?	  What	  gendered	  
performances	  does	   it	   require?	  As	  discussed	  theoretically	   in	  chapter	   two,	  bodies	  
are	   targets	   for	   mechanisms	   of	   power	   (Foucault	   1991:	   155),	   they	   are	   called	   into	  
being	  and	  disciplined	  through	  various	  regulations	  and	  technologies.	  In	  the	  case	  
of	  FETs,	  these	  bodies	  gendered	  in	  particular	  ways	  to	  suit	  the	  mission.	  
As	  discussed	   above,	   and	   in	   chapters	   two	   and	   four,	   counterinsurgency	   operates	  
both	   in	   the	   registry	   of	   death	   and	   the	   registry	   of	   life	   through	   the	   dynamic	   of	  
‘killing	   and	   caring’.	   In	   that	   sense	   it	   practices	   both	   classical	   and	   biopolitical	  
conceptions	   of	   sovereignty	   (Foucault	   1997,	   Foucault	   1998,	   Weber	   2008a).	  
Chapter	   four	   showed	   how	   classical	   sovereignty	   is	   regularly	   performed	   in	  
counterinsurgency,	   and	   visible	   in	   the	   still	   privileged	   position	   that	   combat	   and	  
killing	  has	  for	  soldiers.	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  six,	  this	  is	  also	  central	  in	  the	  training	  
of	   the	  ANA.	  However,	   counterinsurgency	   is	   also	   ‘armed	   social	  work’	   (Kilcullen	  
2006b:	   138),	   and,	   as	   shown	   in	   chapter	   four,	   while	   several	   male	   soldiers	   and	  
‘soldier-­‐scholars’	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  ‘caring’	  of	  counterinsurgency,	  
the	   dynamic	   between	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’	   takes	   on	   particular	   gendered	   and	  
embodied	  dimensions	  through	  the	  deployment	  of	  FETs.	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3.1	  A	  Feminine	  Labour	  of	  Care	  
As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   two	   of	   this	   thesis,	   performances	   of	   masculinity	   and	  
femininity	   do	   not	   necessarily	   follow	   the	   male-­‐masculine	   and	   female-­‐feminine	  
binary.	   Rather,	   military	   masculinities	   are	   multiple	   and	   fluid	   (Higate	   2003b,	  
Higate	  and	  Henry	  2004,	  Duncanson	  2009,	  Henry	  2012),	  and	  are	  assigned	  to	  and	  
can	  be	  claimed	  by	  male	  and	  female	  bodies	  (Halberstam	  1998,	  Tasker	  2002).	  This	  
means	   that	  how	  women’s	  bodies	   are	  written	   in	   the	   ‘theatre	  of	  war’,	   and	   in	   the	  
military	  more	  broadly,	  is	  a	  complex	  balancing	  act	  between	  ensuring	  appropriate	  
feminine	   appearance	   and	   performances,	   while	   making	   sure	   that	   they	   remain	  
capable	  of	  performing	  traditional	  male	  tasks	  and	  physically	  heavy	  work.	  It	  is	  also	  
a	  process	   that	   requires	   considerable	  negotiation	  by	  women	  within	   the	  military	  
(Barrett	   2002).	   In	   other	   words,	   they	   must	   be	   ‘masculine	   enough’	   to	   pass	   as	  
soldiers,	  but	   ‘feminine	  enough’	  to	  pass	  as	  women.	  These	  concerns	  are	  therefore	  
all	   present	   in	   the	  writing	  of	  FETs	  bodies	   and	   their	   roles	   in	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	  as	  primarily	  carers,	  albeit	  as	  martial	  feminine	  bodies	  as	  a	  part	  
of	  recasting	  counterinsurgency	  as	  ‘armed	  social	  work’.	  	  
As	   discussed	   above,	   the	  US	  military	   and	  NATO	   claim	   that	   FETs	   are	   central	   to	  
intelligence	  gathering,	  for	  the	  individual	  and	  collective	  empowerment	  of	  Afghan	  
women,	   and	   for	   the	   acceptance	   of	   the	   allied	   forces	   more	   broadly.	   The	  
Commander’s	   Guide	   states	   that	   ‘when	  Afghans	   see	  U.S.	  military	   females	   in	   the	  
field,	  the	  civilian	  population	  become	  more	  accepting	  of	  the	  U.S.	  military	  in	  their	  
area’	  (CALL	  2011:	  60).	  Afghans	  reportedly	  view	  female	  soldiers	  very	  differently	  by	  
than	  their	  male	  counterparts	  -­‐	  ‘your	  men	  come	  to	  fight,	  but	  we	  know	  the	  women	  
are	  here	  to	  help’	  (Pottinger	  et	  al.	  2010:	  4).	  FETs	  are	  perceived	  as	  soldiers	  who	  care,	  
as	   opposed	   to	   soldiers	   who	   kill.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   statement,	   made	   by	   an	  
Afghan	  man	  and	  cited	  in	  Pottinger,	  speaks	  directly	  to	  the	  dynamic	  of	  this	  type	  of	  
counterinsurgency,	  between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  	  
Wanting	  to	   ‘empower’	  or	   ‘help’	  Afghan	  women	  surfaces	  as	  a	  key	  motivation	  for	  
several	  of	  the	  women	  who	  have	  signed	  up	  as	  FETs	  –	  ‘I	  think	  that	  women	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  freedom	  and	  Afghan	  women	  don’t.	  And	  I	  want	  to	  help	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in	   some	  way’	   (Lawrence	  2011).	  This	   view	   is	   seconded	  by	  one	  FET	  member	  who	  
claims	   that	   ‘the	   FET	   is	   a	   way	   to	   get	   the	   Afghan	   women’s	   voices	   heard’	  
(Pisachubbe	  2011).	  Another	  claims	  that	  ‘I	  think	  we	  give	  them	  hope.	  We	  are	  proof	  
that	   women	   can	   do	   anything	   we	   set	   our	   sights	   on’	   (NATO	   2011a).	   Overall,	   to	  
‘make	  a	  difference’	  is	  cited	  by	  several	  to	  be	  a	  key	  reason	  to	  volunteer	  to	  become	  a	  
FET	   (McCullough	   2012).	   FETs	   envisage	   and	   experience	   their	   mission	   as	  
contributing	   to	   the	   social,	   economic	   and	   personal	   empowerment	   of	   Afghan	  
women.	  This	  element	  is	  emphasised	  by	  NATO	  as	  well,	  with	  one	  Gender	  Advisor	  
explaining	  that	  ‘ISAF	  is	  playing	  such	  an	  important	  role	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  most	  
of	  the	  women	  are	  so	  happy	  we	  are	  there	  to	  help’	  (NATO	  2010b:	  5).	  
This	  sentiment,	  and	  notions	  of	  	  this	  feminine	  labour	  of	  care	  comes	  out	  strongly	  
in	  a	  roughly	  three	  minute	  video	  about	  the	  FETs	  from	  the	  White	  House	  website	  
entitled	  Female	   Engagement	   Teams:	   The	   Changing	   Face	   of	   the	  US	  Marines.	   It’s	  
introduced	   as	   ‘Meet	   the	   brave	   women	   who	   are	   on	   the	   ground,	   building	  
relationships	  in	  combat	  zones’	  (WhiteHouse	  2012).	  The	  film	  features	  four	  female	  
US	  Marines	  and	  Jill	  Biden,	  wife	  of	  Vice	  President	  Joe	  Biden,	  known	  as	  an	  active	  
supporter	   of	   military	   families	   and	   veterans.	   The	   film	   shows	   images	   of	   Afghan	  
children	   and	   women,	   either	   on	   their	   own,	   in	   a	   group,	   or	   together	   with	   FETs.	  
FETs	   show	   them	   how	   to	   wash	   their	   hands	   and	   put	   on	   Chap	   Stick,	   they	   hold	  
children	  and	  babies	  and	  they	  talk	  to	  children	  and	  women.	  These	  images	  are	  cross	  
cut	  with	  the	  FETs	  themselves	  speaking	  in	  a	  studio,	  and	  with	  Jill	  Biden	  explaining	  
what	  FETs	  do.	  	  
FETs	   explain	   that	   ‘we’re	   changing	   people’s	   lives’,	   ‘we	   can	   do	   great	   things’	   and	  
that	   by	   talking	   to	  women	   you	   ‘get	   that	   different	   story’.	   They	   talk	   of	   how	   they	  
found	  a	   ‘hidden	   talent’	   that	   they	  did	  not	  know	   they	  had	  before,	   and	   that	  FETs	  
constitute	   a	   ‘very	   big	   step	   for	   women	   in	   all	  military	   branches’.	   Biden	   explains	  
how	   they	   ‘help	   women	   with	   things	   that	   all	   American	   women	   are	   concerned	  
about,	   like	   healthcare.	   They	   help	   start	   businesses	   so	   women	   become	  
independent,	   they	   start	   schools…	   these	  women	   are	   a	  whole	   new	   generation	   of	  
pioneers.	  This	  is	  something	  we’ve	  not	  really	  seen	  in	  the	  military	  before’.	  One	  of	  
 152	  
the	   FETs	   states	   that	   ‘I	   don't	  want	   to	   be	   considered	   any	   different,	   a	  Marine’s	   a	  
Marine,	   but	   we	   are	   still	   able	   to	   do	   things	   that	   males	   aren’t	   able	   to	   do’	  
(WhiteHouse	  2012).	  	  
These	  are	  all	  statements	  that	  operate	  in	  the	  ‘register	  of	  life’	  and	  they	  are	  stories	  
about	   caring.	   They	   are	   far	   removed	   from	   the	   emphasis	   on	   killing	   and	   combat	  
that	  was	  discussed	   in	   relation	   to	   ‘warrior	  masculinity’	   in	   chapter	   four,	   yet	   they	  
still	   conform	   to	   the	   ethos	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency.	   As	  
McChrystal	   explains,	   ‘the	  whole	  point	  of	   the	  war	   is	   to	   take	   care	  of	  people,	  not	  
just	  to	  kill	  them’	  (McChrystal	  2013).	  	  
The	  Commanders	  Guide	  to	  FETs	  gives	  detailed	  guidelines	  on	  how	  to	  achieve	  this	  
caring,	  which	  in	  turn	  exemplifies	  the	  way	  that	  laws	  are	  ‘written	  on	  the	  body’	  (De	  
Certeau	  1984)	  and	  the	  production	  of	  women’s	  bodies	  in	  war.	  Three	  examples	  will	  
be	  given	  particular	  weight	  here	  –	  hairstyles	  and	  headscarves	  and	   the	  way	  FETs	  
behave	   when	   approaching	   homes	   –	   all	   of	   which	   not	   only	   discipline	   women’s	  
bodies	   in	   war,	   but	   also,	   crucially,	   act	   to	   construct	   them	   as	   cooperative,	   non-­‐
threatening	  and	  caring.	  	  
If	   the	   female	  counterinsurgents	  have	   long	  enough	  hair	   to	  have	   it	   in	  a	  ponytail,	  
they	  are	  encouraged	  to	  let	  these	  show	  out	  the	  back	  of	  their	  helmets	  (CALL	  2011:	  
75).	   Letting	   your	   long	   hair	   show,	   something	   that	   would	   perhaps	   under	   other	  
circumstances	   be	   deemed	   inappropriate	   or	   ineffective,	   is	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   an	   important	   visual	   clue	   that	   gives	   the	  
civilian	  population	  an	  assurance	  that	  this	   is	  a	  female	  soldier.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
‘pony	  tails	  could	  also	  be	  a	  target	  indicator	  for	  the	  Taliban’	  and	  given	  that	  female	  
soldiers	   are	   seen	   to	   be	   a	   particularly	   cherished	   targets	   for	   the	   Taliban,	   FETs	  
should	  wait	  until	   they	  are	   just	  outside	  a	  home	  before	   letting	   their	  ponytail	  out	  
(CALL	  2011:	  75).	  Headscarves	  work	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  While	  they	  are	  not	  deemed	  
strictly	  necessary,	  it	  is	  emphasised	  that	  ‘the	  moment	  the	  FET	  walks	  into	  a	  village	  
wearing	  headscarves	  and	  politely	  approaching	   local	   families,	   the	  FET	   is	  already	  
sending	   a	   powerful	   and	   positive	  message’	   (CALL	   2011:	   59).	   In	   other	  words,	   the	  
wearing	   of	   a	   headscarf	   signifies	   respect	   and	   acceptance	   of	   local	   traditions	   and	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shows	   ‘cultural	   sensitivity’.	   However,	   FETs	   should	   avoid	   brightly	   coloured	  
headscarves	  as	  they	  can	  ‘easily	  identify	  the	  soldier	  as	  female	  at	  a	  great	  distance’	  
and	  stick	  to	  ‘olive	  drab,	  black,	  brown	  or	  multicam’	  (CALL	  2011:	  76).	  Once	  inside	  a	  
home,	  they	  should	  ‘should	  take	  off	  their	  body	  armor,	  eye	  protection	  and	  helmets’	  
as	   a	   sign	   of	   good	   will,	   and	   these	   items	  might	   just	   act	   as	   an	   icebreaker	   and	   a	  
conversation	   topic	   (Pottinger	   et	   al.	   2010:	   7).	   FETs	   are	   also	   encouraged	   to	   tell	  
locals	  that	  they	  are	  married	  and	  have	  children	  (and	  to	  bring	  photos	  along),	  and	  
to	  tell	  them	  that	  male	  soldiers	  accompanying	  them	  are	  their	  brothers	  or	  cousins	  
-­‐	  ‘just	  make	  sure	  every	  Soldier	  knows	  the	  story’	  (CALL	  2011:	  77).	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  FETs’	  ability	  to	  speak	  with	  Afghan	  women	  and	  children,	  they	  are	  
also	  said	   to	  have	  a	  unique	  ability	   to	  engage	  with	  Afghan	  men.	  The	  presence	  of	  
FETs	  is	  seen	  to	  soothe	  the	  overall	  atmosphere	  and	  to	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  overall	  
aims	  of	   any	  operation	   (Pottinger	  et	   al.	   2010).	  This	   is	  worth	  noting,	   as	  women’s	  
bodies	  in	  the	  military	  have	  historically	  proven	  a	  challenge	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  their	  
bodies	   cannot	   be	   coded	   according	   to	   existing	   forms	   of	  military	  masculinity	   in	  
quite	  the	  same	  way	  as	  male’s	  bodies	  can	  (Tasker	  2002).	  	  
The	  Commander’s	   Guide	   discusses	   the	  ways	   that	   FETs	   can	   positively	   influence	  
operational	   effectiveness	   citing	   a	   range	   of	   issues	   as	   discussed	   above.	  However,	  
the	  impact	  they	  are	  claimed	  to	  have	  on	  Afghan	  men	  is	  noteworthy,	  	  
‘Many	  males	   feel	  comfortable	  speaking	  with	  female	  Soldiers.	  They	  find	  them	  to	  be	  an	  anomaly,	  
intriguing,	   and	   less	   threatening	   than	   male	   Soldiers.	   This	   is	   particularly	   true	   with	   adolescent	  
males…adolescent	  males	  have	  a	  natural	  desire	  to	   impress	   females.	  This	   is	   true	  regardless	  of	   the	  
adolescent	  male’s	  race	  or	  nationality.	  Using	  this	  desire	  to	  interact	  with	  and	  impress	  females	  can	  
be	  advantageous	  to	  U.S.	  military	  forces	  when	  done	  respectfully	  to	  both	  the	  female	  Soldier	  and	  the	  
adolescent	  Afghan	  males’	  (CALL	  2011:	  63).	  	  
This	  quote	  not	  only	  dictates	  a	  deeply	  problematic	  ‘natural’	  heterosexual	  desire	  to	  
all	   adolescent	   males	   (regardless	   of	   race	   or	   nationality),	   something	   that	   is	  
discussed	   further	   in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  but	   it	  also	  encourages	  the	  US	  military	   to	  
harness	  this	  desire	  to	  their	  advantage.	  The	  not	  so	  subtle	  insinuation	  that	  this	  is	  
about	   sexual	   desire	   is	  merely	   highlighted	  with	   the	   insert	   that	   this	   needs	   to	   be	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done	  ‘respectfully’.	  Hence,	  the	  assumed	  sexual	  desire	  of	  adolescent	  Afghan	  men	  
towards	   (predominantly)	   white	   Western	   women	   is	   something	   that	   the	   US	  
military	   should	   realize	   as	   an	   asset	   that	   can	   work	   to	   the	   advantage	   of	   the	   US	  
forces.	  	  
	  
3.2	  The	  Politics	  of	  Martial	  Femininity	  
As	  discussed	  above,	  women’s	  bodies	  have	  historically	  been	  difficult	  to	  discipline	  
and	  manage	  in	  militaries.	  As	  Enloe	  shows,	  women’s	  bodies	   in	  the	  military	  have	  
historically	   required	   a	   range	   of	   particular	   regulations,	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	  
they	   remain	   respectable	   and	   feminine,	   yet	   crucially	   to	   ensure	   they	   are	   not	  
mistaken	  for	  men	  (Enloe	  2000:	  261-­‐273).	  The	  managing	  of	  women’s	  bodies	  takes	  
on	  extraordinary	  details	   in	  AR	  670-­‐1.	  Lipstick	  and	  nail	  polish	  colours	  cannot	  be	  
‘unmilitary’,	   but	   must	   be	   ‘conservative’,	   in	   ‘good	   taste’	   and	   ‘compliment	   their	  
uniform	   and	   complexion’.	   Consequently,	   banned	   colours	   include,	   but	   are	   not	  
limited	   to	   ‘purple,	   gold,	   blue,	   black,	   white,	   bright	   (fire-­‐engine)	   red,	   khaki,	  
camouflage	  colours	  and	  fluorescent	  colours’	  (USArmy	  2012:	  5).	  These	  policies	  on	  
the	  use	  of	  make	  up	  and	  cosmetics	  need	  to	  be	  observed	  not	  just	  in	  uniform,	  but	  
also	   in	   civilian	   clothes	   if	   the	   soldier	   is	   on	   duty.	   Ponytails	   must	   not	   be	   held	  
together	  with	  anything	  that	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  being	  for	   ‘decorative	  purposes’	  
(such	   as	   ‘lacy	   scrunchies’	   and	   ‘barrettes	   with	   butterflies’	   (USArmy	   2012:	   5).	   In	  
other	  words,	  nothing	  excessively	  feminine	  or	  ‘girly’	  is	  allowed.	  	  
Jean	   Bethke	   Elshtain	   famously	   claimed	   that	   women’s	   and	   men’s	   roles	   in	   war	  
follow	   a	   ‘beautiful	   soul/just	   warrior’	   dichotomy	   (1987,	   see	   also	   Sjoberg	   2010)	  
which	   grants	   men	   the	   privileged	   masculine	   role	   of	   protector	   (soldier)	   and	  
women	  as	  those	  requiring	  protection	  (civilians).	  In	  other	  words,	  masculinity	  has	  
only	  been	  accessible	   to	  male	  bodies	  whereas	  women	  were	  cast	   in	   the	   feminine	  
role	   of	   the	   victim	   and	   civilian.	   However,	   this	   neglects	   to	   recognize	   how	  
masculinity	   can	   also	   be	   assigned	   to	   and	   claimed	   by	   ‘other’,	   sometimes	   female	  
bodies,	  as	  argued	  by	  Halberstam	  (1998).	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As	   shown	  here,	   the	  military’s	  management	   of	  women’s	   bodies	   in	  war	  needs	   to	  
ensure	  that	  they	  are	  masculine	  enough	  to	  do	  the	  job	  they	  are	  required	  to	  do,	  but	  
not	  too	  masculine,	  as	  they	  need	  to	  still	  be	  identifiable	  as	  women.	  This	  is	  crucial	  
not	  only	  internally	  in	  the	  military,	  but	  in	  their	  practices	  in	  Afghanistan	  as	  well,	  as	  
shown	  in	  the	  detailed	  regulation	  of	  women’s	  appearance	  and	  movements	  in	  the	  
Commander’s	   Guide.	   Chapters	   two	   and	   four	   showed	   how	   militaries	   and	   the	  
practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   requires	   a	   range	   of	   military	  
masculinities	  in	  order	  to	  function,	  including	  the	  feminised	  ‘Fobbits’,	  the	  strategic	  
rationality	  of	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   and	   the	  historically	  valorised	   ‘warriors’.	  FETs,	   as	  
soldiers	   stationed	   in	   a	   combat	   zone	   also	   exist	   within	   these	   hierarchies	   of	  
militarised	  masculinities,	  albeit	  within	  a	  female	  martial	  body.	  	  
While	   women	   are	   set	   to	   perform	   what	   can	   be	   characterised	   as	   traditional	  
feminine	   roles	  of	   caring	  and	  nurturing	   in	   the	  practice	  of	  FETs	  and	  providing	  a	  
feminised	  labour	  of	  care,	  they	  still	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  perform	  as	  a	  martial	  body,	  
as	  a	  soldier.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  a	  delicate	  balancing	  act	  at	  play	  in	  the	  ways	  
that	  women’s	  bodies	  are	  managed	   in	   the	   ‘theatre	  of	  war’	  and	   in	   the	  practice	  of	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   as	   they	   are	   required	   to	   live	   up	   to	  
particular	  physical	   and	  mental	   standards	  on	   the	   same	  ground	  as	  male	   soldiers.	  
As	  the	  FET	  in	  the	  White	  House	  video	  quoted	  above	  stated,	  ‘a	  Marine	  is	  a	  Marine’	  
(WhiteHouse	  2012).	  	  
The	  Commander’s	   Guide	   explains	   that	   a	   FET	   is	   an	   ‘operational	   Soldier’,	   which	  
includes	  capabilities	  like	  ‘extreme	  mental	  and	  physical	  preparedness’	  and	  ability	  
to	   function	   well	   ‘in	   austere	   mountainous	   environments	   and	   extreme	   hot/cold	  
weather’	  (CALL	  2011:	  84).	  For	  instance,	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  as	  a	  FET,	  soldiers	  are	  
required	   to	   carry	   a	   15	   kg	   rucksack,	   wearing	   protective	   gear,	   weapon	   and	  
ammunition	   on	   a	   10	   km	  march	   in	   two	   hours	   and	   24	  minutes	   (CALL	   2011:	   40).	  
Despite	  this,	  there	  is	  reportedly	  an	  expectation	  by	  several	  male	  soldiers	  that	  they	  
cannot	  handle	  the	  physical	  strains	  of	  wearing	  and	  carrying	  heavy	  gear	  on	  patrol,	  
and	  many	  male	  soldiers	  fear	  ‘either	  for	  their	  safety	  or	  that	  they	  would	  get	  in	  the	  
way’	   (Bumiller	   2010b).	   In	   addition,	   female	   soldiers	  meet	   scepticism	  about	   their	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purpose	   for	   joining	   up	   from	   ‘young	   infantrymen	   who	   remain	   resentful	   of	   the	  
attention	  from	  commanders	  and	  the	  news	  media’	  (Bumiller	  2010a).	  	  
All	  the	  while,	  volunteering	  as	  a	  FET	  requires	  an	  ability	  to	  perform	  as	  a	  soldier.	  As	  
one	  FET	  member	  explains,	   ‘you	  need	  to	  know	  what	  every	  infantryman	  knows	  –	  
how	   to	   react	   to	   contact,	   how	   to	   defend	   yourself	   and	   how	   to	   return	   fire’	   (Irby	  
2012).	  Another	  explains	  that	  ‘I	  heard	  that	  it	  will	  be	  hard	  for	  us	  to	  physically	  meet	  
the	   expected	   standards	   of	   infantrymen,	   and	   for	   that	   reason	   they	   push	  us	   a	   lot	  
during	  training,	  but	  I	  can	  show	  them	  that	  I	  physically	  can	  do	  this’	  (Irby	  2012).	  In	  
other	  words,	  the	  women	  that	  make	  up	  FETs	  are,	  like	  any	  other	  soldier,	  trained	  to	  
kill.	  However,	  women’s	  ability,	  and	  perhaps	  also	  their	  desire	  to	  kill	  needs	  to	  be	  
suppressed	   in	   the	   conceptualisation	   and	   assigned	   tasks	   of	   FETs.	   FETs	   are	  
therefore	  particularly	  constituted	  gendered	  bodies	   that	  are	   ‘a	  necessary,	   indeed	  
desired,	   adjunct	   or	   accessory	   to	   an	   asymmetrical	   war’	   (Khalili	   2010a:	   13).	   This	  
constitution	   involves	   them	   being	   communicative,	   caring	   and	   nonthreatening,	  
but	  they	  are	  also	  advantageous	  because	  their	  bodies	  are	  (assumed	  to	  be)	  sexually	  
desirable	   for	   local	   Afghan	  men.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   they	   need	   to	   be	   capable	   of	  
performing	  to	  standards	  required	  of	  any	  soldier	  stationed	  in	  a	  combat	  zone.	  	  
Laura	  Sjoberg	  and	  Caron	  Gentry	  argue	  that	  female	  soldiers	  represent	  much	  more	  
than	   just	   ‘a	   soldier’	   and	   that	   they	   are	   ‘anything	   but	   gender-­‐neutral	   or	   gender-­‐
equal’	  (2008:	  84).	  Using	  the	  highly	  publicised	  story	  of	  the	  rescue	  of	  Jessica	  Lynch	  
in	   Iraq,	   they	   argue	   that	   despite	   her	   being	   a	   fully	   trained	   soldier,	   in	   the	   public	  
representation	   of	   her,	   she	   could	   ‘never	   escape	   the	   weaknesses	   of	   femininity’	  
(2008:	  85).	  They	  summarise	  today’s	  ‘woman	  soldier’	  as	  such,	  
‘She	   is	   brave,	   but	   needs	   the	   men	   around	   her	   to	   survive.	   She	   is	   trained,	   but	   cannot	   be	   self-­‐
sufficient.	  She	  is	  fragile,	  but	  puts	  on	  her	  game	  face.	  She	  is	  sexy,	  but	  not	  sexual.	  She	  can	  fight,	  but	  
the	  kind	  of	  fighting	  she	  can	  do	  is	  sanitized:	  she	  cannot	  engage	  in	  cruelty	  or	  torture.	  She	  is	  never	  
far	   from	   her	   maternal	   instincts.	   She	   is	   a	   soldier	   and	   a	   participant,	   but	   fundamentally	   still	  
innocent	  […]	  capable	  as	  a	  male	  soldier,	  but	  as	  vulnerable	  as	  a	  civilian	  woman’	  (2008:	  86).	  	  
Because	  militaries	   often	   remain	   hostile	   towards	   women,	   and	   because	   of	   these	  
multifaceted	  and	  intricate	  roles	  that	  women	  are	  supposed	  to	  fill,	  female	  soldiers	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have	   to	   continuously	   navigate	   a	   range	   of	   complex	   gendered	   and	   sexualised	  
positions	  and	  embodiments	   in	   relation	   to	  each	  other,	   the	   locals	   they	  meet	  and	  
their	  male	  colleagues.	  Through	  research	  on	  the	  US	  Navy,	  Frank	  J.	  Barrett	  argues	  
that	  while	  women	  are	  subject	  to	  many	  of	  the	  same	  tests	  and	  strains	  of	  training	  
and	  deployment,	  they	  face	  different	  kinds	  of	  negotiations.	  	  
‘Women	  cannot	  go	  too	  far	  in	  being	  like	  men,	  or	  else	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  “unnatural”…women	  face	  a	  
core	   contradiction	   in	   this	   culture:	   the	   more	   that	   men	   witness	   women	   successfully	   “doing	  
masculinity”,	  the	  more	  they	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  charges	  of	  lesbianism…but	  if	  they	  chose	  to	  conform	  
with	   the	   traditional	   images	  of	   femininity,	   they	  can	  risk	  going	   too	   far	   in	   this	  endeavour	  as	  well’	  
(Barrett	  2002:	  171-­‐172)	  
As	  shown	  here,	  the	  emphasis	  in	  both	  the	  deployment	  of	  FETs	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  
female	   soldiers	   more	   broadly	   with	   a	   reference	   to	   a	   ‘gender	   perspective’	   and	  
UNSCR	  1325,	  not	  only	  requires	  a	  detailed	  management	  of	  women’s	  bodies	  in	  the	  
‘theatre	  of	  war’,	  but	  also	  seem	  to	  reiterate	  some	  familiar	  stereotypes	  of	  women’s	  
roles	   in	  war	  by	  emphasising	  how	  women	  can	  calm	  and	   soothe	   the	  atmosphere	  
and	   engage	   better	   with	   local	   women.	   This	   feeds	   into	   powerful	   narratives	   of	  
women	  as	  peaceful	  and	  nurturing,	  something	  that	  is	  visible	  in	  wider	  discussions	  
of	  women’s	   roles	   in	   peacekeeping	   forces	   as	  well.	   Johanna	  Valenius	   argues	   that	  
women’s	  entry	  into	  peacekeeping	  forces	  broadly	  end	  up	  reinforcing	  rather	  than	  
resisting	  traditional	  gender	  roles,	  and	  thereby	  negating	  or	  ignoring	  variations	  in	  
both	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  (2007).	  Similarly,	  Jennings	  finds	  that	  arguments	  
for	  the	  benefits	  of	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  women	  in	  peacekeeping	  operations	  
are	   ‘far	   from	   progressive’	   and	   that	   ‘much	   of	   the	   argumentation	   hinges	   on	   the	  
assertion,	  whether	   implicit	   or	   explicit,	   that	   it	   is	   not	  what	  women	  do,	   but	  who	  
they	  are	  that	  makes	  the	  difference’	  (2011:	  7	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  This	  means	  that	  
‘cumulatively,	   the	   traits	   that	   seem	   to	   underpin	   the	   ideal-­‐type	   woman	  
peacekeeper	   –	   compassion,	   empathy,	   asexualised,	   disciplined	   and	   disciplining,	  
connector,	  consensus-­‐seeker	  –	  are	  also	  often	  associated	  with	  that	  most	  typical	  of	  
womanly	  acts,	  mothering’	  (Jennings	  2011;	  7-­‐8).	  	  
This	   strengthens	   the	   association	  with	  women	   as	   embodied	   and	   ‘natural’	   carers	  
and	   nurturers,	   further	   distancing	   a	   possibility	   of	  women	   to	   be	   associated	  with	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‘killing’.	   That	   said,	   the	   increased	   deployment	   of	   women	   in	   both	   Iraq	   and	  
Afghanistan	  are	  frequently	  cited	  as	  reasons	  for	  the	  recent	   lifting	  of	  the	   ‘combat	  
ban’	  for	  women	  in	  the	  US	  military.	  However,	  while	  FETs	  are	  often	  considered	  to	  
advance	  women’s	  roles	  in	  the	  military	  with	  references	  to	  ‘gender	  equality’,	  this	  is	  
enabled	   through	   a	   reiteration	   of	   traditional	   and	   stereotypical	   notions	   of	  
womanhood.	  In	  other	  words,	  women’s	  bodies	  in	  these	  practices	  are	  set	  to	  do	  the	  
kind	   of	   work	   that	   women’s	   bodies	   have	   always	   been	   seen	   to	   do	   best,	   namely	  
nurturing	  and	  caring.	  Consequently,	  McBride	  and	  Wibben	  conclude	  that	   ‘while	  
FETs	   are	   making	   some	   inroads,	   their	   effectiveness	   is	   limited	   more	   by	   US	  
commanders	   than	   patriarchal	   Afghans’	   and	   they	   should	   not	   be	   seen	   as	  
representing	  a	  ‘new	  era’	  for	  women	  in	  the	  military	  (2012:	  211).	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
As	  this	  chapter	  has	  shown,	  women’s	  bodies	  are	  written	  in	  complex	  ways	  through	  
the	  US	  military	  practice	  of	  FETs	  and	  NATO’s	  integration	  of	  a	  ‘gender	  perspective’.	  
Together	   these	   policies	   call	   into	   being	   particular	   gendered	   bodies,	   both	   as	  
‘targets’	  and	  ‘practitioners’	  of	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency.	  Subjecting	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   to	   this	   kind	   of	   feminist	   analysis	   shows	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  women’s	  bodies	  are	  increasingly	  important	  for	  the	  success	  of	  
the	  US	  military	  in	  Afghanistan.	  This	  has	  included	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  equation	  between	  
Afghan	  women	  and	  victimhood,	  so	  crucial	  for	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  invasion	  as	  
discussed	   in	   chapter	   three,	   to	   a	   conception	   of	   them	   as	   allies	   of	   the	   US	  
counterinsurgency	   project.	   Furthermore,	   the	   deployment	   of	   FETs,	   while	   being	  
important	   for	   information	   operations	   and	   intelligence	   gathering,	   is	   also	  
represented	   as	   central	   to	   Afghan	   women’s	   empowerment.	   In	   other	   words,	  
‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency	  is	  not	  only	  ‘armed	  social	  work’	  (Kilcullen	  
2006b:	  138)	  it	  is	  also	  ‘armed	  empowerment’.	  	  
Carol	  Cohn	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  rhetorical	  strategy	  used	  to	   ‘sell’	  the	  importance	  
of	   a	   ‘gender	   perspective’	   has	   ‘has	   largely	   rested	   on	   the	   “women-­‐as-­‐untapped-­‐
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resource’	  or	  “use-­‐value”	  argument’	  (2008:	  201,	  	  see	  also	  Gibbings	  2011).	  Moreover,	  
the	  incorporation	  of	  women	  into	  armed	  forces	  and	  the	  ‘theatre	  of	  war’	  has	  been	  
enabled	   with	   reference	   to	   better	   force	   protection	   and	   better	   operational	  
effectiveness	   (Jennings	   2011).	   In	   other	   words,	   these	   practices	   might	   point	   to	   a	  
wholly	  instrumentalist	  logic.	  However,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  
only	  interpretation.	  Rather,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  assumed	  equation	  between	  the	  
well-­‐being,	   development	   and	   empowerment	   of	   women	   (both	   Afghan	   and	  
American)	   and	   the	   aims	   and	   objectives	   of	   the	   US	   military	   and	   NATO.	   The	  
Commander’s	  Guide	  sets	  this	  out	  clearly,	  ‘It	  is	  about	  reassuring	  local	  women	  that	  
U.S.	   intentions	   are	   good	   and	   that	   the	   United	   States	   is	   there	   to	   protect	   them’	  
(CALL	  2011:	  59).	  Therefore,	  ‘advancing	  women’s	  rights	  through	  modernisation	  is	  
automatically	  seen	  as	  meeting	  the	  national	  security	   interests	  of	   the	  US’	  (Khalili	  
2010a:	  7).	  What	  is	  visible	  here	  is	  therefore	  not	  only	  an	  instrumentalist	  move,	  but	  
also	  how	   this	   type	   of	   counterinsurgency	  presents	   itself	   as	   being	   on	   the	   side	   of	  
women	  and	  local	  populations,	  equating	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  US	  military	  with	  the	  
interests	  of	  Afghan	  women	  and	  the	  Afghan	  population.	  	  
The	  deployment	  of	  FETs	  enables	  an	  emphasis	  on	   ‘care’	  above	   ‘killing’,	   in	  a	  way	  
that	  further	  complicates	  the	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  in	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency.	  The	  incorporation	  of	  women’s	  bodies	  therefore	  speaks	  of	  the	  
way	   that	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	  aims	  at	   representing	   itself	   as	  a	  
more	  ‘humanitarian’	  way	  of	  war	  (McBride	  and	  Wibben	  2012:	  210),	  casting	  itself	  as	  
a	  progressive	  development	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  local	  women,	  and	  women	  within	  the	  
armed	   forces.	   It	   is	   a	   way	   of	   realising	   the	   aim	   of	   ‘armed	   social	   work’	   and	   the	  
biopolitical	   logic	   of	   counterinsurgency.	   However,	   rather	   than	   this	   signalling	   a	  
radical	  move	   in	  a	  progressive	  direction,	   it	   ‘shows	  not	  only	   the	   flexibility	  of	   the	  
machinery	   of	   rule,	   but	   also	   the	   dynamic	   recreation	   of	   power	   hierarchies	  
throughout’	  (Khalili	  2010a:	  21).	  	  
This	   thesis	   has	   so	   far	   analysed	   the	   various	   embodied	   and	   gendered	  
manifestations	   of	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan	   in	   the	   invasion	   and	   the	   practice	   of	  
counterinsurgency.	  The	  next	  and	   final	  chapter	   takes	   this	  exploration	   further	   to	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argue	  that	  the	  ‘Exit	  Strategy’	  of	  NATO	  and	  the	  allied	  forces	  also	  relies	  on	  calling	  


















-­‐	  Chapter	  6	  -­‐	  
(Re)Producing	  Martial	  Bodies	  and	  Military	  
Masculinities:	  The	  Training	  of	  the	  Afghan	  National	  
Army	  (ANA)	  and	  the	  ‘Exit	  Strategy’	  
	  
‘Do	  not	  try	  to	  do	  too	  much	  with	  your	  own	  hands.	  Better	  the	  Arabs	  do	  it	  tolerably	  than	  that	  you	  
do	  it	  perfectly.	  It	  is	  their	  war,	  and	  you	  are	  to	  help	  them,	  not	  to	  win	  it	  for	  them’	  	  
‘Lawrence	  of	  Arabia’,	  27	  Articles	  
‘When	  we’re	  talking	  about	  basic	  training,	  we’re	  talking	  about	  really	  basic	  training’	  
Robert	  Gates	  	  
	  
The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  shown	  how	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  gendered	  and	  
embodied	   in	   both	   the	   invasion	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   in	   complex,	   fluid	   and,	   at	   times,	   contradictory	   ways.	   These	  
substantive	   chapters	   illustrated	   how	   war	   calls	   into	   being	   a	   multiplicity	   of	  
gendered	  bodies,	  and	  relied	  on	  their	  gendered	  performances	  in	  order	  to	  evolve.	  
This	   final	   chapter	   similarly	   examines	  how	   the	   ‘Exit	   Strategy’	   of	  NATO	  and	   the	  
allied	  forces	  also	  requires	  the	  production	  of	  particular	  subjects.	   It	  analyses	  how	  
martial	  bodies	  are	  made	  in	  the	  ANSF,	  with	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ANA,	  and	  
argues	  that	  such	  productions	  are	  affected	  by	  pre-­‐existing	  perceptions	  of	  Afghan	  
‘cultural	   traits’	   that	   reiterate	   colonial	   and	   orientalist	   tropes	   of	   modernity	   and	  
tradition.	  	  
The	  chapter	  begins	  by	  briefly	  outlining	  the	  history	  and	  logic	  behind	  training	  the	  
ANA.	   While	   this	   is	   in	   part	   a	   statebuilding	   strategy,	   and	   an	   integral	   part	   of	  
counterinsurgency,	   it	   is	   also	   something	   that	   enables	   the	   realisation	   of	  
withdrawing	   from	   Afghanistan	   through	   the	   building	   of	   a	   national	   army	   and	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security	  force	  that	  can	  take	  over	  responsibility	  for	  security.	  Section	  one	  explains	  
that	   the	  background	  and	  underlying	   rationale	  behind	   the	  project	   of	   rebuilding	  
the	  ANA	  requires	  a	  repositioning	  of	  Afghan	  recruits	  as	   ‘less-­‐than-­‐radical-­‐others’	  
(Hansen	  2006).	  In	  other	  words,	  Afghan	  recruits	  are	  positioned	  as	  being	  malleable	  
and	   redeemable	   through	   appropriate	   mentoring	   and	   training.	   However,	   as	   is	  
demonstrated	   throughout	   the	  course	  of	   this	  chapter,	   this	   remaking	  often	  relies	  
on	  orientalist	  preconceptions.	  	  
Section	  two	  details	  how	  the	  Afghan	  recruit	  needs	  to	  be	  remade	  in	  particular	  ways,	  
involving	  both	  an	  individual	  and	  embodied	  remaking	  of	  the	  recruit	  as	  a	  modern	  
martial	  body.	  This	  involves	  disciplining	  the	  recruit’s	  body	  to	  behave	  in	  ways	  that	  
are	   recognisable	   as	   martial	   to	   Western	   armed	   forces,	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	  
training	   and	   skill,	   but	   also	   following	   particular	   gendered	   and	   sexual	  
embodiments	  that	  cohere	  with	  the	  heteronormativity	  of	  Western	  military	  forces.	  
The	   ANA	   as	   a	   whole	   needs	   to	   follow	   a	   standardised	   hierarchy,	   similar	   to	   that	  
evidenced	  by	  Western	  forces,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  placing	  the	  nation’s	  interest	  
above	   the	   self.	  However,	   this	   process	   reflects	   the	   similarly	   essentially	   symbolic	  
remaking	  of	  the	  entire	  ‘body	  politic’	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  modern	  society.	  
However,	  as	  section	  three	  shows,	  the	  remoulding	  of	  Afghan	  soldier	  bodies	  in	  this	  
way	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  orientalisation	  that	  it	  is	  embedded	  in.	  Orientalisation	  
involves	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  fascination,	  exotification	  and	  a	  certain	  desire,	  visible	  in	  
the	  admiration	  for	  the	  pre-­‐modern	  and	  ‘authentic’	  Afghan	  man,	  associated	  with	  
the	  mythical	   fighters	   in	   the	  Mujahedeen	   and	   Afghanistan	   as	   the	   ‘graveyard	   of	  
Empires’.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Afghan	  men	  are	  also	  seen	  as	  effeminate	  and	  unfit	  
for	   the	   disciplined	   life	   of	   modern	   militaries.	   This	   orientalist	   frame,	   while	  
allowing	   for	   a	   certain	   fascination	   and	   ‘awe’,	   ultimately	   ends	   up	   reinforcing	  
Western	   perceptions	   of	   its	   own	   superiority	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   martial	   body,	  
rooted	   in	   modernity,	   uniformity	   and	   discipline.	   As	   a	   whole	   therefore,	   the	  
emphasis	  on	  ‘cultural	  incompatibility’	  between	  ISAF	  and	  Afghan	  forces	  ends	  up	  
reiterating	  familiar	  colonial	  tropes	  that	  does	  the	  potential	  for	  success	  in	  terms	  of	  
rebuilding	  the	  ANA	  no	  favours.	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1.0	  Enabling	  the	  ‘Exit	  Strategy’	  and	  Handing	  over	  Security	  	  
Shortly	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Taliban	  in	  2001,	  rebuilding	  the	  ANA	  began,	  though	  it	  
took	  several	  years	  before	  it	  became	  a	  real	  priority	  for	  ISAF.	  For	  the	  fourth	  time	  in	  
150	  years,79	  Afghanistan	  was	  to	  have	  a	  new	  National	  Army	  and,	  like	  the	  previous	  
attempts	   at	   rebuilding,	   this	   one	   has	   repeatedly	   run	   into	   difficulties	   (Giustozzi	  
2007a,	  Jalali	  2002)80.	  While	  the	  numbers	  at	  first	  were	  humble	  (an	  initial	  target	  of	  
70,000),	  the	  army	  has	  grown	  steadily81,	  and	  the	  ANA	  currently	  stands	  at	  195,000	  
with	   a	   target	   for	   the	   whole	   of	   ANSF	   at	   350,00082.	   The	   growth	   of	   the	   security	  
forces	   is	   by	   any	   account	   staggering	   -­‐	   made	   possible	   financially	   by	   massive	  
support	  from	  the	  US	  and	  politically	  by	  NATO’s	  desire	  to	  withdraw	  its	  own	  troops,	  
which	   required	   an	   emphasis	   on	   ‘Afghanisation’	   (Suhrke	   2011:	   144).	   The	   term	  
‘Afghanisation’	   is	  associated	  with	  gradually	   returning	  control	  and	  responsibility	  
to	   Afghans	   themselves.	   This	   is	   in	   and	   of	   itself	   an	   ambiguous	   term,	   sometimes	  
meaning	  a	  ‘gradual	  withdrawal	  of	  foreign	  troops’,	  and	  other	  times	  referring	  to	  a	  
‘gradual	  shift	  of	  the	  weight	  of	  fighting	  from	  the	  international	  contingents	  to	  the	  
Afghans’	  (Giustozzi	  2008).	  The	  composition	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  ANA	  has	  been	  
determined	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  by	  the	  US	  (Suhrke	  2011:	  144)83.	  Giustozzi	  argues	  that	  
                                                
79	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  some	  dispute	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  fourth	  or	  the	  fifth	  time	  
in	   the	   history	   of	   Afghanistan	   that	   a	   new	   national	   army	   has	   been	   created	   (See	   for	   instance	  
Giustozzi	  2007a,	  Jalali	  2002,	  Haug	  2009)	  
80	  The	  intent	  to	  rebuild	  was	  established	  already	  in	  the	  Bonn	  Agreement	  of	  2001,	  and	  was	  hailed	  as	  
a	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   state	   and	   nation	   building	   of	   Afghanistan	   (Suhrke	   2011:	   145).	   The	   Bonn	  
agreement	   stipulated	   that	   -­‐	   	   ‘Upon	   the	   official	   transfer	   of	   power,	   all	  mujahidin,	   Afghan	   armed	  
forces	   and	   armed	   groups	   in	   the	   country	   shall	   come	   under	   the	   command	   and	   control	   of	   the	  
Interim	  Authority,	  and	  be	  reorganized	  according	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  new	  Afghan	  security	  
and	  armed	  forces’	  (Bonn	  2001).	  At	  the	  time,	  it	  was	  seen	  by	  the	  US	  to	  be	  an	  ‘effective	  alternative	  to	  
the	  expansion	  of	  international	  security	  forces’	  (Jalali	  2002:	  72).	  
81	  Reportedly,	   there	  was	   discussion	   in	   the	   Pentagon	   about	   lowering	   the	   initial	   target	   to	   50,000,	  
recognising	   that	   Afghanistan	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   pay	   for	   a	   70,000	   strong	   army	   until	   2063	  
(Feickert	   2006:	   9).	   The	   suggestion	   to	   lower	   targets	   was	   opposed	   by	   the	   Afghan	   Minister	   of	  
Defence	  Abdul	  Rahim	  Wardak.	  He	   suggested	   that	   rather	   than	   lowering	   the	   target,	   it	   should	  be	  
heightened	  to	  150,000-­‐200,000	  (AP/NYT	  2006).	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  Wardak	  eventually	  gained	  support	  
for	  this.	  	  
82	  The	  ANA	  target	  of	   195,000	  was	   reached	   in	   June	  2012,	   three	  months	  ahead	  of	   the	  set	   schedule	  
(Nordland	  2012)	  
83	  For	   example,	   the	  maintenance	   of	   vehicles	   and	   weapons	   follows	   the	   ‘American	  model’	   where	  
private	  companies	  are	  required	  for	  servicing	  and	  the	  like.	  Provided	  that	  the	  security	  situation	  in	  
parts	  of	  the	  country	  is	  still	  quite	  volatile,	  several	  private	  companies	  are	  unwilling	  to	  perform	  this	  
service.	   This	   along	   with	   other	   factors	   leads	   Giustozzi	   to	   argue	   that	   Afghanistan	   ‘cannot	  
accommodate	  or	  afford	  the	  army	  model	  being	  imposed	  on	  it’	  (2009:	  37).	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from	  the	  very	  outset,	   the	  ANA	  were	  torn	  between	  being	  a	   ‘auxiliary	   indigenous	  
force	  of	  an	  occupying	  power’	  and	  becoming	  a	  ‘central/national	  army’	  (2007a:	  48).	  	  
Today	  it	  is	   ‘widely	  accepted’	  that	  rebuilding	  the	  army	  is	  essential	  for	   ‘long-­‐term	  
success’	   and	   that,	  without	   it,	   the	   country	  will	   ‘slip	   back	   into	   chaos	   until	   some	  
force,	   probably	   the	   Taliban	   in	   this	   case,	   restores	   some	   order’	   (Younossi	   et	   al.	  
2009:	  1-­‐2).	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  is	  not	  only	  about	  attaining	  stability	  and	  order,	  but	  
about	   achieving	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   order	   –	   one	  where	   ‘building	   the	   ANSF’	   is	  
seen	  as	   ‘the	  fastest	  possible	  way	  of	  solving	  the	  security	  problem	  in	  Afghanistan’	  
(Haug	   2009:	   49).	   Crucially,	   it	   also	   forms	   a	   key	   part	   of	   the	   NATO	   strategy	   for	  
withdrawal.	   The	   ISAF	   operation	   plan	   reads,	   ‘NATO’s	   exit	   from	  Afghanistan	   is,	  
inter	   alia,	   dependent	   on	   the	   successful	   establishment	   of	   an	   integrated	   security	  
structure	   that	   is	  owned	  by	   the	  Afghans,	  capable	  of	  maintaining	  security	  within	  
its	  own	  borders	  and	  of	  deterring	   foreign	  adversaries’	   (quoted	   in	  Younossi	  et	  al.	  
2009:	   35).	   President	   Obama	   highlighted	   this	   in	   the	   revised	   strategy	   for	  
Afghanistan,	   announced	   in	   December	   2009.	   The	   new	   strategy	   emphasised	   the	  
importance	  of	  ‘the	  surge’	  of	  30,000	  troops	  in	  order	  to	  ‘increase	  our	  ability	  to	  train	  
competent	   Afghan	   security	   forces,	   and	   to	   partner	   with	   them	   so	   that	   more	  
Afghans	  can	  get	  into	  the	  fight’,	  which	  will	  ultimately	  ‘help	  create	  the	  conditions	  
for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  transfer	  responsibility	  to	  the	  Afghans’	  (Obama	  2009).84	  
This	  sentiment	  is	  echoed	  also	  in	  Norway,	  where	  Norwegian	  officials	  and	  military	  
leaders	   have	   emphasised	   that	   the	   training	   of	   ANA	   and	   ANP	   is	   one	   of	   the	   key	  
priorities	   for	   the	   Norwegian	   army	   (NRK	   2011,	   Gahr	   Støre	   2012).	   Currently,	  
responsibility	   for	  more	  and	  more	  provinces	   is	  being	  transferred	  to	  the	  ANSF	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  three	  phase	  withdrawal	  plan	  for	  NATO	  forces,	  which	  was	  agreed	  upon	  
in	  the	  Lisbon	  Summit	  in	  2010	  (Brooke-­‐Holland	  and	  Taylor	  2012).	  	  
                                                
84	  In	   January	   2013,	  Obama	  and	  Hamid	  Karzai	  met	   in	  Washington	   and	   it	  was	   suggested	   that	  US	  
troops	  might	  pull	  out	  sooner	   than	  expected	   in	  2014.	  However,	   somewhere	  between	  3	  and	  9,000	  
troops	   are	   set	   to	   remain	   in	   the	   country	   also	   after	   2014	   (MacAskill	   2013).	   In	   February	   2012,	   US	  
Defence	  Secretary	  Leon	  Panetta	  announced	  that	  combat	  troops	  would	  withdraw	  as	  early	  as	  mid-­‐
2013,	  one	  year	  before	  the	  scheduled	  exit.	  Forces	  would	  remain,	  however,	  to	  ‘advise	  and	  assist’	  the	  
ANSF	  (Bumiller	  2012)..	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The	  training	  of	  ‘host	  forces’	  or	  ‘indigenous	  forces’	  is	  also	  a	  central	  component	  of	  
counterinsurgency	  (Corum	  2006,	  Cassidy	  2007,	  Ramsey	  III	  2008,	  Gortzak	  2009).	  
Essential	   to	  achieving	  the	  aims	  of	  counterinsurgency	   is	   ‘developing	  an	  effective	  
host-­‐nation	   security	   force’	   (USArmy	   et	   al.	   2007:	   199)	   and	   this	   is	   ‘one	   of	   the	  
highest	   priority	  COIN	   tasks’	   (2007:	   235).	   It	  will	   ideally	   result	   in	   a	   force	   that	   is	  
‘flexible’,	  ‘proficient’,	  ‘self-­‐sustained’,	  ‘well-­‐led’,	  ‘professional’	  and	  ‘integrated	  into	  
society’	  (USArmy	  et	  al.	  2007:	  207-­‐208)85.	  Herein,	   ‘manpower	  is	  not	  enough’,	  nor	  
is	  bravery	  or	  willingness	  to	  fight,	  as	  it	  is	  ‘well-­‐trained	  and	  well-­‐disciplined	  forces	  
that	  are	  required’	  (USArmy	  et	  al.	  2007:	  235).	  	  
As	   a	   whole	   therefore,	   this	   ‘Exit	   Strategy’	   relies	   on	   Afghan	   recruits	   being	  
constituted	  as	  what	  Lene	  Hansen	  calls,	  	  ‘less-­‐than-­‐radical	  Others’	  (2006:	  37-­‐41)	  -­‐	  
a	   relation	   that	   can	   encompass	   a	   temporal	   dimension	   and	   relies	   on	   the	   Other	  
being	  redeemable	  and	  malleable.	  This	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  entire	  project	  of	  training	  
the	  ANA,	  which	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  through	  appropriate	  training	  and	  
dedicated	  mentoring,	  the	  temporally	  backward	  Other,	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  Afghan	  
man,	  can	  be	  transformed	  from	  a	  recruit	  to	  a	  ‘proper’	  soldier.	  Similarly	  the	  Afghan	  
military	  is	  reconstituted	  from	  brave	  but	  undisciplined	  collections	  of	  warriors	  into	  
a	  single,	  ‘modern’	  force.	  	  
However,	  the	  remaking	  of	  Afghan	  recruits’	  bodies	  into	  soldiers	  by	  Western	  forces	  
meets	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  challenges.	  As	  Corum	  argues,	  dealing	  with	  ‘military	  forces	  
with	   a	   tradition	   of	   incompetence	   and	   corruption’	   (Corum	   2006:	   v)	   is	   both	   	   a	  
difficult	  task	  and	  a	  ‘slow	  and	  painstaking	  process’	  (USArmy	  et	  al.	  2007:	  207).	  As	  
shown	  in	  chapter	  two,	  	  ‘soldiers	  are	  not	  born,	  but	  made’	  (Woodward	  2000:	  640)	  
in	   detailed,	   complex	   and	   carefully	   designed	   ways.	   However,	   moulding	   the	  
Afghan	  soldier	  body	  is	  frequently	  presented	  by	  allied	  forces	  as	  being	  that	  much	  
more	   difficult	   than	   the	   making	   of	   a	   Western	   soldier,	   with	   the	   perceived	  
                                                
85	  Generally,	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   British	   forces	   in	   Malaya	   (1948-­‐1960),	   known	   widely	   as	   ‘the	  
Malayan	  Emergency’,	  is	  hailed	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  successful	  counterinsurgency	  (Strachan	  2007),	  
and	  it	  is	  also	  here	  that	  examples	  of	  best	  practice	  in	  terms	  of	  training	  indigenous	  forces	  are	  taken	  
from	  (Corum	  2006).	  The	  U.S	  Counterinsurgency	  Field	  Manual	  mentions	  how	  the	  British	  were	  able	  
to	   train	   commissioned	   and	   non-­‐commissioned	   officers	   which	   ‘dramatically	   improved’	   their	  
discipline	  and	  led	  to	   ‘better	  relations	  between	  population	  and	  security	   forces’	  which	  meant	  that	  
people	  began	  tot	  provide	  the	  security	  forces	  with	  information	  about	  the	  insurgents.	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challenges	  rooted	  in	  particular	  orientalist	  and	  colonial	  presuppositions	  about	  the	  
Afghan	  Other.	  	  
	  
2.0	  Moulding	  the	  Afghan	  Soldier	  Body	  
Building	  militaries	   is	   not	   only	   about	   weapons	   systems,	   equipment,	   structures,	  
skills	  and	  logistics;	  it	  is	  also	  about	  instilling	  certain	  values	  and	  identities	  into	  the	  
forces,	  and	  about	  remaking	  ‘natural’	  recruits	  bodies	  into	  trained	  and	  disciplined	  
soldier	   bodies.	   As	   discussed	   theoretically	   in	   chapter	   two,	   building	   a	   military	  
requires	  the	  production	  of	  military	  bodies,	  a	  view	  that	  rejects	  regarding	  the	  body	  
as	  something	  ‘given’	  and	  ‘natural’.	  Through	  training,	  mentoring	  and	  partnering,	  
ISAF	   forces	   are	   set	   to	  mould,	   guide	   and	   fight	   alongside	   Afghan	   forces,	   in	   the	  
hope	   that	   this	   will	   produce	   the	   conditions	   for	   increased	   security	   for	   civilians,	  
increase	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Afghan	  government	  and,	  crucially,	  enable	  NATO’s	  
withdrawal.	  This	  endeavour	  is	  about	  not	  only	  reshaping	  martial	  bodies,	  but	  also	  
about	   calling	   into	   being	   specific	   subjectivities	   and	   political	   rationalities,	   away	  
from	  the	  ‘traditional’	  and	  towards	  a	  replication	  of	  superior	  ‘modern’	  subjects	  and	  
practices.	  	  
Since	   2009,	   the	   NATO	   Training	   Mission-­‐Afghanistan	   (NTM-­‐A)	   has	   been	  
responsible	  for	  training	  and	  equipping	  the	  ANA,	  both	  for	  higher	  and	  lower	  level	  
military	  personnel.	  Recruits	   to	   the	  ANA	  go	  through	  basic	   training	  at	   the	  Kabul	  
Military	  Training	  Centre	  (KMTC)	  and,	  whereas	  they	  were	  previously	   trained	  by	  
ISAF	   forces,	   the	   basic	   training	   is	   today	   conducted	   by	   higher	   ranking	   ANA	  
soldiers	   (Rayment	   2012).	   Basic	   training	   lasts	   for	   10	   weeks,	   and	   consists	   of	   rifle	  
marksmanship,	   small	   infantry	   tactics,	   mountain	   training,	   urban	   combat,	   but	  
advice	   is	  given	  on	   ‘everything	   from	  training	   to	   logistics’	   (AP	  2009).	   	  As	  Former	  
Defence	   Secretary	   Robert	   Gates	   emphasised,	   ‘when	   we’re	   talking	   about	   basic	  
training,	  we’re	  talking	  about	  really	  basic	  training’	  (Levine	  2008).	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The	  training	  of	  the	  ANA	  follows	  an	  embedding	  principle,	  where	  ‘mentors’,	  either	  
from	  one	   nation,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  US,	   or	   for	   smaller	   nations	   like	  Norway,	  
together	  with	  others,	   train,	   live	  and	  fight	  alongside	  the	  ANA.	  There	  are	  usually	  
between	  13	  and	  20	  personnel	  working	  alongside	  an	  ANA	  battalion,	  or	  kandak	  as	  
they	   are	   known	   in	   Afghanistan	   (Haug	   2009:	   47).	   In	   the	   US	   these	   teams	   are	  
known	  as	  ETTs	  (Embedded	  Training	  Teams),	  whereas	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  NATO	  
countries	   they	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   Operational	   Mentoring	   and	   Liaison	   Teams	  
(OMLTs),	  though	  their	  function	  is	  the	  same86.	  A	  similar	  principle	  is	  followed	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  police	  force.	  	  
The	  ultimate	  aim	  is	  to	  produce	  a	  force	  that	  comes	  close	  to	  resembling	  one’s	  own.	  
It	  would	  ideally	  be	  a	  force	  that	  is	  professional	  in	  its	  conduct,	  thinks	  strategically	  
and	   is	   concerned	  with	  planning	   ahead	   in	  order	   to	   guard	   for	   the	  unforeseen.	   It	  
should	  be	  well	  equipped,	  serious	  in	  its	  mission,	  concerned	  with	  limiting	  civilian	  
deaths	  and	  with	  winning	  ‘hearts	  and	  minds’.	  It	  should	  not	  complain,	  but	  nurture	  
a	  ‘stick	  with	  it’	  attitude.	  It	  should	  be	  bound	  together	  by	  heteronormative	  bonds	  
of	  camaraderie	  and	  the	  willingness	  to	  sacrifice	  one’s	  life	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  force	  
and	   the	   nation	   (Wadham	   2004).	   In	   other	   words,	   training	   the	   ANA	   is	   about	  
calling	   into	   being	   particular	   martial	   bodies	   that	   can	   perform	   their	   duty	   and	  
thereby	  reinforce	  the	  classical	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  -­‐	  that	  of	  killing	  and	  dying	  for	  
one’s	  country	  (Weber	  2008a).	  One	  of	  the	  soldiers	  themselves,	  reflects	  on	  the	  role	  
and	   responsibilities	   of	   the	   professional	   solder	   by	   explicitly	   referring	   to	   the	  
constitutive	  role	  that	  the	  soldier	  plays	  in	  performing,	  and	  therefore	  maintaining,	  
the	  classic	  interpretation	  of	  sovereignty:	  	  
‘To	  be	  a	  professional	  soldier	  is	  to	  understand	  that	  we	  administer	  the	  state’s	  monopoly	  of	  violence,	  
and	  that	  we	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  are	  hired	  to	  be	  extremely	  good	  in	  organised	  violence.	  We	  need	  
to	  understand	  and	  accept	   that	  we	   represent	   something	  bigger	   than	  ourselves.	  This	  means	   that	  
personal	   feelings	   about	   a	   mission	   is	   irrelevant,	   and	   that	   we	   are	   loyal	   servants	   of	   the	   nation’s	  
                                                
86	  According	   to	  Haug	   there	   are	   differences	   in	   the	   time	   spent	   on	   ‘training	   the	   trainers’	   prior	   to	  
deployment.	  Where	   the	  Norwegian	  mentors	   for	   instance	   received	   9	  months	   of	   training	   for	   the	  
OMLT,	  the	  Americans	  only	  received	  72	  days	  of	  training	  for	  the	  ETT	  (2009:	  51).	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interest	   for	   better	   or	   for	   worse.	   In	   this	   is	   also	   a	   recognition	   that	   we	   often	   represent	   higher	  
principles	  like	  democracy,	  justice	  and	  human	  rights’	  (Elden	  2012:	  47).	  
The	   following	   three	   sections	   show	   how	   this	   moulding	   is	   both	   individual	   and	  
collective,	   in	   that	   individual	  embodiment	  aims	  at	   the	   same	   time	   to	  change	   the	  
entire	   ‘body	  politic’.	  The	   first	  and	  second	  sections	  deal	  with	   the	  disciplining	  of	  
individual	   soldier	   bodies	   aimed	   to	   instil	   and	   embody	   particular	   military	  
masculinities.	   The	   last	   section	   examines	   the	   institutionalisation	   of	   specific	  
hierarchical	   structures,	   which	   import	   ideals	   of	   counterinsurgency	   and	   ‘soldier-­‐
scholar’	   masculinity	   and	   emphasise	   the	   importance	   of	   ‘national	   unity’.	   These	  
specific	  processes	  of	  rebuilding	  the	  ANA	  are	  designed	  to	  transform	  the	  entirety	  
of	  the	  ‘body	  politic’,	  away	  from	  the	  ‘traditional’	  and	  towards	  the	  ‘modern’.	  	  
	  
2.1	  ‘Strong	  fighters	  don’t	  always	  make	  good	  soldiers’	  87	  	  
Producing	  disciplined,	  or	  ‘docile	  bodies’	  is	  one	  of	  the	  central	  tenets	  of	  building	  a	  
modern	  military.	  Military	  discipline	  enables	  a	  set	  of	  martial	  bodies	  to	  function	  as	  
one,	   as	   a	   collective	   whole.	   As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   two,	   Foucault	   argues	   that	  
enclosure,	  partition,	  ranks	  and	  serialization	  form	  an	  integral	  aspect	  of	  building	  a	  
modern	  military	  organisation	  (1991).	  Julian	  Reid	  explains	  how	  ‘enclosure’	  enabled	  
‘new	   forms	   of	   control	   and	   security’;	   ‘partitioning’	   individualised	   men	   and	  
‘supervised	   the	   conduct	   not	   only	   of	   the	   mass	   body	   but	   the	   life	   of	   bodies	  
individually’;	   ‘ranks’	   cast	   bodies	   in	   a	   ‘network	   of	   relations	   of	   exchange’	   and	  
‘serialization’	  provided	  ‘fixed	  positions	  for	  individuals’	  (2006:	  130).	  Evident	  here	  is	  
a	  tension	  between	  collectivisation	  and	  individualisation:	  how	  to	  simultaneously	  
build	  individual	  capacity	  while	  joining	  soldiers’	  bodies	  so	  that	  they	  may	  function	  
as	  a	  collective	  mass.	  	  
A	  frequent	  complaint	  about	  the	  ANA	  is	  that	  they	  are	  undisciplined,	  disorganised	  
and/or	  incompetent	  (Parnell	  2012:	  58,	  77,	  325,	  Tupper	  2010:	  90,	  Courter	  2008:	  115,	  
                                                
87	  This	  is	  a	  quote	  from	  Guardian	  journalist	  Declan	  Walsh’s	  photo	  essay	  about	  the	  British	  training	  
of	  ANA	  in	  Helmand	  province	  (Walsh	  2011)	  
 169	  
211),	  ‘faults’	  which	  are	  recognized	  in	  the	  broader	  literature	  as	  well	  (Hansen	  2012a:	  
14,	  Younossi	  et	  al.	  2009:	  18,	  Giustozzi	  2009:	  37).	  One	  US	  soldier	  states,	  ‘They	  are	  
just	  about	  useless;	  genuinely	  stupid’	  (Bordin	  2012:	  25).	  Another	  claims	  that	  ‘this	  is	  
a	  lazy-­‐ass	  culture;	  they	  won’t	  do	  anything	  unless	  they	  have	  to…	  we	  do	  everything	  
for	  them.	  It’s	  like	  a	  kid	  you	  have	  to	  spoon	  feed’	  (Bordin	  2012:	  64).	  The	  ANA’s	  lack	  
of	  discipline	  and	  training	  means	  that,	  on	  several	  occasions,	  ISAF	  soldiers	  take	  on	  
the	   role	   of	   a	   parent	   in	   relation	   to	   them.	   About	   halfway	   through	   his	   mission,	  
Courter	  becomes	  concerned	  for	  their	  safety,	  that	  they	  may	  ‘stumble	  and	  get	  shot’	  
and	  like	  a	  parent	  complaining	  about	  his	  children	  he	  says,	  	  
‘They	  can	  be	  childish	  at	  times,	  they	  only	  seem	  to	  pay	  attention	  for	  short	  periods	  of	  time,	  they	  are	  
usually	   almost	   completely	   self-­‐absorbed	   and	   self-­‐interested,	   they	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   care	   much	  
about	   their	   fellow	   Soldiers,	   and	   they	   would	   rather	   do	   anything	   than	   learn	   or	   work	   hard…yes,	  
training	   them	   is	   sometimes	   like	   teaching	  children,	  but	   these	  are	  grown	  men.	  One	  would	   think	  
they	  would	  know	  better,	  but	  one	  would	  be	  wrong’’	  (Courter	  2008:	  212-­‐214).	  	  
Elden,	   who	   proudly	   recalls	   returning	   to	   the	   FOB	   after	   a	   particularly	   gruelling	  
combat	   experience,	   echoes	   a	   related	   parental	   sentiment	   and	   sense	   of	  
achievement,	  
‘around	  a	  hundred	  Afghan	  soldiers	  and	  police	  officers	   stood	  along	   the	  wall	  and	  smiled	  humbly	  
and	  respectfully.	  They	  knew	  what	  we	  had	  done	  and	  had	  a	  look	  of	  awe	  in	  their	  big	  white	  eyes.	  I	  
was	  proud	  when	  I	  saw	  the	  gratification	  in	  their	  eyes.	  If	  what	  we	  did	  today	  gave	  them	  a	  motivation	  
to	  fight	  for	  their	  country,	  that	  was	  the	  greatest	  reward	  I	  could	  imagine’	  (Elden	  2012:	  157-­‐158).	  
As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   two	   and	   again	   in	   chapter	   five,	   performing	   military	  
masculinities	   and	   disciplining	   martial	   bodies	   requires	   serious	   attention	   to	  
particular	   collective	   aesthetic	   appearances.	   Recall	   how	   AR	   670-­‐1	   states	   that	   ‘a	  
neat	   and	  well-­‐groomed	   appearance	   by	   all	   soldiers	   is	   fundamental	   to	   the	  Army	  
and	  contributes	  to	  building	  the	  pride	  and	  esprit	  essential	  to	  an	  effective	  military	  
force’	   (USArmy	   2012:	   2).	   The	   ANA’s	   lack	   of	   discipline	   is	   therefore	   often	  
immediately	   visible	   in	   their	   poor	   attire	   and	   ‘liberal’	   approach	   to	   uniforms.	  
Parnell	   tells	   of	   how	   the	   ANA	   ‘sat	   in	   the	   dirt	   with	   vacant	   eyes,	   smoking	   hash.	  
Their	  polyglot	  uniforms	  were	  ill	  tended.	  They	  were	  poorly	  groomed.	  They	  looked	  
like	  a	  unit	   that	   just	  didn't	  give	  a	  shit’	   (2012:	  254).	  Clothes	  and	  attire	  are	   in	   this	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way	   ‘instruments’	   that	   ‘regulate[s]	  and	  exercise[s]’	  bodies	  to	  appear	   in	  a	  certain	  
way	   (De	   Certeau	   1984:	   147).	   This	   is	   so	   important	   that	   Elden,	   after	   noticing	  
numerous	   faults	   in	   appearance,	   took	   his	   troop	   aside	   to	   give	   them	   a	   stern	  
reprimand,	  	  
‘I	   expect	   everyone	   in	   the	   troop	   to	  wear	   correct	   attire,	   have	   short	   hair	   and	   that	   you	   are	   either	  
shaved	  or	  grow	  a	  proper	  full	  beard.	  Moustaches	  are	  out	  of	  the	  question!	  …Correct	  attire	  is	  how	  we	  
show	  that	  we	  are	  professionals.	  First	  impressions	  matter’	  (2012:	  71-­‐72,	  see	  also	  Johansen	  2011:	  35-­‐
36).	  	  
The	  contrast	  between	  the	  well	  groomed,	  properly	  attired	  ‘warrior	  masculinity’	  of	  
the	   ISAF	   soldier	   and	   the	   slack	   attitude	   of	   the	  Afghan	   soldier	  wearing	   a	  mix	   of	  
‘do-­‐rags,	  Arab-­‐Style	  head	  scarves	  and	  baseball	  caps’	  (Tupper	  2010:	  19),	  symbolises	  
not	  only	  their	  lack	  of	  discipline,	  but	  also	  a	  broader	  division	  between	  the	  civilised	  
and	  the	  barbarian,	  the	  modern	  and	  traditional.88	  	  
It	  is	  not	  only	  in	  maintaining	  their	  groomed	  appearance	  that	  Afghan	  soldiers	  are	  
regarded	  as	  lacking	  discipline.	  Their	  aversion	  to	  training	  (Skarpskyttere	  2010:	  105,	  
Courter	   2008:	   213-­‐214)	   is	   also	  noted	  by	   their	  Western	   trainers	   and	  mentors.	  As	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  four,	  an	  important	  part	  of	  performing	  ‘warrior	  masculinity’	  
is	  being	  active	  and	   ‘in	   the	  action’,	   as	  opposed	   to	   remaining	   ‘inside	   the	  wire’	  or	  
not	  participating	   in	  various	  assigned	   tasks.	  Repetitions	  and	  drills	   are	   crucial	   to	  
the	   internalisation	   and	   embodiment	   of	   military	   masculinity	   (Myrttinen	   2008:	  
135).	  However,	   internalising	  military	  masculinity	  becomes	  an	  uncertain	  process	  
when	  the	  ANA	  recruits	  are	  reluctant	  to	  commit	  even	  to	  the	  most	  mundane	  tasks	  
like	   target	   practice.	   Trainers	   comment	   that	   Afghans	   appear	   to	   ‘have	   a	   strong	  
dislike	  of	  training	  of	  any	  type’	  (Tupper	  2010:	  91),	  leading	  Parnell	  to	  recall	  how	  he	  
                                                
88	  Challenges	   involved	   in	  disciplining	  of	   the	  ANA	  have	  also	  made	   it	   to	   the	   internet,	  with	  numerous	  
photos	   and	   videos	   being	   posted	   on	   sites	   like	   YouTube	   and	   LiveLeak.	   A	   popular	   one	   seems	   to	   be	  
filming	  Afghan	  soldiers	  doing	  ‘Jumping	  Jacks’	  as	  a	  part	  of	  their	  physical	  exercise	  and	  failing	  to	  jump	  in	  
rhythm	  and	  a	  straight	  line	  (YouTube	  2009,	  	  see	  also	  FoxNews	  2010b).	  US	  armed	  forces	  and	  NATO	  also	  
publish	   videos,	   which	   show	   how	   Afghan	   soldiers	   are	   being	   trained.	   One	   includes	   images	   of	   ANA	  
picking	  apart	  and	  putting	  together	  rifles,	  doing	  stop	  and	  search	  operations,	  and	  marching,	  all	  under	  
the	  watchful	  eye	  of	  their	  trainer	  (RCEast	  2012).	  Others	  again	  show	  Afghan	  soldiers	  training	  in	  urban	  
warfare	  (McCabe	  2010).	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‘watched	   these	   slovenly	   dispirited	   cops,	   and	   wondered	   how	   on	   earth	   such	   a	  
group	  could	  ever	  be	  moulded	  into	  an	  effective	  force’	  (2012:	  58).	  	  
Despite	   all	   this,	   several	   of	   the	   allied	   soldier	  memoirs	   praise	   Afghan	   troops	   for	  
their	  bravery.	  Tupper	  notes	  that	  they	  are	  ‘as	  brave,	  if	  not	  braver’	  than	  the	  average	  
American	  soldier	  (Tupper	  2010:	  16	  see	  also	  ,	  Skarpskyttere	  2010:	  105),	  their	  pursuit	  
of	  the	  enemy	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  ‘hunting	  dogs	  anxious	  for	  the	  chase’	  (Tupper	  2010:	  
16)	   or	   like	   ‘sharks	   smelling	   blood	   in	   the	  water’	   (Tupper	   2010:	   26).	   The	   chosen	  
analogies	  are	  both	  likening	  Afghans	  to	  fearless	  animals,	  something	  that	  is	  akin	  to	  
colonial	  imaginings	  of	  the	  'savage'	  having	  a	  closer	  connection	  to	  nature.	  However,	  
these	   phrases	   are	   meant	   to	   praise	   them;	   Tupper	   is	   clearly	   in	   awe	   of	   their	  
capabilities	  to	  'sniff	  blood'	  and	  'hunt',	  which	  are	  qualities	  necessary	  to	  be	  a	  good	  
combat	   soldier.	  However,	   as	  Courter	   notes,	   Afghan	   soldiers	  may	   be	   brave	   ‘but	  
bravery	   does	   not	   compensate	   for	   skill	   and	   tactics.	   Bravery	   alone	   is	   a	   poor	  
substitute	  for	  knowing	  what	  you	  are	  doing	  and	  being	  competent	  in	  doing	  it.	  We	  
need	  them	  to	  be	  ready	  for	  battle’	  (Courter	  2008:	  211).	  There	  is	  therefore	  a	  curious	  
mix	  of	  applauding	  their	  'primal'	  qualities,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  distinct	  sense	  
that	  they	  need	  to	  be	  reformed	  because	  bravery	  is	  not	  enough.	  Thus,	  the	  recruits’	  
bravery	  needs	  to	  be	  regimented,	  collectivised,	  sanitized	  and	  disciplined,	  as	  glory	  
and	   respect	   are	   only	   granted	   ‘the	   fighting	  men	  whose	   aggression	   is	   controlled	  
and	  regulated	  by	  the	  State	  and	  used	  to	  uphold	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  State’	  (Higate	  
and	  Hopton	  2005:	  435),	  reminiscent	  again	  of	  placing	  the	  trained	  martial	  body	  in	  
the	  service	  of	  killing	  and	  dying	   for	   the	  nation	   in	   the	  classical	  understanding	  of	  
sovereignty	  (Weber	  2008a).	  	  
	  
2.2	  Holding	  Hands	  and	  Watching	  Porn	  	  
The	  moulding	  of	  soldier	  bodies	  also	  involves	  a	  disciplining	  of	  their	  sexuality	  and	  
specifically	   requires	   the	   embodiment	   of	   particular	   versions	   of	   sexuality.	   As	  
discussed	   in	   chapters	   two	   and	   chapter	   four,	   heteronormativity	   remains	   an	  
important	   aspect	   in	   the	   disciplining	   of	   soldiers’	   bodies.	   The	   privileging	   of	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heterosexuality,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  resultant	  subordination	  and	  feminisation	  of	  men	  
that	   are	  deemed	   to	  not	   conform	   to	   it,	  have	  historically	  been	   important	   for	   the	  
production	   of	   military	   masculinities	   (Britton	   and	   Williams	   1995,	   Belkin	   2003,	  
Belkin	  2012).	  Heterosexuality	  remains	  a	  strong	  signifier	  and	  organising	  principle	  
for	   the	  military	   (Bulmer	  2013),	  despite	   the	  production	  of	  multiple	  masculinities	  
and	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  militaries	  to	  women	  and	  other	  minorities,	  as	  discussed	  in	  
previous	   chapters.	  Warrior	  masculinity	   in	  particular	   is	   ‘resolutely	  heterosexual’	  
(Woodward	   2000:	   643),	   which	   means	   that	   actions	   and	   sentiments	   that	   are	  
perceived	   as	   homosexual	   are	   regarded	   as	   highly	   incompatible	   with	   soldier	  
identities.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  production	  of	  soldier	  bodies	  is	  embodied	  not	  only	  
in	  the	  physical	  sense	  of	  training	  to	  particular	  military	  fighting	  standards,	  but	  also	  
by	  instilling	  particular	  notions	  of	  appropriate	  sexual	  behaviour.	  	  
The	   internalisation	   of	   such	   heteronormativity	   is	   strongly	   evident	   in	   the	   allied	  
soldier	   memoirs.	   For	   instance,	   Courter	   reflects	   on	   the	   challenges	   of	   going	   for	  
long	   periods	   of	   time	   without	   sex,	   and	   what	   options	   there	   are,	   ‘given	   our	  
hormones	   and	   the	  male	   genetic	   disposition	   and	   sexual	   drive’	   (2008:	   39).	  He	   is	  
keen	   to	   stress	   that	   any	   action	   taken	   to	   release	   sexual	   tension	   ‘rules	   out	  
homosexual	   activity,	   because	   this	   is	   unattractive	   to	   us	   and	   besides,	   Army	  
regulations	  preclude	  homosexual	  acts	  between	  soldiers’.	  However,	  he	  notes	  that	  
he	  has	  been	  made	  aware	  that	  ‘in	  parts	  of	  the	  Middle	  East,	  including	  Afghanistan,	  
homosexual	  sex	  is	  more	  common	  (Courter	  2008:	  40).	  	  
The	   issue	   of	   Afghan	   sexuality	   and	   how	   it	   potentially	   could	   ‘interfere’	   with	   the	  
training	  of	  Afghan	  soldiers	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  warfare	  in	  Afghanistan	  forms	  the	  
topic	  of	  a	  US	  HTT	  report	  entitled	  Pashtun	  Sexuality.89	  A	  Fox	  News	  report	  on	  the	  
HTT	   study	   notes	   that	   ‘as	   if	   U.S.	   troops	   and	   diplomats	   didn’t	   have	   enough	   to	  
worry	   about	   in	   trying	   to	   understand	  Afghan	   culture,	   a	   new	   report	   suggests	   an	  
                                                
89	  The	  report	  was	  written	  by	  the	  HTT	  AF-­‐6,	  a	  team	  assigned	  to	  the	  US	  Marines	  who	  worked	  at	  the	  
time	   alongside	   British	   Forces	   in	   Lashkar	   Gah,	   Kandahar.	   The	   stated	   aim	   of	   the	   report	   is	   to	  
‘provide	  insight	  on	  Pashtun	  cultural	  traditions	  regarding	  male	  sexuality	  for	  reasons	  of	  enhanced	  
baseline	   cultural	   understanding	   for	   improved	   interaction	   as	   well	   as	   any	   IO	   [intelligence	  
operations]	  applicability’	  (HTT	  2010).	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entire	   region	   in	   the	   country	   is	   coping	   with	   a	   sexual	   identity	   crisis’	   (FoxNews	  
2010a).	  The	  report	  states,	  	  
‘Military	   cultural	   awareness	   training	   for	   Afghanistan	   often	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   effeminate	  
characteristics	   of	  male	  Pashtun	   interaction	  are	  to	  be	  considered	  “normal”	  and	  no	   indicator	  of	  a	  
prevalence	  of	  homosexuality.	  This	  training	  is	  intended	  to	  prevent	  service	  members	  from	  reacting	  
with	   typically	   Western	   shock	   or	   aversion	   to	   such	   displays.	   However,	   slightly	   more	   in-­‐depth	  
research	  points	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  culturally-­‐dependent	  homosexuality	  appearing	  to	  affect	  a	  far	  
greater	  population	  base	  then	  some	  researchers	  would	  argue	  is	  attributable	  to	  natural	  inclination’	  
(HTT	  2010:	  2	  emphasis	  added).	  	  
Afghan,	   and	   more	   specifically	   Pashtun	   men90,	   are	   known	   to	   have	   ‘effeminate	  
characteristics’	  and	  the	  presence	  of	   ‘culturally-­‐dependent	  homosexuality’	   seems	  
to	  ‘affect’	  a	  greater	  amount	  of	  people	  in	  Kandahar	  than	  what	  would	  be	  ‘natural’.	  
US	  and	  Western	  soldiers	  are	  ‘frequently	  confused’	  about	  how	  to	  relate	  to	  Afghan	  
men	  who	   are	   ‘outwardly	   affectionate	   toward	   both	   one	   another	   and	  male	   ISAF	  
members’,	  who	   are	   ‘extremely	   gentle	   in	   their	   demeanour	   and	   touch’,	   and	  who	  
have	   ‘taken	   great	   care	   in	   embellishing	   their	   personal	   appearances	   with	  
fingernails	  dyed	  red,	  hair	  and	  beards	  hennaed	  in	  careful	  patterns,	  and	  eyes	  very	  
subtly	  outlined’	  (HTT	  2010:	  3).	  These	  ‘feminine’	  embodiments,	  involving	  not	  only	  
appearance,	   but	   also	   behaviour	   and	   mannerism,	   are	   often	   interpreted	   as	  
homosexual.	  	  
The	   report	   explains	   the	   prevalence	   of	   homosexual	   behaviour	   as	   stemming	  
primarily	  from	  men’s	  lack	  of	  interaction	  with	  women	  prior	  to	  marriage,	  which	  is	  
often	  an	  expensive	   affair	   that	  many	  cannot	   afford.	  While	   the	   report	  notes	   that	  
homosexuality	   is	   indeed	   prohibited	   in	   Islam,	   in	   rural	   Afghanistan,	   this	  
prohibition	  is	  often	  interpreted	  as	  only	  pertaining	  to	  feelings	  of	  love.	  It	  is	  noted	  
that	   ‘loving	  a	  man	  would	  therefore	  be	  unacceptable	  and	  a	  major	  sin…but	  using	  
another	  man	  for	  sexual	  gratification	  would	  be	  regarded	  as	  foible’	  something	  the	  
report	   interprets	  as	  a	   ‘cultural	  misunderstanding	  of	   Islamic	  tenants’	   (HTT	  2010:	  
5-­‐6).	   This	   ‘misunderstanding’	   results	   in	   a	   problematic	   privileging	   of	  
                                                
90	  Pasthuns	   are	   the	   largest	   ethnic	   group	   in	   Afghanistan,	  making	   up	   around	   40	   per	   cent	   of	   the	  
population.	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homosexuality	  (in	  the	  Western	  definition	  of	  it	  as	  including	  both	  sexual	  acts	  and	  
love)	   over	   heterosexuality.	   This	   stems	   in	   part	   from	   a	   belief	   that	   women	   are	  
‘unclean’	  due	   to	  menstruation,	  which	  means	   that	   ‘local	   cultural	   interpretations	  
have	   created	   the	   passionately	   if	   erroneously	   held	   belief	   that	   women	   are	  
physically	  undesirable’	  (HTT	  2010:	  6-­‐7).	  	  
The	  HTT	  report	  itself	  is	  fascinating	  as	  it	  reveals	  Western	  confusion,	  unease	  and,	  
ultimately,	   dismissal	   of	   any	   notion	   of	   liberal	   or	   adaptable	   sexual	   norms	   that	  
might	  be	  attributed	  to	  Afghan	  culture.	  Moreover,	  the	  report’s	  analysis	  illustrates	  
an	  obsession	  with	  binary	  constructions	  of	  sexuality.	  When	  Afghan	  men	  are	  found	  
to	   interpret	   Islamic	   restrictions	   concerning	   homosexuality	   as	   encompassing	  
solely	  feelings	  of	  love	  rather	  than	  physical	  acts,	  this	  is	  dismissed	  by	  the	  HTT	  as	  
being	   a	   ‘cultural	   misinterpretation’	   of	   ‘true’	   Islam.	   In	   other	   words,	   Western	  
constructions	   of	   sexuality,	   existing	   within	   a	   binary	   that	   includes	   both	   the	  
physical	   and	   the	   emotional,	   and	   composed	   of	   rigid	   categories	   of	   ‘homosexual’	  
and	  ‘heterosexual’,	  are	  projected	  upon	  the	  potentially	  more	  fluid	  understanding	  
of	  male	  sexuality	  in	  Afghan	  culture.	  	  
A	  similar	  sense	  of	  confusion	  is	  present	  in	  Tupper’s	  memoir	  in	  a	  chapter	  entitled	  
Afghan	   Porn	   where	   he	   shares	   some	   reflections	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	  
masculinity,	  femininity	  and	  sexuality	  in	  Afghan	  society.	  He	  describes	  how	  one	  of	  
the	   Afghan	   soldiers	   brought	   (what	   was	   interpreted	   as)	   a	   ‘porno	   DVD’	   to	   the	  
camp.	  	  
‘The	   screen	   came	   alive	  with	   a	  woman	  dancing	   evocatively	   and	   seductively.	   Except	   upon	   closer	  
review,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  this	  woman	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  man.	  He	  was	  surrounded	  by	  a	  crowd	  of	  at	  
least	  fifty	  Afghan	  men	  of	  all	  ages	  and	  ethnicities,	  all	  gazing	  at	  him	  with	  starry	  eyes…compared	  to	  
your	   standard	   MTV	   video,	   the	   dance	   and	   the	   costumes	   were	   mild	   and	   tame.	   Nothing	   was	  
revealing,	  nothing	  shocking,	  nothing	  explicitly	  sexual…But	  in	  the	  Afghan	  context,	  this	  video	  was	  
triple-­‐X’	  (Tupper	  2010:	  145)	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What	  Tupper	  explains	  here	   is	  a	   ‘tradition’	  of	  bachabas	   (or	  bacha	   bazi)91,	  which	  
translates	  as	   ‘boy	   toucher’	  or	   ‘boy	  play’.	  He	  writes	   that	   the	  boy	   in	   the	   film	  was	  
‘obviously	  homosexual’	  but	  since	   ‘men	  are	   literally	  condemned	  to	  a	   female-­‐free	  
existence	  until	  they	  marry’,	  these	  films	  served	  a	  purpose.	  The	  fact	  that	  	  ‘a	  woman	  
cannot	  appear	   in	  public,	  but	  a	   cross-­‐dressing	  gay	  prostitute	   is	  permitted’	  more	  
than	  anything	  speaks	   to	   the	   ‘moral	  of	   the	  story’,	  according	  to	  Tupper,	  which	   is	  
that	  ‘all	  efforts	  to	  stifle	  and	  repress	  sexual	  activity	  just	  pushes	  human	  desire	  into	  
other	   outlets’	   (Tupper	   2010:	   146-­‐147).	  While	  Afghan	  men	  may	  have	   to	   contend	  
with	  ‘mild,	  if	  not	  boring’	  films	  of	  ‘cross-­‐dressing	  gay	  prostitutes’	  at	  the	  moment,	  
Tupper	  thinks	  that	  ‘it’s	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  before	  some	  Jenna	  Jameson	  DVDs	  
find	  their	  way	  into	  ANA	  hands,	  and	  once	  they	  do,	  I	  have	  a	  feeling	  the	  bachabas	  
DVDs	  will	  be	  collecting	  a	  lot	  of	  dust’	  (Tupper	  2010:	  148).	  	  
Mella	  also	  reflects	  on	  Afghan	  sexuality	  and	  relates	  it	  specifically	  to	  the	  practices	  
of	  Afghan	  soldiers.	  He	  describes	  how	  he	  and	  a	  fellow	  soldier	  were	  stranded	  at	  a	  
police	  station	  when	  one	  of	  their	  cars	  broke	  down	  and	  recalls	  how	  ‘great	  dark	  eyes	  
studied	  us	   from	  top	   to	  bottom,	  as	   if	  we	  were	  beautiful	  girls	   they	  couldn't	  keep	  
their	  eyes	  off…I	  was	  a	  bit	  embarrassed’	  (Mella	  2013:	  146).	  They	  tried	  to	  speak	  to	  
them,	  but	  the	  ANA	  soldiers	  did	  not	  speak	  English	  so	  communication	  broke	  down.	  
More	   and	  more	   soldiers	   gathered	   around	   them	   and	  Mella	   notes	   that	  while	   he	  
could	  understand	  how	  people	  in	  the	  rural	  countryside	  were	  often	  curious	  about	  
them	   as	  Western	   soldiers,	   this	  was	   something	   different,	   as	   the	  ANA	   ‘were	   not	  
curious	  about	  the	  uniform	  or	  our	  weapons.	  It	  was	  us	  as	  guys	  that	  they	  thought	  
were	  exciting.	  I	  noticed	  how	  they	  looked	  at	  my	  long	  blond	  hair,	  at	  my	  body.	  They	  
looked	  at	  us	  as	  if	  we	  were	  girls’	  (Mella	  2013:	  147).	  He	  explains	  how,	  
‘homosexuality	   is	   really	   prohibited	   in	   Islam,	   but	   sex	   between	  men	   is	   common	   in	   Afghanistan.	  
When	  my	  brother	  was	  here,	  sex	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  things	  he	  was	  offered	  by	  an	  Afghan.	  During	  
training	  we	  were	  also	  warned:	   if	  you	  get	  caught	  you	  should	  expect	   to	  be	   raped.	  Several	   times	   I	  
                                                
91	  According	   to	   both	   Civil	   and	   Sharia	   Law,	   ’bacha	   bazi’	   is	   illegal	   in	   Afghanistan.	   It	   was	   banned	  
under	  Taliban	  rule	  but	  has	  flourished	  since	  2001,	  also	  in	  major	  cities	  like	  Kabul.	  In	  many	  instances	  
it	  involves	  young	  boys	  being	  forced	  into	  this	  trade	  as	  a	  part	  of	  strong	  and	  powerful	  warlords	  who	  
keep	   them	  as	  part	  of	   their	   entourage.	  They	  are	  usually	   released	  at	   the	  age	  of	   19	  when	   they	  can	  
‘reclaim	  their	  status	  as	  “male”’	   (Abdul-­‐Ahad	  2009).	  This	  practice	  is	  also	  noted	  extensively	   in	  the	  
HTT	  report.	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saw	   soldiers	   from	   the	  ANA	  holding	  hands.	  They	  would	   lie	   and	   relax	   in	   each	  other’s	   laps	  or	   lie	  
extra	  close	  in	  the	  evenings’	  (Mella	  2013:	  147).	  	  
In	  a	  second	  chapter	  that	  deals	  explicitly	  with	  Afghan	  sexuality,	  Tupper	  shares	  his	  
‘solution’	   to	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan.	   Here,	   Afghan	   men’s	   sexual	   frustration	   is	  
argued	  to	  feed	  their	  ‘macho	  warrior	  culture’,	  	  
'It	  is	  my	  conclusion,	  based	  on	  pseudoscientific	  research	  I've	  conducted	  on	  myself	  during	  months	  
of	   female	   deprivation,	   that	   the	   root	   of	   all	   Afghan	  problems	   resides	   in	   the	   pent-­‐up	   desires	   and	  
frustrations	  of	  Afghan	  men.	  They	  are	  denied	  any	  access	   to	  women	  until	  marriage…the	  men	  are	  
frustrated,	  sexually	   frustrated,	  to	   the	   point	   that	   they	   pick	   up	   guns,	   put	   on	   their	   finest	   suicide	  
vests,	  and	  get	  their	  energy	  out	  through	  holy	  war.	  It’s	  the	  only	  rational	  explanation	  for	  the	  macho	  
warrior	  culture	  of	  Afghanistan	  …	  So	  here	  is	  my	  master	  plan:	  lets	  import	  fifty	  thousand	  Brazilian	  
women	   and	   one	   thousand	   Italian-­‐American	   women	   into	   Afghanistan.	  Seriously.	  If	   you	   unleash	  
this	   untamed	   and	   passionate	   assault	   wave	  onto	   this	   country,	   it	   won't	   be	   long	   until	   Afghan	  
women	  are	  streaming	  to	  the	  spa	  to	  get	  a	  Brazilian	  wax.	  Burning	  burkas	  will	  illuminate	  the	  streets	  
as	  women	  march	  to	  purchase	  thong	  bikinis.'	  (Tupper	  2010:	  108).92	  	  
Here,	   as	   in	   the	  HTT	   report,	  Western	  understandings	  of	   sexuality	   are	  projected	  
upon	   Afghan	   society.	   In	   this	   case,	   Tupper	   draws	   his	   conclusions	   based	   on	  
‘pseudoscientific	   research	   conducted	   on	   himself’,	   something	   that	   suggests	   that	  
this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  about	  Afghan	  men	  at	  all.	  All	  the	  while,	  Tupper’s	  ‘solution’	  
feeds	   into	   a	   powerful	   discourse	   of	   Muslim	   men	   as	   overtly	   sexual	   and	  
hypermasculine,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   incorporates	   a	   not	   so	   subtle	   critique	   of	  
Afghan	  women.	  The	  former	  is	  (understandably)	  frustrated	  and	  therefore	  resorts	  
to	  violence	  or	  homosexual	  intercourse,	  while	  the	  latter	  should	  embrace	  Brazilian	  
pubic	  waxing	  and	  thong	  bikinis.	  	  
There	  is	  therefore	  a	  curious	  mix	  of	  representations	  of	  Afghan	  sexuality	  here.	  On	  
the	   one	   hand	   Afghan	   men	   are	   found	   to	   be	   ‘hypermasculine’	   and	   unable	   to	  
control	   their	  urges,	  which	   feeds	   their	   lust	   for	  war;	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   they	  are	  
feminized	  and	   suspected	  of	  being	  homosexual.	  However,	   as	  Puar	   explains,	   this	  
                                                
92	  While	   this	   is	   probably	   intended	   as	   humorous,	   as	   the	   chapter	   appears	   under	   the	   section	  
‘laughter	  is	  the	  best	  defence’,	  paired	  with	  the	  ‘Afghan	  porn’	  chapter	  (which	  is	  in	  a	  different	  part	  of	  
the	   book),	   they	   present	   of	   a	   picture	   of	   the	   curiously	   hypermasculine	   and	   simultaneously	  
feminised	  ANA.	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interpretation	  of	  sexual	  norms	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	   is	  not	  uncommon.	  The	  belief	  
that	   ‘sexuality	   is	   repressed,	   but	   perversity	   is	   just	   bubbling	   beneath	   the	   surface	  
forms	   part	   of	   a	   centuries	   long	   Orientalist	   tradition,	   an	   Orientalist	   phantasm’	  
(Puar	  2007:	  83,	  see	  also	  Khalili	  2010a:	   15-­‐16).	  The	  representation	  of	  Afghan	  men	  
therefore	   portrays	   them	   as	   simultaneously	   hypermasculine	   (contrary	   to	   the	  
restrained,	   women-­‐friendly	   and	   protective	   masculinity	   of	   Western	   men)	   and	  
feminized	  or	  homosexual	  (contrary	  to	  strong,	  heterosexual,	  capable,	  professional	  
Western	  soldiers).	  Crucially,	  however,	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  that	  this	  Oriental	  
sexuality	   will	   evaporate	   and	   be	   reformed	   with	   its	   encounter	   with	   a	   superior	  
sexuality	  (in	  this	  case,	  illustrated	  by	  a	  Jenna	  Jameson	  DVD).	  
	  
2.3	  To	  help	  them	  become	  better	  Afghans93	  	  
In	  addition	   to	   instilling	  certain	  values	   into	  Afghan	  men	   in	  particular	  gendered,	  
sexual	  and	  embodied	  ways,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  the	  strategy	  to	  rebuild	  the	  ANA	  is	  
also	  about	  transforming	  the	  wider	  ‘body	  politic’.	  Constructing	  a	  modern	  Afghan	  
army	  is	  often	  hailed	  as	  essential	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Afghan	  state	  itself,	  to	  
the	  extent	  that,	  unless	  the	  ANA	  become	  a	  professional	  force,	  ‘the	  promise	  of	  real	  
democracy	   in	  Afghanistan	   is	  doomed’	   (George	  2011:	   1).	  This	  means	   that	  Afghan	  
soldiers	   need	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   their	   service	   and	   skills	   should	   benefit	   the	  
whole	   of	   Afghan	   society,	   and	   this	   in	   turn	   requires	   a	   ‘breakdown	   of	   the	   tribal	  
societies’	   (George	   2011:	   6).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   building	   of	   ANA	   into	   a	  
professional	   and	   modern	   army	   requires	   simultaneous	   radical	   societal	   shifts,	  
which	  align	  the	  individual	  soldier	  with	  the	  state.	  For	  them	  to	  become	  ‘sentinels	  
of	  Afghan	  democracy’	   (Chan	  2009)	   these	  bodies	  need	  to	  be	  remade	   in	  order	   to	  
mirror	   the	   modern	   and	   transcend	   the	   traditional.	   While	   the	   previous	   section	  
dealt	  with	   the	   importance	  of	   instilling	  discipline	   into	   the	  ANA	   in	  order	   to	   call	  
into	  being	  particular	  martial	  bodies,	  able	  to	  embody	  discipline	   individually	  and	  
                                                
93	  This	  is	  a	  phrase	  used	  by	  Courter	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  ‘I	  do	  not	  want	  them	  to	  be	  like	  Americans.	  I	  
want	  them	  to	  become	  better	  Afghans’	  (Courter	  2008:	  213)	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collectively	   -­‐	   this	   section	   deals	   with	   the	   two	   other	   central	   ‘lacks’	   of	   the	   ANA,	  
namely,	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  standardised	  hierarchy	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  national	  unity.	  	  
Producing	  modern	  militaries	  requires	  institutionalising	  standardised	  hierarchical	  
structures	   and	   ranks.	   Therefore,	   in	   addition	   to	   KMTC	  mentioned	   above,	   since	  
2003	   the	  National	  Military	  Academy	  of	  Afghanistan	   (NMAA)	  has	  been	   training	  
higher-­‐level	   officers.	   It	   is	   formally	   connected	  with	   the	  US	  Military	  Academy	  at	  
West	  Point,	  and	  provides	  four-­‐year	  courses	  taught	  in	  English.	  At	  the	  end,	  cadets	  
leave	  with	  bachelor	  degrees	   in	   return	   for	   a	   ten	  year	   commitment	   to	   serving	   in	  
the	  ANSF	  (ISAF	  2011a).	  Moreover,	  a	  dedicated	  counterinsurgency	  manual	  (ANA	  
3-­‐24),	  has	  been	  produced	   for/by	   the	  ANA	  and	  whose	  primary	  audience	  are	   the	  
‘leaders	  and	  planners	  at	  the	  Kandak	  [battalion]	  level	  or	  above’	  (ANA	  2007).	  The	  
manual	   states	   that	   practicing	   counterinsurgency	   requires	   a	   ‘flexible,	   adaptive	  
force	   led	   by	   agile,	   well-­‐informed,	   culturally	   astute	   leaders’	   and	   the	   manual	   is	  
intended	   to	   ‘provide	   the	   necessary	   guidelines	   to	   succeed	   in	   such	   a	   campaign’	  
(ANA	  2007:	  3).	  
The	  creation	  of	  this	  manual	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  instil	  the	  values	  of	  ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	  
into	  the	  higher-­‐level	  leadership	  of	  the	  ANA	  inspired	  in	  particular	  by	  the	  US.	  It	  is	  
therefore	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  Afghan	  manual	  (ANA	  3-­‐24)	  largely	  replicates	  its	  
American	  original,	  FM	  3-­‐24,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  four.	  However,	  comparing	  the	  
‘Guide	  for	  Action’	  appendix	  of	  both	  manuals,	  one	  can	  discern	  some	  differences.	  
Broadly,	  the	  appendix	  in	  the	  ANA	  manual	  is	  identical	  to	  the	  US	  appendix,	  but	  it	  
is	   written	   in	   simpler	   language	   and	   uses	   less	   abbreviations.94	  It	   is	   especially	  
interesting	   that	   the	   ‘Engage	   the	   Women,	   be	   Cautious	   around	   the	   Children’	  
paragraph	  from	  the	  US	  manual,	  quoted	  in	  chapter	  five,	   is	  altogether	  omitted	  in	  
the	  ANA	  manual.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  instilling	  the	  values	  of	  ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	  into	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  
ANA,	  another	  aspect	  of	   the	  hierarchy	   that	   largely	  mirrors	   that	  of	   the	  US	   is	   the	  
                                                
94	  For	  example,	  under	  the	  heading	  ‘Remember	  the	  Global	  Audience’,	  directing	  counterinsurgents	  
to	   bear	   in	   mind	   that	   the	   world	   is	   watching,	   the	   ANA	   manual	   has	   exchanged	   the	   word	  
‘omnipresence’	  with	  ‘global	  reach’	  (ANA	  2007:	  187,	  USArmy	  et	  al.	  2007:	  296)	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emphasis	   on	   a	   functioning	   Non-­‐Commissioned	   Officers	   (NCO)	   corps 95	  
(Cordesman	   et	   al.	   2010).	   An	   NCO	   corps	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   crucial	   for	  
establishing	   leadership	   and	   command	   structures.	   However,	   ‘efforts	   to	   create	  
Afghan	   officers	   and	   NCOs	   that	   mirror	   Western	   military	   systems	   have	   to	   be	  
tempered	  with	   the	   understanding	   that	   there	   are	   limits	   to	   how	   quickly	   Afghan	  
concepts	   of	   military	   training	   and	   operations	   can	   be	   changed	   –	   if	   at	   all’	  
(Cordesman	  2010:	  46-­‐47).	  Lt.	  Gen	  Caldwell,	  who	  since	  2009	  has	  led	  the	  NTM-­‐A,	  
argues	   that	   the	   ‘leadership	   deficiencies	   across	   the	   spectrum	   of	   insufficient	  
numbers	   of	   junior	   officers	   and	  NCOs,	   gaps	   in	   the	  midgrade	   ranks	   and	   corrupt	  
senior	  officers	  –	  pose	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  our	  Afghan	  allies’	  (Caldwell	  2011b:	  77).	  
The	   challenges	   associated	   with	   institutionalising	   a	   standardised	   notion	   of	  
hierarchy	   speaks	   to	  a	  difference	   in	   ‘culture’,	   some	  argue,	  and	   the	  ways	   that	  US	  
and	  Afghan	  notions	  of	  ‘warrior	  cultures’	  diverge.	  There	  are	  perceived	  differences	  
in	   terms	   of	   how	   leadership	   is	   viewed,	   and	   whether	   this	   is	   hierarchical	   and	  
standardised	   as	   in	   the	   US	   military,	   or	   personal	   and	   social	   as	   is	   the	   case	   in	  
Afghanistan	   (Willis	   2011).	  While	   technical	   skill	   in	   the	  US	  military	   is	   ‘trainable’,	  
and	  the	  aim	  is	  effectively	  to	  train	  the	  soldiers	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  they	  can	  take	  over,	  
‘an	   officer	   in	   the	   ANA	   may	   train	   their	   subordinate	   leaders	   sufficient	   military	  
skills	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  competently	  follow	  orders,	  but	  not	  to	  take	  his	  position’	  
(Willis	   2011:	   58).	   In	   other	   words,	   argues	   Willis,	   there	   are	   cultural	   inhibitions	  
associated	  with	  Afghans	   that	  makes	   institutionalising	   a	   standardised	   hierarchy	  
and	  the	  training	  of	  leaders	  difficult.	  	  
As	  Giustozzi	  argues,	  ‘large	  numbers	  of	  the	  ANA	  personnel	  would	  appear	  to	  place	  
personal	   benefit	   ahead	   of	   national	   interest’	   (2009:	   39	   see	   also,	   Thruelsen	   2010,	  
Felbab-­‐Brown	  2012)96.	  Willis	  argues	  that	  ‘while	  Afghans	  have	  a	  national	  identity,	  
and	  have	   fought	   to	  maintain	   their	   independence,	   their	   goals	   for	   independence	  
                                                
95 	  Non-­‐Commissioned	   Officers	   (NCOs)	   are	   officers	   without	   a	   commission	   who	   reach	   their	  
promotion	   through	   enlisted	   ranks	   and	   can	   be	   considered	   the	  mid-­‐level	   leadership.	   In	   the	   US,	  
ranks	  of	  sergeant	  and	  corporal	  are	  normally	  considered	  NCOs.	  The	  Norwegian	  Military	  does	  not	  
have	  an	  NCO	  corps,	  but	  operate	  with	  roughly	  three	  ‘ranks’,	  befal	  (commanders),	  stabsoffiser	  (staff	  
officer)	  and	  Generals.	  	  	  
96	  Interestingly,	  this	  issue	  did	  not	  really	  surface	  as	  an	  issue	  in	  Krekvik’s	  study,	  something	  he	  found	  
‘surprising’	  given	  the	  prominence	  it	  has	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  debates	  on	  ANSF	  forces	  (2011:	  32).	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tended	  to	  orient	  around	  local	  and	  personal	  motivations’	  (2011:	  62-­‐65).	  In	  addition,	  
the	  idea	  of	  changing	  sides	  ‘in	  the	  middle	  of	  battle’	  does	  not	  exist	  for	  US	  soldiers	  
(Willis	   2011:	   56-­‐56).	   Conversely,	   while	   US	   forces	   are	   motivated	   by	   numerous	  
factors,	   these	   are	   understood	   to	   ‘ultimately	   be	   tied	   into	   a	   national	   strategic	  
objective’	   (Willis	   2011:	   66)97.	   This	   shows	   that	   the	   training	   of	   the	  ANA	   is	   about	  
calling	  into	  being	  particular	  martial	  bodies	  that	  can	  perform	  particular	  gendered	  
notions	  of	  sovereignty	  associated	  with	  killing	  and	  dying	  for	  one’s	  country.	  	  
As	  shown	  here,	  the	  ANA	  needs	  to	  be	  remade	  individually	  through	  a	  disciplining	  
and	  moulding	  of	  recruit’s	  bodies.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  the	  ANA	  is	  
also	  aimed	  at	  reforming	  the	  entire	  ‘body	  politic’.	  The	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  
ISAF	   forces	   remake	   the	   Afghan	   soldier	   body	   shows	   how	   ‘war	   is	   fought	   for	  
political	  order	  not	  among	  states,	  or	   in	  the	  territorial	  battlefields	  where	  military	  
forces	  clash,	  but	  on	  the	  terrain	  of	  the	  human	  body’	  (Reid	  2006:	  130).	  However,	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  training	  of	  the	  ANA,	  this	  human	  body	  is	  also	  symbolic	  of	  a	  wider	  
effort	   to	   transform	   the	   subjectivities	   of	   the	   entire	   ‘body	   politic’	   –	   from	   the	  
‘traditional’	  to	  the	  ‘modern’.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Courter,	  	  
	  ‘I	  truly	  want	  to	  change	  them	  –	  I	  do	  not	  want	  them	  to	  remain	  as	  they	  are.	  I	  am	  actually	  trying	  to	  
change	  their	  values	  and	  habits.	  I	  do	  not	  want	  them	  to	  be	  like	  Americans;	  I	  want	  them	  to	  become	  
better	  Afghans…I	  want	  to	  take	  away	  their	  complacency	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  zeal	  –	  a	  strong	  desire	  
for	  change,	  to	  improve	  their	  country,	  and	  a	  willingness	  to	  work	  hard	  to	  see	  it	  happen’	  (2008:	  213).	  	  
	  
3.0	   Producing	   the	   Oriental	   Other	   in	   ‘the	   Land	   that	   Time	  
Forgot’98	  
Having	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  embodied	  and	  gendered	  ways	  in	  which	  ISAF	  tries	  
to	  remake	  not	  only	  individual	  Afghan	  men	  into	  soldiers,	  but	  also	  the	  wider	  ‘body	  
politic’,	  this	  chapter	  moves	  on	  to	  discuss	  how	  this	  process	  is	  driven	  by	  particular	  
                                                
97	  This	  claim	  needs	  to	  be	  tempered	  with	  a	  recognition	  of	  how	  it	   is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  people	  to	  
serve	  in	  the	  military	  without	  having	  rights	  as	  citizens,	  or	  as	  a	  means	  to	  gain	  citizenship	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  several	  Latinos	  (Amaya	  2007,	  Sanchez	  2013)	  
98	  This	  is	  how	  Parnell	  describes	  Afghanistan	  (2012:	  272)	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colonial	  and	  orientalist	  logics.	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  four,	  Western	  militaries	  are	  
increasingly	   deploying	   the	   language	   of	   ‘culture’	   as	   a	  means	   to	   frame	  how	  wars	  
should	  be	  understood	  -­‐	  from	  cause,	  to	  practice	  and	  in	  their	  results.	  The	  memoirs	  
analysed	   here	   show	   that	   soldiers	   themselves	   utilise	   the	   language	   of	   cultural	  
difference	   in	   order	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   their	   experiences.	   ‘Culture’	   is	   therefore	  
increasingly	   considered	  by	   the	  military	   to	   explain	   successes	   and	   failures	   as	   the	  
result	   of	   long-­‐standing	   historical	   and	   cultural	   traits	   (Porter	   2009).	   However,	  
‘culture’	  can	  easily	  become	  a	  ‘catch-­‐all’	  term	  that	  supposedly	  explains	  most	  of	  the	  
problems	  Western	  forces	  have	  encountered	  in	  rebuilding,	  training	  and	  relying	  on	  
Afghan	  forces.	  ‘Culture’	  therefore,	  is	  oftentimes	  little	  more	  than	  a	  different	  name	  
for	  orientalisation.	  	  
Like	  all	  discourse,	  the	  discourse	  about	  Afghan	  soldiers	   in	  memoirs,	  reports	  and	  
academic	  literature	  attempts	  to	  ‘fix	  meaning’	  through	  linking	  particular	  actions,	  
notions	   and	   traits	   to	   the	   Other,	   thereby	   simultaneously	   constructing	   the	   Self.	  
However,	  as	  noted	  previously,	  Othering	  does	  not	  necessarily	  follow	  a	  strict	  and	  
radically	   different	   Self-­‐Other	   duality.	   While	   the	   strategy	   of	   training	   the	   ANA	  
relies	  on	  Afghan	  soldiers	  being	  seen	  as	   ‘less-­‐than-­‐radical-­‐others’,	   it	  may	  still	  be	  
the	  case	  that	  ISAF	  soldiers	  themselves	  continue	  to	  view	  Afghans	  as	  more	  or	  less	  
radical	  Others	  (Duncanson	  and	  Cornish	  2012).	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  corruption,	  
mentioned	  by	  many	  of	  the	  soldiers,	  either	  on	  a	  small	  scale	  or	  with	  the	  ‘higher	  ups’	  
(Elden	   2012:	   145,	   205-­‐207,	   Parnell	   2012:	   35,	   Zeller	   2012:	   179,	   Tupper	   2010:	   18,	  
Skarpskyttere	  2010:	  106-­‐107,	  Courter	  2008:	  323,	  Johansen	  2011:	  108-­‐109).	  While	  the	  
memoirs	   indicate	   that	  all	   soldiers	   find	   the	   issue	  of	   corruption	  problematic	  and	  
counterproductive	   to	   their	  efforts,	   it	   is	  not	  necessarily	   represented	   in	   the	  same	  
way.	  Some	  show	  instances	  of	  understanding	  by	  saying	  that	  ‘corruption	  and	  crime	  
is	   not	   unusual,	   but	   the	   only	   thing	   they	   really	   want	   is	   to	   feed	   their	   families.	  
Afghans	   have,	   like	   everyone	   else,	   a	   will	   to	   survive’	   (Johansen	   2011:	   108-­‐107	   see	  
also	  ,	  Tupper	  2010:	  18).	  In	  other	  cases,	  thievery	  and	  crime	  are	  presented	  as	  non-­‐
situational,	   non-­‐contextual	   and	   as	   something	   inherent	   to	   Afghan	   culture	   –	   ‘I	  
know	   they’re	  poor;	   if	   they’d	   just	  ask	   for	   it,	   if	  we	  can,	  we’d	  give	   it	   to	   them.	  But	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they’d	   rather	   just	   steal.	  They	  go	   into	  denial	   saying,	   “We	  are	  Muslims,	  we	  don’t	  
steal”.	  Bullshit!’	  (Bordin	  2012:	  24).	  	  
That	   said,	   the	   conception	   of	   Afghan	   soldiers	   and	   Afghan	   society	   in	   general	  
reiterates	   several	   familiar	   orientalist	   tropes.	   Orientalist	   discourse,	   and	   the	  
process	   of	   orientalising	   the	   Other	   is	   a	   complex	   process,	   involving	   both	  
condemnation	   and	   fascination,	   exotification	   and	   desire.	   At	   times,	   it	   can	   be	  
relatively	  innocent,	  likening	  the	  experience	  of	  Afghanistan	  to	  how	  distant	  places	  
have	  been	  represented	  before.	  For	  instance	  Emil	  Johansen	  writes	  how	  ‘when	  the	  
night	   closes	  and	  morning	  dawns	  with	   the	   sun	   slowly	  creeping	  over	   the	  hills	   in	  
the	  east,	  you	  can	  hear	  prayer	  calls	  from	  the	  several	  hundred	  minarets	  in	  the	  town’	  
which	  was	  ‘like	  an	  exotic	  scene	  from	  a	  movie’	  (2011:	  56).	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  way	  that	  
soldiers	  themselves	  reiterate	  orientalist	  and	  colonial	  discourse	  is	  not	  necessarily	  
surprising,	  given	  that	  a	  certain	  ‘colonial	  nostalgia’	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  ‘written	  into’	  the	  
very	   concept	   of	   counterinsurgency	   itself,	   evident	   in	   the	   frequent	   references	   to	  
‘colonial	   heroes’	   such	   as	   ‘Lawrence	   of	   Arabia’,	   as	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   four	  
(Porter	  2009).	  For	  instance,	  Mella	  explains	  that	  after	  fighting	  in	  the	  mountainous	  
area	   between	   Afghanistan	   and	   Pakistan	   in	   1897,	   Winston	   Churchill	   described	  
how	  “every	  tribesman	  has	  a	  blood	  feud	  with	  his	  neighbour.	  Every	  man’s	  hand	  is	  
against	   the	  other,	  and	  all	  against	   the	  stranger”.	  Mella	   reflects	   that	   ‘It’s	   like	   this	  
still,	  over	  a	  hundred	  years	  later.	  Even	  with	  a	  UN-­‐mandate	  and	  support	  from	  the	  
Afghan	  government,	  we	  as	  foreigners	  will	  always	  be	  seen	  as	  intruders’	  (2013:	  125).	  
Here,	  Afghanistan	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  place	  lost	   in	  history,	  perpetually	  backwards,	  as	  a	  	  
‘land	  that	  time	  forgot’	  (Parnell	  2012:	  272).	  	  
As	   noted	   above,	   orientalism	   is	   ‘highly	   fluid’	   (Porter	   2009:	   23),	   involving	   a	  
complex	  mix	  of	  admiration,	  contempt,	  praise,	  disgust,	  fascination	  and	  confusion.	  
As	  Gerd	  Baumann	  and	  Andre	  Gingrich	  argue,	  
‘Orientalization	   constitutes	   self	   and	   other	   by	   negative	   mirror	   imaging:	   ‘what	   is	   good	   in	   us	   is	  
lacking	   in	  them’,	  but	  also	  adds	  a	  subordinate	  reversal:	   ‘what	   is	   lacking	   in	  us	   is	  (still)	  present	   in	  
them.’	  It	  thus	  entails	  a	  possibility	  of	  desire	  for	  the	  other	  and	  even,	  sometimes,	  a	  potential	  for	  self	  
critical	  relativism’	  (2004:	  x).	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Baumann	  and	  Gingrich	  explain	  how	  what	  is	  considered	  positive	  in	  the	  ‘occident’	  
finds	  its	  counterpart	  in	  the	  ‘orient’	  and	  vice	  versa.	  These	  kinds	  of	  mirror	  images	  
are	  also	  visible	  in	  the	  memoirs	  in	  the	  discourse	  about	  Afghan	  society.	  However,	  
while	  orientalisation	  can	  entail	  a	  positive	  admiration	  of	  an	  exotic	  place,	  a	  longing	  
back	   to	   an	   ‘easier	   time’	   or	   a	   degree	   of	   fascination,	   more	   often	   than	   not,	   it	  
signifies	   an	   overtly	   violent	   and	   dangerous	   place,	   much	   like	   the	   colonial	  
imaginaries	   of	   untouched	   places,	   ripe	   for	   civilising	   projects	   (McClintock	   1995).	  
Feminisation	   and	   infantilisation	   are	   often	   integral	   aspects	   of	   orientalism99	  that	  
posit	   the	   West	   as	   a	   superior	   civilization,	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	   East	   which	   is	  
perpetually	   inferior	   (Smith	   2006:	   68).	   As	   shown	   above	   with	   the	   example	   of	  
sexuality	   and	   the	   prevalence	   of	   heteronormativity	   in	  Western	  militaries,	   being	  
designated	  as	  effeminate	  is	  incompatible	  with	  a	  soldier	  identity.	  	  





















Figure	  no.1:	  The	  Grammar	  of	  Orientalization	  or	  Reverse	  Mirror-­‐Imaging	  (Baumann	  2004:	  20)	  
Soldiers	   deployed	   to	   Afghanistan	   therefore	   make	   sense	   of	   their	   experiences	  
partly	  through	  reiterating	  orientalist	  and	  colonial	  narratives,	  whether	  designated	  
as	  	  ‘oriental	  negative’	  or	  ‘oriental	  positive’	  in	  Baumann	  and	  Gingrich’s	  framework.	  
Woodward	  and	  Jenkins	  argue	  that	  British	  soldier	  memoirs	  are	  also	  often	  framed	  
with	   ‘reference	   to	   a	   geographical	   imagination	   of	   Afghanistan	   haunted	   by	   the	  
ghosts	   of	   the	   colonial	   past	   and	   its	   personification	   in	   the	   present’	   (2012:	   123).	  
Similarly,	   Duncanson	   and	   Cornish	   argue	   that	   while	   there	   are	   exceptions,	   ‘the	  
                                                
99	  Ryerson	  Christie	  argues	  that	  a	  similar	  tendency	  is	  present	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  PRTs	  where	  locals	  
are	   ‘orientalised	  and	   feminised	  as	   either	  passive	   recipients	  of	   aid	  or	   as	   the	  brutal	   and	  cowardly	  
insurgents’	  (2012:	  54)	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colonial	  overtones	  are	  clear	  in	  the	  simultaneous	  positioning	  of	  [British]	  soldiers	  
as	  superior,	  controlled,	  enlightened	  and	  rational,	  bringing	  stability	  and	  civilised	  
values	  to	  the	  primitive	  native’	  (2012:	  158).	  	  
Afghanistan	   as	   a	   country	   is,	   along	   with	   its	   culture,	   commonly	   represented	   as	  
overtly	   violent.	  Violence	   is	   naturally	   a	   recurring	   theme	   in	   any	   soldier	  memoir,	  
but	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   violence	   is	   often	   seen	   as	   something	   inherent	   to	  
Afghanistan	   itself,	   rather	   than	   something	   soldiers	   create	   or	   contribute	   to.	  
Johansen	  for	  instance	  writes	  that	  while	  ‘cultural	  training’	  was	  central	  prior	  to	  the	  
deployment	   of	   Norwegian	   troops	   (learning	   correct	  manners	   and	   phrases),	   this	  
seemed	   of	   little	   relevance	   when	   they	   arrived.	   Afghanistan	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   a	  
place	  where	  ‘you	  are	  not	  judged	  by	  how	  nice	  you	  are.	  It	  is	  survival	  of	  the	  fittest’	  
(Johansen	   2011:	   131,	   see	   also	   Skarpskyttere	   2010:	   80).	   Repeated	   references	   are	  
made	  in	  Elden	  to	  Ghowrmarch	  (area	  in	  Faryab)	  being	  ‘indian	  country,	  our	  indian	  
camp,	   the	  place	  where	  children	  die	  and	  warriors	  are	  born’	  (2012:	  91	  emphasis	  in	  
original,	  see	  also	  131),	  reiterating	  the	  imagination	  of	  a	  ‘wild	  west’	  where	  the	  good	  
guys	  (white	  cowboys)	  fight	  against	  the	  savage	  natives	  (brown	  Indians).	  	  
This	  discursive	  link	  between	  Afghanistan	  and	  violence	  is	  also	  related	  to	  the	  ways	  
in	   which	   it	   has	   been	   historically	   seen	   as	   a	   country	   of	   warriors,	   related	   to	   the	  
notion	  of	   ‘martial	  races’.	  A	  prevalent	  discourse	  in	  imperial	  Britain,	  this	  ideology	  
holds	  that	  certain	  races	  of	  men	  are	  either	  culturally	  or	  biologically	  predisposed	  to	  
warfare	   and	   fighting.	   Heather	   Streets	   argues	   that	   the	   power	   of	   this	   ideology,	  
applied	   to	  Ghurkhas,	   Sikhs	   and	   Scottish	  Highlanders,	   stems	   from	   its	   flexibility	  
and	   ambiguity:	   it	   was	   ‘adaptable	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   historical	   and	   geographical	  
situations	  and	  functioned	  alternately	  to	  inspire,	  intimidate,	  exclude	  and	  include’	  
(Streets	   2005:	   4).	   Connell	   likewise	   highlights	   the	   colonial	   designation	   of	  
supposed	  effeminate	  Bengali	  men,	  while	  Pathans	  (Pashtuns)	  and	  Sikhs	  were	  seen	  
as	   strong	   and	   warlike	   (2000:	   48).	   Inherent	   here	   is	   an	   intimate	   relationship	  
between	   masculinity	   and	   martiality,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   ‘the	   two	   terms	   were	  
occasionally	  used	  interchangeably’	  (Caplan	  1995:	  101)	  and	  where	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  
‘martial	  races’	  to	  make	  war	  was	  conflated	  with	  their	  masculinity	  (Streets	  2005:	  12).	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This	  kind	  of	  orientalisation	  involves	  a	  certain	  fascination	  and	  awe	  of	  ‘the	  Afghan	  
man’	   enabled	   through	   linking	   Afghan	  masculinity	   to	   a	   mythical	   ancient	   man,	  
surrounded	  by	  harsh	  nature	  and	  challenging	  topography.	  In	  some	  instances,	  the	  
geographical	  reality,	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	  men	  it	  breeds,	  is	  preferred	  to	  what	  can	  be	  
found	  back	  home.	   In	  Skarpskyttere,	   the	  author	  contrasts	   the	   ‘simple’	   life	  of	   the	  
Afghan	   farmer	   with	   the	   ‘broken	   backs’	   of	   the	   ‘Norwegian	   man’,	   who	   has	   left	  
traditional	  farming	  behind.	  Invoking	  historically	  important	  figures	  such	  as	  Otto	  
Sverdrup	   (Arctic	   explorer)	   and	  Hjalmar	   Johansen	   (Olympic	   skating	   champion)	  
the	  author	  finds	  it	  ‘disgusting’	  to	  think	  how	  the	  once	  proud	  Norwegian	  man	  has	  
gone	  from	  being	  a	  ‘stalwart	  hard	  worker	  to	  a	  sleek	  prancer’	  (Skarpskyttere	  2010:	  
134-­‐135).	   He	   contrasts	   the	   ‘modern’,	   ‘vain’,	   ‘demanding’	   Norwegian	   man	   -­‐-­‐	   a	  
‘shame	  for	  the	  country’	  -­‐-­‐	  with	  the	   ‘poor’,	   ‘simple’,	   ‘smiling’	  Afghan	  man	  who	  is	  
leading	  a	  ‘hard,	  but	  uncomplicated’	  life.	  The	  soldier	  clearly	  favours	  the	  latter	  by	  
romanticising	   and	  orientalising	   the	  harshness	  of	  Afghan	   life	   and	  Afghan	  men’s	  
ability	  to	  survive	  in	  it,	  over	  the	  feminisation	  of	  Norwegian	  men	  who	  ‘prance’.	  In	  a	  
sense,	  Skarpskyttere	  here	  invokes	  another	  mythical	  martial	  race,	  namely	  that	  of	  
the	  Viking,	  and	  validates	  both	  cultures	  as	  being	  symbolic	  of	  what	  ‘real	  men’	  are	  
all	   about	   and	   laments	   Norwegian	   men’s	   departure	   from	   it.	   Recall	   here	   the	  
importance	  of	  the	  Viking	  myth	  for	  the	  building	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  warrior	  culture,	  
as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  four.	  	  
At	  other	  times,	  orientalisation	  happens	  through	  distinguishing	  between	  different	  
types	   of	   Afghan	   warriors,	   validating	   those	   that	   fulfil	   a	   mythical	   image	   of	   the	  
proud	  Afghan	  warrior	  as	  opposed	  to	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  When	  Elden	  explains	  his	  
first	  meeting	  with	   the	   local	   police100	  (called	   arbakee)	   he	  writes	   that	   they	   came	  
riding	  towards	  them	  on	  ‘grand	  horses,	  dressed	  in	  colourful	  saddles	  and	  carpets’.	  
They	  had	   ‘pretty	  clothes,	   trimmed	  moustaches	  and	  beards,	  and	  AK’s	  and	  RPG’s	  
hanging	  over	   their	   shoulders’,	  which	  gave	  him	  a	   ‘flashback	   to	  Rambo	   III,	  when	  
Rambo	   worked	   with	   the	   riding	   mujahedeen-­‐insurgents	   to	   beat	   the	   Russians’.	  
These	  are	  contrasted	  with	  the	  ANA/ANP	  in	  that	  the	  arbakee	  do	  not	  receive	  any	  
                                                
100	  The	  arbakee	   is	   a	   kind	  of	   tribal	   or	   local	   police,	   outside	   the	   formalised	   structures	   of	   the	  ANP.	  
They	   implement	   the	   rule	   of	   the	   tribal	   Jirga	   and	   are	   legitimated	   and	   controlled	   by	   tribal	   elders	  
(Schetter	  et	  al.	  2007:	  147).	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backing	   from	   the	   government,	   and	   they	   are	   ‘real	  warriors’	   and	   ‘proud	  Afghans	  
who	   protected	   their	   own’	   (Elden	   2012:	   167).	   For	   Elden,	   these	   men	   bore	   a	  
resemblance	   to	   the	   notorious	   and	  mythical	  mujahedeen,	   and	   seem	   to	   confirm	  
the	  image	  of	  the	  dedicated,	  proud	  and	  tough	  Afghan	  warrior.	  	  
As	   shown	   above,	   the	   process	   of	   orientalisation	   is	   multifaceted,	   involving	   a	  
complex	  dynamic	  of	   fascination	   and	   contempt,	   evident	   in	   the	   interactions	   and	  
observations	   of	   both	  US	   and	  Norwegian	   troops	  with	   the	  ANA	   recruits	   and	   the	  
wider	   Afghan	   society	   more	   generally.	   The	   final	   section	   below	   provides	   an	  
analysis	   of	   how	   these	   colonial	   and	   orientalist	   frameworks	   affect	   NATO’s	   ‘Exit	  
Strategy’,	   and	   attempts	   to	   give	   an	   account	   of	   what	   possibilities	   these	  
orientalising	  constructions	  both	  enable	  and	  restrain.	  
	  
3.1	  The	  Politics	  of	  Cultural	  Incompatibility	  	  	  	  
It	   is	  not	  the	  intention	  here	  to	  dispute	  the	  many	  challenges	  and	  frustrations	  felt	  
by	  those	  deployed	  as	  trainers,	  mentors,	  advisors	  and	  soldiers	  alongside	  the	  ANA	  
(see	   among	   others	   Haug	   2009,	   Krekvik	   2011,	   Giustozzi	   2009,	   Bordin	   2012).	  
However,	   since	   this	   thesis	   understands	   performances	   of	   identity	   as	   relational,	  
how	   these	   challenges	   are	   represented	   and	   what	   they	   imply	   is	   very	   important	  
(Duncanson	   and	  Cornish	   2012:	   158).	   The	  memoirs	   and	   reports	   discussed	   above	  
form	  part	  of	  the	  ‘regime	  of	  knowledge’	  (Foucault	  1994:	  331)	  about	  Afghan	  men	  as	  
soldiers	  and	  as	   such,	  construct	  certain	   ‘truths’	  about	   the	  ANA	  and	  Afghanistan	  
more	  broadly.	  When	  culture	  is	  deployed	  as	  a	   ‘catch	  all’	  term,	  which	  supposedly	  
explains	   the	   perpetual	   gap	   between	   ISAF	   and	   the	   ANA	   through	   a	   series	   of	  
negative	  traits,	  this	  becomes	  deeply	  problematic,	  not	  only	  practically	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  potential	  for	  success	  in	  this	  ‘Exit	  Strategy’,	  but	  also	  politically.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  memoirs	  and	  wider	  academic	  literature	  on	  training	  the	  ANA,	  
this	  chapter	  has	  drawn	  on	  two	  recent	  reports	  that	  study	  the	  relationship	  between	  
US	   and	   Norwegian	   soldiers	   and	   their	   Afghan	   counterparts	   respectively.	   One	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focuses	  specifically	  on	  Norwegian	  officers	  experiences	  as	  OMLT	  staff	  and	  aims	  to	  
shed	  more	   light	   on	   the	   role	   that	   the	  military	   forces	   can	   play	   in	   implementing	  
Norwegian	  foreign	  policy	  (Krekvik	  2011:	  8).	  As	  such,	  the	  report	  reads	  as	  a	  means	  
though	   which	   the	   military	   can	   identify	   best	   practices	   and	   take	   appropriate	  
measures	  to	  institutionalise	  these.	  	  
However,	  the	  US	  report	  has	  a	  rather	  different	  story	  to	  it.	  It	  is	  entitled	  A	  Crisis	  of	  
Trust	   and	   Cultural	   Incompatibility,	   and	   was	   published	   as	   ‘unclassified’	   in	  May	  
2012.	   It	   aims	   at	   ‘understanding	   and	   mitigating	   the	   phenomena	   of	   ANSF	  
committed	  fratricide	  murders’	  (Bordin	  2012).	  Since	  its	  publication,	  however,	  the	  
number	   of	   ‘green	   on	   blue’	   attacks	   against	   ISAF	   forces	   have	   increased	  
dramatically,	  with	  a	   total	  of	  60	  NATO	  troops	  killed	   in	  2012	   (BBC	  2013,	   see	  also	  
Guardian	  2012a),	   and	   the	   report	  was	   subsequently	   ‘retrospectively	   classified’	  by	  
the	  US	  military	  (Graham-­‐Harrison	  2012).101	  Bordin	  argues	  that	  the	  ISAF	  has	  been	  
‘disingenuous,	   if	   not	   profoundly	   intellectually	   dishonest’	   in	   its	   insistence	   that	  
these	   attacks	   are	   ‘isolated’	   or	   ‘extremely	   rare’	   (2012:	   5).	   The	   ‘green	   on	   blue’	  
attacks	  are	  most	  often	  explained	  as	  a	  new	  tactic	  from	  Taliban	  forces,	  which	  are	  
said	  to	  have	  infiltrated	  the	  ANSF	  and	  subsequently	  attack	  ISAF	  soldiers.	  However,	  
several	   indicators	   suggest	   that	   the	   attacks	   are	   sparked	   less	   by	   the	  Taliban	   and	  
more	  by	  internal	  animosity	  between	  coalition	  forces	  and	  Afghan	  soldiers.102	  
It	  might	  be	  worth	  considering,	  however,	  whether	  both	  the	  Taliban	  and	  internal	  
animosity	  are	  a	  smoke	  screen	  that	  hinders	  us	  from	  recognising	  that	  the	  ‘green	  on	  
blue’	   attacks	   may	   also	   be	   a	   strategy	   of	   resistance.	   As	   Barkawi	   argues,	   while	  
‘culture’	  may	  be	  a	  medium	  whereby	  discontent	  is	  expressed,	  the	  real	  reason	  for	  
‘green	  on	  blue’	  attacks	  are	  that	  Afghan	  soldiers	  are	  resisting	  foreign	  occupation	  
(2012).	  Similarly,	  Nasim	  Fekrat,	  an	  Afghan	  blogger,	  argues	  that	  the	  NATO	  night	  
raids	  resulting	  in	  civilian	  casualties	  mean	  that	  the	   ‘attackers	  are	  not	  necessarily	  
                                                
101	  It	   is	   worth	   noting	   here	   that	   as	   of	   yet,	   Norwegian	   soldiers	   have	   not	   been	   attacked	   by	   ANSF	  
forces	  (Hansen	  2012b).	  In	  comparison,	  of	  the	  39	  being	  killed	  between	  July	  2010-­‐May	  2012,	  32	  were	  
Americans	  (Bordin	  2012:	  4).	  That	  said,	  there	  are	  thousands	  more	  US	  soldiers	  in	  Afghanistan	  than	  
Norwegians.	  	  
102	  CNN	   reports	   that	   Taliban	   forces	   cause	   around	   25	   per	   cent,	   a	   number	   that	  matches	   Bordin’s	  
report	  (Starr	  2012,	  Bordin	  2012,	  see	  also	  Graham-­‐Harrison	  2012).	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linked	   to	   the	   Taliban;	  most	   of	   time,	   they	   act	   independently,	   inspired	   by	   their	  
need	  to	  bring	  pride	  back	  to	  their	  families’	  (2012).	  	  
The	  story	  behind	  this	  report	  is	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  telling	  in	  terms	  of	  understanding	  
the	  challenges	  associated	  with	  the	  ‘Exit	  Strategy’	  and	  the	  difficult	  waters	  in	  which	  
it	  treads.	  What	  is	  also	  telling	  is	  how	  differently	  the	  US	  and	  ANA	  soldiers	  express	  
their	  grievances	  towards	  one	  another.	  The	  Afghan	  complaints	  are	  centred	  mainly	  
on	   operational	   aspects	   (e.g.	   use	   of	   night	   patrols,	   civilian	   casualties,	   flawed	  
intelligence	  sources	  and	  US	  road	  blocks)	  and,	  as	  such,	  express	  concerns	  that	  can	  
be	   addressed.	   By	   contrast,	   the	   US	   grievances	   are	   far	   more	   concerned	   with	  
(immutable)	   cultural	   differences	   (Afghans	   lie,	   use	   drugs,	   are	   traitorous,	  
dangerous	  and	  incompetent),	  through	  which	  Afghans	  are	  stereotyped.103	  
A	  recurring	  representation	   in	   the	  US	  report	  and	   in	  some	  of	   the	  memoirs,	  or	  at	  
certain	   points	   in	   a	  memoir’s	   narrative,	   is	   that	  Afghan	   soldiers,	   and	  Afghans	   in	  
general,	   are	   untrustworthy	   and	   deceitful	   -­‐	   something	   that	   is	   explained	   as	   a	  
cultural	   characteristic.	  Courter	   explains	   that,	   ‘When	  caught	   in	   a	   lie,	   an	  Afghan	  
will	  often	  try	  to	  change	  the	  subject,	  rather	  than	  accept	  personal	  responsibility…it	  
happens	  a	  lot	  and	  seems	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  more	  negative	  aspects	  of	  their	  culture’	  
(2008:	  133).	  Parnell	  was	  told	  before	  his	  deployment	  that,	  ‘Lying	  is	  a	  part	  of	  their	  
culture’	  and	  that,	  ‘there	  is	  no	  stigma	  to	  it;	  it	  is	  expected’	  (2012:	  40).	  Likewise,	  the	  
‘crisis	   of	   trust’	   between	   the	   US	   forces	   and	   the	   ANA	   is	   destined	   to	   stem	   from	  
‘cultural	  incompatibility’,	  with	  one	  soldier	  stating	  that,	  ‘I	  wouldn’t	  trust	  the	  ANA	  
with	  anything,	  never	  mind	  my	  life’	  (Bordin	  2012:	  25).	  	  
                                                
103	  The	  report	  groups	  together	  the	  complaints	  in	  different	  tiers,	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  times	  they	  
were	  raised	  in	  focus	  groups,	  surveys	  and	  interviews.	  Of	  the	  top	  tier	  ANSF	  complaints,	  only	  3	  out	  
of	   9	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	   cultural	   in	   character	   (don't	   respect	   women	   or	   their	   privacy,	   they	   curse	  
constantly,	  are	  extremely	  arrogant;	   fail	   to	   listen	  to	  or	  take	  advice	  from	  ANSF).	  While	  this	   is	  not	  
unsubstantial,	   it	   is	   far	   less	   than	   the	   US	   grievances.	   7	   out	   of	   the	   11	   first	   tier	   complaints	   by	   US	  
soldiers	   can	   be	   categorised	   as	   cultural,	   leaving	   ‘poor/unsafe	  weapons	   handling	   discipline,	   ‘poor	  
fire	  control	  during	  fire	  fights’,	   ‘dysfunctional	  logistics/supply	  systems’	  and	  ‘poor	  ANA	  leadership’	  
to	  be	  the	  only	  structural	  or	  operational	  grievances.	   	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	   ‘particularly	  low	  
ratings	  were	  found	  among	  U.S.	  officers’	  and	  senior	  NCOs’	  ratings	  as	  well	  as	  among	  those	  soldiers	  
located	   in	   the	   most	   combat-­‐intensive	   regions’	   (Bordin	   2012:	   29).	   Conversely,	   Krekvik’s	   study	  
found	   that	   frustrations	   over	   ANA	   behaviour	   was	   stronger	   with	   younger	   soldiers	   who	  were	   not	  
deployed	   in	  a	  mentoring	  capacity	  and	   those	  who	  did	  not	  have	  a	   ‘personal	   relationship’	  with	  an	  
Afghan	  partner	  (2011:	  33).	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The	   US	   report,	   together	   with	   the	   orientalist	   and	   colonial	   representations	  
discussed	  throughout	  this	  chapter,	  is	  both	  practically	  and	  politically	  problematic.	  
Western	   perceptions	   of	   what	   Afghans	   ‘lack’	   are	   shaped	   in	   large	   part	   by	   an	  
orientalist	   and	  colonial	   frame,	   and	  an	  excessive	   focus	  on	  cultural	   explanations.	  
While	  the	  ‘crisis	  of	  trust’	  is	  no	  doubt	  deeply	  damaging	  to	  any	  potential	  of	  genuine	  
alliance	   between	   the	   ISAF	   and	   the	   ANA,	   equally	   problematic	   is	   what	   the	  
equation	   between	   this	   ‘lack’	   and	   ‘culture’	   enables	  Western	  militaries	   to	   claim,	  
once	  they	  have	  withdrawn.	  When	  this	  is	  a	  reality	  in	  2014,	  probably	  regardless	  of	  
the	  state	  of	  the	  ANSF	  -­‐	  whatever	  follows	  in	  terms	  of	  instability	  and	  insecurity	  can	  
then	   be	   explained	   in	   these	   cultural	   terms.	   For,	   if	   ‘their’	   culture	   was	   always	  
‘incompatible’	  with	  ‘ours’,	  ‘we’	  can	  then	  claim	  to	  have	  tried	  as	  hard	  as	  ‘we’	  could,	  
but	  ‘they’	  were	  simply	  unchangeable.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  detailed	  how	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  the	  ANA	  involves	  a	  complex	  and	  
ambitious	   combination	   of	   disciplining	   individual	   soldier	   bodies,	   and	   the	  
transformation	  of	  the	  entire	  Afghan	  ‘body	  politic’.	  It	  has	  focused	  on	  what	  Afghan	  
soldiers	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  lacking	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  become	  recognised	  as	  ‘real	  
soldiers’.	  Only	   by	   becoming	   disciplined,	   by	   accepting	   a	   standardised	   hierarchy	  
and	  coming	  together	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  national	  unity,	  can	  they	  become	  protectors	  
of	   the	   transition	   in	  Afghanistan	   from	  the	   ‘traditional’	   to	   the	   ‘modern’.	   In	  other	  
words,	  this	  rebuilding	  requires	  a	  change	  of	  Afghan	  ‘culture’.	  	  
The	  first	  section	  outlined	  the	  background	  of	  the	  history	  of	  rebuilding	  the	  Afghan	  
military	   and	   its	   place	   in	   the	   broader	   liberal	   project	   in	   Afghanistan.	  While	   the	  
‘Exit	   Strategy’	   arguably	   relies	   on	   the	   ANA	   soldiers	   being	   viewed	   as	   ‘less-­‐than-­‐
radical-­‐others’,	  this	  neither	  means	  that	  allied	  soldiers	  themselves	  perceive	  them	  
as	  ‘less	  than	  radical’,	  nor	  that	  the	  remaking	  is	  made	  any	  easier.	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As	   shown	   in	   the	   second	   section,	   both	   individual	   soldier	   bodies	   need	   to	   be	  
remade	   alongside	   the	   entire	   ‘body	   politic’	   of	   Afghanistan.	   Individually,	   Afghan	  
soldier	   bodies	   need	   to	   be	   regulated	   in	   deeply	   embodied	   and	   gendered	   ways,	  
involving	  not	  only	  a	   regulation	  of	   training	  and	  skill,	  but	  also	  of	   their	   sexuality.	  
This	   shows	   how	   Western	   militaries	   remain	   bastions	   of	   heteronormativity	   -­‐	  
equating	   soldiering	   with	   heterosexuality	   and,	   consequently,	   subordinating	   a	  
range	   of	   ‘confusing’	   Afghan	   practices	   as	   homosexuality.	  While	   Afghan	   soldiers	  
are	   recognized	   as	   brave	   in	   both	   the	  memoirs	   and	   in	   other	   army	   literature,	   in	  
order	  for	  them	  to	  become	  ‘real’	  soldiers,	  their	  bravery	  needs	  to	  be	  sanitised	  and	  
controlled	   through	  discipline	   and	  professionalization.	   In	   addition,	   as	   shown	   in	  
chapter	   two,	   the	  moulding	   of	   an	   army	   requires	   that	   bodies	   be	   also	   ordered	   in	  
relation	   to	   one	   another	   by	   incorporating	   them	   in	   a	   hierarchy.	   The	   chapter	  
discussed	   how	   allied	   forces	   emphasise	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   Afghans	   have	   a	  
different	  perception	  of	  leadership	  from	  the	  one	  the	  West	  is	  trying	  to	  instil	  upon	  
them,	  which	  arises	  as	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  a	  standardised	  and	  
bureaucratic	  hierarchy.	  	  
The	   last	  part	  of	   the	  chapter	   illustrated	  how	  soldiers	  rely	  on	  complex	  orientalist	  
presuppositions	   in	   the	   way	   they	   encounter	   and	   represent	   their	   Afghan	  
counterparts.	  Afghanistan	   is	   at	   once	   a	   fascinating	   and	   condemned	  place,	   to	  be	  
desired	   and	   abhorred.	   Evident	   in	   these	   constructions	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   colonial	  
nostalgia,	   and	   imaginings	   of	   Afghan	   men	   representing	   the	   hypermasculine,	  
authentic	  and	  ancient	  man	   that	  are	   contrasted	  with	   the	  civilised	  and	   therefore	  
feminised	  Western	  man	  back	  home.	  While	  the	  memoirs	  include	  both	  ‘good’	  and	  
‘bad’	   Afghans,	   the	   ‘culture’	   of	   Afghanistan	   is	   rarely,	   if	   ever,	   represented	   as	  
something	  positive	  or	  worth	  maintaining.	  In	  other	  words,	  those	  who	  are	  deemed	  
‘good’	  Afghans,	  often	  run	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  monolithic	  and	  appropriating	  ‘culture’,	  
and	   therefore	   stand	   out	   as	   exceptions.	   As	   a	   whole,	   therefore,	   this	   chapter	   has	  
shown	  how	  complex	  and	  detailed	  the	  gendered	  and	  embodied	  remaking	  of	   the	  
ANA	  is,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  orientalist	  underpinnings.	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The	   next	   chapter	   concludes	   this	   thesis	   by	   highlighting	   its	   key	   claims	   and	  
contributions	  to	  knowledge.	  Like	  this	  chapter	  has	  shown,	  it	  emphasises	  that	  the	  

















-­‐ Chapter	  7	  -­‐	  
Conclusions	  
	  
Gender,	  when	  studied	   in	  a	  poststructuralist/critical	   feminist	   framework	  can	  be	  a	  
difficult	  concept	  to	  ‘handle’.	  It	  is	  flexible,	  slippery,	  multiple	  and	  ‘messy’.	  Instead	  of	  
trying	   to	   bridge	   or	   resolve	   gender’s	   inconsistency,	   this	   study	   has	   aimed	   at	  
embracing	  its	  fluidity	  and	  internal	  contradictions	  as	  inherent	  to	  its	  very	  possibility.	  
As	   Kathy	   Ferguson	   has	   suggested,	   keeping	   contradictions	   alive	  may	   just	   be	   the	  
feminist	  way	  of	  generating	  new	  knowledge	  (Sylvester	  2002:	  21).	  	  
There	  are	  three	  key	  claims	  that	  this	  study	  has	  made,	  all	  of	  which	  have	  implications	  
not	   just	   for	  how	  we	  approach	   the	  war	   in	  Afghanistan,	  but	   also	   for	   studying	  war	  
more	  broadly.	  This	  conclusion	  will	  proceed	  to	  first	  summarise	  these	  three	  claims	  
in	   relation	   to	   the	   four	   empirical	   chapters,	  before	  discussing	   them	  more	   in	  more	  
detail	  in	  relation	  to	  conceptual	  and	  theoretical	  contributions.	  The	  conclusion	  will	  
end	  by	  providing	  some	  directions	  for	  future	  research.	  	  
First,	  this	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  war	  is	  gendered	  and	  embodied	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  
calls	  into	  being	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  gendered	  bodies	  that	  in	  turn	  perform	  femininity	  
and	   masculinity	   in	   various	   and	   often	   contradictory	   ways.	   In	   the	   invasion	   of	  
Afghanistan	  in	  2001,	  as	  shown	  in	  chapter	  three,	  the	  oppression	  of	  Afghan	  women’s	  
bodies	   surfaced	  as	  a	   legitimation	   for	  why	   it	  was	   just	   to	   invade.	  Afghan	  women’s	  
bodies,	   in	  the	  words	  of	  Foucault,	  became	  a	   ‘political	   field’	  where	  power	  relations	  
took	   hold	   (1991:	   25).	   Through	   a	   strong	   visual	   and	   discursive	   emphasis	   on	   the	  
(in)visible	   ‘body	   in	   the	  burqa’	   the	  discourse	  of	   liberation	  was	  written	  on	  Afghan	  
women’s	  bodies	  (De	  Certeau	  1984).	  This	  critical	  feminist	  reading	  of	  the	  gendered	  
intervention	   in	   Afghanistan	   showed	   that	   while	   gender	   performances	   were	  
important	   to	   the	   legitimation	   of	   the	   war	   in	   both	   American	   and	   Norwegian	  
narratives,	   these	  were	  played	  out	  differently.	  While	   the	   focus	   on	   the	  burqa	   as	   a	  
symbol	  of	  oppression	  was	  stronger	  in	  the	  American	  than	  in	  Norwegian	  narratives,	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the	   Norwegian	   government’s	   decision	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   OEF	   revealed	   other	  
gendered	   dimensions	   of	   its	   foreign	   policy	   constructions.	   There	   was	   a	   need	   for	  
Norway,	  as	  a	  ‘small	  boy’,	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘capable’	  and	  ‘relevant’	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  US	  
and	  NATO	  as	  the	  ‘big	  boys’,	  something	  that	  required	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘remasculinisation’	  
of	  Norwegian	  foreign	  policy.	  However,	  despite	  the	  various	  differences	  between	  the	  
US	   and	   Norway,	   performances	   of	   ‘protective	   masculinity’	   (Young	   2003b,	   Young	  
2003a)	  were	  central	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  both	  countries	  legitimated	  the	  invasion.	  	  
Second,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   in	  
chapters	   four	   and	   five,	   illuminates	   how	   the	   practice	   of	   war	   calls	   into	   being	  
particular	   gendered	   bodies	   and	   gendered	   performances	   through	   its	   dynamic	   of	  
‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  While	  militaries	  have	  always	  required	  a	  number	  of	   roles	  and	  
responsibilities,	   in	   turn	  produced	  by	  and	  productive	  of	   a	  multiplicity	  of	  military	  
masculinities	   (Higate	   2003b,	   Duncanson	   2009,	   Belkin	   2012),	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   has	   in	   a	   sense	   written	   this	   into	   its	   very	   doctrine.	   However,	  
while	   the	   doctrine	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   encompasses	   both	  
dimensions,	   the	   way	   this	   is	   played	   out	   entails	   a	   series	   of	   complex	   gendered	  
productions	  and	  positionings.	   ‘Killing’	  and	  combat,	  primarily	  associated	  with	  the	  
historically	   valorised	   ‘warrior	   masculinity’	   is	   tempered	   by	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   and	  
performances	   of	   ‘protective	   masculinity’.	   ‘Soldier-­‐scholars’	   advocate	   a	   type	   of	  
warfare	  that	  places	  the	  population	  as	  the	  ‘centre	  of	  gravity	  –	  the	  deciding	  factor	  in	  
the	   struggle’	   (USArmy	   et	   al.	   2007:	   xxv),	   which	   requires	   a	   range	   of	   ‘non-­‐kinetic’	  
activities	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  ‘winning	  hearts	  and	  minds’	  through	  providing	  medicine,	  
digging	   wells	   and	   building	   schools.	   Recalling	   here	   Zeller’s	   description	   of	  
counterinsurgency	   as	   a	   ‘thinking	  man’s	   fight’	   (2012:	   221),	   this	   is	   cast	   as	   being	   a	  
smarter,	  more	  intelligent	  and	  culturally	  ‘in	  tuned’	  way	  of	  warfare.	  In	  other	  words,	  
it	  relies	  on	  different	  productions	  and	  performances	  of	  military	  masculinity,	  that	  at	  
times	   appear	   as	   superior.	   However,	   the	   memoirs	   show	   that	   soldiers	   are	   not	  
necessarily	   particularly	   interested	   in	   a	   devalorisation	   of	   ‘killing’	   and	   combat,	  
something	  that	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  way	  that	  ‘Fobbits’	  are	  continuously	  feminised	  and	  
subordinated	   and	   become	   symbols	   of	   the	   ‘civilianising’	   of	   the	  military.	   In	   other	  
words,	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’	  military	  masculinity	   is	   far	   from	  being	  hegemonic,	   as	   the	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desire	   to	   experience	   combat	   and	   to	   perform	   as	   ‘real	   soldiers’	   is	   still	   strong.	  
Furthermore,	  ‘warrior	  masculinity’	  is	  under	  threat	  by	  the	  greater	  diversity	  of	  tasks	  
assigned	  to	  soldiers.	  Similarly,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  five,	  female	  soldiers	  in	  their	  
capacity	  as	  FETs,	  remain	  central	  to	  the	  ‘caring’	  of	  counterinsurgency,	  as	  they	  carry	  
out	   particular	   forms	   of	   feminised	   labour	   for	   counterinsurgency.	   This	   is	   in	   turn	  
reliant	   upon	   another	   gendered	   production,	   where	   Afghan	   women	   are	   re-­‐
configured	   from	   the	   silent	   and	   passive	   victim	   of	   the	   invasion,	   to	   being	   cast	   as	  
valuable	   and	   knowledgeable	   information	   sources,	   and	   positioned	   as	   worth	  
listening	   to.	   As	   such,	   this	   type	   of	  warfare,	  while	   encompassing	   a	  multiplicity	   of	  
gendered	   performances	   and	   ebbs	   and	   flows	   in	   terms	   of	   which	   type	   of	   military	  
masculinity	   is	   deemed	   superior	   at	   any	   given	   time,	   also	   tends	   to	   reinforce	  
particular	   gendered	   constellations	   where	   women	   are	   primarily	   associated	   with	  
caring	  and	  nurturing,	  or	  as	  bearers	  of	  ‘secret’	  and	  private	  knowledge	  that	  needs	  to	  
be	  accessed	  and	  harnessed.	  	  
Third,	  as	  part	  of	  studying	  war’s	  gendered	  and	  embodied	  nature,	  this	  examination	  
has	   also	   shown	   how	   Western	   warfare	   in	   Afghanistan	   aims	   at	   having	  
transformational	   effect	   on	   individuals	   and	   the	   wider	   society.	   This	   is	   evident	  
throughout	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war,	  whether	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  women’s	  liberation	  
in	  the	  invasion,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three;	   in	  the	  way	  that	  counterinsurgency	  
conducts	   ‘armed	   empowerment’	   through	   seeking	   to	   insert	   itself	   into	   the	   gender	  
dynamics	   in	  Afghanistan	  with	  a	  view	  to	  transform	  these,	  as	  discussed	   in	  chapter	  
five;	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  remaking	  of	  Afghan	  men	  into	  soldiers	  in	  a	  modern	  and	  
effective	  army,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  six.	  Chapter	  six	  shows	  how	  the	  remoulding	  
of	   Afghan	   soldier	   bodies	   involves	   a	   series	   of	   complex	   gendered	   relations	   where	  
Afghans	   are	   cast	   as	   simultaneously	   hypermasculine	   and	   feminine,	   and	   these	  
orientalisations	  affect	  the	  production	  of	  bodies.	  While	  Afghans	  may	  be	  perceived	  
as	  brave	  and	  willing	  to	  fight,	  this	  needs	  to	  be	  regimented,	  collectivised	  and	  martial	  
in	  particular	  ways.	  The	  bodies	  of	   fledgling	  Afghan	  recruits	  are	  here	  sought	  to	  be	  
transformed	  as	  parts	  of	  a	  wider	  collective	  body,	  a	  ‘body	  politic’	  that	  is	  disciplined,	  
hierarchically	   and	   bureaucratically	   organized	   and	   beaming	   with	   a	   sense	   of	  
national	  unity.	  By	  way	  of	  Foucault,	  who	  argued	  that	  war	  is	  fought	  on	  the	  ‘terrain	  
 195	  
of	   the	   human	   body’	   (Reid	   2006:	   130),	   we	   can	   see	   in	   Afghanistan	   the	  means	   by	  
which	   Afghan	   soldiers’	   bodies	   need	   to	   become	   ‘sentinels	   of	   Afghan	   democracy’	  
(Chan	  2009),	  these	  bodies	  need	  to	  be	  remade	  in	  order	  to	  transcend	  the	  ‘traditional’	  
in	   favour	   of	   mirroring	   the	   ‘modern’.	   These	   transformations	   speaks	   to	   a	   type	   of	  
warfare	  that	  reiterates	  several	  colonial	  and	  orientalist	  tropes,	  and	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘civil-­‐
military	  war	  machine’	  that	  employs	  a	  ‘complex	  combination	  of	  scholarly	  guidance,	  
development	   expertise	   and	   both	   metropolitan	   and	   local	   military	   forces’	  
(Feichtinger	  et	  al.	  2012:	  37).	  	  
	  
1.0	  Writing	  Martial	  Bodies	  of	  the	  War	  in	  Afghanistan	  	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  contributions	  that	  this	  thesis	  wants	  to	  make	  therefore	  is	  to	  offer	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  way	  that	  war	  writes	  bodies.	  While	  bodies	  are	  everywhere	  in	  
IR,	  the	  body	  remains	  the	  most	  visible	  and	  invisible	  component	  of	  politics	  (Coole	  
2007:	   413).	   The	   thesis	   conceptualises	   its	   theoretical	   approach	   to	   studying	   the	  
production	  of	  gendered	  bodies	  in	  war	  through	  a	  poststructuralist/critical	  feminist	  
approach,	   but	   combines	   the	   performativity	   of	   gender,	   drawing	   particularly	   on	  
Judith	  Butler	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  performativity’s	  embodiment	  through	  the	  work	  
of	   De	   Certeau	   and	   Foucault.	   The	   thesis	   has	   sought	   to	   develop	   a	   theoretical	  
framework	  that	  emphasises	  the	  intimate	  links	  between	  gender	  performativity	  and	  
the	   production	   of	   gendered	   martial	   bodies,	   by	   taking	   as	   its	   starting	   point	   that	  
discourses	  manifest	  themselves	  and	  call	  into	  being	  particular	  bodies.	  In	  the	  words	  
of	  De	  Certeau,	  laws	  and	  regulations	  ‘take	  hold	  of	  bodies’	  (1984:	  139).	  	  
Conceptually,	   this	   claim	  rests	  on	   feminist	   interventions	   in	  political	   thought	   that	  
challenging	   the	  mind-­‐body	   dichotomy	   and	   the	   privileging	   of	   the	  mind	   over	   the	  
body.	  As	  Grosz	  explains,	  this	  privileging	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  other	  
binaries	   such	   as	   reason/passion	   and	   sense/sensibility	   that	   constitutes	   the	  
masculine	  with	   the	  privileged	  and	   the	   feminine	  with	   the	   subordinated	   (1994:	   3).	  
Bodies	  are	  not,	  as	  in	  Cartesian	  dualism,	  neutral	  vessels	  for	  the	  mind,	  a	  conception	  
that	  has	  historically	  left	  women	  with	  little	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  all	  the	  body.	  Bodies	  are	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not	   ahistorical,	   biologically	   given	   and	   acultural	   (Grosz	   1994:	   18),	   nor	   are	   they	  
devoid	  of	  race.	  Rather,	  as	  Foucault	  argues,	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  power	  relations	  that	  
invest	  in	  them,	  mark	  them	  and	  bring	  them	  into	  being	  as	  they	  are	  ‘directly	  involved	  
in	  the	  political	  field’	  (1991:	  25).	  How	  war	  writes	  gendered	  bodies	  has	  been	  explored	  
in	  this	  research	  through	  various	  bodies	  that	  are	  produced	  during	  the	  course	  of	  this	  
war.	   The	   (in)visible	   ‘bodies	   in	   the	   burqas’,	   which	   were	   used	   to	   legitimate	   the	  
invasion;	  the	  bodies	  of	  female	  soldiers	  necessary	  to	  access	  other	  female	  bodies	  in	  
order	  to	  gather	  intelligence	  and	  to	  ‘reinforce	  the	  message	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  
on	   the	   side	   of	   the	   people’	   (CALL	   2011:	   59);	   the	   body	   of	   ‘Fobbits’,	   ‘warriors’	   and	  
‘soldier-­‐scholars’	  with	  their	  multiple	  performances	  of	  military	  masculinity;	  and	  the	  
bodies	   of	   fledgling	   Afghan	   recruits	   being	  moulded	   into	   the	   shape	   of	   a	   modern	  
military	   force.	   These	   bodies	   are	   not	   superficial	   to	   the	   legitimation,	   practice	   or	  
outcome	  of	  war	  but	  integral	  to	  it	  in	  every	  way.	  	  
Hence,	  how	  the	  military	  writes	  (about/on)	  bodies	  has	  formed	  a	  central	  part	  of	  the	  
analysis.	   According	   to	   De	   Certeau,	   the	   clue	   to	   understanding	   how	   bodies	   are	  
called	  into	  being	  is	  in	  the	  everyday,	  seemingly	  trivial	  details.	  He	  writes	  that	  	  
‘as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  removing	  the	  hair	  from	  one’s	  legs,	  or	  putting	  mascara	  on	  one’s	  eyelashes,	  having	  
one’s	  hair	  cut	  or	  having	  hair	  reimplanted,	  this	  activity	  of	  extracting	  or	  adding	  on	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  
reference	  to	  a	  code.	  It	  keeps	  bodies	  within	  the	  limits	  set	  by	  a	  norm’	  (De	  Certeau	  1984:	  147).	  	  
Militaries	   are	   places	   where	   bodies	   are	   disciplined	   and	   regulated	   to	   extreme	  
degrees	  in	  order	  to	  conform	  to	  ‘a	  code’	  and	  ‘a	  norm’,	  whether	  these	  are	  Western	  
martial	  bodies	  or	  bodies	  of	  Afghan	  soldier	  recruits.	  The	  military	  recognizes	  that	  
bodies	   are	   not	   given,	   but	   can	   be	  marked,	   trained	   and	   shaped.	   Bodies	   are	   here	  
‘pliable	   and	  plastic	  material,	  which	   are	   capable	  of	   being	   formed	  and	  organised’	  
(Grosz	   2004:	   181).	   Diet,	   exercise,	   appearance,	   grooming	   and	   sexuality	   all	   fall	  
under	   the	   domain	   of	   what	   the	   military	   needs	   to	   concern	   itself	   with.	   As	   the	  
Norwegian	   soldier	   Emil	   Johansen	   recalls	   once	   taken	   up	   in	   the	  military	   –	   ‘I	   no	  
longer	  decided	  what	  clothes	   to	  wear,	  how	  my	  hair	  would	   look,	  or	  how	   I	  would	  
shape	  my	  beard.	  Now	  I	  represented	  something	  more	  than	  myself.	  ’	  (2011:	  34).	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The	   aesthetic	   conformity	   of	   the	  military	   has	   been	   important	   for	   the	   analysis	   in	  
several	  parts	  of	  this	  thesis,	  both	  as	  something	  that	  signifies	  internal	  coherence	  to	  a	  
regulation,	   and	   thereby	   confirms	   soldiers	   belonging	   to	   ‘something	   more	   than	  
themselves’,	  as	  Johansen	  puts	  it,	  but	  also	  something	  that	  signals	  a	  differentiation	  
to	  a	  ‘constitutive	  outside’	  (Derrida	  1982),	  be	  this	  civilians	  or	  Afghan	  soldiers.	  	  This	  
differentiation	  and	  what	  it	  represents	  is	  what	  Elden	  refers	  to	  when	  he	  disciplines	  
his	  command	  about	  correct	  attire	  in	  the	  ‘theatre	  of	  war’	  (2012:	  71).	  	  
It	   is	  therefore	  not	  surprising	  that	  several	  of	  the	  memoirs	  equate	  Afghan	  soldier’s	  
lack	  of	  discipline	  with	  slack	  regulations	  on	  uniforms	  (Parnell	  2012,	  Tupper	  2010).	  
Strict	  regulations	  in	  terms	  of	  grooming	  and	  uniform	  wear	  symbolises	  not	  only	  the	  
transition	   from	   the	   civilian	   to	   the	  martial	   and	  military	   body,	   but	   also	   signals	   a	  
professionalism	  and	  belonging	   to	  a	  higher	  purpose	  of	  national	  unity.	  As	  chapter	  
six	  shows,	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  the	  ANA	  requires	  soldier	  bodies	  to	  be	  remade	  in	  order	  
to	  mirror	  the	  makings	  of	  a	  modern	  military,	  signalling	  not	  just	  the	  dawn	  of	  a	  new	  
security	   force	  to	  protect	   the	  population	  and	  the	  state	   from	  internal	  and	  external	  
threats,	  but	  also	  a	  transition	  of	  the	  entire	  ‘body	  politic’	  from	  the	  ‘traditional’	  to	  the	  
‘modern’,	  with	  the	  ANA	  as	  the	  vanguard	  of	  this	  transformation.	  	  
A	  related,	  but	  non-­‐martial	  bodily	  transition	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  unveiling	  of	  
Afghan	  women	  and	  the	  Kabul	  Beauty	  Academy,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  Here,	  
Afghan	  women’s	   liberation	   from	   the	   ‘traditional’	   and	   into	   the	   ‘modern’	  was	   not	  
only	   about	   securing	   a	   set	   of	   political	   and	   civil	   rights,	   but	   also	   about	   access	   to	  
particular	  kinds	  of	   corporeal	  beauty	   regimes.	  The	   transformation	  of	  Afghanistan	  
was	   also	   an	   aesthetic	   and	   visual	   process	  where	  Afghan	  women’s	   bodies	   became	  
sites	  to	  measure	  process	  since	  ‘beauty	  acts	  as	  a	  life-­‐affirming	  pathway	  to	  modern,	  
even	  liberated,	  personhood’	  (Nguyen	  2011:	  368).	  	  
However,	  when	  this	  type	  of	  disciplining	  occurs	  on	  women’s	  martial	  bodies	  it	  takes	  
particular	   gendered	   meanings	   as	   the	   management	   of	   women’s	   bodies	   in	   the	  
military	   also	   show	   (Enloe	   2000,	   Basham	   2012).	  While	   it	   is	   important	   that	   these	  
bodies	  become	  instilled	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  military	  masculinity	  (capable	  of	  performing	  
as	  ‘real	  soldiers’),	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  they	  maintain	  their	  femininity.	  AR	  670-­‐1	  details	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how	  make	   up	   must	   ‘compliment	   their	   uniform	   and	   complexion’,	   but	   not	   defer	  
from	  the	   ‘conservative	  military	  image’	  (USArmy	  2012:	  5).	  Likewise,	  practical	  tools	  
such	  as	   ‘hair	  holding	  devices’	   can	  be	  used,	  but	   they	  must	  not	  have	  a	   ‘decorative	  
purpose’	  (such	  as	   ‘lacy	  scrunchies’	  and	  ‘barrettes	  with	  butterflies’)	  (USArmy	  2012:	  
3-­‐4).	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  five,	  this	  curious	  production	  of	  women’s	  martial	  bodies	  
is	   driven	   by	   a	   duality	   –	   being	   able	   to	   perform	   as	   a	   man,	   but	   desirable	   to	   the	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   operations	   precisely	   because	   one	   is	   not.	   In	   other	   words,	  
women’s	  martial	  bodies	  need	   to	  be	  maintained	  as	   feminine,	  desirable	   to	  Afghan	  
men	  and	  aesthetically	  pleasing	  (make	  up	  must	  complement	  complexion),	  but	  not	  
too	   feminine,	   and	   surely	   not	   girly	   (laces	   and	   butterflies).	   This	   entails	   a	  
coproduction	   of	   masculinity	   and	   femininity	   on	   women’s	   martial	   bodies	   which	  
enables	   them	   to	   perform	   a	   kind	   of	   female	  masculinity,	   or	  masculine	   femininity	  
(Halberstam	  1998).	  	  
The	  practice	  of	  war	  and	  the	  specificities	  of	  women’s	  deployment	  in	  the	  field	  also	  
influence	   the	   making	   of	   women’s	   martial	   bodies.	   Chapter	   five	   analyses	   this	  
production	  of	  a	  complex	  female	  military	  masculinity	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  
FETs	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  their	  primary	  role	  as	  engaging	  with	  Afghan	  women.	  This	  
practice	   is	   underpinned	   by	   a	   significant	   change	   in	   how	   Afghan	   women	   are	  
conceptualised.	   Chapter	   three	   shows	   how	   Afghan	   women’s	   bodies	   became	  
important	   rallying	   grounds	   for	   the	   legitimation	   of	   the	   invasion	   through	   an	  
emphasis	   on	   the	   (in)visible	   ‘body	   in	   the	   burqa’.	   However,	   in	   the	   practice	   of	  
‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency,	  Afghan	  women	   take	   on	   a	  new	   role	   away	  
from	  their	  previous	  positioning	  as	  powerless,	  silent	  and	  passive	  victims	  in	  need	  of	  
rescue.	  While	   they	   in	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   still	   remain	  victims	  
and	   in	   need	   of	   empowerment,	   they	   are	   reconceptualised	   as	   influential,	  
knowledgeable	   and	   central	   players	   in	   their	   families	   and	   communities.	   In	   other	  
words,	  they	  become	  potential	  important	  crucial	  allies	  for	  the	  US	  military.	  	  
Through	   its	   emphasis	   on	   the	   plurality	   of	   bodies	   and	   their	   fluidity	   rather	   than	  
singularity	  in	  terms	  of	  performances	  of	  femininity	  and	  masculinity,	  this	  thesis	  has	  
aimed	  to	  push	  gendered	  analysis	  to	  embrace	  and	  analyse	  the	  plurality	  of	  gendered	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bodies	  and	  their	  performances	  in	  war.	  It	  emphasised	  how	  gendered	  bodies	  are	  not	  
superficial	  or	  arbitrary,	  but	  that	  their	  fluidity	  and	  plurality	  is	  a	  crucial	  enabler	  of	  
this	  type	  of	  late	  modern,	  neocolonial	  warfare.	  	  
As	   discussed	   above,	  De	   Certeau	   claims	   that	   laws	   are	  written	   on	   bodies	   and	   are	  
what	  bring	  bodies	  into	  being.	  However,	  bodies	  are	  not	  only	  disciplined	  and	  made	  
by	   laws,	   they	   are	   also	   clues	   that	   tell	   us	   what	   the	   laws	   are.	   The	   way	   bodies	   are	  
disciplined	   are	   ways	   of	   ‘making	   the	   body	   tell	   the	   code’	   (De	   Certeau	   1984:	   148	  
emphasis	   in	  original).	  So	  what	   is	   this	  code?	  What	   is	   it	   that	  gendered	  bodies	  and	  
gendered	  performance	  of	  war	  help	  us	  understand	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  war	  practiced	  
in	   Afghanistan?	   The	   code	   is	   the	   dynamic	   of	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’	   in	   ‘population-­‐
centric’	   counterinsurgency	   –	   this	   is	   what	   calls	   into	   being	   and	   necessitates	   the	  
complex	   multiplicity	   of	   gendered	   bodies	   and	   performances	   of	   femininity	   and	  
masculinity	  in	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  
	  
2.0	  Counterinsurgency	  as	  ‘Killing	  and	  Caring’	  
Throughout	   this	   thesis,	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   has	   been	  
understood	  as	  existing	  within	  a	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  It	  is	  at	  once	  a	  type	  
of	  warfare	   that	  exhibits	   traditional	  conceptions	  of	  war,	   involving	  soldier’s	  killing	  
for	  and	  dying	  for	  one’s	  country.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  type	  of	  warfare	  involves	  not	  
only	   ‘killing	   for’,	   but	   ‘caring	   for’	   one’s	   country	   through	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency’s	   aim	   to	   not	   only	   bring	   death,	   but	   also	   life	   to	   the	   people	   of	  
Afghanistan.	  This	  dynamic	  cannot	  be	  fully	  understood	  without	  paying	  attention	  to	  
its	   gendered	   dimensions.	   In	   other	   words,	   this	   complicated,	  messy	   and	  multiple	  
conception	   of	   warfare	   requires	   equally	   complicated	   productions	   of	   various	  
gendered	  bodies.	  	  
The	   March/April	   edition	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   featured	   an	   interview	   with	   General	  
Stanley	  McChrystal	   entitled	   ‘Generation	  Kill’.	  Here	   the	  General	   spoke	   about	   his	  
recent	  book,	  his	  views	  on	  US	  foreign	  policy	  and	  military	  strategy,	  the	  differences	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between	  the	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  wars	  and	  his	  experiences	  as	  ISAF	  Commander	  
in	  Afghanistan	   from	  2009-­‐2010.	  Towards	   the	  end	  of	   the	   interview,	  McChrystal	   is	  
quoted	   in	   saying	   something	   that	   speaks	   directly	   to	   this	   dynamic	   and	   how	   it	   is	  
gendered.	  He	   is	   asked	  how	  he	   responds	   if	   someone	   says	   that	   they	   like	   ‘the	   Iraq	  
Stan	  McChrystal	   of	   raids	   and	   drones	   and	   targeted	   strikes’	   (killing)	   but	   not	   the	  
‘Afghanistan	  Stan	  McChrystal	  of	  clear,	  hold	  and	  build	  counterinsurgency’	  (caring).	  
He	  replies	  -­‐	  	  
‘I	  would	  argue	  that	  they	  should	  like	  all	  the	  Stan	  McChrystals.	  If	  you	  look	  at	  the	  role	  I	  had	  in	  Iraq,	  it	  
is	  sexy,	  it	  is	  satisfying,	  it	  is	  manly,	  it	  scratches	  an	  itch	  in	  the	  American	  culture	  that	  people	  like.	  But	  I	  
was	  doing	  that	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  effort	  in	  Iraq,	  and	  it	  was	  that	  wider	  effort	  that	  I	  took	  control	  of	  in	  
Afghanistan.	  And	  those	  wider	  efforts	  were	  about	  people.	  The	  whole	  point	  of	  the	  war	  is	  to	  take	  care	  
of	  people,	  not	  just	  to	  kill	  them.	  You	  have	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  reason	  that	  protects	  people,	  or	  it’s	  wrong.	  
So	  while	   I	  did	  what	   I	  had	  do	   in	   Iraq,	  and	  did	  a	   lot	  of	   that	   in	  Afghanistan	  too	  (because	  we	  had	  a	  
significant	  effort	  along	  those	  lines	  there),	  the	  broader	  purpose	  is	  what’s	  important,	  and	  that’s	  what	  
I	  think	  people	  need	  to	  be	  reminded	  of.	  The	  purpose	   is	   the	  Afghan	  kid.	  The	  purpose	   is	   the	  Afghan	  
female.	  The	  purpose	   is	   the	   50-­‐year-­‐old	   farmer	  who	   just	  wants	   to	   farm’	   (McChrystal	  2013	  emphasis	  
added	  ).	  	  
McChrystal	   identifies	   here	   ‘raids,	   drones	   and	   targeted	   strikes’	   –	   the	   kinetic	  
element,	   the	   ‘warrior	   masculinity’	   –	   as	   ‘sexy’,	   ‘satisfying’	   and	   ‘manly’	   –	   three	  
obviously	  gendered	  terms.	  This	  is	  also	  what	  people	  like	  to	  see,	  it	  ‘scratches	  an	  itch’	  
in	  the	  American	  culture	  and	  displays	  war	  as	  ‘we’	  like	  to	  see	  it	  –	  violent,	  precise	  and	  
brutal	  ‘out	  there’	  –	  this	  is	  what	  is	  ‘satisfying’	  about	  war.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  people	  
‘need	  to	  be	  reminded’	  that	  this	  is	  not	  what	  is	  important	  as	  ‘the	  whole	  point	  of	  the	  
war	   is	   to	   take	   care	   of	   people’,	   particularly	   children,	   women	   and	   elderly	  men104.	  
Counterinsurgency	   in	   the	  way	   that	  McChrystal	   describes	   it	   produces	   alternative	  
versions	  of	  military	  masculinity	  associated	  with	  caring	   for	   ‘children	  and	   females’	  
that	   can	   co-­‐exist	   alongside	   the	   more	   kinetic	   elements.	   These	   may	   be	   less	  
‘satisfactory’,	   ‘sexy’	  and	   ‘manly’,	  but	   they	  are	  nevertheless	  what	   the	  war	   is	  about.	  
The	  ‘Afghan	  female’	  is	  the	  target,	  she	  is	  the	  symbolic	  intent	  of	  this	  war	  and	  people	  
need	  to	  be	  reminded	  of	  this	  and	  marshal	  around	  it.	  	  
                                                
104	  Given	  that	  the	  average	  life	  expectancy	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  48	  years	  (WB	  2013),	  a	  50	  year	  old	  can	  
accurately	  be	  described	  as	  elderly.	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McChrystal’s	   reflections	  around	  how	  the	  domestic	  public	   in	   the	  US	  valorises	   the	  
‘raids,	  drones	  and	  targeted	  strikes’	  above	  the	  kind	  of	  counterinsurgency	  practiced	  
in	  Afghanistan	  is	  interesting	  when	  contrasted	  to	  the	  Norwegian	  case,	  which	  is	  why	  
analysing	   the	   two	  alongside	   each	  other	   is	   illuminating.	  As	  discussed	   in	   chapters	  
two	   and	   four	   with	   the	   Alfa	   example,	   Norwegian	   soldiers	   performing	   ‘warrior	  
masculinity’	   and	   apparently	   enjoying	   killing,	   attracted	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   criticism	  
from	  both	  politicians	  the	  broader	  public,	  and	  internally	  within	  the	  military.	  This	  
speaks	  perhaps	  to	  a	  difference	  not	  only	  in	  military	  culture,	  but	  also	  what	  role	  the	  
military	   forces	   are	   supposed	   to	   play	   in	   Norwegian	   public	   discourses.	   The	  
Norwegian	  public	  seem	  to	  prefer	  to	  think	  of	  their	  soldiers	  as	  peacekeepers	  rather	  
than	  killers,	  at	  the	  service	  of	  a	  nation	  with	  humanitarian	  aims.	  	  
Moira	   Gatens	   argues	   that	   bodies	   should	   be	   viewed	   as	   ‘determinant	   in	   the	  
organization	   of	   culture,	   we	   can	   view	   them	   as	   products	   of	   the	   way	   that	   culture	  
organizes,	   regulates	   and	   remakes	   itself’	   (1996:	   52).	   This	   analysis	   shows	   how	  
militaries	   are	   reinventing,	   reorganising	   and	   restructuring	   in	   order	   to	   fight	  
insurgencies	  in	  late	  modern	  warfare,	  and	  how	  the	  practice	  of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	  precisely	  requires	  bodies	  to	  be	  rearranged	  for	  its	  own	  purpose.	  
While	  these	  bodies	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  work	  they	  perform	  may	  be	  ‘unmilitary’,	  in	  the	  
words	  of	  Kilcullen	  –	  get	  over	   it’	   (2006b:	   135).	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  multiplicity	  of	  
gendered	  and	  martial	  bodies	   that	  are	  called	   into	  being	  during	   the	  course	  of	   this	  
war	  shows	  how	  military	  culture	  is	  remaking	  itself.	  	  	  
Seeing	  the	  production	  of	  multiple	  gendered	  and	  martial	  bodies	  in	  the	  military	  as	  
not	  just	  necessitated	  by	  particular	  forms	  of	  warfare	  or	  ‘operational	  environments’,	  
but	   as	   a	   part	   of	   the	   remaking	   of	   military	   culture	   in	   this	   way	   is	   particularly	  
interesting	  when	   the	  US	   is	   studied	   alongside	  Norway.	   As	   argued	   in	   the	   thesis’s	  
introduction,	  military	  culture	  and	  domestic	  politics	  influences	  the	  way	  that	  war	  is	  
practiced	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	  gendered	  forms	  it	  takes.	  What	  has	  been	  shown	  here	  is	  
that	  when	   counterinsurgency	   and	   the	   practices	   of	   late	  modern	  warfare	   are	   read	  
through	  the	  dynamic	  of	   ‘killing	  and	  caring’,	   it	   takes	  the	  US	  and	  Norway	  in	  some	  
interesting	   and	   perhaps	   unexpected	   directions.	   While	   Norway	   has	   a	   history	   of	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combining	  peacekeeping	  with	  development	  work	  and	   is	   therefore	  prolific	   in	   the	  
‘caring’	  part	  of	  counterinsurgency,	  this	  has	  not	  been	  the	  main	  endeavour	  of	  the	  US	  
military	  who	   have	   historically	   been	   associated	  with	   the	   ‘killing’.	  However,	   what	  
has	  happened	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years	  is	  an	  increased	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘caring’	  aspects	  of	  
warfare	   in	   the	  US	  military	  by	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   like	  Patraeus,	  Nagl,	  Kilcullen	  and	  
McChrystal,	  made	  perhaps	  particularly	  visible	  in	  the	  deployment	  of	  FETs.	  And,	  as	  
shown	   in	   chapter	   four	   and	   noted	   above,	   Norwegian	   soldiers	   are	   not	   altogether	  
comfortable	   with	   being	   seen	   as	   soldiers	   only	   capable	   of	   or	   associated	   with	   the	  
‘caring’	  part	  of	   counterinsurgency,	   and	   this,	  paired	  with	   the	   restructuring	  of	   the	  
Norwegian	   military	   away	   from	   ‘territorial	   defence’	   and	   ‘low	   intensity’	  
peacekeeping	  deployments,	  to	  make	  it	  a	  more	  ‘competent	  and	  capable’	  partner	  in	  
NATO	  (Forsvarsdepartementet/MoD	  2003-­‐2004,	  Haaland	  2010),	   shows	  a	  military	  
that	   is	   seeking	   to	  expand	   its	   traditional	  peacekeeping	  remit.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  
dynamic	  between	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  works	  not	  only	  within	  a	  particular	  ‘theatre	  of	  
war’,	   within	   a	   company,	   or	  within	   a	  military,	   but	   also	   between	   these	   two	   cases.	  
Studying	   these	   two	   very	  different	  NATO	   forces	   alongside	   each	  other	   in	   the	  way	  
this	   thesis	   has	   done,	   shows	   therefore	   how	   these	   militaries	   are	   remaking	  
themselves	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  order	  to	  navigate	  the	  gendered	  dynamic	  of	  ‘killing	  
and	  caring’	  and	  using	  the	  gendering	  of	  bodies	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  
This	  dynamic	  does	  not	  operate	  strictly	  as	  a	  binary.	  At	  various	  times	  through	  the	  
course	  of	   this	   thesis	   it	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	   that	   it	   can	   function	  as	   a	   tension,	   a	  
balancing	  act,	  as	  complimentary	  and	  as	  the	  one	  working	  through	  the	  other.	  Said	  
differently,	   ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  are	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  To	  fully	  grasp	  this	  
dynamic	   between	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’	   this	   thesis	   argues	   that	   one	   has	   to	   firstly	  
recognise	   how	   the	   practice	   of	   it	   is	   profoundly	   gendered	   and,	   secondly,	   that	   it	  
reveals	   counterinsurgency’s	   biopolitical	   intent	   and	   how	   it	   operates	   both	   in	   the	  
‘registry	  of	  death’	  and	  the	  ‘registry	  of	  life’.	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  four	  and	  five,	  this	  dynamic	  is	  profoundly	  gendered	  in	  two	  
ways.	   Firstly,	   it	   relies	   on	   alternative	   productions	   of	   military	   masculinity.	   As	  
chapter	   four	   showed,	   there	   are	   multiple	   military	   masculinities	   associated	   with	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counterinsurgency	  that	  operate	  together	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  While	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  
counterinsurgency	   is	   ‘armed	   social	   work’	   (Kilcullen	   2006b:	   138,	   USArmy	   et	   al.	  
2007:	  299),	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  counterinsurgency	  also	  requires	  killing.	  There	  is	  
therefore	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   performances	   of	   military	   masculinity	   at	   play	   in	  
counterinsurgency	   at	   any	   given	   time,	   where	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   emphasise	   the	  
protective	   and	   developmental	   (Duffield	   2007)	   qualities	   of	   counterinsurgency,	  
whereas	  ‘warriors’	  find	  this	  threatening	  and	  wish	  to	  emphasise	  the	  ‘killing’.	  	  
Secondly,	   this	   type	   of	   counterinsurgency,	   as	   shown	   in	   chapter	   five,	   involves	   a	  
gendered	   division	   of	   labour.	   FETs	   do	   not	   have	   access	   to	   the	   ‘killing’	   side	   of	  
counterinsurgency	   but	   operate	   primarily	   as	   ‘carers’.	   They	   perform	   a	   feminine	  
labour	  of	   care	   for	   counterinsurgency,	   something	   that	   requires	   them	   to	  be	  called	  
into	  being	  as	  unthreatening	  martial	  bodies	  productive	  of	  improved	  social	  relations.	  
As	  the	  Commander’s	  Guide	  to	  FETs	  tells	  us,	  their	  purpose	  is	  to	  ‘build	  support	  and	  
confidence	  of	  the	  Afghan	  population	  on	  issues	  of	  security,	  health	  care,	  education,	  
justice	   and	   economic	   opportunity	   to	   enable	   their	   families	   to	   live	   in	   a	   safe	   and	  
secure	   environment’	   (CALL	   2011:	   9).	   Counterinsurgency	   therefore	   reinforces	  
familiar	   notions	   of	   women’s	   bodies	   as	   primarily	   sites	   for	   reproduction	   and	   of	  
women	   as	   nurturers	   and	   carers	   –	   providers	   of	   life,	   rather	   than	   takers	   of	   it.	   As	  
Simone	  de	  Beauvoir	  puts	  it	  ‘For	  it	  is	  not	  in	  giving	  life	  but	  in	  risking	  life	  that	  man	  is	  
raised	  above	   the	  animal;	   that	   is	  why	   superiority	  has	  been	  accorded	   in	  humanity	  
not	  to	  the	  sex	  that	  brings	  forth	  life	  but	  to	  that	  which	  kills’	  (de	  Beauvoir	  1972:	  95-­‐
96).	  
This	   type	   of	   counterinsurgency	   therefore	   involves	   not	   only	   disciplinary	   power	  
working	   productively	   on	   soldiers’	   bodies,	   but	   also	   biopolitical	   power	   working	  
productively	  on	  the	  Afghan	  population.	  While	  individual	  bodies	  are	  disciplined,	  as	  
discussed	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  with	  reference	  to	  political	  and	  military	  discourses	  
of	   bodies,	   biopolitics	   takes	   whole	   populations	   as	   its	   cause.	   As	   Foucault	   argues	  
‘after	  a	  first	  seizure	  of	  power	  over	  the	  body	  in	  an	  individualizing	  mode,	  we	  have	  a	  
second	   seizure	   of	   power	   that	   is	   not	   individualizing,	   but,	   if	   out	   like,	  massifying,	  
that	   is	   directed	   not	   at	   man-­‐as-­‐body	   but	   as	   man-­‐as-­‐species’	   (1997:	   243).	   The	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population	  therefore,	   in	  biopolitical	  governmentality,	  as	   in	  counterinsurgency,	   is	  
‘a	  political	  problem’	  (Foucault	  1997:	  245).	  What	  biopolitics	  involves	  therefore	  is	  a	  
transition	   from	   the	   ‘register	   of	   death’	   to	   the	   ‘register	   of	   life’	   as	   ‘power	   is	  
decreasingly	   the	   power	   of	   the	   right	   to	   take	   life,	   and	   increasingly	   the	   right	   to	  
intervene	   to	   make	   live	   (Foucault	   1997:	   248).	   ‘Population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency	   is	   situated	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   this	   transition,	   at	   once	   sovereign	  
over	  death,	  but	  also	  over	  life.	  	  
Therefore,	   the	   dynamic	   of	   ‘killing	   and	   caring’	   encompasses	   two	   complimentary	  
performances	  of	  sovereignty.	  It	  is	  no	  longer	  enough	  for	  war	  to	  claim	  soldiers	  to	  die	  
for	  their	  country,	  but	  they	  also	  need	  to	  care	   for	   it	   (Weber	  2008a:	   126).	  However,	  
the	  way	  that	  counterinsurgency	  exerts	  biopolitical	  power	  over	  populations,	  needs	  
to	  be	  understood	  as	  gendered.	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  five,	  FETs	  are	  the	  ones	  most	  
closely	  associated	  with	  the	   ‘caring’	  of	  counterinsurgency	  and	   in	  performing	  their	  
feminine	   labour	   of	   care	   for	   the	   people	   of	   Afghanistan,	   they	   are	   doing	   the	  
biopolitical	  work	  of	  the	  state.	  According	  to	  counterinsurgency	  doctrine,	   ‘winning	  
hearts	   and	  minds’	   is	   crucial	   to	   its	   success	  because	   ‘the	  civilian	  population	   is	   the	  
centre	  of	  gravity	  –	  the	  deciding	  factor	   in	  the	  struggle’	  (USArmy	  et	  al.	  2007:	  xxv).	  
Therefore,	   precisely	   by	   conducting	   this	   biopolitical	   work	   through	   their	  
engagement	  with	  the	  Afghan	  population,	  they	  are	  not	  only	  ‘caring’	  for	  them,	  but,	  
more	  importantly,	  they	  are	  ‘caring’	  for	  their	  country.	  	  
A	   central	   enabler	   of	   biopolitical	   power	   is	   knowledge	   about	   the	   population	   and	  
chapters	   four	   and	   six	   discuss	   how	   this	   often	   reiterates	   familiar	   colonial	   and	  
orientalist	  tropes.	  	  The	  turn	  to	  culture,	  and	  particularly	  the	  role	  that	  FETs	  play	  in	  
this,	   signifies	   a	   commitment	   to	   how	   this	   warfare	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   intimate	  
spheres	  of	  life,	  between	  wife	  and	  husband,	  mother	  and	  child,	  and	  sexual	  partners.	  
As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  five,	  one	  of	  the	  justifications	  for	  an	  increased	  deployment	  of	  
female	   counterinsurgents	   in	   Afghanistan	   is	   with	   reference	   to	   culture	   (see	   for	  
instance	  NATO	  2010a,	  Stence	  2011).	  	  
The	   emphasis	   that	   ‘soldier-­‐scholars’	   place	   on	   understanding	   the	   ‘culture’	   of	   the	  
population	  is	  shown	  chapter	  six	  to	  be	  an	  invocation	  of	  familiar	  colonial	  objectives.	  
 205	  
Invariably	   this	   means	   that	   it	   produces	   particular	   types	   of	   knowledge	   through	  
‘ordering	  social	  reality	  in	  order	  to	  define,	  to	  judge	  or	  to	  understand’	  (Jenkins	  2005:	  
4).	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  knowledge	  production	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  
knowledge	   about	   the	  Afghan	  population’s	   culture,	   habits	   and	   social	   practices	   in	  
order	  to	  better	  influence	  and	  fight	  them,	  should	  not	  simply	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  
adjustment	  to	  a	  difficult	   ‘operational	  environment’	  as	  McFate	  argues	  (2010).	  This	  
is	  knowledge	  production	  about	  the	  Other	  with	  the	  declared	  aim	  to	  ‘win	  hearts	  and	  
minds’	   and	   transform	   societies,	   it	   is	   a	   means	   to	   better	   govern	   populations	  
biopolitically.	  Kienscherf	  argues	  that	  the	  emphasis	  on	  gaining	  cultural	  knowledge	  
about	   populations	   in	   counterinsurgency	   entails	   a	   reformulation	   of	   Foucault’s	  
claim	  that	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  biopolitical	  warfare	  is	  its	  racialized	  element.	  	  	  	  
‘Liberal	  governance	  can	  no	  longer	  triage	  between	  ‘safe’	  and	  ‘dangerous’	  species-­‐life	  on	  purely	  racial	  
grounds.	   Yet,	   the	   notion	   of	   culture,	   even	   if	   it	   remains	   implicitly	   racialized	   is	   not	   nearly	   as	  
politically	  suspect	  as	  the	  category	  of	  race’	  (Kienscherf	  2011:	  527)	  
This,	   of	   course,	   enables	   a	   kind	   of	   strategic	   ‘cop-­‐out’.	   If	   the	   liberal	   project	   in	  
Afghanistan	  fails,	  this	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  lack	  of	  forces,	  funding	  or	  
expertise,	   it	   can	   fail	   because	   of	   the	   remnants	   of	   a	   ‘culture’	   that	   is	   resistant	   to	  
biopolitical	  interventions.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  culture	  allows	  a	  logic	  whereby	  one	  can	  
show	  that	  one	  has	  tried	  to	  improve	  conditions	  for	  security,	  democracy	  or	  women’s	  
rights,	  but	  they	  are,	  after	  all	  that	  trouble,	  perpetually	  stuck	  in	  their	  culture.	  There	  
is	  simply	  too	  much	  culture	  to	  be	  had.	  
As	   a	   whole	   therefore,	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	  
exemplifies	  Foucault’s	  claim	  that	  war	  is	  fought	  ‘on	  the	  terrain	  of	  the	  human	  body’	  
(Reid	   2006:	   130).	   Herein,	   the	   terrain	   of	   the	   human	   body	   can	   be	   understood	  
individually,	  as	  disciplinary	  power,	  or	  in	  the	  extended	  and	  reversed	  as	  the	  human	  
terrain,	  collectively	  and	  biopolitically.	  The	  population	  is	  the	  battlefield	  in	  this	  type	  
of	  warfare	  and	  ‘the	  whole	  point	  of	  the	  war	  is	  to	  take	  care	  of	  people,	  not	  just	  to	  kill	  
them’	   (McChrystal	   2013).	   This	   in	   turn	   produces	   and	   relies	   on	   a	   multiplicity	   of	  
complex,	  fluid	  and	  at	  times,	  contradictory	  gendered	  bodies	  and	  performances	  and	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these	   bodies	   illuminate	   the	   ‘code’	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   as	  
encompassing	  a	  dualism	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’.	  
	  
3.0	  Towards	  a	  Feminist	  Reading	  of	  Late	  Modern	  Warfare	  	  
As	   shown	   in	   this	   conclusion	   and	   throughout	   this	   thesis,	   the	   ‘theatre	   of	   war’	  
contains	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   gendered	   performances.	   There	   are	   cracks	   in	   the	  
singularity	   of	   military	   masculinity	   and	   men	   and	   women’s	   roles	   in	   war	   are	  
increasingly	   more	   complex	   than	   the	   ‘beautiful	   souls/just	   warrior’	   dichotomy	  
suggests	  (Elshtain	  1987).	  Military	  masculinities	  are	  here	  shown	  to	  be	  in	  tension,	  
something	  that	   is	  enabled	   in	  how	  the	   invasion,	  counterinsurgency	  and	  the	   ‘Exit	  
Strategy’	  calls	  into	  being	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  ‘killing	  and	  caring’	  practices.	  In	  this,	  it	  
is	  possible	   to	  read	  an	  optimistic	  story	   in	   terms	  of	  how	  these	   ‘cracks’	   in	  military	  
masculinity	   may	   open	   up	   for	   progressive	   possibilities.	   However,	   there	   is	   a	  
cautionary	  tale	  to	  be	  told	  here	  about	  how	  this	  multiplicity	  also	  reiterates	  a	  series	  
of	  stereotypical	  gendered	  and	  racialized	  tropes	  and	  ‘shows	  not	  only	  the	  flexibility	  
of	   the	  machinery	   of	   rule,	   but	   also	   the	   dynamic	   recreation	   of	   power	  hierarchies	  
throughout’	  (Khalili	  2010a:	  21).	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  glazed	  with	  a	  feminist	  
veneer	  since	  its	  outset.	  This	  co-­‐optation	  of	  feminist	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’,	  
and	  feminism’s	  own	  role	  within	  it	  has	  since	  proven	  to	  be	  divisive	  in	  the	  feminist	  
movement	  and	  one	  of	  the	  battles	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  more	  widely	  has	  been	  over	  
the	  meaning	  and	  ownership	  of	  women’s	  rights	  (Bhattacharyya	  2008).	  While	  many	  
feminists	  have	  been	  critical	  of	   the	  employment	  of	   	   ‘feminist	   like’	   rhetoric	   at	   the	  
start	  of	  the	  war,	  others	  have	  lamented	  the	  decreasing	  focus	  on	  Afghan	  women	  in	  
later	  years,	  since	  at	  least	  the	  original	  focus	  meant	  an	  opening	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  
women	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   everything	   else.	   However,	   this	   thesis	   remains	   deeply	  
sceptical	   about	   instrumentalist	   concerns	   for	   women	   and	   how	   the	   protection	   of	  
women’s	  rights	  or	  for	  women’s	  liberation	  became	  a	  pretext	  the	  concept	  for	  waging	  
war	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  as	   ‘it	   is	  precisely	  in	  this	  realm	  of	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escalated	   rhetoric	   and	   assured	   contrasts	   that	   women	   are	   more	   absent	   than	  
ever…women	  are	  invoked,	  but	  are	  not	  present’	  (Franks	  2003:	  137).	  Furthermore,	  it	  
bore	  the	  neocolonial	  promise	  of	  ‘White	  men	  are	  saving	  brown	  women	  from	  brown	  
men’	  (Spivak	  1999:	  303).	  
Much	   of	   this	   neocolonialism	   is	   repeated	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   war.	  
Counterinsurgency’s	   21st	   century	   edition	   of	   	   ‘population-­‐centric’	  
counterinsurgency,	   however,	   entails	   considerably	   more	   emphasis	   on	   ‘winning	  
hearts	  and	  minds’	  through	  social	  and	  economic	  incentives	  for	  the	  population.	  As	  
argued	  in	  chapter	  four,	  this	  is	  aided	  partly	  by	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  military	  masculinity,	  
‘particularly	   well-­‐suited	   to	   the	   liberal	   interventionist	   model’	   (Khalili	   2010a:	   17),	  
namely	   the	   ‘soldier-­‐scholar’.	   This	   kind	   of	   military	   masculinity	   embodies	   a	  
combination	   of	   willingness	   to	   violence	   with	   a	   self-­‐declared	   concern	   for	   the	  
population.	   While	   this	   vanguard	   of	   ‘population-­‐centric’	   counterinsurgency	   are	  
mainly	  US	  based,	  politicians,	  particularly	  in	  Norway,	  argued	  that	  the	  invasion	  was	  
a	  ‘humanitarian	  intervention’	  (Stortinget	  2001a),	  thus	  invoking	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘muscular	  
humanitarianism’	   (Orford	   1999).	   The	   combination	   of	   violence	   and	   compassion	  
that	  this	  discourse	  requires	  speaks	  not	  only	  to	  the	  political	  problematic	  concept	  of	  
‘humanitarian	  intervention’,	  what	  Sylvester	  calls	  ‘kill-­‐to-­‐be-­‐kind’	  (2012),	  but	  also	  to	  
the	  complexities	  of	  gender	  performances	  in	  war.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  is	  here	  a	  
reiteration	   of	   familiar	  military	  masculine	   tropes	   of	   violence	   and	   aggression,	   but	  
this	   is	   tempered	   with,	   at	   times,	   uncomfortable	   and	   contested	   claims	   to	  
compassion	  and	   liberation,	   something	   that	  produces	   an	   alternative	  performance	  
of	  masculinity	  in	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  military.	  	  
While	   this	  on	  the	  surface	  can	  be	   interpreted	  as	   less	  problematic	   from	  a	   feminist	  
perspective,	   ‘protective	   masculinity’	   creates	   its	   own	   oppressive	   mechanism	   as	  
‘ostensibly	   progressive	   masculinities	   can	   have	   a	   deeply	   regressive	   effect’	  
(Duncanson	   2013:	   12).	   Fundamentally,	   it	   still	   relies	   on	   ‘good	   men’	   saving	   ‘good	  
women’	   from	   ‘bad	   men’.	   It	   is	   therefore	   worth	   pausing	   to	   consider	   what	   these	  
changes	  mean	  for	  feminist	  scholarship	  on	  war,	  security	  and	  IR	  more	  broadly.	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Feminists	   have	   historically	   been	  more	   comfortable	   studying	   peace	   rather	   than	  
war,	   although	  war	   is	   ‘just	   as	  much	   ours	   to	   investigate	   as	   anything	   that	   affects	  
embodied	  women	  and	  “women”	  and	  “men”	  as	  subject	  statuses’	  (Sylvester	  2013:	  6-­‐
7).	  Feminists	  who	  work	  on	  the	  military	  and	  war	  (and	  other	  overtly	  militarised	  and	  
patriarchal	  spaces)	  are	  often	  faced	  with	  several	  challenges.	  Cynthia	  Enloe	  argues	  
that	   doing	   feminist	   research	   on	   these	   spaces	   requires	   a	   cultivation	   of	   a	  
‘heightened	  consciousness	  of	  how	  one’s	  own	  compassion	  and	  imagination,	  one’s	  
own	  sense	  of	  a	   “good”	  story,	  one’s	  own	  sense	  of	   “seriousness”	  each	  can	  become	  
militarised	   in	   the	   process’	   (2007:	   83).	   Said	   differently,	   one	   is	   a	   part	   of	   the	  
production	   of	   knowledge	   as	   a	   scholar,	   something	   that	   leaves	   oneself	   and	   one’s	  
research	  open	  to	  numerous	   interpretations,	  co-­‐optations	  and	  manipulations.	  As	  
Christine	  Sylvester	  points	  out,	  	  ‘no	  one	  can	  claim	  to	  be	  outside	  of	  the	  institution	  
of	  war,	  although	  anyone	  can	  hold	  normative	  positions	  against	  it’	  (2013:	  7).	  
Anne	  Orford	  shares	  a	  story	  that	  illustrates	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  feminists	  face.	  
She	  attended	  a	  workshop	  about	  gender	  and	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  with	  
numerous	  high-­‐ranking	  military	  officials	  from	  across	  the	  globe.	  In	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
two-­‐day	   seminar,	   a	   senior	   military	   lawyer	   had	   shed	   his	   scepticism	   of	   the	  
importance	  of	  gender	   in	  war	  and	  became	  convinced	  that	  gender	  matters.	  So	  far	  
so	  good.	  Then	  he	  claimed	  something	  that	  by	  now	  should	  sound	  familiar	  -­‐	  gender	  
matters	  because	  ‘they	  are	  intelligence	  issues!	  Gender	  is	  a	  force	  multiplier	  –	  if	  you	  
understand	  how	  gender	  works	  in	  a	  particular	  society,	  you	  can	  control	  that	  society	  
much	   more	   effectively!’	   (Orford	   2012:	   8).	   Reflecting	   on	   this	   Orford	   presents	   a	  
critique	  against	  this	  ‘uptake’	  of	  gender	  and	  also	  perhaps	  a	  warning,	  	  
‘to	  become	  an	  object	  of	   knowledge	   is	   to	  become	  a	  potential	   target.	   So,	   to	   introduce	  gender,	   or	  
bodies,	   or	   human	   suffering,	   into	   the	   system	   for	   producing	   knowledge	   about	  war	   automatically	  
means	   that	   knowledge	   about	   gender,	   or	   bodies,	   or	   human	   suffering,	   becomes	   a	   part	   of	   the	  
targeting	  machine’	  (Orford	  2012:	  8).	  	  
This	  thesis	  has	  tried	  to	  be	  critical	  of	  the	  way	  that	  gender	  and	  women	  become	  a	  
‘target’	   of	   knowledge	   by	   power.	  While	   producing	   knowledge	   about	   gender	   and	  
targeting	   women	   in	   war	   might	   open	   up	   a	   possibility	   for	   change,	   and	   might	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arguably	   be	   ‘better	   than	   nothing’,	   viewing	   the	   increased	   incorporation	   and	  
remaking	  of	  women’s	  bodies	  in	  war	  as	  a	  ‘progressive	  step’	  should	  be	  approached	  
with	   caution.	   As	   Carol	   Cohn	   notes	   with	   regards	   to	   UNSCR	   1325,	   ‘protecting	  
women	   in	  war,	  and	   insisting	   that	   they	  have	  an	  equal	   right	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  
processes	  and	  negotiations	  that	  end	  particular	  wars,	  both	  leave	  war	  itself	  in	  place’	  
(Cohn	   2008:	   198).	   While	   gender	   and	   women	   therefore	   seem	   to	   be	   ‘targeted’	  
increasingly	   in	  both	   justifications	   for	   invasions	  and	   in	   the	  practice	  of	  war	  as	  an	  
‘issue	   area’	   to	   be	   factored	   in	  by	  military	   elites,	   as	   a	   feminist,	   it	   is	  worth	   asking	  
with	  Wendy	  Brown	  –	  ‘is	  this	  the	  most	  we	  can	  hope	  for?	  ‘	  (2004).	  I	  hope	  not.	  	  
This	  study	  has	  tried	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  growing	  body	  of	  literature	  from	  feminist	  
and	   critical	   voices	   on	   late	   modern	   warfare	   in	   three	   interconnected	   ways.	   It	  
contributes	   to	   IR	   and	   political	   theory	   through	   its	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	  
emphasis	   on	   gendered	   bodies	   as	   key	   actors	   in	   international	   politics	   and	  
methodologically	   through	   its	  use	  of	  soldier	  memoirs	  as	  embodied	  testimonies	  of	  
war.	  It	  furthers	  feminist	  studies	  of	  war	  and	  feminist	  theory	  through	  its	  application	  
of	  performative	  gender	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  war.	  Herein	  it	  shows	  how	  war	  calls	  into	  
being	   a	   range	   of	   gendered	   bodies	   that	   perform	   fluid	   and	   multiple	   notions	   of	  
femininity	   and	   masculinity	   and	   shows	   how	   these	   enable	   the	   practice	   of	   late	  
modern	  warfare	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘population-­‐centric’	  counterinsurgency.	  	  Thirdly,	  it	  
contributes	   to	   existing	   literature	   on	   counterinsurgency	   from	   postcolonial	   and	  
biopolitical	  approaches	  by	  showing	  how	  gender	  performances	  are	  important	  parts	  
of	  the	  realisation	  of	  this	  neocolonial	  and	  biopolitical	  endeavour.	  	  
Finally,	  I	  would	  like	  here	  to	  point	  to	  future	  directions	  and	  possibilities	  for	  research.	  
Many	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  war	  on	  Afghanistan	  and	  
the	   theoretical	   and	   conceptual	   framework	   of	   gender	   performances	   in	   war	   as	  
outlined	   here	   could	   be	   applied	   to	   other	   wars	   as	   well.	   Similarly,	   this	   work	   has	  
potentially	   opened	   up	   possibilities	   to	   explore	   not	   just	   contemporary	   but	   also	  
historical	  examples	  of	  counterinsurgency.	  Furthermore,	  if,	  to	  paraphrase	  Leonard	  
Cohen,	   the	   ‘cracks’	   in	   particular	   kinds	   of	   gender	   productions	   are	   to	   let	   in	   some	  
light,	   these	   ‘cracks’	   should	   be	   studied	   as	   sites	   of	   resistance.	  While	   this	   has	   not	  
 210	  
been	  a	  central	  part	  of	  this	  study,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  point	  this	  out	  a	  key	  area	  for	  future	  
research.	  How	  do	  gendered	  bodies	  resist	  their	  remaking	  in	  militaries	  and	  in	  war?	  
If,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  De	  Certeau,	  ‘it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  grid	  of	  “discipline”	  is	  everywhere	  
becoming	  clearer	  and	  more	  extensive,	  it	  is	  all	  the	  more	  urgent	  to	  discover	  how	  an	  
entire	   society	   resists	   being	   reduced	   to	   it’	   (1984:	   xiv).	   It	   can	  only	  be	   through	   the	  
resistance	  of	  gendered	  bodies,	   to	  particular	  ways	  of	  gendering,	  and	   to	  particular	  
practices	   of	   war,	   both	   within	   and	   outside	   of	   the	   military,	   both	   in	   targeted	  
geographic	   locations	   were	   wars	   are	   fought	   and	   in	   the	   ‘metropole’	   that	   the	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